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THE OTHER AMERICAN WAY OF WAR: UNLIMITED AND IRREGULAR
WARFARE IN THE COLONIAL MILITARY TRADITION

by

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The Other American Way of War: Unlimited and Irregular Warfare in the
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Thesis directed by Associate Professor Fred W. Anderson

This dissertation examines the evolution of an Anglo-American pattern of unlimited-irregular war over the colonial and revolutionary periods. War against noncombatants emerged as a central part of American warcraft in the seventeenth century. Starting with the first settlers' wars against the Indians, first Englishmen, then Anglo-Americans, and finally Americans built a tradition of unlimited war that focused on the destruction of enemy populations. Over the course of the colonial period Anglo-Americans found that waging what contemporaries called *petite guerre* (little war), or what today we call irregular war, offered an effective tool with which to conduct unlimited wars.

By the end of the 1720s Anglo-Americans had created a definable way of war built on unlimited and irregular war directed against cultural "others" -- Indians, Spanish, and French Canadians. In the wars of the middle of the eighteenth century -- the Wars of King George and the Seven Years' War -- Anglo-Americans refined their tradition of unlimited-irregular war and saw it gain acceptance within a British military culture that previously had disparaged such methods. The American War for Independence saw the continuation of earlier Anglo-American patterns of unlimited-irregular war as well as an expansion in its scope that would prove to be a watershed in the development of American military culture. While Anglo-Americans initially turned their way of war of against Indian noncombatants, in the civil war that eventually came to characterize the larger Revolutionary struggle Anglo-Americans for the first time waged unlimited-irregular war against one

another. In the process, they further legitimated the making of unlimited war through irregular means. This pattern would re-emerge in the Civil War and has arguably persisted in American military culture to the present day.

For Molly and Sophia

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Last, and most important, my love and thanks go to my wife Molly and my daughter Sophia. They are my inspiration. It is to both of them that I dedicate all my efforts.

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PREFACE

This study of the place of unlimited and irregular war in early Americans' military culture originated in my interest in Rogers's Rangers of the Seven Years' War and Russell F. Weigley's seminal work, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*.¹ As I became more familiar with the rangers' exploits and approach to war making, I found what to me seemed an intriguing pattern in the way they fought, namely their willingness to wage war against enemy noncombatants. Then, as I examined the other Anglo-American "irregulars" of the colonial period, I found that unlimited war against noncombatants manifested through irregular means -- something Weigley says did not occur -- was a common theme in early American military history. Near the same time, my experiences as an Air Force officer, particularly my tour of duty as an ICBM Combat Crew Commander led me to conclude that Americans still are willing to kill enemy noncombatants if our national security demands it. Today enemy civilian casualties, in the dehumanized lingo of modern war making, are "collateral damage."

I did not, however, intend to write an "advocacy piece" against the military that pointed to "genocidal tendencies" of the American way of war. Rather, I wanted to understand better the evolution of a way of war that could and does condone the use of violence against enemy noncombatants. As such, I hope that this dissertation may encourage my fellow military members

¹ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

to think about that aspect of our tradition of warcraft. Today's and tomorrow's military leaders must be prepared to look at all the ways, even if they seem brutal and "out of character," that we Americans wage war. Similarly, there remains little doubt that a significant part of the future for the American soldier will involve the irregular challenges, in their modern manifestations, that seventeenth and eighteenth century soldiers faced., Especially to my military colleagues, therefore, I suggest, that "real world" lessons abound in a study of colonial military history.

Attributing names to the various groups involved in the conflicts that shaped colonial history is a difficult task. Thus I have made an effort to distinguish systematically between the different participants in the colonial wars. An important difference existed between "Englishmen" and "Britons" on one hand and "Anglo-Americans" on the other. "English" refers to natives of England and Wales; I use "Britons" to describe the same peoples, together with the Scots, after 1707. Anglo-American describes those whites born in England's or Great Britain's North American colonial possessions, or those individuals who emigrated to North America. Since North American-born colonists or immigrants were not called "Americans" until the 1740s, it therefore would be ahistorical to refer to whites who lived in North America prior to then as "Americans." Yet to avoid the confusion that could arise from shifting at the half-way point of the study from Anglo-American to American, I use "Anglo-American" throughout to describe both white creoles and immigrants. "French" and "Spanish" are terms used to describe language groups, as well as the Old and New World subjects of the respective European monarchs. When referring to only the native white inhabitants of New France, I employ "Canadian." Naming the indigenous peoples of North

America is even more difficult. "Native American" could apply to either indigenous peoples or Anglo-Americans. I prefer "Indian." I have distinguished among Indian peoples by "tribal" designations, although those designations should be understood to describe more linguistic than political differentiations.² I have assigned places (forts, rivers, regions, etc.) the names their possessors gave them.

No less a problem than naming people and places is deciding to what degree to modernize or translate the prose and speech of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English and French speakers. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors, especially in their diaries and personal or public correspondence, rarely followed standardized rules of punctuation, capitalization, and spelling. And though their words carry a sense of the age in which they lived, I have opted to adopt the "Modernized Method" as outlined in the *Harvard Guide to American History* to clarify obsolete spelling and erratic punctuation.³ I have translated most quotations taken from French primary sources, with only the occasional exception of short phrases or individual words that seem clear, into English.

² For the use of tribal designations, see Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xiv. Bernard DeVoto made a related point about how one should refer to Indian peoples in the preface to his *Across the Wide Missouri* (1947; reprint, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), xvi. "There is no more sense," he quotes George E. Hyde as having written, "'in writing 'seven Oglala' than in writing 'seven Spaniard' or 'seven western state.'" The study therefore follows Hyde and DeVoto's lead and refers in the plural, for example, not to "Abenaki," but "Abenakis."

³ Frank Freidel, ed., *The Harvard Guide to American History*, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1: 31-36.

ABBREVIATIONS

CSPC	Great Britain. Public Record Office. <i>Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies</i> . Edited by J.W. Fortescue, et. al. 45 vols. to date. London: HMSO, 1860-.
CVSP	Palmer, William P., et. al., eds. <i>Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts</i> . 11 vols. 1875-1893. Reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1968.
DCB	<i>Dictionary of Canadian Biography</i> .
Hist. Stats.	US Bureau of Census. <i>Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957</i> . Washington, DC: GPO, 1960.
HNAI	Sturtevant, William C., et. al., eds. <i>Handbook of North American Indians</i> . 20 vols. planned. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1978-.
IEAHC	Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA.
JSAHR	<i>Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research</i> .
LO	Earl of Loudoun MSS, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
LOMBC	Massachusetts. <i>Laws and Orders of Massachusetts Bay Colony</i> . Buffalo: W.S. Hein, 1987. 736 microfiches.
NEHGR	<i>New England Historical and Genealogical Register</i> .
NYCD	O'Callaghan, Edmund B. and Berthold Fernow, eds. and trans. <i>Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York</i> . 15 vols. Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, Printers, 1856-1887.

PANS	Public Archives of Nova Scotia.
PRO 5	British Public Record Office, Colonial Office Class 5 Papers.
SAL	Hening, William Walter, ed. and comp. <i>The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619</i> . 13 vols. 1819-1832. Reprint, Charlottesville: Published for the Jamestown Foundation of the Commonwealth of Virginia by the University Press of Virginia, 1969.
WMQ	<i>William and Mary Quarterly</i> , 3d ser.
WO 34	British War Office, Class 34 Papers.

INTRODUCTION

John Shy, the father of the "new military history," has written that "military history is not simply a bloody chronicle of attacks and retreats, victories and defeats; it is also the story of unresolved ambiguities and contradictions."¹ This dissertation is an attempt to address one of the most perplexing of these ambiguities, the relationship between unlimited war and what eighteenth-century writers termed *petite guerre*, or "little war," in the American military tradition. Unlimited war, in both its modern and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century manifestations, centered on destroying the enemy's will or ability to resist by any means necessary, including attacks on civilian populations and food supplies. Similarly, military theorists now call *petite guerre* irregular, guerrilla, or unconventional war, or -- most euphemistically -- low-intensity conflict.² Irregular operations involve a combination of disrupting enemy troop, supply, and support networks, gathering intelligence through

¹ John Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), vii.

² French military theorists began to describe minor military operations as *petite guerre* in the middle of the eighteenth century. During the duke of Wellington's Peninsular Campaign in the Napoleonic Wars, Anglophones replaced *petite guerre* with the Spanish phrase *guerrilla* to describe the practice of irregular warfare. Today, guerrilla has entered the English lexicon; we rarely use *petite guerre* to describe irregular actions. See *The Stanford Dictionary of Anglicized Words and Phrases*, 1964 ed., s.v. "La Petite Guerre" and "Guerrilla." George Smith, *An Universal Military Dictionary, A Copious Explanation of the Technical Terms &c.* (1779: reprint, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1969), 202, described the practitioners of *petite guerre* as partisans. "Unconventional" is a term that theorists developed in the twentieth century to address aspects of modern warfare that fall outside "regular" forms of war making. For a definition of what constitutes, in the modern conceptualization, low-intensity conflict, see Alan Stephen, "The Transformation of 'Low-Intensity' Conflict," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5 (1994): 143.

reconnaissance and the taking of prisoners, ambushing and destroying enemy detachments, serving as patrol and flanking parties for friendly forces, operating as advance and rear guards for regular forces, and, most important in the colonial period, destroying enemy noncombatant populations.³

Historians agree that warfare has defined much of American history and, in the process, contributed to the creation of an American identity. Military historians therefore have attempted to describe an "American Way of War" as a means of elucidating the relationship between American warcraft and American identity. Russell F. Weigley has been the most influential of the scholars to suggest that Americans have created a distinctive military heritage. Indeed, his book *The American Way of War* established the paradigm by which most historians explain the American military tradition. This dissertation offers an alternative understanding to Weigley's, one based on the proposition that unlimited and irregular war, resulting in the use of

³ US Army *Field Manual 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1987) states that modern-day American Rangers design, plan and conduct "special military operations" in support of conventional military operations, or act independently when conventional forces cannot be used. *FM 7-85* notes that "special military operations" include "strike operations, usually deep penetration, and special light infantry operations. Strike operations include raids, interdiction, and recovery operations." (p. 1-1 - 1-2). The fundamentals of ranger operations today remain the same as those of the colonial period. Those fundamentals include the ranger unit's ability to discern and exploit the enemy's weaknesses while avoiding his strength. Decentralized execution is a key to ranger operations; special operations forces must use individual and unit initiative. Rangers use surprise achieved through their ability to move by uncommon means, along unexpected routes, and over rough terrain. Survivability is achieved by the use of classic infantry combat techniques, stealth, and concealment, thus allowing the ranger unit to engage the enemy at the time and place of its own choosing. Mobility, speed, and violence of execution allow rangers to close quickly on an objective and complete the mission before the enemy can react. Shock effect, which is a psychological advantage, is achieved by the combination of speed and violence with the precision of the ranger attack. Ranger units strive to achieve maximum physical and psychological effect on the enemy by exhibiting aggressiveness and reasoned audacity. Multiple methods of insertion and attack are used so as not to repeat operations and thus decrease the enemy's chance of detecting a pattern. Deception through the full use of ruses and feints and audacity, achieved by a willingness to accept risks, are ranger trademarks. See *FM 7-85*, 1-3 - 1-4.

armed force against noncombatant populations, is itself a fundamental part of the American warcraft.

Weigley's argument, and with it the accepted synthesis of American military history, rests on two conceptual pillars, both the products of post-Napoleonic German scholarship. First, he contends that Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* defines in general terms the parameters within which we can understand America's distinctive military culture. Clausewitz distinguished between two kinds of wars: those that seek the overthrow of the enemy, and those that seek merely to achieve a limited victory. Weigley asserts that all American military history falls in that framework. In America's earliest wars, he argues, English colonists, and later the United States, proved too weak to pursue anything other than limited wars; as time went on and Americans' military might grew, however, Americans increasingly fought to overthrow their enemies. Thus the Civil War, especially William T. Sherman's March to the Sea, symbolized how Americans embraced the Clausewitzian conception of the complete destruction of the enemy as a goal of war.⁴

The second part of Weigley's thesis derives from his understanding of another German military philosopher and historian, Hans Delbrück. Delbrück suggested that there are two kinds of military strategy: the strategy of annihilation, which seeks to erase an enemy's military power, and the strategy of attrition, which attempts to erode it. Weigley argues that most modern American military strategists have preferred Delbrückian wars of annihilation. He suggests that when American military resources were slight,

⁴ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), xviii-xxiii.

Americans accepted strategies of attrition out of necessity, but the abundance of economic resources characteristic of the United States from the mid-nineteenth century onward, coupled with the adoption of Clausewitzian unlimited war aims, created an environment in which the strategy of annihilation became *the* American way of war. Weigley's synthesis of Clausewitz and Delbrück therefore leads him to see American military history through a lens that focuses only on the complete destruction of the enemy through annihilation of the enemy's military power.

Weigley's argument has two main conceptual weaknesses. First, his view is disjunctive. Weigley establishes a demarcation between American wars before and after 1846, not dissimilar to the break that we sometimes assume separates colonial from later American history. Weigley sees America's pre-Mexican War conflicts as limited-attritive wars; after the Mexican War Americans turned away from the limited-attritive approach to war to one more in line with the unlimited-annihilationist model. He points particularly to George Washington's and Nathanael Greene's strategies in the Revolution as evidence of an early American commitment to irregular strategies enforced by a paucity of military resources. Weigley credits Greene with creating an American conception of partisan or guerrilla war, but also contends that "The later course of American military history, featuring a rapid rise from poverty of resources to plenty, cut short any further American evolution of Greene's type of strategy. He therefore remains alone as an American master developing a strategy of unconventional war."⁵ Thus Weigley's focus on post-mid-nineteenth century American war minimizes

⁵ Ibid., 36.

continuity and evolution in America's military past in favor of an abrupt, "revolutionary" departure from previous norms and institutions.

The second weakness in Weigley's argument is that it favors major campaigns, doctrinal thinking, and diplomacy at the expense of the details of American warcraft. While Weigley's masterpiece explains superbly grand strategy and policy in twentieth-century America, it does so by focusing only on war in the abstract, or how American armies have waged war. Indeed, Weigley rarely discusses how the "common" American has actually fought, and offers only fleeting glimpses of American soldiers' experiences in war. Thus he provides few insights into how those experiences changed and persisted over time and through space.

Yet if we look closely at colonial military history we see that it had little to do with grand strategy, the movements of armies, or the clash of nations. Instead, war in colonial America among Anglo-Americans, Indians, Britons, and Frenchmen consisted of a series of "little wars" and quasi-personal struggles. Although in the 1690s the colonists became embroiled in the century-long series of Anglo-French conflicts that historians sometimes call the Second Hundred Years' War, Americans fought those wars for different ends. While great European armies fought for dynastic and geopolitical goals in Europe, handfuls of Anglo-Americans waged life-and-death struggles against Indians and French Canadians in the American wilderness. Without a Sébastien Vauban-style web of fortifications and magazines covering the land, or the massive armies like those engaged at Lützen, Blenheim, and Mollwitz, colonial Americans depended on the "dirty" arts of war to strike at their enemies: destroying enemy villages and fields; killing enemy women and children; raiding settlements for captives; intimidating, brutalizing and sometimes torturing enemy noncombatants; retaliating against enemy attacks

on friendly civilians and forces; ambushing enemy military outposts and columns on the march; and harassing and killing enemy agents.⁶ Indeed, while seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europeans moved toward the perfection of *grande guerre*, colonial Americans mastered the skills of *petite guerre*.

We therefore must ask where unlimited and irregular war fits in the American way of war. Weigley's model is inadequate for colonial military history because it makes assumptions that marginalize both those kinds of war in early American history.⁷ Indeed, one might argue that his interpretation of American military history rests less on the realities of early American war than on assumptions and prejudices that reflect nineteenth-century German military culture. Clausewitz's service on the Russian general staff in 1812, in which he witnessed first hand the seemingly brutal and

⁶ Of course, there were Vauban-style forts in North America. Louisbourg and San Agustín, for example, would have fit right in as middle-size European forts. The difference was that American forts for the most part stood independent of one another, whereas in Europe they belonged to fortification and magazine systems. In fact almost all regular warfare and quasi-regular provincial warfare in early America was siege warfare and was, in this way, not unlike the wars of the Middle Ages. There were, then, two kinds of military endeavors in colonial North America: siege and fortress war on one hand, the province of regular and provincial troops; and *petite guerre* on the other, the purview of Indians, rangers, backwoodsmen, and the *Troupes de la Marine* of New France.

One could argue that fortifying the frontier with blockhouses was another colonial Anglo-American way of war. Indeed, forts were as ubiquitous in colonial military history after 1675 as rangers. Some of the leading figures of late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century New England society, like the Saltonstalls of Haverhill, Massachusetts, made both names and fortunes for themselves as the builders and organizers of New England's frontier fortification system. For a study that puts forts and garrisons at the center of war on the frontier, see Stephen C. Eames, "Rustic Warriors: Warfare and the Provincial Soldier on the Northern Frontier, 1689-1748" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1989), chaps. 2-3.

⁷ In his essay in on "American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War" in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), Weigley briefly assesses the impact of unlimited war on American warcraft, after which he writes "historians may tend to exaggerate the readiness of early Americans to turn toward absolute war." See Weigley, "American Strategy," in *ibid.*, 409.

unorganized methods of unlimited and irregular war practiced by the Tsar's Cossacks, led to his repudiation of *petite guerre* as an inferior, as well as ineffectual, way to fight.⁸ Clausewitz argued that war, rightly understood, was the rational instrument of national policy; he wrote that if "civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death, do not devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence exercises greater influence on their mode of carrying on War, and has taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of mere instinct."⁹ Delbrück, on the other hand, was a Prussian nationalist interested in chronicling the nineteenth-century Wars of German Unification. He emphatically shared Clausewitz's belief that war fell within the purview of legitimate state power.¹⁰

Weigley imbeds both Clausewitz's revulsion at *petite guerre* and Delbrück's focus on national war in his analysis. These biases -- for that is what they are -- lead Weigley to discount irregular war as abnormal, or unworthy of serious consideration. In the process, Weigley creates, like the military theorists who preceded him, an artificial dichotomy between regular and irregular war and organization.¹¹ From that dichotomy, Weigley situates

⁸ Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in *ibid.*, 186-213.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 103.

¹⁰ Gordon Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 326-53.

¹¹ Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century military theorists spoke of a dichotomy between regular war and irregular, partisan, or *petite* war. Today's US military uses a "spectrum of conflict" to describe the different kinds of conflicts the army faces. It divides the spectrum into three main areas: low, mid, and high. Low-spectrum conflict includes low-intensity conventional warfare, unconventional war, and terrorism. Mid-spectrum conflicts involve primarily minor conventional war and aspects of major conventional war. High-spectrum conflict encompasses other characteristics of major conventional war and nuclear war. Modern-day ranger units are trained, equipped, and tasked to operate primarily in the low and mid spectrums.

American warcraft on an evolutionary path toward encompassing a regular (read Clausewitzian-Delbrückian) unlimited-annihilationist model of war. In reality, the American way of war, while on a trajectory toward its realization of a Clausewitzian-Delbrückian synthesis, also traveled the evolutionary route of irregular war.

Weigley's interpretation stands like a colossus over American military historiography. Indeed, military historians have been unable to move beyond it and advance a synthesis on the place of *petite guerre* in the American military tradition. Most colonial military historians, a small group to begin with, have touched on irregular (and with it unlimited) war only superficially. The two most recent review essays on colonial military history, now over a decade old, as well as the definitive bibliography on United States military history, show that there is no monograph devoted entirely to unlimited or irregular war in early America.¹² The handful of historians who have mentioned unconventional war treat it as a minor part of larger themes in Anglo-American colonial history.

One group of historians, nonetheless, has noted that there was something "different" about war in colonial America. That difference often manifested itself in patterns of unlimited and *petite guerre*. For example, Ian Steele argues that Anglo-Americans built a tradition of war that was at odds with both traditional European and Indian methods of war. Adam Hirsch similarly contends that there was a collision of military cultures in seventeenth-century New England. He suggests that overall patterns of

¹² Wayne Carp, "Early American Military History: A Review of Recent Work," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 94 (1986): 259-84; Don Higginbotham, "The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal," *WMQ* 44 (1987): 230-73; Robin Higham and Donald J. Mrozek, eds., *A Guide to Sources of United States Military History, Supplement III* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books), 1993.

native and European military cultures differed widely, and rather than merging in a Hegelian synthesis, "In the New World, honor was tossed aside -- and once the colonists set the precedent, the surrounding Indians followed suit . . . an antecedent of total war had somehow emerged."¹³

John Ferling argues that racism and the wilderness imparted a unique "brutality" to early American military history, an experience that led Anglo-Americans to war against Indian civilians. He suggests that while "Europe's wars grew less ferocious, or at least had less drastic impact on the civilian population, American wars tended to become more feral."¹⁴ John Dederer contends that the distinctive characteristic of early American military history centered on Anglo-Americans' combined experiences of Indian fighting with their reading of histories of antiquity's wars. As a result Anglo-Americans forged the ideal of the militarily self-sufficient citizen-soldier in service of the ideal virtuous republic.¹⁵ Together, Ferling and Dederer suggest the brutality and commonalty of the colonial experience of war. I contend that the brutality and commonalty fed the practice of unlimited-irregular war.

Other historians have focused on how irregular war influenced the development of the British Army's eighteenth-century doctrine and practice of war. Daniel Beattie has argued that the British Army in the Seven Years' War used *petite guerre* partially to overcome the problems involved in wilderness campaigning. Eric Robson, Rory Cory, and David Parker have suggested

¹³ Ian Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994): 106; Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *Journal of American History* 74 (1988): 1204.

¹⁴ John Ferling, *A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 197.

¹⁵ John Dederer, *War in America to 1775: Before Yankee Doodle* (New York: New York University Press, 1990).

that its experiences in North America during the Seven Years' War and the Revolutionary War led the British Army to incorporate irregular tactics and organization during the Napoleonic Wars. Peter Russell believes that the irregular tactics that the British Army used in America during the Seven Years' War originated in the British officer corps' experience fighting European partisans in Scotland, Flanders, and Central Europe in the mid-eighteenth century. Taken together, Beattie's, Robson's, Cory's, Parker's, and Russell's interests lie with the British experience with *petite guerre*, an experience that they see had more importance for European than American military developments.¹⁶

The one area in which historians have come closest to addressing the impact of irregular war in the American military tradition has been in studies of the Revolutionary War. John Shy has argued that Charles Lee's argument for partisan war against the British offered a "radical alternative" to the regular war effort conducted by George Washington and the Continental Army. Mark Kwasny shows that the state militias attached to Washington's army indeed fought a partisan war in the Connecticut-New York-New Jersey theater of operations during the Revolution. Similarly, John Pancake and others who have written on the Revolution in the South have described it as a partisan and brutal civil war. Shy's essay on "British Strategy for the

¹⁶ Daniel Beattie, "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763," in *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Maarten Ultee (Birmingham: The University of Alabama Press, 1986), 56-83; Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The Effect of American Conditions," *The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal* 43 (1952): 209-22; Rory McKenzie Cory, "British Light Infantry in North America in the Seven Year War," (Ph.D. diss., Simon Fraser University, 1993); David E. Parker, "That Loose Flimsy Order: The Little War Meets British Military Discipline in America 1775-1781," (M.A. thesis, University of New Hampshire, 1985); Peter Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," *WMQ* 35 (1978): 629-52.

Southern War," coupled with Sylvia Frey's depiction of the Revolution in the South as a "Triangular" war among white patriots, black slaves, and British soldiers, suggests the distinctly irregular nature of war in the American South during the Revolution.¹⁷

Not one of those works individually places the Revolutionary practice of *petite guerre* in the context of its development from the previous colonial wars, or addresses its impact on the development of the American military tradition. Instead, the unlimited and irregular war that played such an important part in the Revolution appears as a militarily self-contained element of the Revolution, with no ties to what came before or after it.¹⁸

This dissertation therefore examines the place of unlimited and irregular war in the whole of the early American military experience. To clarify where they fit in our military heritage, this study addresses two sets of questions. The first overarching question has two interrelated parts: how did

¹⁷ John Shy, "American Strategy: Charles Lee and the Radical Alternative" in *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Mark Kwasny, *Washington's Partisan War, 1775-1783* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1996); John Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Shy, "British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781" in *A People Numerous and Armed*; Sylvia Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

¹⁸ The historical practice of *petite guerre* outside the American military experience has received the attention of several scholars. In 1896 Colonel Charles E. Calwell of the British Army wrote his classic *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: HMSO, 1896). Calwell was most interested in providing a military treatise for British army officers' use in combating "opponents who will not meet them [British soldiers] in the open field" (p. 21). Walter Laqueur's *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976) was intended to examine guerrilla and terrorist theory throughout history. Laqueur focused his attention on examining the doctrine and actions of twentieth-century European partisans and the place of guerrilla warfare in "Third World Wars of National Liberation." Robert Aspery's *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, 2d ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), like Laqueur's study, focuses on twentieth-century guerrillas. However, Aspery did include material on guerrilla warfare as a phenomenon of both ancient and early-modern warfare.

Americans develop a way of war that was both unlimited in its ends and irregular in its means, and how did that way of war change over time and space? Next, it asks, what were American attitudes toward *petite guerre*? What cultural and social experiences and perceptions informed Americans' understanding and practice of unlimited-irregular war? Similarly, which groups within American society participated in those wars, and why did they choose, or feel required, to do so? Second, we must ask how American attitudes and practices of unlimited and irregular war compared to contemporary European models of war. How did the American conception of *petite guerre* differ from European conceptualizations of both regular and irregular war? Of what influence on American patterns of war was European irregular war, especially the English experience in colonizing Ireland and the British Army's suppression of the Highland rebellions of 1715 and 1745? Likewise, what did contemporary French military theorists -- the originators of an eighteenth-century doctrine of irregular war -- think of *petite guerre*, and how did their conception resemble or depart from the Anglo-American experience with irregular war? How did French and British regulars in North America view Anglo-American guerrilla war? Why did some French and British soldiers encourage and participate in American-style irregular wars, while some did not? In what ways and to what extent did the British army in North America adopt the Anglo-American model of *petite guerre*?

The answers to those questions comprise this dissertation's central argument: colonial Anglo-Americans created a military tradition that accepted, legitimized, and encouraged attacks upon and the destruction of *noncombatant* populations, employing irregular means to achieve unlimited goals of conquest by annihilating the enemy's power to resist. Unlimited-irregular war therefore became the colonial American way of war, and in time

produced a military that embraced *both* Weigley's unlimited-annihilationist paradigm and little war against enemy noncombatants.

The colonial American way of war evolved over a century and a half. Long before significant numbers of British troops arrived in the colonies Americans had forged a tradition of fighting unlimited-irregular wars against Indians, Spaniards, and French Canadians noncombatants. From the beginnings of English settlement in North America, Anglo-Americans had waged frequent *petite guerre* campaigns against enemy combatants and noncombatants alike. Anglo-Americans' unlimited wars of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries suggest the extent to which early Americans erased the distinction between combatants and noncombatants at exactly the same time that European professional soldiers were coming to insist on that distinction as the basis of civilized military conflict. Thus the American way of war began from European roots, but eventuated in a martial culture strongly shaped by North American circumstances quite different from those of Europe. In the process they created an American military tradition radically unlike the tradition of war that developed in Europe at the same time.

During the Wars of King George (1739-1755) and the Seven Years' War (1754-1763) British regulars faced French and Indian enemies who had mastered unconventional war. The French fully embraced partisan war and even gave precedence to training the *Troupes de la Marine* (France's colonial regulars) in its techniques. Many British professional soldiers, on the other hand, disparaged as "savage" the methods of *petite guerre* that Anglo-American colonists had evolved to counter the Spaniards, Canadians, and their Indian allies. Faced with a shortage of Indian allies, and in some cases disdaining the ones that did present themselves, however, the British eventually turned to American "rangers" to fight the Spanish, French, and

Indians by irregular means.¹⁹ In time most British regulars gladly accepted the use of American rangers to wage terrorist campaigns against Indian, Spanish, or Canadian noncombatants since it freed them to focus on defeating French regulars in North America.

The Revolution was a watershed in the development of American *petite guerre* traditions for Anglo-Americans not only continued to wage unlimited-irregular war against Indian noncombatants, but expanded their notions -- as Loyalists and Patriots alike -- to include white American enemies as justifiable targets of irregular operations. Military necessity also dictated that the British and the Continental Armies use irregular war on both the western frontier and in the Southern colonies. The result was the first American civil war in which Anglo-American noncombatants became the targets of unlimited-irregular war waged by Anglo-Americans. Thus we need not necessarily explain Sherman's March to the Sea as an anomaly, or even as a revolutionary application of Clausewitzian and Delbrückian unlimited-annihilationist war; it may be just as much or more a product of traditions founded in colonial era *petite guerre*.

Military history is *passé* in most academic circles and its practitioners often derided as the "drum and bugle corps." More often than not critics see military history as litanies of orders of battle, the movements of regiments, or the deeds of the Great Captains. However, to military officers, and to the men and women whom they lead, military history can furnish an important

¹⁹ Englishmen probably first used "ranger" near the start of the fourteenth century. During the late Middle Ages, "range" was a common verb to describe the act of patrolling specific areas by military and law enforcement bodies. In Maryland in the seventeenth century rangers patrolled the woods for wild livestock, especially horses. Also in the seventeenth century, English settlers in North America called the horse-mounted bodies of men who patrolled the frontier rangers. See *A Dictionary of Americanisms on Historical Principles*, 1951 ed., s.v. "Ranger"; *Colonial Wars of North America, 1512-1763*, s.v. "Rangers."

foundation for the profession of arms. It is imperative that professional soldiers, and civilians as well, discuss and dissect how, not just why, Americans fight wars. I have therefore tried to approach the writing of military history in such a way as to address the criticisms that many have levied against it by focusing on the practice and techniques of American war making. In this my approach is that of the so-called "new" military historians, who have tried to contextualize warfare by examining its social, cultural, and economic dimensions. In addition, however, I have tried always to bear in mind soldiers' *raison d'être*: to kill the enemy and destroy his means of making war. I therefore also concentrate, like those traditional military historians who remain interested in orders of battle and the movements of regiments, on how the little warriors of colonial North America used the techniques and tactics of *petite guerre* to strike at their enemies, and how they forged a tradition of unlimited-irregular war from the materials at hand.

This dissertation contains, besides this introduction, five chapters and an epilogue. Chapter I discusses the Anglo-American experience of war through the late 1720s and describes the nature of war that Anglo-Americans waged against Indians. It addresses the "problems" of irregular war that confronted Anglo-Americans and traces their innovations in seeking to overcome those problems. These included an embrace of unlimited war, the creation of ranger units that specialized in Indian fighting, and the use of what I call "land privateering" to motivate privatized, commercialized war through the issuance of scalp bounties. This chapter argues that the pre-1740s American way of war centered on small unit and individual action that used *petite guerre* waged primarily against enemy food supplies and civilian populations.

The colonial American tradition of unlimited-irregular war and the European practice of regular and irregular war intersected in the late 1740s when, for the first time, large numbers of British soldiers arrived in North America. The second chapter therefore focuses on the American practice of unlimited war and *petite guerre* in Wars of King George -- The War of Jenkins' Ear, King George's War, and the obscure post-war conflict that I have called Father Le Loutre's War. The focus of that chapter is on how the approach to unlimited and irregular war by Anglo-American rangers in the marchland provinces of Georgia and Nova Scotia, particularly the activities of John Gorham's Rangers, marked both continuation and a refinement of previous American patterns of war. Just as important, Chapter II explains how, with British commanders' use of American rangers to pacify the hinterlands of Georgia and Nova Scotia, the eighteenth-century wall within British military culture between regular and irregular war, began to crumble.

Since Anglo-Americans were part of a larger British Empire, and it would be specious to suggest that the colonial tradition of war developed in a vacuum of North America, Chapter III describes the European military experience with regular and irregular war. The third chapter compares the traditions of irregular war in continental Europe and Britain and Ireland, describing the differences in theory and practice among European models of *petite guerre*. European soldiers, including the British soldiers who served in Ireland and Scotland, had by the middle of the eighteenth century created a corpus of knowledge on irregular war that was rooted in both experience and theory. The European model of *petite guerre*, however, differed from the American variety of little war in one crucial way. In Europe, irregular war was the bastard child of a war-making culture that found itself useful, but not

worthy of acknowledgement; in America, irregular war became the father of a new military tradition.

Chapter IV explains how the Seven Years' War legitimized unlimited war and *petite guerre* within both the American and British military traditions. It concentrates on explaining how and why the British Army ultimately accepted Anglo-American style unlimited-irregular warfare. It also shows how by the end of the Seven Years' War and the Indian wars of the early 1760s, Anglo-Americans and Britons acknowledged unlimited-irregular war directed against enemy noncombatants as a legitimate endeavor.

Chapter V details how the colonial practice of unlimited and little war developed in the American Revolution and embarked on a new path with profound implications for American history. During the Revolution the Anglo-American tradition of unlimited and *petite guerre* directed against noncombatants was the dominant way that Patriots waged war against Indians on the frontier. Meanwhile, that way of war became entwined within the civil war among white Anglo-Americans on both the frontier and in the East. This chapter examines why troops and officers who formed both American and British irregular corps used *petite guerre* against their fellow Anglo-Americans and applied practices previously reserved for Indians and Canadians. It shows that the birth of the United States fostered a military tradition that could, if necessary, sanction the use of unlimited and irregular war against white Americans.

The epilogue puts the thesis of this dissertation in a broader context. By looking forward into American military history, the significance of the American way of unlimited-irregular war becomes clear. War directed against enemy noncombatants has more often than not occupied a central role in the American military tradition since the end of the Revolutionary War. Whether

in the Indian wars of the nineteenth century, the Civil War, the strategic bombing campaigns against Nazi Germany and Japan in World War II, or the Vietnam War, that phenomenon has been less a part of a cosmic Clausewitzian-Delbrückian synthesis than a living legacy of a colonial tradition of war that made priority of attacking civilian populations.

Students of early American history have an incomplete understanding of *petite guerre* in the American military tradition. If we hope to understand completely colonial military history and the American way of war, we need to augment the standard interpretation of our military past. Indeed, we need to use an approach that more fully encompasses the American experience of unlimited and *petite guerre* to place a third conceptual pillar beneath our understanding of America's historic approach to war. By acknowledging that unlimited and irregular war have served as both component and unique parts of the American culture of war making from the start, we may acquire a better understanding of how Americans have waged and will wage war. I hope "The Other American Way of War" will illuminate an uncharted region in early American military history and fill the gaps in Weigley's masterful yet incomplete interpretation of America's military past. I believe our attempts to grasp the roots of the American culture of war making can then begin with the American colonial military experience, an experience that unlimited and irregular war defined. From there we will be able to identify, rather than merely presume, elements of continuity and change across the entire history of American warcraft.

CHAPTER 1

"THE KNOWN RULE OF WARFARE": THE ORIGINS OF UNLIMITED- IRREGULAR WARFARE IN COLONIAL AMERICA

In July 1779 Thomas Jefferson wrote to William Phillips explaining the treatment of Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton, a British officer held prisoner of war by the state of Virginia. In an earlier letter Phillips, who had been Hamilton's superior at Detroit, protested Jefferson's insistence that Hamilton be held in "strict confinement." Tradition as well as several written agreements on the treatment of prisoners of war dictated that captors had the responsibility either to exchange officer prisoners quickly or parole them.¹ However, when his captors brought him from Illinois to Williamsburg, Jefferson authorized them to shackle Hamilton in irons and lock him in a prison cell. Phillips, upon receiving word of this seeming ill treatment, requested that Jefferson "put a claim for this British Officer Lieutenant Governor Hamilton being set at liberty and considered a prisoner of war."²

Jefferson refused to intervene on Hamilton's behalf. Instead he presented Phillips with an impassioned argument against granting Hamilton

¹ The Convention of Écluse, for instance, signed by Great Britain and France during the Seven Years' War, read that "All prisoners . . . were to be returned fifteen days after capture, or sooner if possible, either by exchange or ransom." See Reginald Savory, "The Convention of Écluse, 1759-1762: The Treatment of Sick and Wounded, Prisoners of War, and Deserters of the British and French Armies during the Seven Years' War," *JSAHR* 42 (1964): 68. Eighteenth-century officers, in principle at least, could expect treatment radically different and more benevolent from that which prisoners today can expect, or Henry Hamilton experienced in American hands.

² Phillips to Jefferson, July 5, 1779, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian P. Boyd, et. al., 29 vols. to date (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), 3: 27.

parole or exchange. "Governor Hamilton's conduct," Jefferson wrote, "has been such as to call for exemplary punishment on him personally." Jefferson reminded Phillips that the "general nature of the service he [Hamilton] undertook at Detroit and the extensive exercise of the cruelties, which that involved" justified his refusal to either parole Hamilton or exchange him for an American officer held in Phillips's custody.³

What in Hamilton's conduct at Detroit was so reprehensible as to make Jefferson forbid him the privileges normally accorded gentleman prisoners of war? Although by the summer of 1779 the Revolutionary War had lasted four long years with thousands of deaths on both sides, it remained common practice to parole and exchange enemy officers. Jefferson, it seems, viewed Hamilton not as a prisoner of war, but rather as a war criminal. For in Jefferson's mind Hamilton had committed the most grievous transgression imaginable to a colonial-era American: he had unleashed the specter of "Indian warfare" against white settlers on the frontier. As Jefferson told Phillips,

The known rule of warfare with the Indian Savages is an indiscriminate butchery of men women and children. These Savages under this well known character are employed by the British Nation as allies in the War against the Americans. Governor Hamilton undertakes to be the conductor of the war. In the execution of that undertaking he associates small parties of whites under his immediate command with large parties of the Savages, & sends them to act, not against our Forts or armies in the field, but farming settlements on our frontiers. Governor Hamilton then is himself the butcher of men women and children. I will not say to

³ Jefferson to Governor of Detroit [Phillips], July 22, 1779, *CVSP*, 1: 322. In October 1780 Jefferson finally paroled Hamilton and allowed him to travel to New York. However, in January of the next year Jefferson refused the request of Chevalier Charles-François, Dubuysson des Hayes, a French officer in American service held captive by the British, to be exchanged for Hamilton. See Henry Hamilton's Parole, October 10, 1780, *Papers of Jefferson*, 4: 24-25; Theodorick Bland to Jefferson, January 29, 1781, *ibid.*, 4: 462.

what length the fair rules of war would extend the right of punishment against him: but I am sure that confinement under its strictest circumstances as a retaliation for Indian devastation & Massacre must be deemed Lenity.⁴

Two years after Jefferson's correspondence with Phillips about Hamilton, Jefferson's letters again touched on cruelties perpetrated against women and children on the frontier. In a letter from Arthur Campbell, the commander of a Virginia army operating in western North Carolina, Jefferson learned that raiders had put frontier settlements to the torch and targeted noncombatants. In that instance, however, Campbell's men had committed the killings and pillage.

Campbell embraced the long-held Anglo-American practice of making unlimited-irregular war that directed destruction on enemy noncombatants and agricultural resources. To make the Cherokees feel the sting of war, Campbell, in the winter of 1780-1781, led a 700-man Virginian army to ravage the Cherokee country. Campbell related to Jefferson that upon seeing the white columns converging on their homes the Cherokee "seemed to be flying in consternation."⁵

The Cherokees had good reason to fear the white raiders as they fanned out across Cherokee territory intent on wreaking devastation, burning, killing, and looting as they went. Campbell reported to Jefferson that on Christmas Day, 1780, that one of his detachments "surprised a party of

⁴ Jefferson to Phillips, July 22, 1779, *CVSP*, 1: 322. Jefferson's condemnation of Hamilton resembled his indictment of King George III in the Declaration of Independence. In that document, Jefferson accused the King of endeavoring "to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions."

⁵ Campbell to Jefferson, January 15, 1781, *CVSP*, 1: 434.

Indians, took one scalp, and Seventeen Horses loaded with clothing and skins and House furnishings." The same day, Campbell detailed one of his company commanders, Captain Crabtree, "with 60 men to burn the Town of Chilhowee; he succeeded in setting fire to that part of it, situated on the South side of the river, although in time he was attacked by a superior force. He made his retreat good."⁶

Campbell described the swath of destruction that his force cut across the Cherokee lands. The day after Crabtree's attack on Chilhowee, Campbell sent a troop of 150 mounted men under a Major Tipton to sack Tilassee. Major Christen Gilbert's 150 infantry also returned to Chilhowee to continue the work that Captain Crabtree's men had started but had been unable to finish the previous day. Campbell reported that unlike Crabtree's men, "this Party did their duty well, killed three Indians and took nine prisoners."⁷

The American raid into the Cherokee homelands was a resounding success. Campbell wrote to Jefferson that the Americans'

whole loss on this Expedition was one man killed by the Indians, and two wounded by accident. By the Returns of the Officers of different detachments, we killed 29 men, and took 17 Prisoners, mostly women and children, the number of wounded is uncertain. The Towns of Chote, Scittigo, [illegible] Chilhowee Togue, Micliqua, Kai-a-tee, Sattoogo, Telico, Hiwassee, and Chistowee, all principal Towns, besides some small ones, and several scattering settlements, in which were upwards of one thousand Houses, and not less than fifty thousand Bushels of Corn, and large quantities of other kinds of provisions, all of which after taking sufficient subsistence for the army whilst in the Country and on its return, were committed to the flames, or otherwise destroyed.⁸

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 435.

⁸ Ibid., 436.

Considering Campbell's dispatch, what should we make of Jefferson's refusal of parole to Hamilton for encouraging Indian raids against white frontier settlements? Of course, there was a difference in Jefferson's mind between Hamilton's and Campbell's actions. Hamilton encouraged Indians to kill whites; Campbell encouraged whites to kill Indians. Nonetheless, Campbell's report on the American foray into Cherokee territory shows that white Americans too would resort to the killing of noncombatants for which Jefferson excoriated Hamilton. One of course could suggest that Jefferson did not approve of Campbell's actions. However, it is unlikely that Campbell would have reported to his superior the results of his campaign if he felt Jefferson either was uninterested or disapproved of his actions against Cherokee farming communities, women, and children.

An element of duplicity certainly underlies Jefferson's condemnation of Hamilton. Jefferson knew that Anglo-American soldiers regularly put Indian settlements to the torch, and few inhabitants of the frontier, either white or Indian, ever were free from the peril of massacre and pillage at the hands of enemy raiding parties. Jefferson also knew that *both* Anglo-Americans and Indians had over the course of the previous century and a half ranged across the frontier, killed enemy civilians, and burned enemy towns with devastating regularity. Indeed, both Anglo-Americans and Indians often resorted to the "indiscriminate butchery of men women and children."

If Anglo-Americans acted like Indians and regularly burned farms and killed women and children, what then was the "known rule of warfare" among Anglo-Americans in the colonial period? Jefferson's letters suggest that colonial Americans knew two kinds of warfare: white "civilized" warfare and

Indian "savage" warfare.⁹ Jefferson's correspondence with Phillips also implies that the white and Indian approaches to war were mutually exclusive. Indeed, Jefferson's depiction of the colonial military scene was dichotomous; Anglo-American methods of war occupied one pole in which soldiers discriminated between combatants and noncombatants, and Indian ways of war occupied the opposite pole, in which all enemies, regardless of age or sex, were fair game.

In fact, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans created a way of war that resembled in important ways the "savage" kind of war that Jefferson decried. At the center of the colonial American conceptualization of war were three core elements that combined to shape the Anglo-American culture of war making: annihilationist war; ranging; and land privateering. This chapter relates how those core elements developed and evolved over the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries, until by the late 1720s, they had merged into a single Anglo-American way of war.¹⁰ Indeed, by the

⁹ Jill Lepore has noted Montaigne's observation that "each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice." Lepore suggests that colonial Americans created a triangulated conception of identity and with it a language to describe war. She writes that between the narrow path of virtue, piety, and mercy that Anglo-Americans traveled were the ways of war of the "cruel" Spaniards and the "savage" Indians. She contends that "after nearly a century of repetition on successive American frontiers, this triangulated conception of identity would form the basis of American nationalism as it emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." See Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), xiv.

¹⁰ Rather than narrate the course of the colonial wars so well described by historians, this chapter addresses how the core elements shaped the early American culture of war making. Ian Steele's *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) is now the standard against which studies of colonial military history must be judged. Other modern works on the colonial wars include Douglas Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1973); Howard H. Peckham, *The Colonial Wars 1689-1762* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); and Edward P. Hamilton, *The French and Indian Wars: The Story of Battles and Forts in the Wilderness* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1962). For summaries of America's wars before King George's War, see Francis Parkman, especially his *Count*

middle decades of the eighteenth century colonial Anglo-Americans had created a tradition of unlimited war waged primarily through irregular means.

The Anglo-American way of war evolved in three phases, each a response to the ways that Indians waged war against and for whites.¹¹ In the first phase of development, from Europeans' initial settlement through the mid-1640s, Englishmen used the European model of annihilationist war -- violence directed primarily at enemy noncombatants -- to subdue their Indian enemies.¹² Between the start of King Philip's War in 1675 and the end of Queen Anne's War in 1711, the Anglo-American way of war entered its second phase of development in which ranging and land privateering

Frontenac and New France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1877) and the first volume of his two-volume *A Half-Century of Conflict* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1892). Despite his Anglocentric biases and racist attitudes, his narratives of the wars between Anglo-Americans and Indians and Anglo-Americans and French Canadians remain informative, engaging, and beautifully written narratives in the grand style.

For a contemporary's view of New England's colonial wars, see Samuel Niles's *A Summary Historical Narrative of the Wars in New-England with the French and Indians, in the Several Parts of the Colony*. The Massachusetts Historical Society published it in its *Collections* in two parts, the first in 3d ser., 6 (1837): 154-279, and the second in 4th ser., 5 (1861): 311-589.

¹¹ My periodization of Anglo-American military history evolved as a response to Steele's, which holds that colonial military history evolved over a century and a half in three phases. He argues that the European settlement of North America witnessed a series of diverse interactions between Indians and Europeans, and the changing nature of war in the Americas is central to his analysis. Steele defines the early colonial period (to the 1680s) as a crucial initial phase in which Indians and Europeans met, fought, tolerated, cooperated, or incorporated one another into their pre-existing conflicts. In the early period limited resources and limited skill in irregular warfare forced Europeans to fight Indians on the Indians' terms. He views the Anglo-French imperial wars through King George's War (1687 to 1748) as a transitional second phase in which irregular war became entwined with war on the European regular model. Steele sees the period between the Seven Years' War and its aftermath in Pontiac's Uprising (1748 to 1765) as the climax of colonial military history. The arrival of large numbers of European regulars, he argues, ushered in a significant change in colonial military affairs and the history of European-Indian relations.

¹² My appropriation of Delbrück's term "annihilationist" is intended to express the conceptualization of unlimited-total war directed against noncombatants, the opposite of the limited strategies of war that focused on enemy armies.

became staples of Anglo-American warcraft. Ranging was a direct result of changing patterns of Indian and Anglo-American warfare. Anglo-Americans, after 1675, found themselves engaged in conflicts with Indian peoples that had augmented mourning war with elements of white annihilationist war.¹³ Whites responded in turn to those changes in the Indian way of war by adopting Indian tactics and strategy, or what seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans called "skulking."¹⁴ They turned to Indian allies,

¹³ The pre-contact Indian culture of war making centered on a highly evolved and ritualized system of limited war called mourning war. In mourning war, vanquished foes and captives "replaced" losses in native communities. Indian raiding parties would venture forth, procure captives, return those captives to the war party's home village, and apportion them among grieving clans. At that point, the elder women of the clan determined the fate of the captive: either death by torture or adoption into the community. Males usually suffered death by excruciating torture; women and children most often were incorporated into the captors' society. See Daniel Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1992), 32-38. The practitioners of mourning war, unlike Europeans who practiced annihilationist war, did not seek to destroy their enemies in their entirety. "Know that the Indians' fight far differs from the Christian practice," John Underhill noted. "They might fight seven years and not kill seven men." He observed: "the fight is more for pastime, than to conquer and subdue enemies." See Underhill, *News From America; Or, A New and Experimentall Discoverie of New England* (1638, reprint, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 3d ser., 6 [1837]): 4, 26. Geoffrey Parker, in *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 118, points out that there was an important difference between Europeans, who sought to kill, and the native peoples who, like Europeans of the Middle Ages, fought more often to capture. That focus on killing was an integral component of Parker's "Military Revolution" of 1500-1800. For the changing nature of Indian war in the late-seventeenth century, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 50; and Colin G. Calloway, *New Worlds for All: Indians, Europeans, and the Remaking of Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), chap. 5.

¹⁴ The skulking way of war, as Patrick M. Malone has described it, was designed to capitalize on speed and stealth to ambush an enemy, engage it in an attack only long enough to inflict casualties, perhaps take some prisoners, and then safely retreat from harm's way. See Malone, *The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among the New England Indians* (New York: Madison Books, 1991). Harry Holbert Turney-High, in his *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1949): 147, argued that the Indians' warcraft was built on the quest for individual glory more than the security of the village or nation. The result, Turney-High wrote, "was disastrous for the military efficiency of the American Indian." See also Leroy V. Eid, "National War among the Indians of Northeastern America," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 16 (1985): 125-54.

particularly the Mohawks of the Iroquois League, and promised them generous rewards, including bounties on the scalps of both enemy soldiers and noncombatants. Many white frontiersmen, meanwhile, looked to Indian allies to teach them the techniques of skulking and wilderness fighting. They renamed it "ranging." Some of those rangers sought for themselves the rewards that came from procuring Indian scalps and began the practice of land privateering, or hunting for Indian scalps under the state's sanction. The two decades that saw the Tuscarora and Yamasee Wars in the South and Father Râle's War in New England witnessed the final phase in the development of the Anglo-American way of war. It was then that Anglo-Americans combined the separate but interrelated elements of annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering into a single military tradition. By the end of the 1720s, annihilationist war waged by Anglo-American rangers acting as land privateers against enemy noncombatants shaped a definable colonial Anglo-American way of war.

PHASE I: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANNIHILATIONIST WAR PARADIGM, 1607 to 1646

The first phase in the development of the Anglo-American way of war saw Englishmen transfer the European model of annihilationist war to North America. The military leaders of the first English colonies quickly realized that targeting noncombatants and agricultural resources was an effective way to defeat Indians without engaging them in battle. Partly because the English could not force their more mobile Indian enemies into battles on terms favorable to them, Englishmen thereafter made immobile Indian villages and

fields their primary target in all their wars. By the mid-1640s, that annihilationist paradigm had come to dominate Anglo-Americans' military culture.

Military men figured prominently in the leadership of the first English colonies in North America, and as one would expect, brought with them to the New World their European-derived conceptualization of war.¹⁵ The professional soldiers that led the colonies' small armies -- John Smith in Virginia, Myles Standish at Plymouth, John Mason in Connecticut, and John Underhill in Massachusetts -- were products of the Wars of Religion that ravaged Europe from the mid-sixteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries. The wars in which they learned their craft were brutal affairs. Fueled by the passions of the Reformation and Counter Reformation, late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth-century European soldiers had little compunction, and some would say almost a preference, for putting towns to the torch and noncombatants to death.¹⁶ Indeed, the captains' experiences had taught

¹⁵ In the first Virginia Assembly formed in 1619, nine of the twenty-two members had military titles. Even if the leadership did not actually have military experience, they felt a military title gave them an air of authority. See *A Reporte of the Manner of Proceeding in the General Assembly Convened in James City, July 30-31, 1619*, Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., *The Records of the Virginia Company of London*, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1906-35), 3: 153-54.

¹⁶ Describing the Thirty Years' War in Central Europe, Thomas Griess has written that "Germany, long a battlefield, became a wasteland. Armies and armed bands marched and countermarched from one end to the other, gruesomely strewing in their wake devastation, disease, and death. Discipline disappeared. Rape, pillage, arson, and murder became the norm. Historians have been virtually incapable of adequately describing the utter horrot, the depth of misery, the abject human debasement. Millions perished. Bohemia's population had been 2,000,000 in 1618; by 1648 it was 700,000. Perhaps half the homes and farms and villages went up in flames; sheep, oxen, cattle, horses all but disappeared. Famine stalked the land; starvation was epidemic. Peasants revolted, preying like wild beasts on straggler and stranger alike. Barbarity vied with brutality. Only armies were safe." See Griess, ed., *The Dawn of Modern Warfare* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1984), 63-64.

them that there was no difference between combatant and noncombatant enemies. They therefore encouraged their fellow settlers to fight the Indians of the New World as they would have fought Europeans. When war came, they led their fellow colonists in punitive expeditions directed at Indian women and children, not Indian armies.

In their first military conflicts with the Powhatans of Virginia (the Anglo-Powhatan War of 1609-1614, the First Indian War of 1622-1632, and the Tidewater War of 1644-1646) Englishmen quickly became frustrated with the style of war Indians fought.¹⁷ Rather than face the English in set-piece battles as a European army would have done, Powhatan warriors roamed the woods, struck small parties of Englishmen harvesting crops or working the land, and then, John Smith wrote, "by the nimbleness of their heels well escaped."¹⁸ The Powhatans soon had the English virtually penned in the fort at Jamestown, forcing Smith and the English to search for other means by which to defeat them.¹⁹

¹⁷ Powhatan refers to the Indians of the Powhatan Confederacy. Within the Powhatan Confederacy, the Pamunkey nation was the dominant group. By 1608, they had absorbed all the tribes on the James, York, and Payankatank Rivers and their tributaries, with the exception of the Chickahominies. See Christian F. Feest, "Virginia Algonquians," *HNAI*, Volume 15, Northeast, 255-56.

¹⁸ John Smith, *The Proceedings of the English Colonie in Virginia*, in *The Complete Works of Captain John Smith*, ed. Philip L. Barbour, 3 vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1986), 1: 206.

¹⁹ Guy Chet, in "Starting Over: The Transformation of European Warfare in New England" (working paper # 98-23, International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Harvard University, 1998), has argued that the first colonists applied European strategy and tactics toward confronting Indians in New England. The first colonists indeed used a European strategic approach of annihilationist war, but later added to it Indian tactics, particularly an adaptation of skulking.

Smith first attempted to best the Powhatans with their own methods. In May 1607 he spent a week "training our men to march, fight, and skirmish in the woods [so they] were better able to fight."²⁰ Smith aspired to train the colonists in skulking. His efforts, however, did little to stop the epidemic of Indian attacks on the English. Smith realized that the Powhatans simply were too skilled in the woods, and a week, or for that matter, even a month of training could not have turned English settlers into effective skulkers. As events in both Virginia and New England proved, it took generations to make that transition.

In the meantime, Smith determined that instead of fighting Indian warriors that moved like deer through the woods, he and his soldiers would target what could not move, Powhatan villages and crops. Smith understood a basic fact about Indian war making. Upon venturing forth to skulk, they usually left their villages and fields relatively undefended. "If they assaulted us," Smith wrote, "their Towns they cannot defend."²¹

With Smith leading the way, Englishmen turned to the destruction of Powhatan fields and villages as their primary means to control and intimidate the Indian peoples that bordered the English settlement. Smith warned King Powhatan that if his subjects attacked English foraging parties the whites would seek retribution against the Indians' wives and children. The English quickly learned that carrying out such threats helped gain English objectives. When, for example, the Powhatans refused to return several Englishmen they

²⁰ John Smith, *A True Relation of Such Occurances and Accidents of Note, as Hath Hapened in Virginia*, in *Works of John Smith*, 1: 85.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1: 87.

had taken captive, Smith and his men sallied forth "and burnt their Towns, and spoiled, and destroyed, what they could, but they brought our men and freely delivered them."²²

Annihilationist war against Indian noncombatants and villages became the order of the day when full-fledged war between the English and Powhatans erupted in August 1609. In what J. Frederick Fausz has described as a "vicious cycle of reciprocal atrocities," both sides in the Anglo-Powhatan War turned to the indiscriminate killing of the other side's civilians.²³ During the five years of war that followed, somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of the English colonists perished, while large parts of Virginia bordering the James River became depopulated of Indians.²⁴

Few contemporary accounts relate the degree that annihilationist warfare shaped English war marking in early-seventeenth-century North America better than George Percy's "*A Trewe Relacyon*." In August 1610 Virginia's Governor Thomas Gates ordered Percy, a combat veteran of the Wars of Religion in the Netherlands, "to take Revenge" upon the Paspahegh Indians for their crime of living on the lands near Jamestown.²⁵ The Paspaheghs amounted to no more than 135 souls and posed no serious military threat to the English. The Virginia Council, nonetheless, found them threatening enough to warrant a full-scale, at least for 1610 Virginia

²² Ibid., 1: 89.

²³ J. Frederick Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides': England's First Indian War, 1609-1614," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 98 (1990): 4.

²⁴ Feest, "Virginia Algonquians," 256-57.

²⁵ George Percy, "*A Trewe Relacyon*": Virginia from 1609 to 1612," *Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 3 (1922): 260.

standards, war of annihilation.²⁶ True to an evolving pattern, Percy chose to "beset the savages' houses that none might escape."

Percy and his men undertook to eradicate the Paspaheghs from the face of the earth. Upon his signal, the English

fell in upon them, put some fifteen of sixteen to the Sword and Almost all the rest to flight, Whereupon I caused my drum to beat and drew all my Soldiers to the Colors. My Lieutenant bringing with him the Queen and her Children and one Indian prisoner for the which I taxed him because he had Spared them, his Answer was that having them now in my Custody I might do with them what I pleased. Upon the same I caused the Indian's head to be cut off. And then disposed my files Appointing my Soldiers to burn their houses and to cut down their Corn growing about the Town, And after we marched with the queen And her Children to our Boats again, where being no sooner well shipped my soldiers did begin to murmur because the queen and her Children were spared. So upon the same a Council being called it was Agreed upon to put the Children to death, the which was effected by Throwing them overboard and shooting out their Brains in the water. Yet for all this Cruelty the Soldiers were not well pleased.²⁷

Only after the return to the English main camp was Percy's soldiers' bloodlust satisfied. A certain Captain Davis, Percy related, believed that it was "best to Burn" the Paspaheghs' queen. Percy determined to "give her A quicker dispatch. So turning myself from Captain Davis he did take the queen with two soldiers Ashore and in the woods put her to the Sword."²⁸

Annihilationist war increasingly became the Anglo-Americans' *modus operandi* during the misnamed First Indian War of 1622-1632.²⁹ The

²⁶ Feest, "Virginia Algonquians," 257.

²⁷ Percy, "'Trew Relacyon'," 271-72.

²⁸ Ibid., 272-73.

²⁹ On Easter Morning, March 22, 1622, the Powhatan Confederacy under Opechancanough, King Powhatan's brother and successor, with the assistance of the

"Massacre" of 1622 further hardened the English attitudes toward the Indians and drove them to increasingly harsh measures. George Wyatt, upon hearing the news of the "Massacre," advised his son Francis, then Governor of Virginia, that the settlers' "Game are the wild and fierce Savages haunting the Deserts and woods. Some are to be taken in Nets and Toils alive, reserved to be made tame and serve to good purpose. The most bloody to be rendered to due revenge of blood and cruelty, to teach them that our kindnesses harmed are armed."³⁰ Smith, expressing the opinion of many, wrote from London that "now we have just cause to destroy them by all means possible."³¹

Destroying the Powhatans' army, however, was easier said than done. The most logical option, it seemed, was to target their villages and fields. Upon surveying the situation that faced it, the Virginia Council realized that it lacked the manpower necessary to challenge King Opechancanough's army

Chickahominy nation and other Indians, attacked virtually every English settlement along the James River. Had it not been for a friendly Indian warning the English of the impending attack, perhaps Opechancanough's plan to punish the English and forge a new balance of power in which coexistence and trade might be possible would have worked. With warning in hand, however, the English staved off the Indian onslaught. Yet nearly 350 of the colony's settlers perished, or almost thirty percent of the Anglo-American population. It is important to note, however, that the Powhatans chose not to attack English agricultural resources, suggesting that they had not embraced the European model of annihilationist war. See William S. Powell, "Aftermath of the Massacre: The First Indian War, 1622-1632," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 66 (1958): 44.

³⁰ George Wyatt quoted in J. Frederick Fausz and John Kukla, "A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia," *WMQ* 34 (1977): 127. The hunting analogy became part of the Anglo-American approach to dealing with Indians. In 1706, in the midst of Queen Anne's War, the Massachusetts General Assembly realized that "hounds and other dogs used to hunting" proved "of a great service to discourage and keep off the Indians." The Assembly thus allowed five shillings per annum for any breeder of hounds and hunting dogs who kept them in readiness to hunt Indians. See *LOMBC*, October 1706: 598.

³¹ Smith, *The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles*, in *Works of John Smith*, 2: 298.

in open battle, even in the unlikely event the Powhatans had been willing to offer one. The English, however, realized that they could wage another war of destruction against Indian fields. A survey of the colony's military rosters shows that of the 180 men fit for military duty 80 were assigned to "carrying corn," that is destroying Powhatan fields.³² John Martin suggested that the English starve the Indians out of Virginia by preventing the Powhatans and their allies from fishing and growing corn. He proposed to send against them 200 soldiers whose primary task would be to torch Indian fields and destroy their fishing weirs. During the summer months, Martin advised, English shallops should patrol the waterways and kill Indians attempting to fish. At the same time, all trade in corn between whites and Indians, even those Indians friendly to the English, would be forbidden. With the Indians thus starved, Martin argued, English settlers could enslave them and expropriate their land for the cultivation of hemp, flax, and silk.³³ In June 1622 the Council embraced Martin's plan and began the systematic destruction of the Powhatans' agricultural resources. In that month the colony's small army set "upon the Indians in all places" and "slain divers, burnt their Towns, destroyed their Wears [fishing weirs] & Corn."³⁴

Even after the colonists secured enough firepower to crush Opechancanough's army should the two sides meet in open battle, they preferred to continue to target Indian noncombatants and fields. In

³² Council in Virginia to Company in London, January 20, 1623, *Records of the Virginia Company* 4:12; George Sandys to Samuel Wrote, March 28, 1623, *ibid.*, 4: 67.

³³ John Martin, *The Manner Howe to Bringe the Indians Into Submission*, *ibid.*, 3: 704-06.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 4: 9.

September 1622, the Virginia Company in London sent their beleaguered colonists 1000 muskets, 400 shirts and coats of mail, 400 bows, 800 sheaves of arrows, 300 pistols, 2,000 iron helmets, and 40 sets of plate armor.³⁵

Upon the receipt of that one shipment, the English settlers of Virginia had become the most heavily armed group in North America.³⁶ The Council, however, detailed "60 fighting men (whereof 24 were employed only in the Cutting down of Corn)" to destroy Indian crops. In the ensuing war against corn and legumes, the English deemed each field destroyed as a "great Victory" and relished how the Indians "gave over fighting and dismayedly, stood most ruefully looking on while their Corn was Cut down."³⁷

The English settlers of Virginia had become committed to unlimited war. They continued their campaigns against the Powhatans for nearly ten years, long after they could have secured a peace. Even the Virginia Company in London and the Crown expressed their desire that their colonists

³⁵ Ibid., 3: 676. Anyone who has ever spent a summer in the Chesapeake Tidewater can only imagine the discomfort that must have accompanied wearing an iron helmet and a coat of mail while tramping through the woods and swamps of the Virginia lowlands. Such discomfort, however, certainly was less than having a stone arrowhead through one's chest.

³⁶ Fausz has described how settlers to the Chesapeake quickly realized that European firearms proved less than completely effective against Powhatan methods of woodland fighting. See Fausz, "Fighting 'Fire' with Firearms: The Anglo-Powhatan Arms Race in Early Virginia," *American Indian Culture Research Journal* 3 (1979): 33-50. However, while matchlocks were inferior to bows and arrows in respect to rate of fire and accuracy, body armor offered substantial protection against Indian arrows.

³⁷ Letter from the Council in Virginia to the Earl of Southampton and the Council and Company of Virginia, *Records of the Virginia Company*, 3: 507. For another account that points to the significance that the English settlers in Virginia placed on the destruction of Indian crops, see Sir Francis Wyatt and Council of Virginia to Henry Early of Southampton and the Council and Company of Virginia, December 2, 1624, *CSPC, 1574-1660*, 70-71. At the end of the campaigning season, Wyatt wrote, the English had suffered 16 casualties. Those casualties, however, were an acceptable exchange since the English has seen "as much corn cut down as would have sustained 400 men for a twelvemonth."

stop the war; investors could not make a profit on a colonial venture when their colonists were busy fighting instead of raising exportable crops.³⁸ But in the wake of criticism from home about their on-going war with the Indians, the colonists argued that they held that "nothing unjust, that we may tend to their ruin." "Stratagems were ever allowed against all enemies," they continued, "but with these neither fair War nor good quarter is ever to be held, nor is there any other hope of their subversion, who ever may inform you to the Contrary."³⁹ Clearly, the experiences of the Anglo-Powhatan and First Indian Wars had convinced Virginians that annihilation of the Powhatans was the only way to achieve security.

When war returned to Virginia in 1644, the English colonists again adopted the tactics of unlimited war.⁴⁰ As the number and might of the English in Virginia grew, so did their designs for annihilating the Powhatans. In 1644, for instance, the Virginia Assembly voted to raise five times the number of men for the 1622 campaigns, plus 30 horses with tack, to devastate Indian crops and villages.⁴¹ After only two years of suffering raids,

³⁸ In the wake of the Massacre and the ensuing war, Virginia, in 1624, became a Royal Colony.

³⁹ Quoted in Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Seventeenth-Century Indian Wars," *HNAI*, Volume 15, Northeast, 96.

⁴⁰ In April of 1644 Opechancanough led another attack on the English settlements in Virginia. Like the Massacre of 1622, the Indians' initial attack was a severe blow to the colonists, wiping out nearly five percent of the colonists in one fell swoop.

⁴¹ Virginia Assembly, "Acts of the Virginia Assembly, Indian War of 1644," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 23 (1915): 231-32. For details of the Tidewater War of 1644, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1957), 30-32.

and the capture and murder of the septuagenarian King Opechancanough, whites forced the Powhatans to accept a humiliating peace.

The end of the Tidewater War in 1646 ushered in thirty years of peace for colonial Virginia and cemented unlimited war as the preferred approach of Anglo-Americans in the Chesapeake. By 1646, two generations of suffering unlimited war at the hands of the English, and exposure to European diseases, had devastated most of the tribes of the Tidewater. With the Tidewater Indians weakened, Anglo-Americans displaced the survivors to reserves set away from white settlements and forced them to accept tributary status.⁴² Annihilationist war had worked. Anglo-Americans had forced the tribes that surrounded them into a lasting peace.⁴³ Indeed, the lessons of

⁴² Alden T. Vaughan notes that following the 1622 Massacre Virginians moved toward the removal of all Indians from the Tidewater. See Vaughan, "Expulsion of the Salvages: English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622," *WMQ* 35 (1978): 57-84. Some tribes managed to completely avoid the wrath of Anglo-American annihilationist war by accepting tributary status. James H. Merrell, in "Cultural Continuity among the Piscataway Indians of Colonial Maryland," *WMQ* 36 (1979): 548-70, has shown that submission to English rule did not automatically condemn a tribe to cultural decay or extermination. He writes that some tribes "were able to maintain their cultural integrity by accepting a tributary status from the colonial governments and working within the new system" and the fate of the Piscataways "demonstrates that it was possible for Indians to follow successfully a path that lay between total war and complete capitulation." (p. 549).

Tributary status to the English, nonetheless, could be a mixed blessing, offering both protection and threats of violence. In March 1655/56 the Virginia Burgesses passed a law "Against Stealing Indians." It seems that "sundry individuals" fraudulently had forced some tributary Indians to sell their children as slaves, "to the great scandal of Christianity and of the English nation." The law required all such illegally obtained children returned to their parents within ten days. Tributary status, nonetheless, was a double-edged sword. In 1720 whites forbade all of Virginia's tributary Indians from crossing northward of the Potomac River or westward of the Allegheny mountains. Any Indian who violated that mandate would be put to death or transported to the West Indies to be sold as slaves. See *SAL* 1: 410, 481; 4: 720.

⁴³ Anglo-Americans occasionally conducted minor "police actions" against both tributary and "foreign" Indians after 1646. Virginia experienced a minor war in 1655 when the 700 "Richahecian" Indians established a community near present-day Richmond. In March 1655, the Burgesses authorized Colonel Edward Hill to lead 100 militia men and friendly "neighboring Indians" to "remove" the "Richahecians." The military acumen of the militia was not something of which Virginians could be proud. Hill and his men murdered five enemy chiefs who had come to parley under a flag of truce, and in the war's one battle, the enemy

1607 through 1646, in which killing Indian noncombatants and destroying Indian agricultural resources had won Virginia for whites, would not be lost on later generations of Anglo-Americans.

The Indian peoples of New England managed to navigate the difficult path between war and peace with the English longer than the Powhatans in Virginia. Peaceful relations, with only minor exceptions, defined an environment of coexistence in early New England.⁴⁴ Unlike the Jamestown colony, located in the middle of the territory owned by the most powerful Indian confederacy on the East Coast, a disastrous epidemic of European diseases between 1617 and 1619 had destroyed perhaps eighty percent of the Indian populations of New England. As such, New England's Indians, at least in the early days of settlement, were more tractable to English interests.

The peace, however, proved untenable when in 1636 the Pequots' and the Puritans' differing notions of justice precipitated the Pequot War, New England's first large-scale military conflict.⁴⁵ Pequot warriors responded to

routed the Virginia militia and killed most of its Indian auxiliaries. Yet the "Richahecrians" then moved away from their settlement, bringing an end to the war. See SAL, 1: 402-403.

⁴⁴ A treaty of friendship between Massasoit, the Wampanoag sachem, and the colonial leaders defused early hostilities between the Pilgrims and the Indians. Tensions between the English and other Indians occasionally boiled near the point of war, including in the winter of 1622-1623 when a colony led by Thomas Weston on Massachusetts Bay seemed to be on the brink of disintegrating into chaos. To "save" that colony, Plymouth's Captain Standish assassinated several Indian leaders and according to John Mason, "spread a Terror over all the Tribes of Indians round about him, from the Massachusetts to Martha's Vineyard, and from Cape-Cod harbor to Narrangansett." See Mason, *A Brief History of the Pequot War* (1736; reprint, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 2d ser., 8 [1826]): 121.

⁴⁵ Tensions between the Pequots and the Puritans escalated to a crisis point when in 1634 allies of the Pequots murdered an English ship captain and rogue, John Stone. The Pequots accepted a treaty in November of that year in which they admitted guilt in Stone's murder. With tensions temporarily defused, the murder of another English ship captain, John

the attempted kidnapping of Indian women and children by attacking English settlements on the lower Connecticut River. Englishmen countered by plundering Indian lands and spoiling "both houses and corn in great abundance."⁴⁶ After several months of inconsequential skirmishing, Connecticut commissioned Captain John Mason to conduct the war as he saw fit.⁴⁷ Mason, he told his superiors, would end the war by attacking the Pequots' main settlements and destroying them. In May 1637, he led 90 Connecticut soldiers, with the assistance of 70 Massachusetts troops under John Underhill, against the Pequot fort on the Mystic River. While there were in fact two main Pequot forts -- one with mainly warriors in it, one with women, children, and old men -- Mason, as one would expect of a soldier trained in the Wars of Religion, selected the latter as his target.

The English destruction of the Mystic River Fort stands as the most infamous event in the early military history of New England, as well as a striking example of the place unlimited warfare occupied in early Anglo-American culture. As soon as the English attack began, the Pequots retreated to their wigwams to barricade themselves, others tried to flee the fort, and still others took cover under their beds to hide from the English

Oldham, this time in 1636, plunged the English and Pequots into open hostilities. For the background to the Pequot War, see Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996) and Neal Salisbury, *Manitou and Providence: Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

⁴⁶ John Winthrop, *Winthrop's Journal "History of New England," 1630-1649*, ed. James K. Hosmer, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908) 1: 191; Underhill, *News from America*, 6.

⁴⁷ J. Hammond Trumbull and Charles J. Hoadly, eds., *Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut*, 15 vols. (Hartford: Connecticut Historical Society, 1850-1890), 1:10, hereafter cited as *Connecticut Records*.

attackers who broke in to shoot and stab defenseless Pequot women and children. Mason and Underhill led the way in the slaughter and showed their men by personal example what they expected of them. Coming upon some Pequots in a lane between two rows of wigwams, Mason and a party of troops chased them to the end of the lane, backed them into a corner, and dispatched them with swords. Mason then came upon two English soldiers standing idly by watching the massacre. Upbraiding them -- "We [the English] should never kill them after that manner" -- an inspiration struck him: "We must Burn them."⁴⁸ He thus stepped into a wigwam, removed a firebrand, and set the structure afire. Underhill, seeing what Mason had done, kindled a fire on the other side of the compound.⁴⁹ The two fires spread quickly, joined, and soon engulfed the entire compound in flames "to the extreme Amazement of the Enemy, and a great Rejoicing of our selves." Two other English officers then joined Mason in setting the wigwams aflame while the shocked "Indians ran as Men most dreadfully Amazed."⁵⁰

The English refused to grant the Pequots quarter. Many of the Indians, consumed with "a dreadful Terror," either attempted to flee the fort or begged for mercy. While their 500 Narragansett allies watched in astonishment, the English used their muskets and swords to drive the handfuls of Pequots who tried to escape the blazing fort back into the inferno. The Narragansetts, obviously thinking the battle would be like the mourning war raids with which they were familiar, pleaded with their allies to stop the

⁴⁸ Mason, *Pequot War*, 139.

⁴⁹ Underhill, *News From America*, 25.

⁵⁰ Mason, *Pequot War*, 139.

slaughter; "it is too furious" they cried, and "slays too many men."⁵¹ Still, "down fell men, women, and children," Underhill wrote, and "those that escaped us fell into the hands of the Indians in the rear of us."⁵² All told, the English and Narragansett killed nearly 700 Pequots, while the English suffered only two dead and around twenty wounded.⁵³

Although the scale of the slaughter shocked even Underhill, he contended that it was necessary. He related a ghastly scene: hundreds of Indian bodies lay charred upon the ground, so many that it was impossible in places to walk without stepping on a corpse. The battlefield, he wrote, was a "bloody sight."⁵⁴ Yet he justified his actions. "Should not Christians have more mercy and compassion?" he asked. He answered: "Sometimes the Scripture declare the women and children must perish with their parents."⁵⁵

The slaughter at the Mystic River Fort was only the first act of the Puritans' unlimited war against the Pequots. Many New Englanders believed that the way to preserve the security of their homes, especially since they had made the Pequots an intractable enemy, was to complete the slaughter of the Pequots that had begun on the Mystic River.⁵⁶ They therefore embarked on

⁵¹ Underhill, *News from America*, 27.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 25.

⁵³ Mason, *Pequot War*, 140.

⁵⁴ Underhill, *News from America*, 25.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Philip Vincent, *A True Relation of the Late Battle Fought in New England, between the English and Pequet Salvages* (1638; reprint, *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 3d ser., 6, [1837]): 39.

a campaign in which they and the Narragansetts pursued the surviving Pequots, "ranging the country until they destroyed many of them, and the rest were so scattered and dispersed."⁵⁷ On one such expedition, Mason and 40 Englishmen came upon 200 old men, women, and children holed up in a swamp. With the Pequots destroyed as a military power, Mason was "loath to kill Women and Children." Instead, he put the old men to the sword and "spared" the remaining 180 women and children by enslaving them.⁵⁸

The few remaining bands of Pequots, near starvation and lacking either the strength or the will to fight were at the mercy of the English -- who were, however, in no mood to grant quarter. When the Pequot sachems sued for peace and prostrated themselves before the English and Narragansetts at Hartford, all that remained of the Pequot nation -- a group that once totaled at least 2,000 -- were 180 to 200 half-starved survivors.⁵⁹ The English victors apportioned the surviving Pequots among their Narragansett and Mohegan allies as slaves and forbade the Pequots to inhabit their native lands or even to maintain the name Pequot. Connecticut, weighing the "several Inconveniencies that might ensue" from a Pequot "revival" in the future then sent Mason and 40 men to burn the Pequots' wigwams and destroy their corn fields.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Niles, *Indian and French Wars*, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 3d ser., 6 (1837): 173.

⁵⁸ Mason, *Pequot War*, 147-48.

⁵⁹ Estimates for the Pequot population prior to the 1617-1619 epidemics vary between 2,200 and 4,000 people. See Bert Salwen, "Indians of Southern New England and Long Island: Early Period," *HNAI*, Volume 15, *Northeast*, 169.

⁶⁰ Mason, *Pequot War*, 149.

The Anglo-American victory over the Pequots was absolute and proved to be the last major Indian war in New England for forty years. It served as an ominous harbinger to the other Indians of the Northeast of how Anglo-Americans would wage war. For example, tensions between the English and the Narragansett almost erupted into war in 1643 and 1644. The English responded quickly. Plymouth gave Standish command of a small army, while Massachusetts prepared for war by designating thirty percent of each militia company to be prepared to take the field with half an hour's notice.⁶¹ The Narragansetts, seeing the English preparations and recalling the fate of the Pequots when they had challenged the whites' military might, appealed to King Charles I for redress of English encroachments on their lands. But in the early 1640s Charles I faced issues more pressing than the abuse of Indian rights perpetrated by his white subjects in Boston. Thus in the summer of 1645 the Narragansetts, who had come to understand that war against the English would be disastrous, agreed to a treaty in which they accepted tributary status.

The aversion of war with the Narragansett in New England, at the same time of the conclusion of the Tidewater War in the Chesapeake, signaled the end of the first phase in the development of the colonial Anglo-American way of war. Over four decades, Englishmen had won peace for themselves by waging unfettered wars of annihilation against their Indian

⁶¹ Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Colony of New Plymouth in New England*. 12 vols. (Boston: Press of William White, 1856-61), 2: 45-46; Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, ed., *Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England*, 5 vols. (Boston: Press of William White, 1853-54), 3: 41, hereafter cited as *Massachusetts Records*.

enemies. The Anglo-American way of war hung like a Damoclean sword over the heads of the Indians in both the Chesapeake and New England. Indians knew that if that sword fell, it would mean not only the destruction of villages and fields, but the annihilation of their people.

PHASE II: RANGING AND LAND PRIVATEERING ENTER THE COLONIAL WAY OF WAR, 1675 to 1711

By the mid-1670s whites and Indians faced a state of military affairs radically different from the one that had confronted either their parents or grandparents. As a result, they forged new elements that would shape the colonial Anglo-American way of war for generations to come. Separating the end of the first phase in 1646 and the start of the second phase in 1675, the non-Indian populations of the English colonies exploded in size.⁶² Because agreements that ended the previous cycle of war had forced many Indian nations into tributary status, during the middle decades of the seventeenth century Anglo-Americans occupied frontier lands that later would become the front line of future wars. Meanwhile, the Indian model of war mutated dramatically. Indians, especially those in the Northeast, adopted European weaponry and more ominously for Anglo-Americans, elements of the white

⁶² In 1680, for instance, the estimated population of the mainland North American English colonies was 151,507; in 1640 the population had been only 26,634. In 1630 Connecticut's population was 1,472; in 1680 it had grown to 17,246. In those forty years, Virginia's population increased four fold, as did Massachusetts's. See *Hist. Stats.*, 756. Of course, an increasingly significant, although not overwhelming, proportion of the colonial populations was made up of black slaves. However, slaves -- no matter how discontented individually -- did not threaten the existence of any of the colonies until the American Revolution. In fact, blacks fought with whites against Indians in all the colonial wars.

conceptualization of annihilationist war.⁶³ While procuring captives -- a remnant of mourning war -- remained a common practice, and necessary to replace populations lost to disease or war, the focus of Indians' attacks on frontier settlements after the mid-1670s increasingly became to destroy them.⁶⁴ Anglo-Americans responded to those raids with the development of an Anglo-American ranger tradition.

⁶³ For the importance of the Indian adoption of European weaponry, see Francis Jennings, *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 166. Jennings has argued that Indians originally fought in massed bodies, but the arrival of European firearms made massed attacks suicidal. As a result, they turned to the skulking way of war. Building upon Jennings's thesis, Armstrong Starkey, in *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), implies that around King Philip's War there occurred a "military revolution" in North America as the Indians of New England adopted European weaponry. With Indians possessing European weapons, he has written, "forms of frontier warfare were established that lasted until Indian resistance was crushed during the War of 1812." (p. 14). Settlers as early as the 1630s, it should be noted, feared the Indians' possession of guns. William Bradford wrote: "As our own safety we ourselves betray;/For these fierce natives, they are now so fill'd/With guns and muskets, and in them so skill'd/As that they may keep the English in awe." See Bradford, "A Descriptive and Historical Account of New England in Verse," (1794; reprint, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 1st ser., 3 [1810]), 78. For the further effects of firearms on North American war, see also Donald E. Worcester and Thomas F. Schilz, "The Spread of Firearms among the Indians of the Anglo-French Frontier," *American Indian Quarterly* 8 (1984): 103-15. For Indians' turn to a total war ethos, see Adam J. Hirsch, "The Collision of Military Cultures in Seventeenth-Century New England," *Journal of American History* 74 (1988): 1210.

⁶⁴ The ubiquity of captivity narratives nonetheless suggests that dread of captivity continued to influence Anglo-Americans' perceptions on how and why Indians waged war. The first captivity narrative -- that of Mary Rowlandson -- was published during King Philip's War. Richard Slotkin has analyzed many of them and contends that the captivity narrative functioned as a myth, "reducing the Puritan state of mind and worldview, along with the events of colonization and settlement, into archetypal drama. In it a single individual, usually a woman, stands passively under the strokes of evil, awaiting rescue by the grace of God. The sufferer represents the whole, chastened body of Puritan society, and the temporary bondage of the captive to the Indian is dual paradigm -- of the bondage of the soul to flesh and to the temptations arising from original sin, and of the self-exile of the English Israel from England. In the Indian's devilish clutches, the captive had to meet and reject the temptation of Indian marriage and/or the Indian's 'cannibal' Eucharist." See Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973), 94.

Ian Steele has shown how during times of peace Indians often sold their Anglo-American captives to French authorities, who in turn either sold them back to the English or exchanged them for French prisoners. During times of war, however, Indians often killed their

The course of Anglo-American military history between 1675 and 1711 hinges on the multi-phased creation of the Anglo-American ranger tradition. At first, only a handful of white settlers understood that the way to protect their homes and families was to win control of the woods in which the Indians operated. Yet control of the forests required that Anglo-Americans learn to fight like Indians. Indian-style skulking, however, was foreign to most whites and learning to wage it was both a dangerous and a time-consuming proposition. Nonetheless, starting in the mid-1670s, handfuls of Anglo-Americans turned to friendly Indians for tutelage in skulking and thus began the first "Indian" phase in the development of the ranger tradition. By the 1690s, enough Anglo-Americans had learned the rudiments of ranging war to create viable and credible ranger companies. Once formed, ranging companies embraced unlimited war as the primary means by which they fought Indians.

Indian successes in King Philip's War forced Anglo-Americans to adopt ranging.⁶⁵ The "Great Swamp Fight," on December 19, 1675, although a

captives. Steele argues that much of the benevolent treatment that Anglo-American captives received at the hands of the Indian captors during times of peace can be explained by the increasing inclusion of Indians into the cash economy of the Europeans. See Steele, *Betrayals: Fort William Henry and the "Massacre"* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 14-18. During times of peace, captives were worth more as commodities than as "replacements" in Indian clans. In times of war, they were simply prisoners, who, if it was not burdensome to their captors, could serve as replacements. If they, however, became burdensome, the "new" Indian ethos of annihilationist war condoned the killing of captives.

⁶⁵ Open war between white settlers and the Wampanoags erupted across New England in the summer of 1675. The previous January unknown individuals had killed John Sassamon, a "Praying Indian," upon his return from Plymouth Governor Josiah Winslow's home where he had reported that the Wampanoags under Metacom, whom the English called King Philip, were plotting a conspiracy. The Plymouth authorities blamed Philip and his followers for the murder, arrested three Wampanoags, tried them, and sentenced them to death. One of the accused Indians at his trial claimed that Philip was responsible for the murder of Sassamon. Plymouth Colony, over the protest of the Rhode Island Quakers, thereafter determined that the proper response of actions was to declare war on the Wampanoags. A major concern for both Massachusetts and Connecticut, meanwhile, was

victory for the English, set in motion a full-fledged Indian war that nearly devastated the New England frontier.⁶⁶ Unlike the Pequots, who following the slaughter at the Mystic River Fort ceased to be a credible military threat, the Wampanoags and Narragansetts continued to field large bands of warriors after the Great Swamp Fight. Throughout the winter of 1675-1676 the Wampanoags and Narragansetts abandoned the limitation of violence usually associated with mourning war and unleashed a series of devastating raids against towns and small ambushes of individual settlers, travelers, and others. The Indians, Captain Benjamin Church of the Plymouth militia noted, started with small-scale hit-and-run attacks against isolated settlements. But as time progressed and whites proved incapable of responding to the raids, the enemy "flushed with these exploits grew yet bolder and skulking everywhere in the bushes, shot all passengers and killed many that ventured abroad."⁶⁷

that the Narragansetts, whom they had bullied into tributary status in the mid-1640s, might side with the Wampanoags and engulf those colonies in the war that was ravaging Plymouth. In November 1675, leaders of the United Colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Plymouth agreed to launch a preemptive strike against the Narragansetts to crush them as a military power. The next month Governor Winslow led a white attack on the Narragansett fort in the Great Swamp. For more detailed histories of King Philip's War, see Douglas Edward Leach, *Flintlock and Tomahawk: New England in King Philip's War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1966); Russell Bourne, *The Red King's Rebellion: Racial Politics in New England, 1675-1678* (New York: Athenaeum, 1990); and Lepore, *The Name of War*.

⁶⁶ Narragansett losses at the Swamp Fight were over 300 killed and wounded. See Niles, *Indian and French Wars*, Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 3d ser., 6 (1837): 182.

⁶⁷ Benjamin Church, *Diary of King Philip's War 1675-76*, eds. Alan and Mary Simpson (Chester, CT: The Pequot Press, 1975), 77.

The colonists first responded to the Wampanoag and Narragansett raids by fortifying the frontier.⁶⁸ In July 1675, for instance, before the war entered its Narragansett phase, the leadership of New Haven ordered that everyone able to bear arms were to hold themselves in readiness for militia service, and established a committee to construct fortifications at the town meeting house. In October the committee realized that its fortification system was not enough for defense against lurking Indians who used the forest cover to sneak up on outposts to attack. The committee thus directed that half-mile fields of fire around the town cut and cleared away. Governor Edmund Andros of New York, fearing that New England's war would spread to his colony, directed that all towns in his colony "forthwith without Delay, to Fortify and make complete, in some convenient Place, a block or palisaded House, or Place for a retreat to Women and Children, etc."⁶⁹

The colonists' defensive measures, however, did little to protect them. On October 5, 1675, for instance, a Wampanoag war party struck Springfield, Massachusetts. The previous day, Major John Pynchon, a fur trader from Springfield and the commander of its local militia, had marched his troops away from Springfield at the direction of the Massachusetts Council.⁷⁰ When

⁶⁸ The major problems with forts, as will be seen in more detail in chapter 2, is that they were primarily defensive and failed to capitalize on the offensive potential that rangers offered.

⁶⁹ Charles H. Townsend, "The Quinnipiack Indians and Their Reservation," *New Haven Historical Society Papers*, 4 (1900): 184-85. Andros quoted in Hugh Morrison, *Early American Architecture From the First Colonial Settlements to the National Period* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 76.

⁷⁰ J.H. Temple, *History of North Brookfield, Massachusetts. Preceded by an Account of Old Quabaug Indian and English Occupation, 1657-1676; Brookfield Records, 1686-1783* (North Brookfield, n.p., 1887), 109.

Pynchon returned to Springfield the next day he "came to a Lamentable and woeful site." In a letter to his friend John Russell, Pynchon described the destruction of property and the human tragedy that accompanied the Indians' war of annihilation on the frontier.

The Town in flames, not a house or barn standing except Old Gooden Branch's, till we came to my house & then Mr. Glover's. John Hitchcock's and Gooden Stewary's, burnt down with Barns, corn and all they had . . . My Grist Mill & Corn Mill Burnt down: with some other houses & Barns I had let out to Tenants; all Mr. Glover's library burnt, with all his Corn, so that he has none to live on, as well as myself, & Many more that have not for subsistence they tell me; 32 houses & the Barns belonging to them are Burnt & all the Livelihood of the owners, & what more may meet with the same strokes the Lord only knows.

Many more had their estates Burnt in these houses: So I believe 40 families are utterly destitute of Subsistence; the Lord show mercy to us. I see not how it is Possible for us to live here this winter, & If so the sooner we were helped off, the Better.⁷¹

All told, over the course of the war Wampanoag and Naragansett war parties burned over 1,200 of New England's 12,000 houses, made one-tenth of its male population casualties of war, and cost the region's colonies £150,000.⁷²

Anglo-Americans acknowledged in the winter of 1675-1676 that the forts and garrisons could no longer defend the frontier. In October 1675, Massachusetts's Assembly, although not officially at war, advised frontier communities to evacuate their women and children to more settled areas.⁷³

⁷¹ Major John Pynchon [to Rev. John Russell], October 5, 1675, "Letter on the Burning of Springfield in King Philip's War," *NEHGR* 48 (1894): 317.

⁷² Extracts from Edward Randolph's Report to the Council of Trade, n.d., *NYCD* 3: 243-44; T.M. Thompson, "Number of New England Houses in 1675," *Magazine of American History* 8 (1882): 849-50.

⁷³ *Massachusetts Records*, 4: 48.

Five months later, Indian raids to the North forced Rhode Island to make special provisions to shelter the hundreds of refugees who were flooding into the colony seeking protection from the Wampanoag and Narragansett attacks.⁷⁴ Those settlers that stayed behind to save their homes and fight, wrote John Sharpe were "in expectation of the enemy every day."⁷⁵

Skulking Indians presented the Anglo-Americans with a significant problem: whites were unable to find them so as to fight them. William Harris, writing from Rhode Island in 1676, noted that the Narragansetts did "so many mischiefs in a secret sly, skulking way, no man knew well how to find them."⁷⁶ Nathaniel Saltonstall described the Narragansetts as "being like Wolves, and other Beasts of Prey, that commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by Stealth, dare not come forth out of the Woods and Swamps, where they lay skulking in small Companies, being so light of Foot that they can run away when they list, and pass Bogs, rocky Mountains and thickets, where we could by no Means pursue them."⁷⁷

Benjamin Church had learned first hand the difficulty in fighting and pursuing Narragansett and Wampanoag skulkers. In the fall of 1675 he and his militia company had engaged the Wampanoags in several small

⁷⁴ John R. Bartlett, ed., *Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantation. Volume 2, 1664 to 1677* (Providence: General Assembly of Rhode Island, 1856), 533.

⁷⁵ John Sharpe to Thomas Meekins, January 8, 1676, *NEHGR* 10 (1856): 65.

⁷⁶ William Harris to Sir Joseph Williamson, August 12, 1676, "Letter to Sir Joseph Williamson, August 12, 1676," *Rhode Island Historical Society Collections* 10 (1902): 163.

⁷⁷ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *A New and Further Narrative of the State of New-England, by N.S., 1676*, in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 89.

skirmishes where the Indians regularly defeated the Anglo-Americans.⁷⁸ Church also commanded one of the Anglo-American militia companies on the so-called "Hunger March" that followed the "Great Swamp Fight." After their victory at the Great Swamp, the English decided to conduct an annihilationist campaign against the Narragansetts, just as their predecessors had done against the Pequots in 1637. However, unlike the Pequots, Anglo-Americans could not find the Narragansetts. Instead, they soon found themselves in the middle of enemy territory and without provisions. Their pursuit of the Narragansetts quickly degenerated into an affair of wilderness survival in which they ate their horses rather than starve.⁷⁹

Anglo-Americans, Church thereafter argued, "must make a business of the war as the enemy did."⁸⁰ Although he was still recovering from wounds that he had received at the Swamp Fight, Church took it upon himself in early 1676 to learn the Indian way of skulking. He enlisted the support of a group of friendly Indians, selected a handful of hardy settlers who could survive the rigors of winter campaigning, and set out to search for the Narragansetts.⁸¹ Church's small company traveled northward along the Connecticut River as far as the Nipmuck country (present-day north central Massachusetts --

⁷⁸ Church, *Diary of King Philip's War*, 83-90.

⁷⁹ Ray Gilbert Hawes, "First American Warriors in Battle," *Journal of American History* 4 (1910): 424.

⁸⁰ Church, *Diary of King Philip's War*, 106.

⁸¹ Richard Johnson has argued that from the earliest days of settlement New Englanders attempted to solve the military problems that Indians posed by incorporating Indians into the Anglo-American colonial military structure. See Johnson, "The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial New England," *Journal of American History* 44 (1977): 623-51.

Worcester County) where, Church related in his memoirs, "they had success of killing many of the enemy, until at length, their provisions failing, they returned home."⁸² Although the raid was of only limited military value, it showed Church that whites acting in concert with friendly Indians could adapt to the skulking way of war. The "Nipmuck Expedition" thus inaugurated the Anglo-American ranger tradition.

Church's raid into the Nipmuck country led his fellow Anglo-Americans to see him as "a person extraordinarily qualified for and adapted to the affairs of war."⁸³ Indeed, Church and his handful of men were nearly the only whites who had made any offensive endeavors against the Wampanoags and Narragansetts. Church tried to capitalize on his newly found acclaim and claim a larger role for himself and his developing ideas about ranging. He petitioned Governor Winslow for permission to raise a company of 60 or 70 hand-picked "scouts" for wilderness warfare. Church and his scouts would "not lie in any town or garrison with them [the militia]," he told Winslow, "but would lie in the woods as the enemy did." To do otherwise, he advised, would "be but to deliver so many men into their hands [the Indians'] to be destroyed."⁸⁴

After initially balking at the costs of his company, Governor Winslow commissioned Church in July 1676 to take 60 whites and 140 friendly Indians to "discover, pursue, fight, surprise, destroy, or subdue" the colony's Indian

⁸² Church, *Diary of King Philip's War*, 102-04.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 106.

enemies.⁸⁵ The ratio of whites to Indians in Church's company is instructive, for it sheds light on the mechanics of Anglo-Americans' earliest tradition of ranging. In that early stage, even the best of the Anglo-American Indian fighters like Church knew that without the help of friendly Indians they were no match in the woods against Indian warriors. Similarly, the colonists must have had a terrible time in Indian country without maps and a knowledge of the geography of the areas in which they were expected to operate. Thus Indian guides were imperative to the colonists' operations. Anglo-Americans in fact never could have become rangers without the tutelage of Indian allies. In time, however, as more backwoodsmen learned the skills of ranging, whites came to comprise a greater proportion of ranger units. Before they could realize that potential, however, whites depended on Indians as both allies and teachers.

In the summer of 1676 Church, with his Indian allies and handful of white scouts, began patrolling the Anglo-American frontier, hunting Wampanoags and Narragansetts in what today's military calls "search and destroy missions." Church and the other ranger leaders, including Charles Frost and John Gorham II, engaged the enemy in countless small but deadly skirmishes. Their instructions from their leaders were clear and unambiguous: "in all places & by all ways & means to your power take, kill, & destroy the enemy without limitation of place or time as you shall have opportunity."⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁸⁶ Thomas Danforth to Charles Frost, n.d. [probably Spring 1676], "Indian War Papers," ed. Charles W. Parsons, *NEHGR* 3 (1849): 24.

Church did not have the opportunity to perfect his ideas on ranging in King Philip's War before the Anglo-Americans' Mohawk allies crushed the Narragansetts. At the outbreak of the war in New England, New York's Governor Sir Edmund Andros enlisted the nations of the Iroquois League in the first of several military and diplomatic alliances with the English that in time formed the Covenant Chain -- the system of treaties that eventually led to the dominance of the Iroquois across the colonial Northeast.⁸⁷ By the summer of 1676 disease, as well as combat losses to the Mohawks, had devastated the Wampanoags and Narragansetts. Indeed, Iroquois warriors proved to be the decisive factor in crushing the Wampanoags and the Narragansetts. Without their participation on the side of the Anglo-Americans, it is difficult to imagine an Anglo-American victory over King Philip. Yet King Philip's War sowed the seeds from which the Anglo-American tradition of ranging sprouted.

Near the same time that Church formed his first company of scouts in New England, Southerners moved to create their own ranger tradition. In the Susquehannock War of 1675 Virginians turned to rangers as the first line of defense of the frontier.⁸⁸ The Virginia Burgesses raised an army of 500

⁸⁷ Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 134-142. See also Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual," *HNAI, Volume 15, Northeast*, 418-41. For the role of the Iroquois League in King Philip's War, see Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), 367-71. See also Daniel R. Mandell, *Behind the Frontier: Indians in Eighteenth-Century Eastern Massachusetts* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 22.

⁸⁸ In June 1675 several Doegs of Maryland murdered a swine herder over the issue of some stolen hogs. A party of Virginia militiamen took arms to seek retribution from the Doegs, and upon coming to a party of Doegs and Susquehannocks sleeping in a cabin, murdered them. The murder of the Susquehannocks was a miscalculation of the first order. They had long served as a buffer between Virginia and the Iroquois to the North. Governor William Berkeley ordered an investigation hoping to find the whites responsible for the murder. However, the two militia officers assigned to the investigation summoned 1,000 militia men

men, including 125 mounted horsemen, and placed them at strategic garrisons at the heads of the major rivers where they were, as the law read, to "range" between the garrisons and search out Indians.⁸⁹ In a repeat of King Philip's War, the Mohawks played the decisive role, first shattering and then incorporating Susquehannock bands as they fled into the Virginia backcountry.⁹⁰ Nonetheless, Virginians had gone far toward forging the origins of a Southern ranger tradition, one unique from that of New Englanders. For the most part, New Englanders never developed cavalry or dragoon (mounted-infantry) forces. Yet in the more open areas of the Southern Piedmont, horse-mounted rangers could cover the greater open spaces.⁹¹ As a result, Southerners developed a tradition of ranger warfare in which dragoons and cavalry dominated.⁹²

and then surrounded the main Susquehannock fort at the junction of Piscataway Creek and the Potomac River. When five Susquehannock chiefs ventured forth to demand from the English why they were acting so aggressively, the militiamen seized the chiefs and murdered them. The Susquehannocks, as one might expect, responded in January 1676 with raids that killed 36 white settlers near the falls of the Rappahannock and Potomac Rivers. See Washburn, *Governor and Rebel*, 20-24.

⁸⁹ SAL 2: 327.

⁹⁰ Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 135-36. Stephen Saunders Webb has written that the Iroquois chose to go against the Susquehannocks because, in the best tradition of mourning war, they wanted to "absorb the best of the Susquehanna warriors as the janissaries of the Iroquois." See Webb, 1676, 374.

⁹¹ The densely wooded forests of New York and New England made cavalry operations difficult. In 1756, for instance, Anthony Van Schaick wrote to the Earl of Loudoun that he had made seven trips to the south bay of Lake Champlain "to find a Way, by which a Carriage, or at least a horse might go, but could never find any such." Van Schaick to Loudoun, August 1756, LO 1163. Twenty years later, Major General Charles Lee of the Continental Army noted that in the American South "a body of horse is a *sine qua non*, in a country circumstanced like this." See Lee to the President of Congress, April 19, 1776, *Lee Papers, Collections of the New-York Historical Society* (1871): 434.

⁹² In 1684, the Virginia Burgesses created four troops of mounted rangers to patrol the backcountry against possible Indian excursions. During King William's War, when the threat to Virginia originated in raiders from the Ohio country descending upon the Piedmont,

Ranging proved the only effective means by which Anglo-Americans could strike at their enemies during King William's War.⁹³ Anglo-Americans were on their own in that conflict. New France's Governor, Louis de Baude, comte de Frontenac, effectively isolated the Five Nations from the Anglo-American interest by launching a series of annihilationist raids into Iroquoia. Conducted primarily by New France's Algonquian-speaking allies, those raids pounded the Iroquois -- particularly the Mohawks -- to the point of destruction and made them unable and unwilling to provide the kind of aid the English needed to neutralize the Indians along the New England frontier.⁹⁴ Meanwhile, the Anglo-Americans' attempt to take Quebec with a provincial army in a regular-style operation and thus cut down the "Tree in which those Rooks [the French-allied Abenakis] had their Nests" met with only failure.⁹⁵

the Burgesses again created, in 1691, 1692, 1693, and 1695, troops of horse-mounted rangers. See SAL 3: 17, 82-83; 115, 119, 126.

⁹³ For the details of King William's War, see Steele, *Warpaths*, chap. 7; Leach, *Arms for Empire*, chap. 3.

⁹⁴ For the details of Iroquois participation in the Last of the Beaver Wars (King William's War), see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, chap. 7 and Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 34.

⁹⁵ Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699*, ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 214. In 1690, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and Plymouth planned a two-pronged attack against Canada. But the land army under Colonel Adam Winthrop never received the 1,800 Covenant Chain Iroquois it expected -- the Iroquois were no longer interested in supporting the Anglo-Americans since they had become embroiled in a war with the French and their Iroquois cousins in Canada -- and failed to advance up Lake Champlain. Sir William Phips's sea borne expedition against Quebec fared little better. Although Phips took Port Royal, his army failed to breach the walls of the citadel at Quebec and returned to New England. See *The Revolutionary Government at New York to the Earl of Shrewsbury, June 23, 1690*, CSPC, 1689-1692, #955; Thomas Savage, *Expedition Against Quebec, 1690* (1691; reprint Massachusetts Historical Society *Collections*, 2d ser., 3 [1845]), 256-59.

Abenaki raiders instead ran amok on the Maine and New England frontier, wreaking havoc and destruction wherever they went.⁹⁶

Benjamin Church knew it was useless to fight the Abenakis by attacking the French in Canada. The way to compel the Abenakis to stop raiding white settlements was to march directly against them and annihilate their armies, their homes, their fields, and their women and children. Church thus led in 1689 the first of his "Eastward" (Maine) expeditions against the Abenakis. In 1690, 1692, and 1696 he followed suit with other campaigns to the "Eastward." In each of those campaigns Church's Indian and Anglo-American rangers waged unlimited war, primarily against Abenaki villages and noncombatants.⁹⁷ In the process, the Anglo-American tradition of ranging entered its second stage and Anglo-Americans slowly perfected their own tradition of ranging and began to make it central to military life on the frontier.

As in King Philip's War, Church originally enlisted the support of and depended upon friendly Indians to train him and his men in skulking.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ The Abenaki were divided into two main groups: the Eastern Abenaki and the Western Abenaki. The Eastern Abenaki defined their homelands around the area of present-day Maine between the river drainages of the Penobscot River and the White Mountains. The Western Abenaki lands stretched from the White Mountains in the East to the Champlain Valley, Green Mountains, and Connecticut River Valley in the West. The Southern boundary of the Western Abenaki stretched south of present-day Lake Winnepesaukee, New Hampshire, while the Northern boundary reached the St. Lawrence River. See Dean R. Snow, "Eastern Abenaki," *HNAI, Volume 15, Northeast*, 137-38; Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," *ibid.*, 149. For the role of the Abenakis in the colonial wars, see Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

⁹⁷ Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 161-63.

⁹⁸ Letter from Major Benjamin Church, October 7, 1689, Maine Historical Society Collections, 2d ser., 4: 472. In 1689 whites had formed at least two Indian ranger companies. Those companies consisted of 64 and 34 Indians respectively. See Joseph Prout to the Governor & Council, September 13-19, 1689, *ibid.*, 458. Daniel Mandell, in *Behind the*

Events proved that Anglo-Americans still could not wage little war without Indian allies. In 1689, for instance, Church reported to the Governor and Council of Massachusetts that he could progress no further in to the wilderness because he lacked Indian scouts who were familiar with the land "east" of Casco Bay.

By the middle of the war, however, the best of Church's white rangers, men like John Gorham II and Charles Frost, had learned enough from their Indian teachers to form their own ranger companies. Church and his initial band thus became the mentors to three generations of New England rangers. By the middle of the 1740s, most New England rangers served in units under officers that had a direct connection back to Church. In King Philip's War, for instance, one of Church's subalterns was John Gorham I of Barnstable (now Yarmouth) Massachusetts. Gorham died of wounds he received at the "Great Swamp Fight," but his son John Gorham II served with the ranger company that Church formed in 1676. Twenty years later, in 1696, Gorham II was second in command of the rangers on the "Fourth Expedition" against the Abenakis. During King George's War his grandson John became commander of the Gorham's Rangers. Joseph Gorham, one of John II's other grandsons, commanded Gorham's Rangers through the Seven Years' War and saw combat as an irregular in Nova Scotia, Canada, and Cuba.⁹⁹

Frontier, 51, shows that in 1701 the Massachusetts Assembly gave 190 acres to their Indian allies in Massachusetts who had fought in King Philip's and King William's Wars. Records also suggest that Church may have had soldiers of African descent in his army. Silvanus Davis, a Captain of rangers, wrote that "Major Church & his soldiers *Both White & Black*" (*italics mine*) arrived at Fort Loyal." See Silvanus Davis to Governor and Council, *ibid.*, 455. In 1690 there were an estimated 400 blacks residing in Massachusetts. See *Hist. Stats.*, 756.

⁹⁹ For the genealogical record of the Gorham family, see "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' and the Gorham Family," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record* 28 (1897): 133-36, 197-201. For a partial summary of the Gorham family's military service, see Frank W. Sprague, "Barnstable Gorhams: The Old House in which They Lived, and Their Services in

The military lineage of the Gorham clan suggests an intriguing point about the connection between the Anglo-American way of war and the ranger tradition. The careers of John Gorham, his son, and grandsons suggest that ranging became a way of life for successive generations of New England backwoodsmen among whom a "corporate knowledge" of forest warfare passed down from generation to generation. John Gorham, the irregular leader of King George's War, was not born a ranger, but there may have been something in his cultural inheritance that made him one. Students of colonial military history will recognize John Gorham from his service during the provincial siege of Louisbourg in 1745. In that campaign he served admirably, led the landing of the New England army, and commanded the failed provincial assault on the Island Battery.¹⁰⁰ Who better than John Gorham, whose great-grandfather and grandfather had both served with Benjamin Church, to lead the Anglo-American rangers of King George's War? Tales of campaigns past in all likelihood furnished a store of practical lessons passed down to the younger Gorhams, and applied time after time in New England's wars.

The Gorhams were not alone in tracing a tradition of ranger service across the generations. The Lovewell family, of Dunstable, Massachusetts (present-day Nashua, New Hampshire), also traced a direct line from Church through the Seven Years' War. John Lovewell I fought along Church and

the Colonial Wars," *NEHGR* 50 (1896): 32-34 and John Gorham, "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' Facsimiles," ed. Frank W. Sprague, *ibid.*, 52 (1898): 186-92. See also John Gorham, "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' and His Dayly Journal," ed. George Ernest Bowman, *Mayflower Descendent* 2 (1903): 172-80; John Gorham, "Gorham Letters, with Facsimiles," *ibid.*, 3 (1904): 181-84; and Anon., "Barnstable, Mass., Vital Records," *ibid.*, 33 (1935): 139-42.

¹⁰⁰ Charles Hudson, "Louisbourg Soldiers," *NEHGR* 24 (1870): 374, 376.

Gorham at the "Great Swamp Fight." His son, John Lovewell II, became the most famous land privateer of Father R  le's War. At the time of his death in 1725, the younger Lovewell's wife Hannah was pregnant with their son, Nehemiah. During the Seven Years' War, Captain Nehemiah Lovewell commanded a ranger company for New Hampshire.¹⁰¹

From Lovewell's ranger and Indian fighting companies emerged another family that could trace its ranger service across two wars. Although John Lovewell met his end hunting Indians in 1725, two brothers who were members of his privateering company, Eleazer and David Melven, survived "Lovewell's Fight." Both Eleazer and David went on to serve in the provincial army that besieged Louisbourg in 1745 during King George's War. In 1748 they enlisted as New Hampshire rangers. Eleazer became Captain Melven, and his brother became a lieutenant.¹⁰²

Taken together, the military lineages of the Gorhams, Lovewells, and Melvens point to the multifaceted nature of war in eighteenth-century North America. Within the Anglo-American military tradition there existed more than enough room for rangers, men experienced in Indian fighting. The "experience" of battle is an important distinction to make. Untold numbers of white males served in the colonial militias and with provincial armies mustered for King William's and King George's Wars. Yet the Americans who most frequently experienced combat before the Seven Years' War, and thus who stamped the colonial military tradition with a force disproportionate to

¹⁰¹ Thompson Maxwell, "The Narrative of Major Thompson Maxwell," Essex Institute, *Historical Collections* 7 (1865): 98.

¹⁰² Eleazer Melven, "Journal of Captain Eleazer Melven," New Hampshire Historical Society *Collections* 5 (1837): 207.

their numbers, were the rangers. Only the militiamen who volunteered to serve as rangers experienced battle with any regularity before large-scale provincial service.

The rangers, nonetheless, could do only so much to protect the frontier. Even with, and perhaps in because of, Church's, Gorham's, and Frost's men patrolling the countryside and subjecting Abenaki villages to annihilation, Indian and French war parties continued to burn settlements and kill and capture settlers all along the Anglo-American frontier. Indeed, by the end of King William's War, Anglo-Americans realized that annihilationist war waged by the growing but still small corps of frontiersmen skilled in ranging did not guarantee the security of the frontier. Upon surveying the situation that faced them, however, Anglo-Americans realized that in their traditions of annihilationist war and their growing familiarity with ranging lay the potential to strike crushing blows against the Indian enemies. What colonial governments needed was a mechanism to increase the number of irregulars operating against Indians on the frontier. The tool that Anglo-Americans developed to attain that goal was land privateering.

The ordeal of Hannah Dustan of Haverhill, Massachusetts suggests where the Anglo-American way of war was headed near the start of the eighteenth century. It was becoming a way of war in which individual action and a willingness to war against noncombatants would dominate Anglo-American warcraft.

In March 1697, an Abenaki war party descended on Haverhill and captured Dustan, her newborn child, and her nurse, Mary Neff. Over the course of the next two weeks twelve Abenakis -- two men, three women, and seven children -- prodded Dustan and Neff 150 miles toward Canada

where they intended to either enslave/adopt them or sell them to the French. In the first mile of the march Dustan, too weak to carry her baby, passed the child to Neff. Neff, however, soon tired, at which point an Abenaki warrior ripped the child from Neff's arms and "dashed out the Brains of the Infant, against a Tree."¹⁰³ Dustan resolved to take vengeance on her Abenaki captors. Nearly two weeks after her capture, while still on the march toward Canada, Dustan took a tomahawk from one of her captors while he slept. She waited until just before dawn and then struck at the murderers of her child. She, Neff, and another captive taken from Worcester, Massachusetts, crushed the skulls of the Abenaki men. Only one Indian adult escaped -- an old woman who Dustan wounded with a hatchet blow to the head. One of the children, whom Dustan had planned to transport back to Boston and sell as a slave, awoke in the ruckus and fled into the woods. Dustan then methodically scalped her victims. When she related her tale to the Massachusetts General Assembly and presented it with ten Indian scalps, it rewarded her with £50.¹⁰⁴

Dustan's awareness of the pecuniary value of her victims' scalps points to the place that scalping and land privateering already had come to occupy in the Anglo-American way of war.¹⁰⁵ Hunting for Indians and

¹⁰³ Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, 263-66.

¹⁰⁴ *An Historical Sketch of Haverhill, in the County of Essex, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts; with Biographical Notices*, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 2d ser., 4 (1846): 129.

¹⁰⁵ For the origins of scalping, see James Axtell and William C. Sturtevant, "The Unkindest Cut, or, Who Invented Scalping?" *WMQ* 37 (1980): 451-472. Axtell and Sturtevant argue that scalping was a pre-contact Indian practice, but one that Europeans adopted and incorporated into their own cultures of war making.

scalps, after King William's War, became one of the primary means by which Anglo-Americans could strike directly at their Indian enemies on the colonial frontier. Whites originally used scalp bounties as rewards aimed at getting friendly Indian to search out and kill hostile Indians. As Anglo-American rangers perfected their skills in wilderness fighting, many of them took up scalp hunting in their own right. Colonial governments capitalized on the increased white interest in scalping and offered more and larger bounties on Indians' heads. In the process, there began the wholesale privatization of war within Anglo-American frontier communities. In the end, Anglo-Americans thus combined their way of unlimited war with the burgeoning tradition of ranging to create a complementary tradition of land privateering.

Scalp bounties -- separate from bounties on Indian heads that Connecticut and Massachusetts had offered in the Pequot War -- first appeared in the laws of the Anglo-American colonies in the mid-1670s.¹⁰⁶ In the Susquehannock War, for instance, the Virginia House of Burgesses offered a reward of one matchcoat or twenty arm's lengths of tobacco for every Indian captive.¹⁰⁷ In King Philip's War, Plymouth colony put a bounty of trucking cloth worth five shillings on each Wampanoag "head skin." For King Philip's scalp the reward was 100 shillings (£5).¹⁰⁸ The practice

¹⁰⁶ During the Pequot War Englishmen received bounties for the heads of Indian enemies. Elizabethan Englishmen decapitated untold numbers of Irishmen in their campaigns there.

¹⁰⁷ SAL, 2: 348.

¹⁰⁸ Nathaniel Saltonstall, *The Present State of New-England*, in *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, ed. Lincoln, 34. After killing King Philip in August 1676, Church and his men returned to Plymouth where they "received their premium, which was thirty shillings per head for all enemies which they had killed or taken, instead of wages. And Philip's head went at the same price." See Church, *Diary of King Philip's War*, 156.

continued following those wars. In July 1689, at the start of King William's War, Massachusetts declared that each soldier would receive £8 out of the public treasury for each Indian scalp, "and whatever Indian plunder falls into their hands shall be their own."¹⁰⁹

Governments that have not had the resources to conduct regular military operations often have resorted to privateering.¹¹⁰ At the outbreak of Queen Anne's War the New England colonies found themselves bankrupt in allies. They would have to wage their desperate struggle against the Abenakis alone.¹¹¹ The French, in 1701, had won an important military and diplomatic coup against the English when the Iroquois League agreed to peace with them in the "Grand Settlement."¹¹² The "Grand Settlement" thus precluded Iroquois warriors from "taking up the hatchet" in the service of New England as they had done in King Philip's War. With the Iroquois refusing to wage war against the government of New France or the Indians of Canada,

¹⁰⁹ Maine Historical Society *Collections*, 2d ser., 9: 7. The previous year the Governor of Canada instructed his Indian allies to strike at the English and their Indian allies and "kill all what you can, bring no prisoners but their scalps, and I'll give ten beavers for every one of them." See Examination of Magsigpen, an Indian, September 15, 1688, *NYCD*, 3: 562.

¹¹⁰ For the place of naval privateering in the imperial wars, particularly in the War of Jenkins' Ear and King George's War, see Carl E. Swanson, "American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748," *WMQ* 42 (1985): 357-82. In those conflicts, Swanson argues, "privateering operations played the leading role in America's war effort." For the role that offers of plunder had in encouraging men to enlist in provincial land armies, see Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 280.

¹¹¹ For the details of Queen Anne's War, see Steele, *Warpaths*, 151-60; Leach, *Arms for Empire*, chap. 4.

¹¹² For the long and complicated train of events that preceded and resulted in the "Grand Settlement" see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, chaps 7-9. The League agreed to peace with France, and thus neutrality in the Anglo-Franco conflict, at a conference held at Montreal.

the colonial government in New York, it then claimed, could not dare risk to enter a war in support of New England.

New Englanders thus turned to rangers and land privateers to fight the Indians in Queen Anne's War.¹¹³ Whereas in port towns colonial governors issued ship captains letters of marque, in frontier communities they commissioned ranger captains on similar terms.¹¹⁴ Colonial leaders asked little of prospective Indian hunters other than they enlist in a company sanctioned by the colonial government, one "under a proper officer, to be appointed and commissioned by the captain-general or commander-in-chief."¹¹⁵ Massachusetts, for example, offered £10 for "every Scalp of an Indian Enemy killed in fight, that is ten Years of age."¹¹⁶ When that bounty proved too small to attract sufficient numbers of land privateers, the General

¹¹³ Queen Anne's War also saw two failed Anglo-American attacks on Port Royal in 1707. In 1711 a joint Anglo-American and British armada, including seven regiments of the duke of Marlborough's battle-hardened troops from Europe set out for Quebec. At the same time 2,300 provincial troops headed North from Albany toward Montreal. At the mouth of the St. Lawrence River in the early morning of August 24 Sir Hovenden Walker lost ten ships, including eight transports filled with soldiers, in a storm. His council of war advised him to sail for England. When the provincials on the overland route turned back to Albany the regular operations of the war ended. See Colonel King to Mr. Secretary St. John, September 11, 1711, *CSPC, 1711-1712, #94-1*; Resolution of Council of War of Sea and Land Officers Held on Board *H.M.S. Edgar* in the Spanish River, September 8, 1711, *ibid.*, #92-3. For the fighting in the South in Queen Anne's War, see chap. 2, note 7.

¹¹⁴ For a typical letter of marque, see *CVSP*, 1: 236. In 1740 William Gooch, the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia and the Commander in Chief of the colony, granted a letter of marque to Captain John Copeland of the *Happy*, a 200-ton ship with 16 guns and a crew of 25. Gooch authorized Copeland "to set forth in a Warlike manner" and "apprehend, seize and take the Ships Vessels and Goods belonging to Spain, or the Vassals and Subjects of the King of Spain or others Inhabiting within any of his Countries, Territories and Dominions." Upon returning from his voyage, Copeland was to report to the Admiralty to settle his account and receive rewards for his prizes.

¹¹⁵ *LOMBC*, October 1704: 558.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, October 1703, 32.

Assembly first increased it to £20 per head and then eventually to £100 per scalp of each adult Indian male capable of bearing arms. For women above ten years old the bounty stood at £10. Children under ten were to be taken captive and then sold into slavery, with the profits from the sale going to the scalp hunters.¹¹⁷

Of course, "adult," "capable," and "child" were discretionary terms dependent on the judgment of the land privateer. Although the bounties were graduated by age and sex, more than any other institutionalized practice, scalp bounties erased within both the Anglo-American culture at large and the culture of war making the distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Indeed, many a privateer must have faced a financial, though probably not moral, dilemma. After all, the killing of noncombatants was an outgrowth of the seventeenth-century practice of unlimited war. Should the privateer, nonetheless, kill and scalp an Indian child under ten and then claim the child was "capable of bearing arms" and collect a guaranteed £20 or £100, or should the privateer transport the child to Boston where he would receive the profits from selling the child into slavery? Of course, not every scalp procured was taken by a hunter in a commissioned body. Thus it is probable, though impossible to prove, that a black market in scalps may have arisen.

Scalp hunting offered Anglo-American frontiersmen acting as *entrepreneurs de guerre* a means of earning replacement income during times of war when frontier settlers otherwise would have evacuated their

¹¹⁷ For Massachusetts' scalp bounties in Queen Anne's War see *ibid.*, September 1703: 530; October 1703: 31-32; March 1704: 44-45; October 1704: 558; August 1706: 594; March 1706/07: 600.

homes for the protection of the forts.¹¹⁸ At a time when the daily wages of laborers rarely exceeded two shillings, the promise of a bounty of £10 (200 shillings) must have seemed appealing.¹¹⁹ In the records of the Massachusetts General Assembly, for instance, there are several accounts of individuals receiving relatively large rewards for scalps. In 1698, for example, Massachusetts paid Benjamin Wright and thirteen of his compatriots £22 for the scalp of an Indian they killed. In 1704, William Southworth and his forty men each received £4.3s.4d for the four scalps they presented to the Assembly. The same year, the Assembly paid Thomas How

¹¹⁸ André Corvisier used the term *entrepreneur de guerre* to describe the *condottieri* that hired out the services of their personal companies of mercenaries to the Italian city-states during the Renaissance. The *condottieri* had little other than pecuniary interest in the wars they fought, and as such generally shied away from battle, preferring to collect their pay and live to "earn" another day. While in time European states replaced the *condottieri* with professional armies that owed and maintained loyalty to the state to which they served, in colonial America Indian hunters acting as *entrepreneurs de guerre* remained a central component of the military scene well into the eighteenth century. See Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789*, trans. Abigail T. Siddal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 42. Swanson, in "American Privateering," notes that there was a strong correlation between urban development and participation in naval privateering. In port communities there existed a ready pool of experienced seamen and merchants willing to take the risks associated with privateering. See Swanson, "American Privateering," 363. On the frontier there existed another pool of Anglo-Americans willing to take many of the same risks as land privateers.

¹¹⁹ *Hist. Stats.*, 771. For estimates of the average wages of skilled and farm laborers in New England from 1630 to 1774, see Gloria Main, "Gender, Work, and Wages in Colonial New England," *WMQ* 51 (1994), 48. She estimates, for example, that only between 1735 and 1764 did the average daily wage for a skilled laborer in New England approach 2 shillings (24 pence Sterling). For the rest of the period between 1630 and 1774, daily wages for skilled workers averaged between 16.3d and 18.5d (Sterling). John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, in *The Economy of British North America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1991), 61, show that the average wealth per free white person in New England in 1774 was only £33 (Pounds Sterling). Even accounting for deflation that accompanied the conversion of provincial funds into Pounds Sterling, scalp bounties offered a relative economic windfall. For a graph showing comparative price indices that suggest the relative purchasing power of the moneys received from scalp bounties, see Gloria L. Main and Jackson T. Main, "The Red Queen in New England?," *WMQ* 56 (1999): 129.

£10, Samuel Partridge £10, Caleb Lyman £21, and a certain Captain Wells £60 for scalps. In 1709 the Assembly paid Captain Wright and his company of nine men, "having lately made a march to Canada against the Indian Enemy, and have had the good Success to Kill (as they suppose) seven or eight of said Enemy, One of whose Scalps they recovered & brought in," £66.¹²⁰ Even in times of peace, the colonial governments continued to pay out bounties on both Indian and French scalps. The Privy Council, for instance, issued a report detailing how in 1750 -- two years after King George's War ended in the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle -- Anglo-Americans paraded French scalps through the streets of New York City. The Indians who had brought in the scalps were "handsomely treated by the Council and gentlemen of this City, and afterwards by the Assembly."¹²¹

The killing of noncombatants, as manifested in Indian hunting, had again received official Anglo-American state sanction and, in the process, been made into an exceedingly lucrative endeavor. In 1722, Noah Ashley received a financial windfall: the Massachusetts Assembly passed resolution allowing him to collect £100 for an Abenaki scalp he had taken several months earlier on an Indian-hunting expedition.¹²² In the end, through land privateering, Anglo-American society besides commercializing war had sanctioned the killing of noncombatants as a legitimate act of war.

¹²⁰ LOMBC, October 1698: 198; March 1704: 48; October 1704: 83, 90; May 1709: 62.

¹²¹ Abstract of the Evidence in the Books of the Lords of Trade Relating to New York, n.d., NYCD, 6: 647.

¹²² LOMBC, November 1722: 237.

With scalp hunting entering on a large scale into the Anglo-American way of war during Queen Anne's War, each of the individual elements in the colonial tradition of war fell into place. Over the course of King Philip's War, the Susquehannock War, King William's War, and Queen Anne's War, Anglo-Americans had created in two phases a ranger tradition and a tradition of land privateering. In the first phase Anglo-Americans in New England depended upon Indians to teach them how to skulk, while Anglo-Americans in Virginia developed the practices of mounted ranger warfare. In the second phase in the evolution, colonists began to conceptualize the character and limits of irregular war to establish a white "corporate knowledge" that successive generations of rangers employed in the mid-eighteenth century. During Queen Anne's War, when New Englanders faced Abenaki and French raiders without substantial Indian allies, frontier war increasingly became tied to issues of fiscal economy. Massachusetts thus turned to land privateering to increase the number of Anglo-Americans in the field against the enemy. By the end of that war, privateering had served its military function and entered the Anglo-American economy and the culture of war making.

PHASE III: THE COALESCENCE OF A COLONIAL ANGLO-AMERICAN WAY OF WAR, 1711 to 1727

After 1711, in the period when Anglo-Americans again found themselves waging war against Indians only, whites combined the three distinct core elements of annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering into a single, unified Anglo-American way of war that was irregular in character and unlimited in scope. In the Tuscarora War (1711-1713), the

Yamasee War (1715-1722), and Father Râle's War (1722-1727), Anglo-Americans directed their efforts at war making on the complete destruction of their enemies by irregular means. By the end of the 1720s, that focus had produced practices not unlike the "savage rule of war" described by Thomas Jefferson in 1779 -- one that focused on the conquest, control, and destruction of enemy noncombatant populations.

Following Queen Anne's War, the center of military activity for Anglo-Americans shifted southward into Virginia and the Carolinas. While New England and New York remained at peace in the 1710s, the Tuscarora and Yamasee Wars wracked the Virginia and Carolina frontiers. Both those wars marked transitional episodes between the second and third phases in the development of the Anglo-American way of war. In them Anglo-Americans used only ranging focused against the enemy's civilian population. Colonial governments gave little consideration to establishing static defenses or expending resources on anything other than ranging and land privateering.

In September 1711, after the Iroquoian Tuscaroras of North Carolina began the war that took their name by killing a handful of Indian traders and dozens of white and black settlers on the frontier, Anglo-Americans combined annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering to defend their homes and communities. Soon after the initial Tuscarora attacks, the Virginia House of Burgesses raised several companies of rangers, with the instruction to search out enemy Indians and either seize or kill them. To facilitate the adequate defense of the frontier, the Burgesses also privatized ranger service with a

£20 bounty on Indian scalps.¹²³ South Carolina was more direct in providing aid to North Carolina.¹²⁴ Its Assembly authorized military expeditions under John Barnwell and James Moore to take the war to the Tuscaroras. As they prepared for the expeditions against the Tuscaroras -- a nation with somewhere between 1,200 and 1,400 fighting men in 15 villages -- South Carolina enlisted the support of 800 "tributary savages" to complement its meager force of 50 rangers.¹²⁵ By 1711 a long-standing ranger tradition had developed in the Chesapeake, but South Carolina, with only just over 4,000 white settlers, lagged behind in the number of rangers it could field.

The South Carolinians, nonetheless, pounced with "fury upon parts of the Tuscarora nation."¹²⁶ The joint Anglo-Indian army methodically marched through the Tuscarora country, laid siege to Tuscarora villages, massacred their inhabitants, and then marched on to repeat the process. Barnwell wrote that the English ferocity shocked the Yamasees and the Catawbass, just as

¹²³ SAL, 4: 8. Virginia claimed that it previously had concluded a treaty of peace with the Tuscaroras and therefore was unable to supply North Carolina with anything other than what today would be called humanitarian assistance. See William L. Saunders and Walter Clark, comps. and eds., *The State Records of North Carolina*, 30 vols. (1886-1914; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1968-1978), 1: 836-837.

¹²⁴ On November 3, 1711 South Carolina's assembly voted to send John Barnwell's expedition against the Tuscaroras and authorized a generous £4,000 for expenses. See *ibid.*, 1: 811-12.

¹²⁵ Douglas W. Boyce, "Iroquoian Tribes of the Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain," *HNAI, Volume 15, Northeast*, 288. The roster of the Indians that joined the white army reads like a roll call of the major Indian nations of the Southeast. Among them were Yamasees, Appalachees, Pedees, Catawbass, and others. See John Barnwell, "Journal of John Barnwell," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 5 (1897): 391-402. For the population of South Carolina, see *Hist. Stats.*, 756, and Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1974), 152.

¹²⁶ *Records of North Carolina*, 1: 954.

white actions had appalled the Narragansetts during the Pequot War. "It was Terror to our own heathen friend behold us," wrote Barnwell, as his men "executed" the enemy.¹²⁷

The destruction directed at the Tuscaroras was truly an unlimited war. Throughout the conflict Anglo-Americans spared neither Tuscarora women nor children. Indeed, time spent killing of noncombatants often precluded whites from the more lucrative plundering of Indian villages. Upon seizing one Indian village, for instance, Barnwell's Indian allies quickly set about plundering the town while the white soldiers killed women and children. There still remained, it seems, differences between the Anglo-American and Indian conceptions of war. The native allies of the war were in it for the booty and spoils of war as well as captives. The Anglo-Americans, on the other hand, fought to annihilate the Tuscaroras. Although Barnwell bemoaned that his men missed out on some easy plunder, he nonetheless deemed the "battle" a success: his men killed and scalped 52 Indians, including 10 women; a man not averse to profit, he also took 30 women and sold them into slavery.¹²⁸ Enslavement, indeed, became a leading point of the Anglo-Americans' campaigns against the Tuscaroras. While no one knows exactly how many Tuscaroras perished in the war -- the number certainly was in the thousands -- whites sold at least 400 Tuscaroras into slavery.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Barnwell, "Journal of John Barnwell," 394.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ Peter H. Wood, "Indian Servitude in the Southeast," *HNAI, Volume 4, History of Indian-White Relations*, 408.

The Anglo-American unlimited-irregular war against the Tuscaroras continued until the Indians could no longer endure white attacks on their villages. In March 1713, in one of the largest engagements of the war, James Moore and his Anglo-American and Indian force fell on the Tuscarora "fort" of "No-ho-ro-co." The battle of No-ho-ro-co quickly became a slaughter. Over 360 Indians died trying to defend the fort. At the end of the day 192 Indians had been scalped and another 392 taken prisoner.¹³⁰ In the wake of their crushing defeat, 1,500 surviving Tuscaroras fled North to New York to seek protection in the Iroquois League, while another 1,500 fled to Virginia.¹³¹

The Yamasee War of 1715-1722 offered Anglo-Americans another opportunity to build upon their tradition of unlimited-irregular war.¹³² During that conflict Anglo-American rangers proved they were more than a match for Yamasee raiders. The origins of their success resided in the Tuscarora War. In the wake of that war South Carolina had passed a law creating a company to serve full-time as the front-line defense of the colony.¹³³ When in 1715 after the Yamasees struck several plantations, Captain George Chicken thus

¹³⁰ CVSP, 1: 27.

¹³¹ Dorothy Jones, "British Colonial Indian Treaties," *HNAI, Volume 4, History of Indian-White Relations*, 192; Boyce, "Iroquoian Tribes of the Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain," 287. The Tuscaroras thereafter became the sixth nation with the Iroquois League.

¹³² In April 1715 the Yamasees of South Carolina, allies of the whites during the Tuscarora War, killed several British traders, inspiring several other tribes, including the Creeks and Catawbans, to take arms against the English. In the spring and summer of 1715 Indians attacked the frontier plantations of the South Carolina lowlands and drove most of the white inhabitants to Charles Town, where disease and starvation proved as much of a threat to the existence of the colony as the Yamasees.

¹³³ Boyce, "Iroquoian Tribes of the Virginia-North Carolina Coastal Plain," 285-86.

had on hand a ready force with which to counter the Indians' raids. On June 13, 1715, Chicken's rangers and militia ambushed a group of Yamasees headed for a raid on the outskirts of Charleston. At the end of the battle, 60 Yamasee warriors were dead and the Indian threat to Charleston lifted.

The most important element in the Anglo-Americans' success in the Yamasee War, however, was South Carolina's privatization of the conflict. Upon the outbreak of hostilities South Carolina had appealed to land privateers and the other mainland British colonies for military assistance. White scalp hunters rushed to service of the colony while other whites armed their black slaves, many of whom were skilled frontiersmen, to destroy the Yamasees. The joint white-black army, one contemporary of the war noted, was "to protect the Settlements till the crops are all got in & then march to fight the Enemy where they can find them."¹³⁴ Governor Robert Hunter of New York, meanwhile, enticed the Iroquois of the Covenant Chain to travel to the Carolinas -- away from the French in Canada -- with the promise of blunder and booty to war against the Yamasees and their allies. In the fall of 1715 Iroquois war parties, including 70 Tuscaroras, attacked and destroyed the towns of the Yamasees' Cheraw allies.¹³⁵ The Iroquois attacks drove

¹³⁴ Quoted in Wood, *Black Majority*, 128. "In simple proportional terms," Wood has written, "Negroes may never have played such a major role in any earlier or later American conflict as the did in the Yamasee War of 1715. See Wood, *Black Majority*, 127. Daniel Usner reports that in the Lower Mississippi Valley French settlers likewise armed their slaves against the Choctaws and Chickasaws. See Daniel Usner, Jr. *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley Before 1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1990).

¹³⁵ For the Indian participation in the 1715 campaign, see James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 76-78. For a general account of the Yamasee War, see Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

the Creeks and Catawbias from the Yamasees' camp. By 1717 the Anglo-American armies had crushed the Yamasees in South Carolina. In the face of the onslaught they had little choice but to retreat to Florida and the protection of the Spanish.¹³⁶

The year 1717, while signaling the end of Indian wars in the South, was the year that conflict was rekindled between the Eastern Abenakis and New England in Father R  le's War (also called Dummer's War, Lovewell's War, and Gray Lock's War).¹³⁷ In that conflict, waged without help from either Great Britain or the Iroquois, annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering combined into a now-definable Anglo-American pattern of unlimited-irregular war.

Land privateering shaped the events of Father R  le's War throughout the conflict. In 1717 a land dispute over several English settlements along the Kennebec River had exacerbated the already acrimonious feelings between the English and the Abenakis.¹³⁸ The Abenakis turned to Father

¹³⁶ For the next eleven years Yamasees launched sporadic raids against the Anglo-American frontier in South Carolina, and not until 1728, after a South Carolina raid against the main Yamasee village in Florida did the Yamasee War "officially" end. See Douglas Edward Leach, "Colonial Indian Wars," *HNAI, Volume 4, History of Indian-White Relations*, 140. For the final action of the Yamasee War, see chap. 2, note 8.

¹³⁷ By the early 1720s, Jesuit Father S  bastien R  le had lived among the Eastern Abenakis of Maine at his mission at Norridgewock on the Kennebec River for over twenty years. R  le arrived in America in 1690, and after spending time among the Illinois, he established a mission at Norridgewock. By 1703, his influence among the Indians was such that R  le claimed that the Abenakis "would take up the hatchet whenever" he pleased. See Abstract of Certain Parts of a Despatch from Messrs. [Philippe de Rigaud, marquis] de Vaudreuil and [Charles, marquis de] Beauharnois; with Notes by the Minister, November 15, 1703, *NYCD*, 9: 755.

¹³⁸ The English, the Abenaki claimed, had violated the Treaty of Utrecht when they built eight blockhouses and settled over 200 men, women, and children on Abenaki lands. See Messrs. de Vaudreuil and [Michel] B  gon to the Council of Marine, October 17, 1722, *ibid.*, 9: 910.

Râle as their spokesman, and he promised his flock that he would write a letter to the Governor of Massachusetts to protest the English seizure of the Abenaki lands. Râle's letter demanding that the English evacuate Abenaki lands reached Lieutenant Governor William Dummer in Boston in the summer of 1721. The Massachusetts General Assembly earlier had judged Râle an "Incendiary" who had treated the settlers along the Kennebec in an "insolent and hostile manner" and placed a £100 bounty on his head.¹³⁹ When Dummer forwarded to the Assembly Râle's letter it authorized funding to raise 300 rangers to seize Râle and transport him to Boston for trial.¹⁴⁰ Near the same time Massachusetts's assembly offered first £60 and then £100 rewards for Abenaki scalps.¹⁴¹

Anglo-American rangers played an important part of Father Râle's War. The Iroquois, in spite of the offer of a £1,000 gift, refused to join the Anglo-Americans in their war against Râle and the Abenakis. In the winter of 1721-1722 it therefore was up to rangers and land privateers to capture Râle at his mission at Norridgewock. One party managed to reach the mission only to find that an Abenaki scout had warned Râle of the Anglo-Americans' advance, allowing the priest to escape with the mission's chalice and crucifix. The rangers pursued Râle for across the wilderness of Maine until, growing

¹³⁹ For the details of Râle's letter, see Messers. de Vaudreuil and Begon to Louis XV, October 8, 1721, *ibid.*, 9, 903. For Massachusetts's bounty on Râle, see *LOMBC*, July 1720: 14. In 1690 one French official in New France aptly remarked that the Anglo-Americans regarded "all our Missionaries as their most bitter enemies, whom they will not tolerate amongst the Indians within their reach." See M. [Jacques René de Brisay, marquis] de Denonville to M. [Jean-Baptiste, marquis] de Seignelay, January 1690, *NYCD*, 9: 440.

¹⁴⁰ *LOMBC*, August 1721, 112.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, July 1720: 14; November 1721: 126; May 1722: 204; August 1722: 258.

tired of the chase, they returned to Norridgewock and plundered the church and missionary's house. They also left a note posted to the door of the chapel boasting that they would return the next spring to relieve Father R  le of his scalp.¹⁴²

The Abenakis and their allies the Micmacs and Caughnawagas responded with raids into Massachusetts, Maine, and Nova Scotia.¹⁴³ With Indians taking the initiative by harassing the English, the government in France covertly supported their Indian allies. Louis XV's Council advised Governor Vaudreuil "that it is not expedient that the French appear in this war, but it is proper, at the same time, that Sieur de Vaudreuil do secretly encourage the other nations to assist the Abenakis."¹⁴⁴ Over the next two years Abenakis, Micmacs, and Caughnawaga mission Iroquois attacked the

¹⁴² Messers. de Vaudreuil and Begon to the Council of Marine, October 17, 1722, *NYCD*, 9: 910. Upon the failure of the first ranger company to capture R  le, Massachusetts increased the bounty on R  le's head to £200. See *LOMBC*, November 1721: 126.

¹⁴³ The Micmacs were the northernmost of the Eastern Algonquian speakers. They dominated the area surrounding Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island, Prince Edward Island and the Northern coastal area of New Brunswick. In the seventeenth century they developed amicable relations with the French, and in time intermarried with the Acadians. See Philip K. Bock, "Micmac," *HNAI*, Volume 15, *Northeast*, 109-10.

By the start of the eighteenth century, several hundred Mohawks had settled at various French missions on the south side of the Saint Lawrence River, south of Montreal. The Indians' main settlement was named Caughnawaga, after the castle in the Mohawk Valley from which the Iroquois first emigrated to Canada. See William N. Fenton and Elisabeth Tooker, "Mohawk," *HNAI*, vol. 15., *Northeast*, 469-72. In 1689, Covenant Chain Iroquois had raided the Caughnawaga settlement at Lachine and carried off more than 120 captives and massacred over 200 Indians. See Summary of Intelligence from Canada, 1689, 1690, *NYCD*, 9: 435. The Caughnawagas responded with the destruction of Schenectady the next year and became determined enemies of the Anglo-Americans. See M. de Monseignat, Narrative of the Most Remarkable Occurrences in Canada, 1689, 1690. *ibid.*, 9: 468-69. The Caughnawagas also participated in Frontenac's expedition against the Iroquois in 1696, and the allied themselves with the French in Queen Anne's War where they participated in the raid on Deerfield in 1704.

¹⁴⁴ Louis XV to Messers. de Vaudreuil and Begon, May 30, 1724, *NYCD*, 9: 936.

Anglo-American frontier. One party of Micmacs assaulted Port Royal, destroyed several English homes there, killed a number of settlers, and drove the garrison into the fort. On another foray, Micmacs seized 14 English fishing ketches and took nearly 100 captives. Western Abenaki from the Jesuit mission at Saint Francis de Sales sent out war parties against western Massachusetts, as did the Caughnawagas. Governor Vaudreuil wrote the Council of the Marine that it seemed that the Indians had finally won, and indeed, by the spring of 1724 the situation was so critical on the Maine frontier that Dummer ordered its evacuation. Although the inhabitants then were, from Boston's perspective, safe in their garrisons, Captain John Penhallow wrote to Dummer that "the Indians are still skulking about, having discovered how weak the garrisons are."¹⁴⁵ Operations on the frontier again would fall to the rangers.

Râle, meanwhile, felt little but disdain for the Anglo-Americans. "Did you ever see them come to attack you in the spring, summer, or in the fall," Râle asked another priest, "when they [the Anglo-Americans] knew you were in your habitations?" "For if they knew there were but twelve men in your dwellings," Râle continued, "they dare not approach you with one hundred."¹⁴⁶

Râle's contempt for the Anglo-Americans' military prowess cost him his life. On July 12, 1724, four companies of rangers led by Captain Johnson Harman caught up with him at Norridgewock. Harman had set out with the

¹⁴⁵ Penhallow to Dummer, April 29, 1724, "Documentary History of the State of Maine, Containing the Baxter Manuscripts," ed. James Phinney Baxter, Maine Historical Society *Collections*, 10: 197; Penhallow to Dummer, 18 May 1724, *ibid.*, 10: 199-200.

¹⁴⁶ Father Rallé [Râle] to Another Priest, August 1724, *CSPC, 1724-1725*, #740-13.

intention to not only capture Rôle, but also to destroy the mission. The Anglo-American rangers succeeded in approaching the Abenakis' settlement undetected, entered the village, and began killing and burning before its inhabitants could muster an adequate defense.¹⁴⁷

There are conflicting accounts of Father Rôle's death in the battle. Samuel Niles wrote that upon discovering the Anglo-Americans in the village Rôle emerged from his cabin prepared to fight and "refused to give or take quarter when offered him."¹⁴⁸ Governor Vaudreuil offered a different account of the death of the missionary. He told how Rôle, upon hearing the noise of English muskets, stepped from the door of his cabin and was immediately shot dead by a volley of English musket fire.¹⁴⁹ Contradictory reports also cloud other facts of the fight, including the total number of Indian casualties. Niles wrote that the English killed upwards of 80 Indians that day, while Vaudreuil reported to the ministry of the *Marine* that the Abenakis suffered only around two dozen casualties. Captain Harman, in the post-battle fête held by the Massachusetts Council, presented the Council members twenty-seven scalps, including Father Rôle's, and four prisoners.¹⁵⁰

The reports of the general course of the fight reflected the way by which Anglo-Americans had come to wage war against Indians. At the first

¹⁴⁷ Abstract of Letters Respecting the Abenakis, April 24, 1725, *ibid.*, 9: 945.

¹⁴⁸ Niles, *Indian and French Wars*, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 4th ser., 5 (1861): 353.

¹⁴⁹ M. de Vaudreuil to the Ministry, November 28, 1724, *NYCD*, 9: 937.

¹⁵⁰ William Blake Trask, ed., "Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook and Others, Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine, 1722-1726," *NEHGR* 48 (1894): 187.

alarm, the fifty Abenaki warriors in the village grabbed their arms and began to fire on the rangers. Upon seeing R  le killed they began to retreat toward the Kennebec River. Harman's men pursued them, driving Abenaki women and children into a prearranged ambush where rangers mowed them down and took others as prisoners. Against the Abenakis that reached the river, Harman's rangers, like George Percy's men 115 years earlier, poured musket fire into the crowded canoes filled with women and children. Harman later lamented that he and his men had killed more than twenty-seven Abenakis, but the river's swift current washed the bodies downstream before the rangers could retrieve them for scalping. With the village then deserted of all but Anglo-Americans, Harman's rangers set the fields to flames, razed the wigwams, storehouse, and cabins, "profaned" the sacred vessels of the Church, and burnt it to the ground. The rangers then gathered their prisoners and quietly melted unharmed back into the woods.¹⁵¹

Land privateering, ranging, and annihilationist war shaped Father R  le's War to a greater extent following Harman's destruction of Norridgewock. While Anglo-Americans hoped that Harman's raid would be enough to compel the Abenaki to accept peace on the whites' terms, Harman's raid only escalated the war by precipitating a series of counter

¹⁵¹ Anon., "Biographical Memoir of Father Rasles," *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 2d ser., 8 (1826): 255. Kenneth Roberts, in his novel *Northwest Passage*, described a similar scene when in 1759 Rogers's Rangers drove Abenaki women and children into the St. Francis River and poured fire into them as they tried to escape in canoes. The scenes described by Harman and Roberts are so similar that they lead one to suspect that Roberts based his narrative of the rangers' massacre of the St. Francis Abenaki in 1759 on Harman's report of 1724. See Roberts, *Northwest Passage* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1937). The Abenaki survivors returned the next day to find their homes and fields smoldering, as well as Father R  le's corpse -- minus its scalp. The men of the village had little choice but to lead 150 survivors to Canada where they joined their Abenaki cousins and the Jesuit missionaries at St. Francis de Sales. See Abstract of Letters Respecting the Abenakis, April 24, 1725, *NYCD*, 9: 948.

raids.¹⁵² Again short on funds and without Indian allies, Massachusetts turned to the then standby of Anglo-American land privateers who would wage an unlimited-irregular war against the Abenakis.

Captain John Lovewell's fortunes, both in monetary gain and fate, suggest the heights and depths that Anglo-American warfare waged against noncombatants had reached by the 1720s. In November 1724 Lovewell petitioned the General Assembly of Massachusetts for a commission to take forty or fifty frontiersmen on a scalp-hunting expedition into Maine. Lovewell and his fellow petitioners, Joshua Farnwell and Jonathan Robbins, wrote that they were "inclined to range and to keep out in the woods for several months together, in order to kill and destroy their enemy Indians, provided they can meet with Encouragement suitable." Lovewell was confident that he would find Indians sufficient in numbers to kill; for suitable encouragement, Lovewell and his compatriots considered five shillings per day pay appropriate for one year of Indian hunting, and, if they failed to kill any Indians, they agreed to accept no compensation from the colony.¹⁵³ The Assembly's authorized Lovewell and his men 2s.6d per day -- half of what they asked -- but granted as an incentive £100 for each male scalp they returned to Boston.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Commissioners from Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire to Canada, to the Commissioners of the Indian Affairs in Albany, 1725, *CSPC*, 1724-1724, #740-30.

¹⁵³ Lovewell's petition is quoted in Charles J. Fox, *History of the Old Township of Dunstable: including Nashua, Nashville, Hollis, Hudson, Litchfield, and Merrimac, N.H.; Dunstable and Tyngsborough, Mass.* (Nashua: Charles T. Gill, 1846), 111.

¹⁵⁴ *LOMBC*, November 1724: 484.

Lovewell's first expedition met with almost immediate success. After filling his ranks of his company with experienced backwoodsmen, Lovewell led his scalp hunters into the wilds of Maine. On December 10, 1724, Lovewell's men came upon a wigwam where two Indians, a man and a young boy, were sleeping. Lovewell's men killed them, scalped them, and returned triumphantly to Boston where they received £200, plus 2s.6d. per day for their "troubles."

Encouraged by their initial success, Lovewell and his hunters started out a second time on January 27, 1725. On February 9, the scalp-hunters picked up the trail of ten Indians near Lake Winnepesaukee. After tracking them for eleven days, they caught up with them just before sunset on the 20th. Lovewell waited until near midnight to spring his ambush. The Anglo-Americans killed the Indians before they knew what hit them. Again, Lovewell's company scalped their victims, took their worldly goods, and returned to Dover where they sold the dead Indians' guns for £7 each and collected a small fortune -- £1,000 -- from the public treasury.

Lovewell became an instant celebrity. Few questioned whether his victims were hostile Indians or not. While we will never know if Lovewell killed innocent Indians, Thomas Symmes, the eighteenth-century chronicler of Lovewell's career, undoubtedly expressed the view of most Anglo-Americans when he wrote "some attempt against the Frontiers of New Hampshire [were] prevented; for these Indians were marching from Canada, well furnished with guns and plenty of ammunition."¹⁵⁵ It seemed that as

¹⁵⁵ Thomas Symmes, "Lovewell Lamented, or a Sermon Occasion'd by the Fall of the Brave Captain John Lovewell," (1725; reprint, *Early American Imprints, 1639-1800*, ed. American Antiquarian Society, published New Canaan, CT: Readex, 1981-82), microfiche #2705.

long as the Indians were dead, no one would bother to inquire if they were warriors, boys and girls, or women. Lovewell's sum of £1,200 from his first two expeditions must have been a powerful inducement to take up the hatchet against the Abenakis.

In the spring of 1725, Lovewell embarked on his most famous, and as events proved, last scalp-hunting expedition. Lovewell designed a plan to use his now eighty-man company, many of whom were Boston townsmen unfamiliar with ranging, to attack the Abenaki village of Pequawket. The goal was to march to the village and massacre its inhabitants. On the march to there, however, Lovewell and his troops were distracted by an Indian on a point near Saco Pond (now Lovewell's Pond), Maine. In their haste to fall upon what they thought was a lone enemy, thirty-two of Lovewell's men threw caution to the wind, dropped their packs to the ground and gave chase. It was a trap; nearly 100 Indians were waiting for the scalp hunters in ambush. Lovewell had made a mistake that Church, the Gorhams, Frost, and Harman never made. In the quest for fame and fortune Lovewell had ignored a basic rule of ranging: caution. Lovewell fell at the Indians' first volley of fire while his men, many of them panic-stricken, scrambled to find cover behind trees. Fortunately for a handful of the scalp hunters Lovewell, the previous day, had constructed a small "fort" thirty miles to the south and left nine men there with supplies. The overmatched and outnumbered survivors of the ambush rushed back to the fort. The Abenakis pursued them only a short distance; they preferred to scalp and mutilate Lovewell's corpse. All told, only twelve of Lovewell's men, including the Melven brothers, survived "Lovewell's Fight."¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ Eleazer Tyng to Summer, May 12, 1725, "Baxter Manuscripts," 10: 268-69.

"Lovewell's Fight" had little effect in shaping the eventual outcome of Father Râle's War. Yet it, like Harman's destruction of Norridgewock, is symbolic of how, by the late 1720s, Anglo-Americans conceptualized war. Father Râle's War was the arena in which Anglo-Americans combined their previous patterns of warcraft into a single Anglo-American pattern. When Johnson Harman accepted a Lieutenant Colonel's commission as the reward for his sacking of Norridgewock, as well as the £100 bounty for Râle's scalp, he had no doubts or questions about what the "known rule" of Anglo-American warfare was.¹⁵⁷ It was a way of war that placed ranging and land privateering at the center of an approach to killing all enemies, regardless of sex or age. It was in fact an unlimited-irregular way of war.

¹⁵⁷ Trask, "Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook," 187.

CHAPTER 2

"THE MOST HAZARDOUS AND FATIGUING DUTY": ANGLO-AMERICAN UNLIMITED-IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE WARS OF KING GEORGE, 1739-1755

In late 1752 Governor Peregrine Thomas Hopson dispatched to the Lords of Trade a report in which he assessed the contributions that Anglo-American rangers had made to Nova Scotia's defense. The Lords of Trade wanted Hopson's opinion on the necessity and feasibility of keeping a company of rangers on that colony's defensive establishment. While Hopson failed to offer a precise recommendation on the exact number of irregulars needed in Nova Scotia, he nonetheless provided the Lords a justification for keeping at least a minimal force of rangers on the colony's rolls. "I am not able to inform your Lordships that I have heard of any particular exploit worth remarking being done by the Rangers," Hopson wrote, "the nature of their service, being irregular, scarcely admits of it, but they have most assuredly been of great utility, such as protecting the out settlers, ranging the Country, and marching upon services the regulars would not be spared for."¹

Hopson's assessment of the rangers' "great utility" points to the central and ubiquitous role that Anglo-American irregulars played in not only Nova Scotia, but in each of the Wars of King George -- the War of Jenkins' Ear,

¹ Hopson to Lords of Trade, October 16, 1752, Thomas B. Akins, ed., *Selections from the Public Documents of the Province of Nova Scotia* (Halifax: Charles Annand, Publisher, 1869), 680, hereafter cited as *Nova Scotia Documents*.

King George's War, and Father Le Loutre's War.² British officials and commanders in those conflicts, first out of military necessity and then out of preference, turned to Anglo-American irregulars as both the first line of defense of the colonies and as the troops most capable of harassing, intimidating, and destroying enemy armies and noncombatants. In the War of Jenkins' Ear, rangers shielded the Georgia frontier from invasion by Spaniards and Indians and wreaked havoc upon large portions of Spanish Florida. During King George's War, irregulars provided, albeit with marginal effectiveness, the only line of defense for backcountry settlements along New England's and New York's frontier with New France.³ In Nova Scotia, in both King George's War and Father Le Loutre's War, the fate of British Nova

² No one has given the conflict of 1749-1755 in Nova Scotia a formal name. Since Father Jean-Louis Le Loutre was as responsible for the war in Nova Scotia in the early 1750s as Father Sébastien Râle was for the conflict which took his name, I therefore have chosen to refer to it as Father Le Loutre's War. The most modern account of Le Loutre's career is *DCB*, s.v. "Le Loutre, Jean-Louis." Lawrence Henry Gipson, in his *British Empire before the American Revolution*, vol. 5, *Zones of International Friction: The Great Lakes Frontier, Canada, the West Indies, India 1748-1754* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1942), 166-206, discussed the struggle between Anglo-Americans and Britons with Acadians, Frenchmen, and Indians in Acadia without giving that struggle a name. Both John C. Webster and Norman Rogers discussed the career of Le Loutre in their respective *The Career of the Abbé Le Loutre in Nova Scotia, with a Translation of his Autobiography* (Shediac, NB: John C. Webster, 1933) and "The Abbé Le Loutre," *Canadian Historical Review* 11 (1930): 105-28. Le Loutre's autobiography can be found in "Une Autobiographie de L'Abbé Le Loutre," *Nova Francia* 6 (1931): 1-34. John Bartlet Brebner devoted chapter 7 of his *New England's Outpost: Acadia before the Conquest of Canada* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), 166-202, on the 1749-1755 conflict but as well did not give it a formal title. Francis Parkman covered the war in Nova Scotia in the fourth chapter of *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 2 vols. (1884; reprint, New Library ed., Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1905).

³ In the late eighteenth century Samuel Drake used a "Diary of Depredations," or a litany of devastation and death that French and Indian raiders wrought on Anglo-American frontier communities, to describe the course of King George's War on the New England frontier. See Samuel G. Drake, *A Particular History of the Five Years French and Indian War in New England* (Albany: Joel Munsell, 1870), 89. Modern scholarship, however, seems to have abandon Drake's focus on the frontier aspects of the war to focus instead on the regular operations of the conflict, such as the provincials' success at Louisbourg or the still-born Canada Expedition of 1746.

Scotia depended almost solely on the outcome of the guerrilla war between Anglo-American rangers and the Acadians and their Indian allies.

This chapter discusses how those campaigns fit in the development of the Anglo-American way of unlimited-irregular war. It details an important stage in the evolution of Anglo-Americans' military culture. While engaging in what ranger captain John Gorham called "the most Hazardous and fatiguing Duty that is Required in this part of the World," Anglo-American rangers won partial acceptance and legitimacy for their way of war from Britons in North America and also refined the techniques of white irregular warfare.⁴ Indeed, in the crucible of the Wars of King George, both Anglo-Americans and Britons came to see the Anglo-American approach to unlimited-irregular war as both an effective and acceptable means of war making.

THE WAR OF JENKINS' EAR, 1739-1743

Anglo-American-style unlimited-irregular war defined military affairs in the colonial South through the first half of the eighteenth century and was at the center of the North American campaigns of the War of Jenkins' Ear.⁵ Beginning in the late seventeenth century, Anglo-Americans in the Carolinas

⁴ John Gorham to William Shirley, November, 1749, John Gorham MSS, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

⁵ The most detailed study of military affairs and the War of Jenkins' Ear on the Southern frontier is Larry E. Ivers, *British Drums on the Southern Frontier: The Military Colonization of Georgia, 1733-1749* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974). For a study that focuses on the relationship between rangers, militia, and regulars in Georgia, see James M. Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats: The Military in Georgia, 1754-1776* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1992). Although Johnson's book focuses on the years after 1754 and shows how the militia became the dominant military entity in Georgia, his first and second chapters nonetheless point to the important role that rangers had in the defense of early Georgia.

depended on annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering forged into a unified tradition of unlimited-irregular war to fight and defeat the Spanish and their Indian auxiliaries in the colonial Southeast. Brigadier General James Oglethorpe, after the establishment of Georgia in 1733, embraced those methods of war and made Anglo-American irregulars the foundation upon which he built the defense of Georgia. When the War of Jenkins' Ear erupted in 1739, Oglethorpe turned to his Anglo-American irregulars and Indian allies to ravage Spanish Florida in annihilationist campaigns. Southern rangers, from 1740 through 1743, were the *avant guard* of Oglethorpe's and Great Britain's defense of Georgia and unsuccessful campaigns to conquer Florida. In fact, over the course of the War of Jenkins' Ear, Anglo-American irregulars went further than any other British troops in defending British interests in North America, making it primarily the rangers' war. They not only saved Georgia for Great Britain, but proved to Oglethorpe and other British leaders the strategic and tactical effectiveness of irregular war.

Through the late seventeenth and well into the first third of the eighteenth century, Carolina irregulars employing the then evolving Anglo-American way of war raided Spanish-controlled Guale (Georgia) and Apalachee (the Florida panhandle) with devastating effectiveness.⁶ In the 1680s and 1690s, Carolinians fell on the Spanish settlements in Guale, destroyed them, and compelled both the Spanish and their Indian allies to abandon the area. During Queen Anne's War, South Carolina's Governor James Moore led 50 white land privateers and 1,000 Indian auxiliaries to "go

⁶ In the late sixteenth century Franciscan friars labored to extend from San Agustín a string of Indian missions in Guale and Apalachee. For the Spanish and Franciscan efforts to settle and proselytize in Georgia, see David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 6, 36-37, 67-68, 100-3, 117, 179-81, 349.

a slave hunting" in Apalachee. After ravaging western Florida Moore and his men returned to Carolina with over 4,000 Indian slaves.⁷ A generation later, as their expertise in ranging and land privateering had improved, whites needed fewer Indians to support their campaigns against Florida. In 1727, in retaliation for Yamasee attacks on English traders traveling on the Carolina frontier, Colonel John Palmer led 100 white rangers and 100 friendly Indians against Nombre de Dios, the Yamasees' main settlement outside San Agustín. Palmer's rangers and Indians approached Nombre de Dios undetected, killed thirty Yamasees, and drove the rest into Castillo de San Marcos -- the Spaniards' fort at San Agustín. From inside the Castillo, the Yamasees watched the Anglo-Americans sack and loot Nombre de Dios and then retreat with impunity to Carolina. Although his army could not take and hold San Agustín, South Carolinians saw Palmer's campaign as a great victory. "We have now Balanced accounts with them," one Carolinian noted after Palmer returned to Charleston, "and it's my opinion that they never will come near us more."⁸

Anglo-American rangers also played an important part in the defense of Georgia from the first days of settlement of that colony. Oglethorpe knew that the fledgling British settlements offered easy targets to Spanish and Indian raiders.⁹ Yet having received virtually no military support from the

⁷ Quoted in J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1971), 64. Moore first had tried to take San Agustín by siege with a small provincial army in 1702. After the failure of that campaign, Moore turned to irregular means both to defeat the Spanish and win riches for himself. For further details on Moore's 1702 San Agustín campaign, see Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 75-78; Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, 142-43.

⁸ Quoted in Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 250.

⁹ Although uninhabited by Spaniards, Guale technically remained a possession of Spain. The Spanish crown cited the 1670 Treaty of Madrid that gave Spain possession of

Britain with which to defend the colony, Oglethorpe had little choice but to depend on Anglo-Americans to protect Georgia's settlements. While he could have turned to local militia, he instead, as one of his first acts upon arriving in Georgia as commander-in-chief of the colony, enlisted the services of Captain James McPhearson's company of South Carolina mounted rangers. McPhearson's Rangers offered Oglethorpe a highly mobile and responsive force with which to protect the "out settlements." Posted in detachments along a string of small forts and blockhouses situated outside the first settlements, the rangers served to provide both early warning and reconnaissance functions, and gave the settlers a cadre of trained soldiers around whom to rally in times of crisis.¹⁰ For the first few years of settlement, the rangers were the only significant military force in the colony capable of countering the threat of Indian or Spanish raids on Georgia.

Oglethorpe quickly came to appreciate the services the irregulars provided. He understood that in Georgia, regulars needed to learn to operate independently in small units if they were to be of any use against Indians and Spanish raiders. Shortly after the men of the Forty-second Regiment of Foot arrived in Georgia, Oglethorpe therefore commissioned Hugh Mackay, Jr., a Highlander and former British Army officer who had been one of the first settlers and militia officers in Georgia, to raise from the regulars a company of

Georgia as far as 33.5° North latitude -- well North of the area settled by Georgia's first Anglo-American and British inhabitants. See Harman Verelst to Earl of Wilmington, April 24, 1742, Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1729-1745*, comp. William A. Shaw, et. al., 5 vols. (1897; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1974), 5 (1742): doc. #70.

¹⁰ Sarah B. Gober Temple and Kenneth Coleman, *Georgia Journeys. Being an Account of the Lives of Georgia's Original Settlers and Many Other Early Settlers from the Founding of the Colony in 1732 until the Institution of Royal Government in 1754*. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1961), 43.

"Highland Rangers."¹¹ Scottish Highlanders had a reputation as tough and often wild fighters. Such men, Oglethorpe hoped, would make the transition from European regular to North Americans irregular with relative ease.¹²

Oglethorpe's appointment of Mackay to lead the Highland Rangers was significant in that he chose an "American" to lead British regulars. Oglethorpe could have selected any one of the company officers of the Forty-second Regiment to command the rangers, yet he selected Mackay, an officer with military experience in both Europe and North America. Indeed, here was what normally would have been considered primarily a militia officer -- although Mackay was a half-pay British officer -- placed in command of British regulars. Oglethorpe understood that New World conditions necessitated a willingness to put aside preconceived notions on the inherent superiority of regulars over irregulars. In the process, Oglethorpe became the first of several high-ranking British officers who, after serving in North America, realized that British success in the colonies would depend upon the British Army's ability to embrace at least partially Anglo-American warfare and train British regulars in its methods.

The formation of the Highland Rangers, however, proved a mixed blessing for Oglethorpe and the settlers of Georgia. Between Oglethorpe and

¹¹ In 1737 Oglethorpe had requested from the Crown a regiment of regulars for service in Georgia. In the fall of that year the Whitehall, in the face of objections of the costs of raising another regiment in peacetime, authorized Oglethorpe to form the Forty-second Regiment of Foot with an establishment of 684 officers and men. The War Office instructed Oglethorpe to draft 250 men from the Twenty-fifth Regiment of Foot stationed at Gibraltar. Oglethorpe raised the remaining troops from central and northern England, including many Scottish Highlanders. See Ivers, *British Drums*, 91.

¹² James Michael Hill, *Celtic Warfare, 1595-1763* (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1986), chap. 1. Hill has written that "Because the Celts emphasized the individual warrior, they were at their best in the field when operating in small, mobile armies." (p. 2).

the Trustees for Georgia -- the *de facto* ruling body of the colony -- the General alone understood the colony's need for rangers. After the creation of the Highland Rangers, the parsimonious Trustees, even though Secretary of State Thomas Pelham-Holles, duke of Newcastle, had advised them that war with Spain was imminent, refused to authorize funding to equip and pay Anglo-American irregulars. Oglethorpe responded with a flurry of letters and reports in which he predicted the dangerous state that the colony's defense would fall without irregulars. The regulars, he reminded the Trustees, "can defend the parts they are in, but they cannot march on foot over the waters without boats nor overtake horse or Indians on foot in the vast woods on the continent" -- only the rangers could do that.¹³ To the duke of Newcastle, he wrote that without rangers he could neither prevent Spanish cavalry from raiding and devastating Georgia, nor could he gain any intelligence or warning about enemy forces marching from Florida.¹⁴ He advised Harman Verelst (his personal agent in London) that he meanwhile could no longer depend on the traditional stand-ins for white irregulars -- Indians. Rum and smallpox carried by Carolina traders had alienated the Cherokees from the British side.¹⁵ The answer, as Oglethorpe saw it, was to form two thirty-man

¹³ Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, November 16, 1739, *CSPC*, 1739, #467.

¹⁴ Oglethorpe to Duke of Newcastle, October 8, 1739, *ibid.*, #409.

¹⁵ Oglethorpe to Verelst, October 19, 1739, *ibid.*, #429. Oglethorpe traveled personally to the Cherokee towns in the hopes of convincing them to assist the British if war broke out between the English and the Spaniards. In October 1739, just before the outbreak of hostilities, in exchange for 1,500 bushels of corn, Oglethorpe won from the Cherokees a promise that they would take the field against the Spanish. At that time, however, he realized his Indian allies had their, not Great Britain's, best interest at heart and could change sides without notice. He also knew that all the while Spanish emissaries were doing their utmost to turn the Cherokees and other Indians against the British. See Earl of Egmont's journal, October 5, 1739, *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia*, comp. Allen D. Chandler (1904-16; reprint, 25 vols. New York: AMS Press 1970), 5: 231; Thomas Causton to Trustees for Georgia, January 14, 1739, *CSPC*, 1739, #17.

troops of Anglo-American rangers and post them on the frontier from where they could warn of, and slow, any Spanish advance into Georgia. Oglethorpe hoped that a third company of rangers patrolling Georgia's coastal waterways in specially designed shallow-draft "scout boats" at least could detect an amphibious Spanish or French invasion of the colony.¹⁶

The Spaniards' raid on a Highlander outpost on Amelia Island in November 1739 in which two Highlanders were killed and decapitated prodded the Trustees into giving Oglethorpe the rangers he wanted. After the attack, Oglethorpe rushed a letter to the Trustees in which he claimed he must have the rangers immediately "otherwise there will be no possibility of the people's going out to plant without being murdered as those Highlanders were." The Trustees consented and authorized Oglethorpe to act as he saw best. Oglethorpe immediately raised his companies for the frontier, as well as the rangers for the scout boat corps. Had it not been for irregulars rushing to the field in November 1739, Oglethorpe later reported, the outlying settlements "must all have been destroyed."¹⁷

Before the Amelia Island raid by the Spanish Oglethorpe had been concerned primarily with how the rangers fit into Georgia's defensive scheme. After November 1739 he looked for ways to use his irregulars offensively. He quickly realized that they could be the linchpin of his design for the conquest of Florida. "I think the best way [to defeat the Spanish]," he wrote, "is to make use of our strength [in irregulars] and beat them [the Spanish and

¹⁶ For Oglethorpe's decision to raise an additional thirty rangers for service in scout boats, see Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, October 5, 1739, "Letters from James Oglethorpe to the Trustees of the Colony and Others, from October 1735 to August 1744," *Georgia Historical Society Collections* 3, pt. 2 (1873): 82. For a description and illustration of the scout boats, see Ivers, *British Drums*, 54.

¹⁷ Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, December 29, 1739, *CSPC*, 1739, #536.

Indians] out of the field and destroy their plantations and out settlements."¹⁸

Such attacks, he reported, "would daunt them so heartily that we might take Augustine."¹⁹

In December 1739 Oglethorpe led the rangers on the first of his three invasions of Florida. He conceived the mission as little more than to destroy Spanish plantations and intimidate the Indians into neutrality. As the rangers marched southward, they accordingly sacked and looted villages in their path. As they burned and pillaged, Oglethorpe's Indian allies combed the countryside scalping and killing Spanish-allied Indians and runaway slaves from the British colonies. In a campaign that lasted several weeks, the rangers "ravaged Florida" and seized Spain's northern-most outpost at San Francisco de Pupo.²⁰ Upon returning to his headquarters at Frederica, Oglethorpe informed the Trustees that he and his irregulars would return to Spanish Florida in the spring and take San Agustín.²¹

The rangers proved invaluable in Oglethorpe's second invasion of Florida. In the spring of 1740 Oglethorpe placed them in the lead of a 1,500-man army of Georgia and South Carolina militia and British regulars as it advanced toward San Agustín. The rangers performed admirably as the vanguard of the invasion force and, one ranger reported, "so harassed the

¹⁸ Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, November 16, 1739, *ibid.*, #467.

¹⁹ Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, December 29, 1739, *ibid.*, #536.

²⁰ Oglethorpe to William Stephens, February 1, 1739/40, "Letters from James Oglethorpe," 105. William Stephens was the Secretary to the Trustees in Georgia. For Oglethorpe's payment of bounties on scalps, see "A Ranger's Report of Travel with General Oglethorpe, 1739-1742," in *Travels in the American Colonies*, ed. Newton D. Mereness (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), 225; Harman Verelst to Earl Wilmington, April 24, 1742, *Treasury Books and Papers* 5 (1742): doc. #70.

²¹ Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, December 29, 1739, *CSPC*, 1739, #536.

Spaniards that they were afraid to appear without the walls of St. Augustine."²² The rangers' successes were the only ones of the campaign. In the ensuing siege of Castillo de San Marcos, Oglethorpe's dream of the conquest of Spanish Florida crumbled in the face of poor planning and military ineptitude. Oglethorpe retreated to Georgia after two months of laying siege to Castillo de San Marcos.²³

Thereafter Oglethorpe depended even more on rangers to defend Georgia. Because the War Office had earmarked virtually all available military resources in North America and the West Indies for the Cartagena campaign, he realized that he could expect no reinforcements of regulars in either 1740 or 1741. Yet at the same time, he faced the threat of an invasion of Georgia by the Spanish-allied French garrison at Mobile and their 1,500-plus Choctaw allies.²⁴ He suspected, rightly so as events proved, that the

²² "A Ranger's Report," 228.

²³ Trevor R. Reese, in "Britain's Military Support for Georgia in the War of 1739-1748," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 43 (1959): 1-10, wrote that the Georgia-Florida theater of operations was a military sideshow for British planners. As such, they failed to supply Oglethorpe even the most basic material necessary to conduct a siege. Nonetheless, Oglethorpe seemed on the threshold of victory when he discovered a small British naval squadron under Commodore Vincent Pearse riding off San Agustín. Oglethorpe was confident that with the guns from Pearse's ships supporting him he could take Castillo de San Marcos. However, Pearse claimed that six Spanish galleys and a shallow sand bar blocked his approach to the Castillo and made it impossible for him to support Oglethorpe in a joint land-sea attack. Oglethorpe then resigned himself to a siege. But after seeing his army succumb to disease, and receiving word that Pearse was departing to northern waters for fear of the approaching hurricane season, the General retreated to Georgia. See Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry*, 92-93; William Stephens' journal, July 18, 1740, *Colonial Records of Georgia*, 4: 622.

²⁴ Even before the war began in Georgia, the major debate at the highest levels of British government revolved around the relative merits of attacking either Havana or Cartagena. The Cartagena campaign of 1741 was a disaster for the American provincials who served with the British Army. British land and sea commanders bickered incessantly and, in the duke of Argyle's opinion, "did not do a single thing right there" [British House of Lords Proceedings, December 4, 1741, Leo Francis Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, Volume 5, 1739-1754* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, 1941), 110, hereafter cited as *Proceedings and Debates*] while nearly fifty percent of the Anglo-American provincials died from tropical diseases. See John Tate

Spanish were preparing to launch either an overland or amphibious campaign designed to respond in kind to the rangers' two forays into Florida.²⁵

After assessing the situation that faced Georgians, Oglethorpe concluded that rangers were the only troops that could defend the outlying plantations and prevent the enemy's depredations. Since any overland invasion of Georgia from Mobile would have to cross several major rivers, Oglethorpe hoped "a large body of Rangers with the assistance of the Indians might stop them there." He added that other companies of rangers on the Georgia-Florida border would be "very useful in blocking up Saint Augustine" and intercepting and defeating Spanish and Indian raiders.²⁶

The rangers in fact were instrumental in driving the Spanish army from Georgia in the summer of 1742 when the long-anticipated Spanish invasion finally came. Ranger scouts were the first troops to detect Manuel de Montiano's 2,000-man invasion force off St. Simons Island, and once the Spanish army had landed on Georgia soil, contained it on its beachhead until Oglethorpe could rush reinforcements to the front.²⁷ In two bloody engagements, ranger detachments were at the lead of inflicting nearly 200

Lanning, "American Participation in the War of Jenkins' Ear," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 11 (1927): 191-215.

²⁵ ? to Juan Franciso de Güemes y Horcasitas, October 31, 1741, C. DeWitt Wilcox, ed. and trans., *The Spanish Official Account of the Attack on the Colony of Georgia in America, and of its Defeat on St. Simons Island by General James Oglethorpe*, Georgia Historical Society Collections 8, pt. 3 (1913): 21-22.

²⁶ Verelst to the Treasury, August 5, 1742, *Treasury Books and Papers* 5 (1742): doc. #149; Oglethorpe to Trustees for Georgia, June 29, 1741, "Letters from James Oglethorpe," 117.

²⁷ "A Ranger's Report," 233.

casualties on the Spaniards as they tried to advance toward Frederica.²⁸ Then, as the Spanish force sat dejectedly on the beach, rangers and Indians infiltrated to harass the Spaniards in their camp. One ranger bragged that he and several other rangers and Indians managed to shoot nine Spaniards within their lines.²⁹ The Anglo-Americans' sniping pushed the Spaniards' morale even lower, and with his inability to break out of the St. Simons Island beachhead, certainly contributed to Montiano's decision to retreat from Georgia.

In the final major action of the war, in March 1743, Anglo-American irregulars again served Oglethorpe well. Oglethorpe had set out for Florida at the head of a party of Georgia rangers and Indians to plunder and pillage Spanish outposts. Although termed the "Second Siege" of San Agustín, Oglethorpe's 1743 invasion was a repeat of Palmer's 1727 operation -- little more than a spoiling raid. His intention was not to take San Agustín, but to inflict as much punishment as possible on the Spaniards and their Indian and black allies. In the face of the Anglo-Americans' onslaught, "the usual terror took them [the Spaniards and Indians] and they retired within the walls of St. Augustine."³⁰ After looting what they could, Oglethorpe's rangers again burned the surrounding settlements and marched victoriously northward.

The War of Jenkins' Ear on mainland North America thus stands as primarily an unlimited-irregular conflict in which the Anglo-American way of

²⁸ James Oglethorpe's Account of the Spanish Invasion of Georgia, July 30, 1742, "Letters from James Oglethorpe," 135; Ivers, *British Drums*, 157; "A Ranger's Report," 234-35.

²⁹ "A Ranger's Report," 235.

³⁰ Quoted in Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry*, 97.

irregular war played the central role. Irregular troops and irregular methods were at the center of every operation of the war. In fact, rangers were key to every victory for British arms in the North American phase of the conflict, from the initial campaigns against Florida in 1739 and 1740, through defending the Georgia frontier in 1741 and repulsing the Spanish invasion in 1742, to devastating the Spanish countryside outside San Agustín in 1743. In the process, Anglo-American rangers won from Oglethorpe and other high British officials a place on the royal military establishment. The British War Office and Parliament, between 1743 and 1747, authorized two troops of provincial rangers and 115 men in the Highland Rangers for full-time service in Georgia.³¹ In 1743 Oglethorpe returned to England, in time to apply the lesson he had learned as the commander of irregulars in America toward suppressing the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. As the next chapter will show, Oglethorpe used the techniques of the Anglo-American irregular war when he confronted Jacobite rebels. The result in Scotland proved the same as in America: the successful application of the theory and practice of American-style irregular warfare.

KING GEORGE'S WAR, 1744-1748: NEW ENGLAND AND NEW YORK

Anglo-Americans' culture of unlimited-irregular war also shaped military affairs during King George's War on the Nova Scotia-New England -

³¹ For the post-war funding of the Georgia rangers, see *Treasury Books and Papers* 5 (1744): doc. #43-h; *Treasury Books and Papers* 5 (1745): doc. #30; House of Commons Proceedings, January 16, 1745/46, *Proceedings and Debates*, 227; House of Commons Proceedings, March 10, 1748/49, *ibid.*, 300. Although King George II ordered the rangers disbanded in 1747 to reduce what seemed unnecessary costs in peacetime, Parliament continued to fund two companies of rangers as late as 1749. See Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats*, 12.

New York frontiers with New France.³² Between 1744 and 1748, British commanders depended almost exclusively upon Anglo-American irregulars and Indian auxiliaries to protect New England and New York from Canadian and Indian raiders. In Nova Scotia, British army officers turned to Anglo-American guerrillas to wage their brand of irregular war against Acadians, Micmacs, and Maliseets.

The collective experiences of the rangers of King George's War illuminates an important stage in the development of the Anglo-American way of irregular war. For in that war, as had been demonstrated in the War of Jenkins' Ear, both Anglo-Americans and Britons learned irregulars operated most effectively in offensive roles. A significant difference existed between the way that British officials deployed Anglo-American irregulars in New England and New York, and how they used them in Nova Scotia. In New England, British officials employed their rangers to little benefit in primarily a defensive posture by assigning them to remote garrisons and expecting them to intercept and destroy Indian and French war parties before they struck Anglo-American settlements. Benjamin Doolittle, in his 1750 critique of the failure of Anglo-American and British arms to protect the Massachusetts frontier during King George's War, noted "What a great Difference there is between our managing a War, and our Enemies: The most we do is to defend ourselves at Home; but they are for an offensive War."³³ In Nova Scotia, on

³² For discussions of King George's War, see Ian Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), chap. 8; Douglas Edward Leach, *Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 224-61.

³³ Benjamin Doolittle, "A Short Narrative of Mischief Done by the French and Indian Enemy on the Western Frontiers of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay," (1750; reprint, *Early American Imprints, 1639-1800*, New Canaan, CT: Readex, 1981-82), microfiche #6488, 20.

the other hand, Anglo-American irregulars served as offensive troops. British leaders in Nova Scotia gave the Anglo-American rangers virtual *carte blanche* in dealing with the Acadians and Micmacs. The rangers parlayed that free hand into a bloody war of annihilation and terror focused on Acadian and Indian noncombatants. Their exploits won acclaim for Anglo-American irregulars from British commanders in both Britain and America and came to exemplify the model of Anglo-American unlimited-irregular warfare.

In 1744, Governor William Shirley placed the responsibility for the defense of Massachusetts's frontier in the hands of Anglo-American irregulars. Shirley correctly guessed that if war erupted between France and Great Britain, waves of Canadian and Indian raiders would swoop down on the New England frontier.³⁴ In March he therefore raised ten fifty-man companies of what he called "snowshoe men," or rangers, and described their mission to the duke of Newcastle as "to hold themselves ready at the shortest Warning to go in pursuit of any Party of Indians, who frequently in time of War make sudden Incursions, whilst there is a deep Snow upon the Ground, and retreat as suddenly into the Woods after having done what Mischief they can."³⁵ Shirley then ordered that the snowshoe men construct a line of blockhouses along the frontier as bases from which (he hoped) they

³⁴ Since the beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear, British officials cautiously watched France for signs that the French intended to enter the Anglo-Spanish conflict on the side of the Spaniards. Then, in October 1743, Spain and France signed the Treaty of Fontainebleau, or the Second Family Compact, and effectively brought France into war with Great Britain. Six months later Britain claimed that France was aiding Spanish privateers in the West Indies and, in response, declared war on France.

³⁵ Shirley to Duke of Newcastle, March 23, 1743/44, *The Correspondence of William Shirley*, ed. Charles Henry Lincoln, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1912), 1: 115.

could screen New England's out settlements.³⁶ In June, as tensions heightened between France and Great Britain and with the usual campaigning season well under way, Shirley ordered Colonel John Stoddard, commander of Massachusetts's rangers and frontier militia, to move his forces to positions from which they could intercept and destroy enemy raiders. In October, upon Shirley's recommendation, Massachusetts's General Assembly followed a then well-established tradition and offered a £100 bounty on Indian scalps.³⁷ However, with his thoughts turning increasingly to the Louisbourg campaign planned for the spring of 1745, and with the Iroquois League maintaining its long-held position of neutrality and thereby denying Shirley the substantial auxiliaries he needed, the Governor chose not to unleash the rangers in a preemptive winter campaign against the enemy settlements in Canada.³⁸ Instead, he ordered that the rangers to remain in their garrisons and await the spring's French and Indian attacks on the frontier.

With the Anglo-Americans on the defensive -- Doolittle noted that the Anglo-Americans "never kept Men in the woods towards Crown-Point to discover their large Bodies coming down upon us, and give notice of an

³⁶ Shirley to Lords of Trade, August 10, 1744, *ibid.* 1: 138.

³⁷ Shirley to Stoddard, June 2, 1744, *ibid.*, 1: 127-28; Massachusetts General Court, *The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private, of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay* 21 vols. (Boston: Massachusetts General Court, 1869-1922), 3: 218, hereafter cited as *Acts and Resolves*.

³⁸ In late 1744 and early 1745 the Iroquois League remained committed to neutrality, and the French determined to do nothing to antagonize them. See M. [Charles, marquis] de Beauharnois to Count [Jean-Frédéric Phélypeaux] de Maurepas, June 18, 1745, *NYCD*, 10: 2. It is no coincidence that also in the summer of 1745 the New York Assembly passed a law authorizing payment to both whites and Indians for enemy scalps. See Lords of Trade Books, *NYCD*, 6: 647.

approaching Enemy"³⁹ -- Abenakis from St. Francis de Sales were able to fall upon the Anglo-American settlements in New Hampshire and Northern Massachusetts throughout the summer of 1745, killing dozens of settlers and razing many undefended farms.⁴⁰ Among the homesteads the Abenakis attacked was on the "Great Meadow" area belonging to James and Mary Rogers; their fourteen-year old son Robert thereafter enlisted in Captain Daniel Ladd's ranger company as an Indian fighter.⁴¹ It was the beginning of a long career for the man who would become North America's best-known ranger -- and who would lead the 1759 attack that left 200 Abenaki women and children dead, and the mission of St. Francis in ashes.

Yet for the backcountry settlers of the northern colonies, Rogers's offensive campaigns against the Abenakis were far in the future. In the summer and fall of 1745, the New England rangers watched from their blockhouses while French and Indian raiders destroyed large portions of the northern Anglo-American frontier. Two emblematic instances can stand as representative of a great many raids. In August 950 Canadians and Indians managed to march undetected from Canada and overwhelm the small company of Bay Colony militia stationed at Fort Massachusetts.⁴² Three months later, another French force struck Saratoga. The Canadians and Indians, Robert Sanders reported, "appeared & did Beset all the houses there, Burnt & Destroyed all that Came before them Left only one Sawmill

³⁹ Doolittle, "A Short Narrative," 21.

⁴⁰ Colin G. Calloway, *The Western Abenakis of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and the Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 149-150.

⁴¹ John Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (1952, reprint; New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987), 7.

⁴² Abstract of Despatches received from Canada, January 17, 1757, NYCD, 10: 77.

Standing which stood a Little out of their way it seems, took along with them such Booty as they thought fit, Kilt & took Captives 100 or 101 persons Black & white."⁴³

After the bloodletting of 1745, settlers in the backcountry lived in fear that Indian or French raiders would strike them next. Frontier communities barraged crown officials in Albany, Boston, and Portsmouth with pleas for military assistance. Many settlers simply fled their homes for the safety of the more settled areas, just as their grandparents and parents had done in earlier wars. Those that remained, Ebenezer Eastman reported from the Connecticut River settlements in March 1746, lived "in deadly fear that they shall be attacked" by a "Body of the enemy [that] is waiting an opportunity to do mischief!" If the Governor and Council of New Hampshire did not send troops to protect the settlers that stayed behind, Eastman warned, they too surely would "quit the Place."⁴⁴

Shirley and Benning Wentworth, the Governor of New Hampshire, rushed ranger companies to the frontier to halt the exodus of backcountry settlers. The rangers, however, found themselves mired in a bloody war of attrition against an elusive and dangerous enemy. Captain Daniel Ladd's

⁴³ Robert Sanders to William Johnson, November 28, 1745, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, ed. James Sullivan, et. al., 14 vols. (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1921-65), 1: 43; Abstract of Despatches from Canada, NYCD, 10: 76. Cadet Paul Marin commanded the French attack on Saratoga. He originally intended to strike the Anglo-American settlements in the Upper Connecticut River Valley. However, his Indian auxiliaries did not arrive at Ft. St. Frédéric until mid-November. Marin and the Indians then determined that "not being fitted out for the winter they would run great risks in returning from this expedition." Marin instead chose to strike the target of opportunity at Saratoga. See Military and other Operations in Canada during the Years 1745-1746, NYCD, 10: 38. Marin had a long and distinguished career as an officer of the *Troupes de la Marine* including service in Acadia and commander of the Indians at the siege of Ft. William Henry in 1757.

⁴⁴ See Ebenezer Eastman to [New Hampshire] Council, March 12, 1746, Nathaniel Bouton, ed., *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire*, 23 vols. (Concord: George E. Jenks, State Printer, 1867-93), 859.

company of rangers, for instance, spent nearly three months patrolling the New Hampshire wilderness. Only after five weeks in the woods did they encounter their first Indians when forty warriors ambushed a Lieutenant Bradley and seven of the rangers while on patrol. Daniel Gilman the only survivor of the ambush, reported that as he came over the saddle of a hill, scores of Indians who had concealed themselves in the woods "rose up and shot a volley and run out into the path, making all sort of howling and yelling." Although Lieutenant Bradley tried to rally his outnumbered men, the battle was over in an instant and five rangers "were killed down dead on the spot" and two others taken captive. As Gilman ran the two miles back to the rangers' main camp, the Indians scalped the Anglo-American dead and then melted into the woods.

Gilman's experience brings to mind the maxim that one man's small skirmish is another man's massacre.⁴⁵ The rest of Ladd's men had little stomach for pursuing the Indians. They took two hours to organize a relief party and march to the site of the ambush. Instead of following the Indians' trail, they chose first to transport their dead back to camp. Then, after following for only a short distance the blood trail of an Indian whom Gilman had seen Bradley wound, the rangers suspected the Indians were about to ambush them, lost their nerve, and beat a hasty retreat for the blockhouse at present-day Rumford, Maine.⁴⁶ At the end of the campaigning season,

⁴⁵ Paddy Griffith has written that "one man's 'small war' may be another man's 'apocalypse': *his* 'routine policing' may be *our* 'holocaust', whereas *my* 'brief skirmish' may be *your* 'massacre.'" See Griffith, "Small Wars and How They Grow in the Telling," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 2 (1991): 216.

⁴⁶ Abner Clough, "Abner Clough's Journal," New Hampshire Historical Society *Collections* 4 (1834): 204-14. Rogers joined the rangers after Lieutenant Bradley's defeat. See Cuneo, *Robert Rogers*, 8.

Ladd's rangers, like many others on the frontier, had little to look back upon favorably. They had suffered seven casualties, inflicted only one on the enemy, and for all practical purposes been driven from the field.

It was obvious by the spring of 1746 that the Indians and the French had the upper hand on the war on the frontier. Although the American provincials had taken Louisbourg the previous year, and the French were occupied with "suppressing" the Indian "rebellions" in the *pays d'en haut* (Great Lakes Region), French and Indian raiders still ravaged the Anglo-American frontier with their guerrilla and unlimited war.⁴⁷ Yet Shirley, instead of sending the rangers on retaliatory raids into Canada, conceived another regular-style invasion of Canada.⁴⁸

While Shirley pondered how best to execute the regular invasion of Canada, other British and Anglo-American leaders wanted him to turn loose the rangers. Newcastle, from his office in Great Britain, could see the potential the rangers offered the British cause. He instructed Shirley to enlist as many rangers as possible and send them out to "destroy the open country between Quebec and Montreal."⁴⁹ Shirley responded by increasing Massachusetts's bounty on Indian scalps to £250,⁵⁰ but he could do little more; the rangers alone would be less than effective operating in Canada

⁴⁷ Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 5.

⁴⁸ William Shirley envisioned that while a land army would march up the "Albany-Montreal Corridor," a sea-born force from Louisbourg would sail up the St. Lawrence and take Quebec.

⁴⁹ Duke of Newcastle to Shirley, April 9, 1746, Douglas Brymner, ed., *Report on Canadian Archives, 1894: Calendar of Papers Relating to Nova Scotia* (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson for the Public Archives of Canada, 1895), 113, hereafter cited as *RCA, 1894*.

⁵⁰ *Acts and Resolves*, 3: 342.

without support from the Iroquois League. In August, New York's Governor George Clinton, in hopes of enticing the Iroquois from their neutralist stance, authorized William Johnson to offer the Mohawks bounties on scalps if they would go "against the French & their Indians in Canada to harass and Alarm their Quarters in Parts and to take Prisoners for Intelligence."⁵¹ Clinton earlier had reported to the Lords of Trade that upwards of 1,000 Iroquois seemed willing to raise the hatchet on the British side. Johnson responded that he indeed could bring many Iroquois into Britain's camp, and that a promise of a mere £10 for each scalp was sufficient to get the Indians to go against the French.⁵²

Although the Canada Expedition stalled and the provincial armies failed to advance further than Albany or Louisbourg in 1746, the Indians and rangers met with some small successes.⁵³ While most of the provincials

⁵¹ George Clinton to William Johnson, August 28, 1746, *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 1: 60. By the late 1740s the Six Nations had come to fear that the British would supplant them with the Indians of the Ohio country as the primary distributors of British trade goods. The only way to secure continued support from the Britons was to take up the hatchet for them. Ironically, after King George's War, the British crown cut its presents to the Iroquois. See White, *Middle Ground*, chap. 6, esp. 226.

⁵² Clinton to Lords of Trade, July 24, 1747, *NYCD*, 6: 364; Johnson to Clinton, May 7, 1747, *ibid.*, 6: 361.

⁵³ The Canada expedition unraveled in the fall of 1746. First, Lieutenant General James St. Clair's regulars -- troops that Whitehall had promised the provincials to support the invasion up the St. Lawrence -- never arrived at Louisbourg. See John Rutherford to William Johnson, June 12, 1746, *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 1: 52. Then, the provincials waiting in garrison or on ships began to die from communicable diseases at alarming rates. "The Heat of the Season and Great Rains," Captain William Rice of the Rhode Island provincials wrote, "occasioned the Bloody flux to rage among our Soldiers" only to be replaced by a "a putrid fever." See Rice, *Nine Muster Rolls of Rhode Island Troops Enlisted During the Old French War, to which is Added the Journal of Captain William Rice* (Providence: Society of Colonial Wars in the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, 1915), 46. In the fall, the War Office and Shirley called off the campaign, disbanded the provincials, and presented Parliament with a bill for over £220,000 for an expedition that did not leave its muster points. House of Commons Proceedings, March 12, 1749/50, *Proceedings and Debates*, 415-18.

returned home, others remained at Albany in hopes of collecting the generous scalp rewards offered by the northern colonies.⁵⁴ Captain Eleazer Melven's company of rangers, for instance, ventured into Canada in search of Indian and French scalps.⁵⁵ In early 1747 Johnson wrote to Clinton that he had at his home "daily such Numbers of Indians about me for Scalping money" that he could not pay them all.⁵⁶

Nevertheless, after the initial enthusiasm with scalp-hunting passed most of the rangers retreated to their blockhouses to wait out the winter and left the frontier for all practical purposes undefended. It simply was impossible to build an impermeable barrier of patrols along the frontier. Benjamin Doolittle, for instance, observed that it was "a rare thing" when an Anglo-American obtained an Indian scalp.⁵⁷ Canadians and Indians, selecting only targets they felt reasonably certain of taking, continued to destroy isolated frontier settlements and to assault Anglo-American forts and garrisons.⁵⁸ The results were frightful for the white settlers along the frontier. In January 1748 Governor de La Galissonnière of New France reported that

⁵⁴ Doolittle, "A Narrative," 21.

⁵⁵ Eleazer Melven, "Journal of Captain Eleazer Melven," *New Hampshire Historical Society Collections* 5 (1837): 207.

⁵⁶ Johnson to Clinton, May 31, 1747, *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 1: 96.

⁵⁷ Doolittle, "A Narrative," 20.

⁵⁸ In April, a Canadian-Indian war party attacked the thirty Anglo-American rangers stationed at No. 4. After a siege of several days, during which the Indians tried to immolate the rangers inside the walls of the fort, the Anglo-Americans repulsed the enemy. See Jaazaniah Crosby, "Annals of Charlestown, in the County of Sullivan, New Hampshire," *New Hampshire Historical Society Collections* 4 (1836): 111-13. For another description of the war on the Maine frontier, see Sergeant Trott, "Scout of Sergt. Trott and Ten Men from Presumpscot River to Royal's River," *Maine Historical Society Collections*, 2d ser., 12: 300.

his Indians had "experienced their usual success in enemy territory" and brought him 150 Anglo-American scalps and 112 prisoners.⁵⁹

Only after British and French plenipotentiaries signed a preliminary treaty of peace at Aix-la-Chapelle did the *petite guerre* end on the Anglo-American frontier, and with it an important phase in the evolution of the Anglo-American war making, end.⁶⁰ Anglo-American irregulars for four years had tried with only minimal success to stop the French and Indian depredations of the frontier. But "we may observe," Benjamin Doolittle noted in 1750, "that in this War, as we increased *our* Number of Men in our *Forts* or *Scouts*, the Enemy have increased *their* Numbers; and the longer the War continued, the oftener they came, and the more bold they grew."⁶¹ Perhaps the only tangible success that the Anglo-American side experienced along the New England frontier was when the Mohawks and rangers raided Canada. If anything, the events of 1744 to 1748 on the New England and New York frontiers showed the futility of defensive applications of irregular war. A valuable truth about irregular operations thus emerged from the experience of King George's War in Massachusetts and New York: irregular warfare, to be effective, must be conducted and waged offensively. The course of King George's War and Father Le Loutre's War in Nova Scotia proved the veracity of that proposition, and in the process, solidified offensive irregular warfare as an integral part of Anglo-American's military culture.

⁵⁹ Abstract of M. [Roland-Michel Barrin, marquis] de La Galissonière's Despatches, January 8, 1748, NYCD, 10: 132.

⁶⁰ British and French representative signed the preliminary treaty on April 30, 1748. See House of Commons Proceedings, November 29, 1748, *Proceedings and Debates*, 286.

⁶¹ Doolittle, "A Narrative," 22.

KING GEORGE'S WAR, 1744-1748: NOVA SCOTIA

The irregular war in Nova Scotia originated in the ambiguous and often acrimonious relations among Anglo-Americans, Indians, and Acadians in Maritime Canada. Great Britain had won possession of Nova Scotia following Queen Anne's War.⁶² By 1744, however, Nova Scotia was a British colony in name only. The overwhelming majority of the colony's inhabitants remained pro-French Acadians or descendants of Acadian-Micmac and Acadian-Maliseet unions.⁶³ In 1745, for example, the Governor and Intendent of New France noted that the English garrison at Annapolis Royal amounted to only 300 men, while "All the rest of Acadia is inhabited exclusively by French people," including 2,500 men capable of bearing arms at Beaubassin, Minas, and Port Royal. "As regards the dispositions of the inhabitants towards us," they wrote, "all, with the exception of a very few small portion, are desirous of returning under the French dominion."⁶⁴ The English settlements at Annapolis Royal and Canso were thus little more than islands of British influence surrounded by a sea of hostile Acadians and Micmacs.

⁶² Great Britain claimed Nova Scotia based on the success of the joint provincial-British conquest of Annapolis Royal in 1710. In 1710, four regiments of New England provincials and four battalions of Royal Marines captured Port Royal. With the change in sovereignty came changes in names. Port Royal became Annapolis Royal while a major portion of Acadia became Nova Scotia.

⁶³ The Maliseets resided on the Eastern shore of the Bay of Fundy, surrounding the area where the St. John River empties from New Brunswick. The French had friendly relations with the Maliseets as well. See Mason Wade, "French Indian Policies," *HNAI*, Volume 4, *History of Indian-White Relations*, 110.

⁶⁴ Messrs. [Charles, Marquis] de Beauharnois and [Gilles] Hocquart to Count de Maurepas, September 12, 1745, *NYCD*, 10: 4. After 1714 the British and Anglo-American population in Nova Scotia remained small while the Acadian and Micmac populations grew considerably. See Paul Mascarene to Duke of Newcastle, June 7, 1739, *RCA*, 1894, 93.

In early 1744 it became clear that the British garrison was in no position to fight or win a guerrilla war in Nova Scotia should the Acadians or Micmacs revolt against English rule. Father Jean-Louis Le Loutre, the previous October, had informed Nova Scotia's Lieutenant Governor Paul Mascarene that the Micmacs were ready to raise the hatchet against the British should war erupt between Great Britain and France.⁶⁵ Although Mascarene responded to Le Loutre's threat with a crash program to improve the dilapidated fortifications around Annapolis Royal, he still worried that his 400 regulars, thinly spread from Annapolis Royal to Canso and Placentia, Newfoundland, were the wrong troops to counter an Acadian rebellion.⁶⁶ Mascarene realized his fears in May 1744. François du Pont du Vivier led a force of mostly Micmacs and French *marines* against Canso, seized the British settlers and garrison and took them as prisoners to Louisbourg, burned a small British man-of-war tender stationed there, and put the village to the torch.⁶⁷ Mascarene, meanwhile, was powerless to respond. The Micmacs would have destroyed any detachment of regulars that he sent into the countryside.

Both Mascarene and Shirley realized that the British forces in Nova Scotia were in dire need of irregulars to "beat the bush" against the Indians

⁶⁵ Minutes of Council on a Letter from Le Loutre, October 10, 1743, *RCA*, 1894, 98. Mascarene served as Lieutenant Governor of Annapolis Royal and chief military and civilian administrator of the colony. Edward Cornwallis, appointed in 1749, was technically the first Governor of Nova Scotia.

⁶⁶ House of Commons Proceedings, March 13, 1743/44, *Proceedings and Debates*, 178. Canso merited a company because it was a major outpost for New England fishermen that worked the waters of Nova Scotia. Daniel Vickers has written that in the mid-eighteenth century the grounds off Nova Scotia were the favorites of New England fishermen. See Vickers, *Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1994), 150.

⁶⁷ Mascarene to Bastide, June 4, 1744, *RCA*, 1894, 100.

and Acadians. Shirley responded to the French excursion against Canso with a request to the Massachusetts Assembly for funding to raise two sixty-man companies of rangers for service at Annapolis Royal. Mascarene, meanwhile, sent requests to the northern colonies for any assistance that they could spare for Nova Scotia. Among his few specific requests, Mascarene asked Shirley for more irregulars since "A Company of Rangers would be of great service."⁶⁸

In the summer of 1744 John Gorham began enlisting men for one of the Nova Scotia companies of rangers. For his first company Gorham could find only twenty Anglo-Americans. Shirley and Mascarene had failed to offer the generous scalp bounties that traditionally had drawn land privateers into ranger service, and most New England frontiersmen probably were enlisting in the companies for service on the Massachusetts frontier. Gorham thus turned to Mohawks to fill the ranks of his company. Although the Iroquois League still professed its neutrality between Great Britain and France, twenty-two Mohawks with Christian names enlisted under Gorham's command. Expressing a bias against Indians commanding whites, and following the tradition of his grandfather who had commanded a joint white-Indian company in King William's War, Gorham selected his subalterns and noncommissioned officers from the Anglo-American volunteers. In another gesture toward family tradition, Gorham appointed his eighteen-year old son, John Jr., as the company's clerk.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Shirley to the General Court of Massachusetts, May 31, 1744, *Correspondence of Shirley*, 1: 122; Mascarene to Shirley, July 7, 1744, *RCA*, 1894, 101.

⁶⁹ Muster Roll for Gorham's Rangers, n.d., Gorham MSS; John Gorham, "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' Facsimiles," ed. Frank W. Sprague, *NEHGR* 52 (1898): 192. By 1749, after the threat to the New England frontier had been lifted, Gorham's Rangers were all Anglo-Americans. See Names Officers & Men on Comd when took 3 French Men, January 1, 1749, Gorham MSS. An examination of Gorham's muster roll from 1744 and the muster roll from

Gorham was an ideal choice to command Great Britain's irregulars in Nova Scotia. Not only was he a member of the Gorham clan that had fought Massachusetts and Maine's Indian wars stretching back to King Philip's War, but he was intimately familiar with Nova Scotia. In the late 1730s and early 1740s, he had traveled extensively in the Maritimes as a merchant and land speculator. In 1737, for example, he was Captain of the brigantine *Greenland* that plied the Bay of Fundy. Gorham, in 1738, petitioned Mascarene's predecessor, Lieutenant Governor Armstrong, for a grant of land on Sable Island on which he proposed to settle Huguenot settlers from Boston. In preparation for his settlement scheme, Gorham traveled throughout Nova Scotia, including the Acadian-controlled areas of the Minas Basin and Chignecto Isthmus.⁷⁰

Gorham had self-interest in mind in forming Gorham's Rangers. During his pre-war travels to Minas and Chignecto, Gorham certainly saw the fertile lands, diked fields, and snug houses of the Acadians. It is little wonder then that throughout King George's and Father Le Loutre's Wars Gorham was the most vociferous proponent of seizing Acadian lands as punishment for their "rebellious" actions. In November 1748 Gorham proposed to settle a township on the eastern coast of Nova Scotia.⁷¹ When that proposal fell by

1749 shows that not a single Indian private who served in 1744 remained with the company five years later, nor had any of them been promoted to a noncommissioned officer or junior officer.

⁷⁰ George T. Bates, "John Gorham, 1709-1751: An Outline of His Activities in Nova Scotia 1744-1751," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 30 (1954): 31-32.

⁷¹ Petition of John Gorham on Behalf of Himself and Others, for a Township on the Eastern Coast of Nova Scotia, November 24, 1748, *RCA*, 1894, 133; Council minutes, January 4, 1748/49, Charles Bruce Fergusson, ed., *Minutes of His Majesty's Council at Annapolis Royal, 1736-1749* (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1967), hereafter cited as *Annapolis Royal Council Minutes*.

the wayside, Gorham, in 1749, suggested that Mascarene impose "large quit rents" to drive the Acadians off their lands "so as to encourage Its being settled with some of his Majesty's Protestant Subjects."⁷² It is safe to assume that Gorham had to look no farther than himself to find a proprietor for those settlements.

While Gorham busily raised his company, Great Britain's position in Nova Scotia deteriorated as the Micmacs, led by Father Le Loutre, and the Acadians seized control of the entire colony except Annapolis Royal. Then, on July 1, 1744, 300 Micmacs attacked Annapolis Royal itself. Although Mascarene had so-called "loyal" Acadian work parties combing the countryside surrounding the fort for timber and supplies, not a single Acadian warned him of the advancing Micmacs. One minute the British were repairing the walls of Annapolis Royal, the next the Micmacs had them surrounded. Mascarene managed to get most of his troops and settlers into the fort, only to find that he had on hand a mere one hundred regulars to defend against a force three times his size. If it had not been for several small artillery pieces firing into the Micmacs' ranks, they surely would have overrun the fort. Mascarene now faced the certainty that the Acadians and Micmacs had him trapped inside its walls; when two regulars ventured out from behind its protective walls Indians quickly fell upon them and killed and scalped them before the eyes of soldiers watching from the fort's ramparts.⁷³ Fortunately for Mascarene, the Micmacs did not intend to besiege Annapolis Royal.

⁷² Gorham to Mascarene, 1749, Gorham MSS.

⁷³ Mascarene to Shirley, December 1744, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 140-41.

Instead, they pillaged the town below the fort and then withdrew to the woods to await promised French cannon.⁷⁴

The Micmacs struck Annapolis Royal for a second time two months later. In September, Du Vivier led upwards of six hundred Indians, Acadians, and *Troupes de la Marine* against the British. The French forces still lacked siege artillery, so Du Vivier positioned his troops in the woods outside the town and fort. To pass the time as he waited for cannon to arrive from Louisbourg, the French commander allowed his Acadian and Micmac auxiliaries to pillage the town and scalp any Britons and Anglo-Americans foolish enough to venture forth from the fort.

Gorham's Rangers sailed into Annapolis Royal harbor at that critical junction and turned the tide of the "siege" in Great Britain's favor. While Mascarene felt the Anglo-American force remained too weak "to cope with such a number of adversaries," Gorham thought otherwise, and ordered his men to secure the lower town and drive the Micmacs and Acadians from the field.⁷⁵ After several brisk skirmishes, the rangers reoccupied the town and fortified its largest house as a forward base of operations. With the rangers in the field, the entire complexion of the battle changed. In the face of the rangers' attacks on his Micmac allies, which quickly eroded their interest in standing by the French, plus a lack of cannon and other supplies, Du Vivier determined the best course of action was to withdraw to Minas and Chignecto.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Mascarene to Lords of Trade, July 7, 1744, *RCA*, 1894, 101.

⁷⁵ Mascarene to Lords of Trade, September 20, 1744, John C. Webster, ed., *Thomas Pichon: "The Spy of Beauséjour." An Account of His Career in Europe and America, with Many Original Documents Translated by Alice Webster* (Halifax: Public Archives of Nova Scotia, 1937), 132, hereafter cited as Webster, "Pichon Papers."

⁷⁶ Bates, "John Gorham," 29-30.

Gorham's Rangers then set about re-consolidating the British hold on the countryside around Annapolis Royal, and in effect, intimidating the Acadians into submission. The Acadians, Gorham believed, had shown their true colors when the French and Indians had attacked Annapolis Royal. After having secured the lower town, the rangers thus took to the woods to root out French sympathizers and collaborators. They announced that they would treat any Indian they found as an enemy, and soon proved it by bringing back the scalps of an entire Indian family -- adults and children -- that they claimed they had found skulking in the woods. While it is doubtful that a Micmac war party would have taken women and children on the warpath, Mascarene nonetheless praised Gorham and his men for their outstanding service in killing the "enemy."⁷⁷ For the Acadians, many of whom were of mixed Acadian and Micmac blood, the rangers' aggressiveness suggested that they too could find themselves on the wrong end of a scalping knife.

Gorham, however, was not content to focus his rangers' activities and operations around only Annapolis Royal. An aggressive and audacious officer, he wanted to take the war directly to the Micmacs and Acadians in their sanctuaries of Minas and Chignecto. Gorham suspected that his troops could strike fear into the hearts of the enemy; he "was very well Inclined to do anything that Might tend to the distressing the Indian Enemy."⁷⁸

In December 1744 Gorham therefore presented Mascarene with a detailed plan to punish the Micmacs and Acadians. Gorham's design was to march stealthily to Minas and Chignecto, kill any Acadians and Micmacs in his path, and loot and pillage all the rangers could carry. Gorham threatened

⁷⁷ Ibid., 30.

⁷⁸ Copy of Minutes of Council, December 6, 1744, PANS, vol. 11, #16.

he would treat all in Minas and Chignecto as enemies. When he requested from Mascarene permission to draft Acadians as guides -- hostages -- Gorham's intentions were clear. Gorham then offered the captain of a sloop a one-eighth share in the booty that he expected he and his rangers would seize if the captain agreed to ferry a detachment of the rangers up the Bay of Fundy. It seemed that Gorham had in mind for the Acadians a "hammer and anvil" operation. One party of rangers would march overland (the hammer) and drive the enemy into another group advancing by sea (the anvil).⁷⁹ Before Gorham could realize his ambition of punishing the Acadians and Micmacs of Minas and Chignecto, however, British officials called him to other duty. Gorham put aside his plan for the conquest of Minas, with every intention of executing it as soon as he returned to Nova Scotia.

Starting in early 1745, Gorham focused his attention and substantial energies on the Louisbourg campaign. Gorham had traveled to New England in January to recruit more rangers for the Minas-Chignecto expedition. His and his rangers' reputations had preceded him. Shirley and William Pepperrell, then in the early stages of organizing the provincial army to go against Louisbourg, wanted Gorham and some of the rangers to join their army. To encourage the ranger captain to abandon ranging for provincial service, Shirley commissioned Gorham a Lieutenant Colonel in the 7th Massachusetts Regiment, the regiment his father commanded.⁸⁰

Gorham experienced little difficulty in making the transition from irregular leader *par excellence* to provincial officer, a role in which he contributed significantly to the conquest of Louisbourg. He commanded the

⁷⁹ December 8, 1744, *Annapolis Royal Council Minutes*.

⁸⁰ Bates, "John Gorham," 35.

whaleboats that ferried the Anglo-American troops from their transport ships to their landing zones and directed the landing of the provincial army.

Gorham stepped forward when Pepperrell needed a volunteer to lead a dangerous night attack on the Island Battery protecting Louisbourg. On May 23, 1745, Gorham's provincials, with the assistance of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble's men, attacked the battery. Although the French repulsed the provincials with heavy losses, Gorham's behavior was exemplary. When Commodore Peter Warren and Pepperrell -- joint commanders of the Louisbourg force -- convened a court-martial to investigate the defeat at the Island battery, they found that Gorham had performed bravely in the attack. After Louisbourg fell in June, Gorham remained with the provincial troops, only to see hundreds succumb to infectious diseases.⁸¹ Upon his father's death in one of the many plagues that wracked the provincial army, Pepperrell promoted Gorham to Colonel and commander of the 7th Massachusetts.⁸² Even so, Gorham chose to return as the leader of the rangers to Nova Scotia where greater personal gain beckoned.

Gorham sailed to Annapolis Royal in April 1746 to find that the state of the colony's defenses had again reached a crisis point in the rangers' absence. Several companies of New England militia had replaced the rangers at Annapolis Royal and done little to secure the colony. They rarely ventured outside the security of the lower town and spent the long Nova Scotia winter days killing time and consuming valuable provisions.

⁸¹ By January 1746, 500 of the provincials had died and another 1,000 were sick. See Warren and Pepperrell to Secretary of State, January 18, 1746, *RCA*, 1894, 110.

⁸² John Gorham, "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' and the Gorham Family," *New York Genealogical and Biographical Record* 28 (1897): 198.

Meanwhile, the Micmacs and Acadian partisans again turned to harassing and raiding British out settlements.⁸³

Gorham remained convinced that the most effective way to prevent the Acadian and Micmac excursions was to take the rangers to Minas and Chignecto. With Gorham and company back in Nova Scotia, Mascarene dismissed the militia and turned the conduct of the war over to the rangers.

Mascarene, at the same time he gave Gorham command of the provincial forces, planned to offer the Acadians both the carrot and the stick.⁸⁴ He hoped that many of the Acadians would submit to the rangers without a fight and therefore authorized Gorham to administer to as many Acadians as were willing to accept it the oath of allegiance to King George II. Those who took the oath would receive amnesty. At the same time, he instructed Gorham to build several blockhouses in Minas and Chignecto as forward operating bases for future ranger operations.⁸⁵ The Acadians saw the blockhouses, and not the offer of amnesty, as the true intentions of the British. They viewed Gorham's Rangers for what they were: invaders determined to burn and destroy Acadian homes and communities. Many of the Acadians feared, Gorham later reported, that the letter of amnesty that the rangers carried was "only to make them [the Acadians] easy until we can get them in our power to Remove them."⁸⁶

⁸³ Mascarene to Secretary of State, December 9, 1745, *RCA*, 1894, 109.

⁸⁴ Shirley to Duke of Newcastle, May 22, 1746, *PANS*, vol. 13, #22.

⁸⁵ Shirley to Duke of Newcastle, August 15, 1746, *Correspondence of Shirley*, 1: 336.

⁸⁶ Copy of a Letter from Lieut. Colonel Gorham to Governor Shirley, November 15, 1746, *PANS*, vol. 13, #34.

In May 1746 Gorham's Rangers set out for his long-anticipated mission to Minas and Chignecto. Intelligence reports estimated that upwards of 500 Acadians of military age, well supplied with cattle and corn, awaited them.⁸⁷ The Acadians, however, chose not to counter the rangers in one large battle but instead turned to guerrilla raids to harass and wear down the Anglo-Americans. After several clashes in which his rangers bested the Acadian partisans, the enemy, Gorham wrote to Shirley, deserted their homes and "Lodge in the Woods at Nights for fear" of facing the Anglo-American irregulars. Gorham responded with a war against Acadian villages and farms.⁸⁸ Gorham's Rangers quickly won a reputation as "far more terrible than European soldiers."⁸⁹

In the fall of 1746, Gorham's Rangers again proved their great utility to the British cause and nearly set the stage for a major British victory. One of the rangers' common practices was to disguise themselves as French troops and capture Acadians. On one such instance Gorham and a party of rangers captured an Acadian farmer as he worked his fields. Gorham extracted from the prisoner the important intelligence that storms had wrecked at sea a French armada headed toward Annapolis Royal and Boston.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the prisoner related, the French and Indian troops on Chignecto had retreated to Quebec to shore up that post's defense for the expected Anglo-

⁸⁷ Council minutes, November 8, 1745, *Annapolis Royal Council Minutes*.

⁸⁸ Gorham to Shirley, October 4, 1746, Gorham MSS.

⁸⁹ Quoted in *DCB*, s.v. "Gorham (Goreham, Gorum), John."

⁹⁰ In the spring of 1746 a French armada under the duc d'Anville had escaped the British Navy's blockade at Rochefort and sailed for American waters. In the trans-Atlantic passage, d'Anville's force was devastated by storms, calms, and epidemics. All told the fleet suffered 3,000 casualties, including its commander.

American invasion in the fall. A third French force that had marched along the eastern coast of Nova Scotia to take Annapolis Royal from the rear, Gorham therefore determined, was exposed and vulnerable. Gorham, ever aggressive, moved to cut off the retreat of that force and destroy it outside Annapolis Royal. His rangers, he boasted, would "so Annoy & Surprise this Army as to oblige them to make as precipitate and Lucky Retreat as Monsieur Du Vivier did before in the Like Case."⁹¹ The French army, however, withdrew overland to Chebucto just before the rangers could intercept it and engage it in battle.

By late January 1747, the rangers were back in Annapolis Royal after having spent the better part of late December and early January serving as scouts for the 460 Massachusetts provincials recently assigned to garrison the rangers' blockhouses in Minas. Mascarene had ordered Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Noble, the officer with whom Gorham had led the attack on the Island Battery at Louisbourg, to take his newly arrived troops to Minas where they would spend the winter among the not-so-friendly Acadians of Grand Pré.⁹² Mascarene had detailed Gorham's Rangers to teach the provincials the basics about waging war in Nova Scotia. After spending several weeks with the Bay Colony's soldiers and familiarizing them with their new surroundings, the rangers marched back to Annapolis Royal.

Had the rangers remained at Grand Pré they might have averted the disaster that struck Noble's party on the last day of January 1747. An army

⁹¹ Gorham to Shirley, October 4, 1746, Gorham MSS.

⁹² The Acadians of Grand Pré proved especially difficult for the English to control. They, unbeknownst to the English, had petitioned the French government in Quebec for "a detachment at the said place (Grand Pré) to protect them from the incursions of the English, which detachment they will supply with everything they can for its support." See *Military and Other Operations in Canada during the Years 1745-1746*, NYCD, 10: 66.

of nearly 300 Canadians and Indians under Captain Nicholas-Antoine Coulon de Villiers and Chevalier Louis de La Corne managed to march undiscovered against Grand Pré. After a twelve-hour battle that left Noble and 130 of his men dead, plus another 34 wounded, the Anglo-Americans surrendered.⁹³ Upon receiving word of the defeat at Grand Pré, Mascarene immediately rushed Gorham and his rangers to Minas.⁹⁴ Unable to catch the French army as it fled across Chignecto, the rangers escorted the defeated survivors of Noble's party safely back to Annapolis Royal.

After Noble's defeat at Grand Pré, British leaders in both Nova Scotia and Boston abandoned all hopes of defending Nova Scotia by regular means. They agreed that they were mired in a guerrilla war that required substantial numbers of rangers. Shirley even proposed to raise 2,000 rangers for service in Nova Scotia.⁹⁵ However, suspecting that there was resistance in Great Britain to paying for such a large partisan force, especially after he had presented Parliament the bill for the failed Canada Expedition, Shirley dispatched Gorham to the Duke of Newcastle to lobby for the ranger companies.⁹⁶ "I think the great service which Lieutenant-Colonel Gorham's Company of Rangers has been to the garrison at Annapolis Royal" Shirley

⁹³ Journal of Occurrences in Canada, 1746, 1747, *NYCD*, 10: 92. The French account of the battle of Grand Pré reads that Coulon's detachment set out on snowshoes for Minas on January 23 and arrived there on February 10. Those dates are old style, thus placing the French forces at Grand Pré on January 31, 1747. The French officer did not treat the Anglo-American survivors of the battle badly. Although Micmacs comprised a significant proportion of Coulon's forces, the French officers prevented them from scalping their prisoners or wounded. See *Capitulation of the Garrison at Grand Pré, Nova Scotia, NYCD* 10: 78.

⁹⁴ Mascarene to the Commander and All the Other Officers of the Part Returning from Minas, February 7, 1746, *PANS*, vol. 13, #38.

⁹⁵ Bates, "John Gorham," 42. Shirley's request was not granted.

⁹⁶ Gorham to ?, March 1746/47, Gorham MSS.

wrote in Gorham's letter of introduction, "is a demonstration of the usefulness of such a corps."⁹⁷

Gorham's trip to London signaled another occasion when the highest levels of British government gave legitimacy to the Anglo-American way of war. When John and Elizabeth Gorham arrived in England in the late spring of 1747, the ranger captain made a lasting impression on Newcastle and the King's advisors. The Secretary of State was so taken with Gorham that he arranged an audience for him with King George II at St. James's Palace. After his audience with King George, John Russell, duke of Bedford wrote that Gorham and his rangers were "more than ever absolutely necessary for the immediate preservation of the Province of Nova Scotia."⁹⁸ Newcastle then informed Gorham that the King had commissioned him a Captain in the regular British Army as recognition for his outstanding service.⁹⁹

Gorham's commission in the regular army is significant on several levels. He was the first of three prominent Anglo-American irregulars -- himself, his brother Joseph, and Robert Rogers -- to earn regular commissions in the British Army. The crown commissioned other Anglo-Americans -- usually high-ranking crown officials like governors or lieutenant governors -- as officers in the British Army, while many others, George Washington included, strove unsuccessfully for regular rank. King William, for example, made William Phips a major general for the 1690 Canada expedition. Phips's commission, however, had less to do with his military

⁹⁷ Shirley to Duke of Newcastle, February 27, 1747, quoted in Bates, "John Gorham," 42.

⁹⁸ Duke of Bedford quoted in *DCB*, 261.

⁹⁹ Bates, "John Gorham," 44; "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book' and the Gorham Family," 198.

prowess than his connections and position within the imperial bureaucracy.¹⁰⁰

Gorham, on the other hand, won his captaincy because of his military acumen. More important, the King commissioned Gorham because he was the premier irregular of King George's War. In doing so the King acknowledged unlimited-irregular war as vital to British military success in Nova Scotia and in effect sanctioned it as a legitimate form of war making.

Gorham, with his new commission in pocket, returned to Nova Scotia in late 1747 to find that peace was breaking out everywhere. Mascarene had put offensive operations in the colony on hold in the ranger captain's absence, forcing Gorham to start again from near scratch and spend the winter of 1747-1748 collecting reinforcements and provisions for a spring campaign against Minas and Chignecto. The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, however, precluded Gorham's further operations. Upon news of a preliminary peace, Mascarene extended an olive branch to the Acadians.¹⁰¹ He sent Gorham's brother Joseph to Minas to pay the Acadians for the provisions they had supplied Noble's troops, even though they had failed to come to Noble's men when they fought for their lives against Coulon and La Corne.¹⁰² The politic Mascarene was prepared to forgive past behavior, yet Gorham failed to share in his notions of amity. While he agreed to grant leave to some of his rangers so they could see their families in New England, he

¹⁰⁰ Leonard W. Labaree, "The Royal Governors of New England," *Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Volume 32, Transactions 1933-37* (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1937): 120-31.

¹⁰¹ Word of the Peace would have reached Annapolis Royal relatively quickly. Following Queen Anne's War, Great Britain had created a regular packet service that carried mail and government communications between Great Britain and the North American colonies. See Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

¹⁰² Mascarene to Duke of Bedford, September 8, 1748, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 164.

simultaneously sent recruiting parties to Massachusetts with the promise of a £15 advance in pay to anyone willing to enlist for what he expected would be the next war that soon would wrack the colony.¹⁰³

At the end of King George's War, and looking back on his companies' service, Gorham could take pride in his rangers' service. His troops had been the key to protecting Britain's interest in Nova Scotia. As the war progressed, they had become the only effective Anglo-American or British troops in the colony. By 1748, they thoroughly dominated British military affairs in Nova Scotia. In the undeclared struggle that followed, a period of strife that might be called Father Le Loutre's War, they would play an even larger role in winning Britain's final victory in Nova Scotia.

FATHER LE LOUTRE'S WAR, 1749-1755

Between 1749 and 1755, Nova Scotia was the scene of an Acadian-Indian insurgency against British rule. Father Le Loutre's War originated in the failure of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle to settle the central question that shaped Anglo-Americans' and Britons' relations with the Acadians. Although France had given Acadia to Great Britain two generations before, it had never been established to what degree the Catholic Acadians would maintain their status as neutrals in the Anglo-Franco rivalry. Clearly, many Anglo-Americans and Britons -- among them Gorham and Shirley -- wanted to colonize Nova Scotia. In that respect, both the Acadians and Micmacs stood as a roadblock to the Anglo-British colonizers' aspirations. For the many

¹⁰³ Gorham to Capt Bourn, December 13, 1748, Gorham MSS.

combatants of King George's War, especially the vehemently anti-British Jesuit priest Le Loutre and his mixed Indian-Acadian flock, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signaled not a lasting peace but merely a temporary cease fire.¹⁰⁴

Within a year of the British Parliament's ratification of the treaty, Anglo-American rangers, Acadian guerrillas, and Indians embarked on what became a two-phase guerrilla contest for the final control of Nova Scotia.

Father Le Loutre's War was a war fought in the shadows. Neither France, Great Britain, nor their respective colonies in North America officially declared war in Nova Scotia, and neither metropole devoted its regular military establishment to the conflict. Instead, the European home governments depended on New World irregulars to wage a war in which ambushes, murder, and atrocities committed against civilians and noncombatants became the norm. By 1755, the focus of violence directed against noncombatants manifested itself in the most infamous event in the history of the Maritimes. Charles Lawrence embraced fully the style of irregular war that he had seen Anglo-Americans wage in Nova Scotia and ordered the proscription and deportation of the Acadian population from the Maritimes. The Acadian expulsion often has been seen in the context of the Seven Years' War. It, however, resulted directly from the experiences of Le Loutre's War. As such, it, more than any other event to that time, shows the extent to which unlimited-irregular war had permeated the thinking of both British and Anglo-American officers who served in North America.

¹⁰⁴ Governor de La Galissonnière noted in 1750 that "Whilst peace appeared to have lulled the jealousy of the English in Europe, this bursts forth in all its violence in America." See *Memoir on the French Colonies in North America*, December 1750, *NYCD*, 10: 220. Le Loutre was not a man to search for compromise. His epitaph reads "Si les Anglais te mordent, mords-les!" ["If the English are killing you, kill them!"]. See Rogers, "Abbé Le Loutre," 128.

Anglo-American irregulars were at the center of the events leading up to the start of Father Le Loutre's War. In September 1748, Mascarene had ordered Gorham's Rangers to the French missions in present-day New Brunswick to inform the Acadians and Maliseets that they must send deputies to Annapolis Royal to explain their behavior during the war. While the Acadians agreed to dispatch representatives to parley with the British, the Indians adopted a more belligerent stance. On one occasion, after the rangers and Maliseets exchanged harsh words, some Maliseets fired on the Anglo-Americans and killed two of Gorham's men. Gorham responded by kidnapping two Indians and burning a Maliseet village. Coupled with an earlier instance in which Gorham had expelled a Roman Catholic priest from Minas and burned the homes of two Acadians judged to have "appeared too openly in the Enemies interest," Gorham's actions convinced French and British officials that war was imminent.¹⁰⁵ As the campaigning season ended, both sides watched to see what the other would do. Governors Shirley and Mascarene exchanged terse letters with Governor de La Galissonière condemning the other side's "hostile" actions. De La Galissonière singled out Gorham as particularly responsible for the depths to which relations in the colony had fallen. "The acts and threats of Mr. Gorham," de La Galissonière warned, had nearly pushed the French and British into war.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Mascarene to Duke of Bedford, September 8, 1748, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 164.

¹⁰⁶ Count de La Galissonière to Mascarene, January 15, 1749, *ibid.*, 362-64; Mascarene to de La Galissonière, April 25, 1749, *ibid.*, 365-67; Shirley to de La Galissonière, May 9, 1749, *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 1: 481.

Not until the return of Father Jean-Louis Le Loutre to Nova Scotia in the summer of 1749, however, did the much-expected war begin.¹⁰⁷ Le Loutre arrived in Chignecto to find his Micmac flock "*dans la consternation générale*."¹⁰⁸ That summer, 1,400 British settlers under Colonel Edward Cornwallis had established the settlement and naval base at Halifax on Chebucto Bay.¹⁰⁹ Le Loutre, with the encouragement of the French Ministry of War and leaders in Quebec, moved to exacerbate the tensions between the English and Micmacs and weaken the Britons' increasingly strong hold on Eastern Nova Scotia.¹¹⁰ "As we cannot openly oppose the English venture," Le Loutre wrote, "I think that we cannot do better than to incite the Indians to continue warring on the English; my plan is to persuade the Indians to send word to the English that they will not permit new settlements to be made in Acadia . . . I shall do my best to make it look to the English as if this plan

¹⁰⁷ In 1747 a British war ship had captured Le Loutre as he attempted to return to France to win monetary support for his mission. He won his freedom in a prisoner exchange after three months of captivity. He spent most of 1748 lobbying influential friends in France for support of the mission. He returned to Acadia in 1749 to bring about the restoration of Acadia to French hands. See Gipson, *Zones of International Friction*, 187.

¹⁰⁸ L'Abbé Le Loutre au Minister, July 29, 1749, Placide Gaudet, ed., *Report Concerning Canadian Archives for the Year 1905: Acadian Genealogy and Notes* (Ottawa: S.E. Dawson for the Public Archives of Canada, 1906), appx. N, 283, hereafter cited as *RCCA*, 1905; L'Abbé Le Loutre au Minister, October 4, 1749, *ibid.*, appx. N, 296.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas B. Akins, "The First Council," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 2 (1881): 17-18. Cornwallis was the uncle of Charles Cornwallis of the Revolutionary War. The *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* lists T.B. Akin as the author of the article "The First Council." However, that is a typographical error. The author was Thomas B. Akins, the compiler and editor of *Nova Scotia Documents*.

¹¹⁰ The French government in Quebec concluded that the restoration of Acadia was necessary for the security of France's possessions in North America. In December 1750, for instance, Governor de La Galissonnière wrote that "Acadia constituted, formerly, a part of Canada, and is doubtless one of the most serious losses we have experienced at the peace of Utrecht. The establishment of Louisbourg, with a view to repair that loss as much as possible, is but a feeble recompense." See *Memoir on the French Colonies in North America*, December, 1750, *NYCD*, 10: 225.

comes from the Indians and that I have no part in it."¹¹¹ After which, "The missionary did not cease," Le Loutre wrote of himself in his autobiography, "while at the same time urging them [the Micmacs] to uphold their rights and their claims to their lands, their hunting areas and their fishing, of which the English wished to gain control."¹¹² Governor Cornwallis, meanwhile, suspected that the French would try to precipitate war between the Micmacs and the British and therefore instructed his military officers -- Gorham especially -- "to avoid quarrel with the Indians if possible."¹¹³

Cornwallis's efforts to preserve the fragile peace, however, were to no avail. Starting in August bands of Micmacs and Maliseets, at Le Loutre's urging, raided English outposts across Nova Scotia. They took 20 English prisoners at Canso, attacked two English sloops in Chignecto Bay, and killed four settlers. In October Cornwallis advised the Secretary of State that the French and Indians had "begun their usual game -- their Missionary to the Indians De Loutre [sic], the same that led them before Annapolis Royal [in 1744], has once more persuaded them to begin hostilities." Cornwallis, however, refused to declare war against the Acadians. As he understood it, the problem resided in the influence of that "good for nothing scoundrel" Le Loutre among the Micmacs. As such, he followed the pattern that had been well established in the British North American colonies and issued a proclamation that declared the Micmacs "bandits" and offered ten guineas for

¹¹¹ Quoted in *DCB*, s.v. "Le Loutre."

¹¹² Webster, *Career of Abbé Le Loutre*, 40.

¹¹³ Cornwallis to Lords of Trade, September 11, 1749, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 583.

each Indian taken or killed.¹¹⁴ Upon the public issuance of Cornwallis's bounty, "*tous les Sauvages*," wrote Le Loutre, "*levèrent la hache*."¹¹⁵

With a full-scale Indian war facing him, Cornwallis turned to the Anglo-American rangers to take the war directly to the Micmacs. Cornwallis realized that "some effectual method should be taken to pursue them [the Indians] to their haunts and show them that after such actions they should not be secure within the Province." The rangers proved the best troops for that mission. He immediately called for 100 New England rangers to "join with Gorham's during the Winter and go over the whole province" searching for Indians to kill and capture. At the same time, he authorized Captain William Clapham to raise a fifty-man company of rangers for the defense of Halifax.¹¹⁶

From his position as advisor to the Nova Scotia Council as its expert on military affairs, Gorham hoped to translate Cornwallis's enmity for the Micmacs into a war against the Acadians.¹¹⁷ "Securing & Settling this province," Gorham wrote, "can not be done but by Force of Arms" and since "these Inhabitants [Acadians] by Influence of the French Neighboring Government all Refuse to take the Oath of allegiance" they too should feel the sting of war. It was time, the ranger captain suggested, that the British focus their attention not on the Micmacs, but on the Acadians.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Cornwallis to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, October 17, 1749, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 591; Cornwallis to Duke of Bedford, October 17, 1749, PANS, vol. 40, #9. Each guinea was fixed in value in 1717 at £1.1s (sterling).

¹¹⁵ "Autobiographie de Le Loutre," 16.

¹¹⁶ Cornwallis to Duke of Bedford, October 17, 1749, PANS, vol. 40, #9.

¹¹⁷ By 1749 Gorham represented the military on the Nova Scotia Council. See Akins, "First Council," 26.

¹¹⁸ Gorham to Shirley, November, 1749, Gorham MSS.

In the spring of 1750 Cornwallis adopted Gorham's recommendations and unleashed the rangers directly against the Acadians. In December 1749, Cornwallis had acknowledged in a private letter to Robert Napier that "the Acadians [were] certainly more Friends to the French than us."¹¹⁹ The next month he determined to punish the friends of the French and ordered Captain Silvanus Cobb, a former company commander in Gorham's regiment at Louisbourg, to take his sloop and a party of irregulars to Chignecto to apprehend Le Loutre.¹²⁰ Along with seizing the priest, Cobb was to capture several Acadian women and children "to remain as Hostages of their better behavior."¹²¹

Cornwallis then sent Gorham's Rangers and Captain Francis Bartelo's newly raised company to Minas and Chignecto where they were to terrorize and intimidate Acadians.¹²² In a repeat of the rangers' 1746 campaign, as Gorham's men marched overland from Chebucto toward Beaubassin, Bartelo's corps would sail up the Bay of Fundy on Cobb's sloop. Along the way, both forces arrested Acadians and seized their property.¹²³ It was

¹¹⁹ Cornwallis to Napier, December 6, 1749, Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), 8.

¹²⁰ DCB, s.v. "Cobb, Silvanus."

¹²¹ Cornwallis to Cobb, January 13, 1749/50, Webster, "Pichon Papers," 178-79. Cobb's mission had to be aborted because word of it reached Le Loutre before it could be executed.

¹²² Little is known of Francis Bartelo's career before he served as a ranger in Nova Scotia. His name is rarely mentioned in the documents. In "Readers' Questions," *JSAHR* 32 (1954): 45, however, one reader claimed that Bartelo was the same Captain Bartelo "who commanded the Duke's [Cumberland's] Free Companies in Flanders" during King George's War. Perhaps Bartelo learned part of the craft of irregular war in Europe fighting French *Grassins*.

¹²³ Cornwallis to Gorham, March 12, 1749/50, Webster, "Pichon Papers," 181.

Cornwallis's intention to "make an example of these lads" and convince the Acadians that they must abandon the French interest. Cornwallis hoped that if the English continued "for some time to harass and hunt them [the enemy guerrillas] by Sea and Land they will either abandon the Peninsula or come in upon any terms we please."¹²⁴

Le Loutre turned to a guerrilla strategy to oppose the rangers. All along the Bay of Fundy, Cornwallis complained, the Acadians "if they did not think their Strength sufficient to dispute our landing they would at first retire to the Woods with a resolution of committing every mischief that they were capable of."¹²⁵ Le Loutre, meanwhile, complained that he did not have the proper irregular force to confront the Anglo-Americans. "Why do we not imitate the English," Le Loutre asked, "who have free companies, rangers, who are at liberty to do all the mischief they can, and may be disavowed if circumstance made it necessary? It is true that it would cost the King a trifle; but great advantages would also be derived therefrom."¹²⁶

When his guerrillas failed to stop the rangers, Le Loutre adopted a scorched-earth policy to deny the Anglo-Americans the benefits of occupying Minas and Chignecto. Le Loutre had first used these tactics the previous fall to harry the rangers as they patrolled Minas.¹²⁷ In the spring of 1750, he returned to the practice with frightening efficiency. He not only ordered the evacuation to Chignecto of all the Acadian families of Minas, but also

¹²⁴ Cornwallis to Lords of Trade, March 19, 1749/50, PANS vol. 35, #1.

¹²⁵ Enclosure in a Letter of Cornwallis to Lords of Trade, July 10, 1750, *RCCA, 1905*, appx. N, 320.

¹²⁶ Webster, "Pichon Papers," 65.

¹²⁷ Gorham's Journal, September 9-16, 1749, Gorham MSS.

threatened that he would put to death any Acadians who returned to their homes. When several Acadians refused to comply with the missionary's instructions, Le Loutre turned his Micmac allies on them. Then, after the British succeeded in September 1750 in building Fort Lawrence on Chignecto, Le Loutre ordered all the Acadian settlements in Beaubassin burned to the ground and drove the Acadians further into New Brunswick and to Baie Verte.¹²⁸ Minas and large parts of Chignecto thus became a no-man's land where only Anglo-American rangers and Micmacs dared tread.

For most of 1750, it seemed that Le Loutre's Fabian strategy slowly was paying dividends.¹²⁹ In April, the rangers failed to secure the approaches to Chignecto, allowing a party of Acadian guerrillas and French regulars to drive Colonel Charles Lawrence's detachment of regulars from the isthmus.¹³⁰ Lawrence succeeded in building the fort which took his name six months later, only to find his regulars -- like Mascarene's half a decade earlier -- trapped inside it by Indians and Acadian partisans. Meanwhile, Acadian and Indian guerrillas defeated Bartelo's and Gorham's Rangers in two bloody skirmishes. In September, they ambushed Bartelo and sixty of his men. The Acadians and Indians killed seven of the rangers, wounded Bartelo, and took captive several rangers whom they spent the night torturing. The Acadians then repulsed Gorham and thirty of his rangers in the Anglo-Americans' raid

¹²⁸ Cornwallis to Duke of Bedford, March 19, 1749/50, Webster, "Pichon Papers," 183; Cornwallis to Charles Lawrence, April 15, 1750, *The Journal of Joshua Winslow*, ed. John C. Webster (St. John, NB: Publications of the New Brunswick Museum, 1936), 31. Le Loutre also asked for permission to excommunicate those Acadians who expressed sympathy or support for the British cause. See DCB, "Le Loutre."

¹²⁹ For a description of Fabian strategy, see Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 65-68.

¹³⁰ "Autobiographie de Le Loutre," 17.

on the Acadian-Indian settlement on the Petoutiah River.¹³¹ Emboldened by their victories over the rangers, Le Loutre detailed several bands of his Micmacs to spend the winter ravaging the countryside and searching for English scalps.¹³²

Yet just when events seemed to be reaching a crisis point for the English, the first phase of Father Le Loutre's War suddenly ended. Monetary costs of continuing the war had reached exorbitant levels and forced a peace. In 1750, Parliament had expended slightly less than £174,000 -- significantly more than the £39,000 it had estimated -- for the maintenance of Nova Scotia. For a colony of only 5,000 settlers, such costs were simply unacceptable. Both Cornwallis and his successor Peregrine Hopson understood that Parliament would hold them responsible for any excesses in expenditures. Maintaining the rangers alone accounted for almost seven percent of the colony's budget.¹³³ On the French side, meanwhile, the costs of continuing Le Loutre's personal war likewise were becoming intolerable to the Ministry of Marine. Le Loutre reported in the spring of 1751 that the Acadian refugees whom he forcibly had evacuated to Baie Verte were out of provisions, and many of the refugees had complained that they wanted to return to their former homes. Le Loutre, in a stopgap measure, transferred many of the presents intended for the Micmacs to the Acadians. Upon their

¹³¹ Journal de ce qui s'est passé à Chinectou et autre parties des frontières de l'Acadie depuis le 15 septembre 1750 jusqu'au 28 juillet 1751, *RCCA*, 1905, appx. N, 325.

¹³² "Autobiographie de Le Loutre," 19.

¹³³ House of Commons Proceedings, February 27, 1750/51, *Proceedings and Debates*, 451-52; House of Commons Proceedings, March 7, 1749/50, *ibid.*, 410-11. In late 1752 Cornwallis, disgusted at the parsimony regarding Parliament's expenditures for Nova Scotia, solicited the home government for his recall to Great Britain. See Akins, "First Council," 20.

loss of presents, the Micmacs refused to take to the field against the rangers.¹³⁴

The peace of 1751 gave the key antagonists of the war -- Le Loutre and Gorham -- much needed opportunities to attend to their personal affairs. In August 1751, Gorham sailed for London to settle the debts he had incurred when he first raised the rangers in 1744. Although the crown welcomed the services of Gorham's Rangers, Parliament remained less than generous in paying them or supplying them with even edible rations.¹³⁵ Gorham would never return to Nova Scotia; in December 1751 he died of smallpox in London.¹³⁶ Le Loutre, meanwhile, traveled to Quebec to lobby for more supplies for the Acadians and Micmacs. After his requests fell on deaf ears, he sailed for France to lobby personally for support for the Acadians and Micmacs.¹³⁷

Nova Scotia thus entered a period of tranquility for almost four years. Leaders on both sides now refused to allow tension to escalate into war. In October 1752, for example, the Micmacs abducted several Anglo-American fishermen and took them as captives to Louisbourg; the French commander of Louisbourg immediately returned the fisherman to Hopson's custody in Halifax.¹³⁸ Before the transfer of power from Cornwallis to Hopson,

¹³⁴ *DCB*, s.v. "Le Loutre." Philip Bock has noted that smallpox epidemics, alcoholism, and warfare all contributed to significant reductions in the Micmac populations. See Bock, "Micmac," *HNAI, Volume 15, Northeast*, 117. Peace thus would have served the interests of the Micmacs as well as the French and British.

¹³⁵ Gorham to Erasmus James Philipps, January 17, 1746/47, Gorham MSS.

¹³⁶ Gorham's widow, Elizabeth, wrote in June 1752 that her "dearly beloved husband in his loyal service to the King, has expended his entire fortune." Quoted in John Gorham, "Col. John Gorham's 'Wast Book'," ed. Sprague, 187.

¹³⁷ *DCB*, s.v. "Le Loutre," 457.

¹³⁸ Hopson to Lords of Trade, October 16, 1752, *RCA*, 1894, 184.

Cornwallis ordered the reduction of the rangers to one company.¹³⁹

Cornwallis, who had complained that Gorham was a wild and uncontrollable ruffian, thought peace stood a chance as long as the rangers were contained in many of their excesses.

In 1754, however, a clash of arms between Great Britain's colonists and the French in the Ohio valley shattered Nova Scotia's brief calm. Le Loutre had returned to Chignecto the previous spring and had tried with no success to break the state of peace that existed between the British and Micmacs. However, when news of George Washington's battle with French and Indian forces reached Nova Scotia, Le Loutre had all he needed to push the Micmacs into war. Upon the missionary's promise to pay for scalps, the Micmacs again agreed to take up arms for the French.¹⁴⁰ To prove their loyalty, they traveled to Quebec and presented the governor-general of New France thirty English scalps. Meanwhile, Le Loutre did his best to raise the Acadians against the British. "Moses [Le Loutre]," the British spy Thomas Pichon reported from inside Fort Beauséjour on Chignecto, "preached a most vehement sermon" against the British. Two weeks later, "Moses" advised the Acadians that they soon must expect war with the British.¹⁴¹

By the summer of 1755 fighting had broken out in Nova Scotia, starting the brief but climatic second phase of Father Le Loutre's War. One of Great Britain's main military objectives at the start of the Seven Years' War, from London's perspective, was to remove French "encroachments" on British colonial frontiers, and in the case of Nova Scotia, that meant the reduction of

¹³⁹ Hopson to Lords of Trade, October 16, 1752, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 680.

¹⁴⁰ DCB, s.v. "Le Loutre," 457.

¹⁴¹ Pichon to Lt. Col. George Scott, September 17, 1754, Webster, "Pichon Papers," 39; Pichon to Scott, October 14, 1754, *ibid.*, 44; Pichon to Scott, November 2, 1754, *ibid.*, 53.

Fort Beauséjour. For the Anglo-Americans and Britons in Nova Scotia, however, the focus of activity in 1755 was directed against the Acadians.¹⁴²

Following the capitulation of Fort Beauséjour, Anglo-Americans and Britons in North America moved to settle the "Acadian problem," once and for all.¹⁴³

Although historians continue to debate who, either Shirley or Governor Charles Lawrence, was most responsible for the deportation of the Acadians, the Acadian expulsion can not be separated from mid-eighteenth-century Anglo-Americans' conceptualization of war.¹⁴⁴ Anglo-Americans were in fact Britain's willing executioners. Colonel John Winslow, commander of the Anglo-American troops, noted that "Although it is a Disagreeable Part of Duty we are Put Upon, I am Sensible it is a Necessary One."¹⁴⁵ Captain Abijah Williard, one of the provincial officers assigned the onerous task of gathering

¹⁴² For the differing perspective on the need to attack either Ft. Beauséjour or the Acadians, see LO 477 and Extract of Letter from Govr. Lawrence to Govr. Shirley, November 5, 1754, *Nova Scotia Documents*, 376-77. The French began construction on Ft. Beauséjour in 1751. See Cornwallis to Duke of Bedford, June 24, 1751, PANS, vol. 40, #32.

¹⁴³ In June 1755, British Colonel Robert Monkton led 2,000 New England provincials and 270 British regulars against Fort Beauséjour. The French garrison within the fort surrendered on June 16 to Monkton and John Winslow. Le Loutre escaped from the fort, only to be apprehended by a British man-of-war later in the war as he tried to flee to France.

¹⁴⁴ In his writings, Lawrence tried to exculpate himself. "It was determined," Lawrence wrote in a classic use of the passive voice, "to bring the inhabitants to compliance or rid the Province of such perfidious subjects." See Lawrence to Lords of Trade, July 18, 1755, *RCA*, 1894, 206. Naomi E.S. Griffiths, in *The Contexts of Acadian History, 1686-1784: The 1988 Winthrop Packard Bell Lectures in Maritime Studies* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press for the Center for Canadian Studies, 1992), 63, expressed an earlier synthesis regarding Lawrence's guilt and argued that "Charles Lawrence, Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia in 1755, [was] the person who must bear the major responsibility for the policy" of expelling the Acadians." Brebner, in *New England's Outpost*, page 190, similarly stated that Lawrence "conceived and ordered the expulsion of the Acadian population." In the most recent study on the Acadian expulsion, Carl A. Brasseaux, *The Founding of New Acadia: The Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-1803* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), places the blame on Shirley. One should note, however, that as early as 1749 John Gorham had proposed a plan by which the British and Anglo-Americans could drive the Acadians from Nova Scotia. See note 72, above.

¹⁴⁵ Winslow to Lawrence, August 30, 1755, *RCCA*, 1905, appx. B, 17.

the Acadians for deportation, described the details of the four-month unlimited-irregular campaign against Acadian civilians. On August 27, 1755, for example, Willard and his company arrived at Tatmegoush to "pacify" the country. After confiscating the Acadians' arms, Willard's men went from house to house and arrested all the Acadian males and transported them to Fort Cumberland [Fort Beauséjour]. Twelve days later, Willard saw a Major Frey take 200 men to Shepody with orders to "take, burn and Destroy all the French in that part of the world." Willard's company then marched on other proscription missions. On September 17 his men set fire to forty Acadian homes; on another mission, in November, his men burned 157 more. As the harsh Nova Scotia winter approached, Willard's company fanned out across the countryside surrounding Fort Cumberland to kill livestock and leave it "to Rot upon the Ground," after which the Anglo-Americans set nearly 100 buildings aflame.¹⁴⁶

The Acadian proscription stands as a powerful example of the colonial Anglo-American way of war. Winslow's troops, in the matter of only weeks, forcibly removed nearly 4,000 noncombatants from Nova Scotia, of whom at least half perished in the Acadian Diaspora.¹⁴⁷ Another 8,000 fled -- to the woods, and across the isthmus of Chignecto -- to avoid deportation. The Acadians were the single largest population of Europeans forcibly dispersed in American history. As an episode in the history of the North Atlantic world it

¹⁴⁶ "Journal of Abijah Willard, 1755," ed. John C. Webster, *New Brunswick Historical Society Collections* 13: 49-69.

¹⁴⁷ Lawrence to Lords of Trade, October 18, 1755, *RCA*, 1894, 207. For an accounting of the numbers involved in the Acadian proscription, see Adams G. Archibald, "The Expulsion of the Acadians," *Nova Scotia Historical Society Collections* 5 (1886-87): 11-95. For the Acadian Diaspora, see Brasseaux, *The Founding of New Acadia*.

ranks second in magnitude only to the expulsion of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685.

The deportation of the Acadians by Winslow's men marked the culmination of a well-established Anglo-American pattern of war. The decision to proscribe the Acadians was a product of the Anglo-American experience of war making and represented a novel development only insofar as the population made a target was of European descent. For well over a decade, Anglo-Americans had engaged in irregular operations, aimed at enemy noncombatants and civilians, as their tactics of preference in Nova Scotia. The Acadian proscription grew in an environment that the killing, intimidation, and plundering of noncombatants. In the process Anglo-Americans and Britons of all ranks, from the privates in Willard's company to Governors William Shirley and Charles Lawrence, accepted noncombatants as just and proper targets of military violence.

Taken together, the Wars of King George occupy an important place in the development of the colonial military tradition. In those three conflicts, British imperial authorities in North America admitted, for the first time, that Anglo-Americans' culture of unlimited-irregular war contained a useful and acceptable mode of military action. The decade and a half between 1739 and 1755 also taught Anglo-Americans valuable lessons about their own warcraft. Anglo-Americans learned that irregulars made poor defenders and were employed better, as the events in Georgia and Nova Scotia particularly showed, as offensive troops. The British acceptance of Anglo-Americans' military culture and their skill in offensive operations would receive even further legitimization and refinement after 1755. Before examining that important period in the development of Anglo-Americans' culture of war

making, however, it is important to add one further element of context, by discussing contemporary European practices in irregular warfare. Only thus is it possible fully to grasp the notions and assumptions British regulars brought with them when they came to North America to fight the Seven Years' War.

CHAPTER 3

"WAR IN SUCH A VAGUE AND IRREGULAR MANNER": CONTINENTAL AND BRITISH *PETITE GUERRE*, CIRCA 1750

On May 11, 1745, over 50,000 British, Hanoverian, Austrian, and Dutch soldiers suffered defeat at the hands of 56,000 Frenchmen and their allies at Fontenoy, one of the classic battles of the eighteenth century.¹ Fontenoy symbolizes the mid-eighteenth-century European conceptualization of regular war, that highly stylized enterprise in which soldiers marched in perfect order and straight lines to exchange volleys of musket fire within a stone's throw of one another.² From the decorum of Lord Charles Hay's supposed call to the French officers -- "*Messieurs les Gardes Françaises, tirez le premiers!*" [Gentlemen of the French Guard, fire first!] -- to the ordered advance of the British infantry against the French lines, British soldiers looked to Fontenoy as a model of bravery and behavior that they should strive to emulate.³

¹ Historians and soldiers alike regard Fontenoy as an example of mid-eighteenth-century European regular war. For instance, the United States Military Academy at West Point's military history text describes how "Maurice de Saxe, one of the most famous French marshals, stampeded the British lines in a classic battle at Fontenoy." See Thomas E. Griess, ed., *The Dawn of Modern Warfare* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1984), 109.

² Historians have filled libraries on European regular war in the eighteenth century. For a general study see Griess, *Dawn of Modern Warfare*. For a detailed discussion of the development of the eighteenth-century combined-arms synthesis, see Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially chaps. 4 and 5. Hans Delbrück's *The Dawn of Modern Warfare: History of the Art of War Volume IV*, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), Book II, "The Period of the Wars of Religion" and Book III, "The Period of Standing Armies," discusses in detail the campaigns of the Great Captains, including Maurice of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, the Duke of Marlborough, and Frederick the Great.

³ John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. 2, *First Part -- To the Close of the Seven Years' War* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1910), 114; *Gentleman's Magazine* 15 (1745): 248. Fortescue described how "the shot plunged fiercely and more

But decorum and order made up only part of the mid-eighteenth-century European culture of war making. The mid-eighteenth century was also the age of unchivalrous and chaotic irregular warfare, what the French called *petite guerre*. For most eighteenth-century Western European soldiers, Britons particularly, *petite guerre* was the antithesis of regular warfare. Their view of regular war revolved around images of battles like Fontenoy, battles between professional soldiers using parade-ground tactics; *petite guerre*, they knew, focused on raids against enemy detachments, ambushes of isolated outposts, devastation of enemy fields, villages, and towns, and in many cases, the murder of innocent women and children. For the eighteenth-century regular, *petite guerre* was not a form of war, but rather a manifestation of criminality. Even Thomas Auguste le Roy de Grandmaison, one of the eighteenth century's most vociferous advocates for irregular war described it as a kind of war usually practiced by "*Nations Barbares*."⁴

Notwithstanding Fontenoy's status as the premier example of open-field engagement, the countryside surrounding the battlefield was scene to some of the most extensive *petite guerre* operations in the mid-eighteenth century. Sir John Fortescue, the premier historian of the British Army, noted that the villages and fields that surrounded Fontenoy were "crammed with mercenary irregular troops -- Pandours, Grassins, and the like."

fiercely into the serried lines as they advanced into that murderous cross-fire, but the gaping ranks were quietly closed, the perfect order was never lost, the stately step was never hurried. Only the Hanoverians in the second line, finding that they were cramped for space, dropped back quietly and decorously, and marched on in third line behind the British. Silent and inexorable the scarlet lines strode on."

⁴ Thomas Auguste le Roy de Grandmaison, *La Petite Guerre, ou traité du service des troupes legeres en campagne* (n.p., 1756), 7.

Contemporaries of the battle knew that irregulars on both sides played pivotal roles in the battle's outcome. Grandmaison, for example, detailed how on the day before the battle a detachment of French *Grassin* drove an advance-party of Austrian *huszars* from Fontenoy and thus allowed the regulars commanded by French Marshal Maurice, comte de Saxe, the crucial hours they needed to entrench. Perhaps if the *huszars* had held Fontenoy for only a few hours longer the British would not have lost nearly 15,000 men in their ordered but self-destructive frontal assault against the French line.⁵ The *Grassin* were indispensable to Saxe's victory at Fontenoy. Another French commentator anonymously wrote that Saxe's irregulars "did wonders all these days," as they harried the Allies' supply and communication lines.⁶ Saxe, Grandmaison wrote, not only learned of the movements of the British Army from his *Grassin*, but he used them throughout the battle to strike at the Britons, Austrians, and Dutch.⁷

If *petite guerre*, as Grandmaison and others believed, played such an important role in the battle of Fontenoy, where then did irregular war fit in the eighteenth-century European way of war? The answer is clear: by the middle decades of the eighteenth century *petite guerre* had come to occupy a central place in the thinking of Western European strategists and the practices of Western European soldiers. In fact, by 1755, the year that saw British soldiers arrive in significant numbers in North America for the first time, every major Western European army had its own a tradition of *petite guerre*.

⁵ *Gentleman's Magazine* 15 (1745): 316.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 314.

⁷ Grandmaison, *La Petite Guerre*, 407.

It is, however, the differences among those traditions that partially explain why the British Army failed at waging *petite guerre* with Britons in North America. At the risk of over-generalization it might be said that two varieties of *petite guerre* evolved in the first half of the eighteenth century: a Continental tradition and a British tradition. Approaches differed within Continental armies, but each possessed a common element of concern for finding the proper role of irregulars within a military context dominated by regular armies. The result was not only the creation of *petite guerre* corps, but also what modern theorists would call doctrines of irregular war. In the European British Army, on the other hand, *petite guerre* never attained the acceptance that it did in the armies of the Continental powers. Ironically, the British Army, in the colonization of Ireland and the suppression of Jacobitism in Scotland, forged an effective, albeit brutal, tradition of *petite guerre*. Unlike the Continental powers, however, British officers never embraced their tradition of *petite guerre* as a legitimate or effective way of war except as applied against rebellious populations. Thus no institutionalized or sanctioned doctrine of *petite guerre* existed in the mid-eighteenth-century British Army.⁸ As Major General Edward Braddock's march in 1755 on Fort Duquesne in western Pennsylvania showed, British officers' narrow understanding of *petite guerre* could lead to disastrous results on the battlefields of North America where irregular war was supreme.

⁸ Peter Russell has argued that the British Army gained a familiarity with irregular war fighting in Flanders, Central Europe, and Scotland. Those experiences, he postulated, became the seedbed from which grew the British army's irregular doctrine in the Seven Years' War in North America. See Russell, "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760," *WMQ* 35 (1978): 629-52. The success of British regulars in fighting the "little war" in North America, however, came mainly from Britons adopting Anglo-American methods of irregular war and incorporating Anglo-American rangers into the North American British Army of the Seven Years' War. The origins of the successes resided squarely in North America.

The mid-eighteenth-century Continental way of *petite guerre* was the synthesis of two separate traditions within Europe's culture of war making. On one level, the end of the Wars of Religion witnessed the beginning of an era in which Western European states strove to limit the effects of war on noncombatants. On another, beginning in the late-seventeenth century and stretching into the middle of the eighteenth century, Western European soldiers increasingly found themselves in contact with Eastern and Central European irregulars who brooked no such prohibitions against killing civilian men, women, or children. Eastern and Central European irregulars instead waged *petite guerre* primarily as a tool to inflict annihilationist warfare on their enemies' civilian populations. Western European soldiers, especially Frenchmen, found a way to reconcile the prohibitions against killing noncombatants with their interests in capitalizing on the military value of *petite guerre*. The result was a Continental approach to irregular warfare that subsumed *petite guerre* by incorporating aspects of its practice within regular military establishments. Indeed, by the mid-1750s *petite guerre* had become a component part of the Continental way of regular war, with its own protocols and doctrine.

A central tenet of civilized warfare in the early eighteenth century was its prohibition against waging war on noncombatants and civilians. Before the middle of the seventeenth century, Western European soldiers had embraced in both practice and theory an annihilationist model of war that permitted the killing of enemy women and children as well as enemy soldiers. The Wars of Religion precipitated the whole-sale slaughter of noncombatants across Central and Western Europe. In the wake of that devastation, the

Dutch lawyer Hugo Grotius promulgated a set of "rules of war," of which one of the core principles was denial of legitimacy to those who killed noncombatants. After 1648, the newly formed dynastic states of Europe, seeking to maintain the status quo established by the Treaty of Westphalia, embraced Grotius's legal theory. By the start of the eighteenth century all the standing armies of the Continental powers had accepted Grotius's rule against waging war against noncombatants as a foundation for both military effectiveness and civil-military relations.

This marked a great change, for Western Europeans had waged annihilationist war against noncombatants for hundreds of years. Since Antiquity soldiers had targeted noncombatants. Tacitus, for instance, wrote that the Roman Legions under Germanicus crossed the Rhine River in Germany and "ravaged and burnt the country for fifty miles around. No pity was shown to age or sex."⁹ During the Middle Ages, Christian "rules of war" sanctioned the killing of women and children provided, they were not Christians.¹⁰ Near the end of the fourth century, for example, Flavius Vegetius Renatus devoted a small section of his *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, which would later become one of the most read military treatise in Europe during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Era, on the ways that a commander could deal with enemy noncombatants. He contended that an enemy could

⁹ Tacitus, *The Annals of Imperial Rome*, trans. Michael Grant, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 61-62.

¹⁰ Just-war theory evolved during the Middle Ages, and applied not only to the legitimacy but the conduct of wars. To violate the norms too frequently was to invite a papal interdict.

be more easily defended by starving or terrorizing its civilians than by meeting its armies in battle.¹¹

By the end of the Wars of Religion, however, the propriety of targeting noncombatants had come under scrutiny within Western European military culture. The Reformation had shattered the old prohibitions on war among Christians that the medieval Church tried to enforce, leading to the whole-scale slaughter of Christian noncombatants. The devastation of the Wars of Religion shocked Europeans. During the Thirty Years' War in Germany alone, over eight million people died or became war refugees.¹² Johann von Grimmelshausen's contemporary novel of the war in Germany, *Simplicius Simplicissimus*, illustrates how soldiers of the Wars of Religion routinely looted, pillaged, and raped civilian victims. Grimmelshausen's hero, "Simplicius," describes the scene as a band of marauding Swedish soldiers arrive at his father's farm. The soldiers, Simplicius tells us, each "took up a special job, one having to do with death and destruction." They

raced through the house, ransacking upstairs and down; not even the privy chamber was safe . . . Still others bundled up big packs of cloth, household goods, and cloths, as if they wanted to hold a rummage sale somewhere. What they did not intend to take along they broke and spoiled. Some ran their swords into the hay and straw, as if there hadn't been hogs enough to stick. Some shook feathers out of beds, and put bacon slabs, hams and other stuff in the ticking, as if they might sleep better on these. Others knocked down the hearth and broke the windows, as if announcing an everlasting summer. They flattened out copper and pewter dishes and baled the ruined goods. They burned up bedsteads, table, chairs, and benches, though there were yards and

¹¹ Falvius Vegetius Renatus, *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, ed. and trans. Leo F. Stelten (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 213.

¹² For a discussion of the devastation wrought by soldiers in the Thirty Years' War, see John Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648-1789* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1982), chap. 1.

yards of dry firewood outside the kitchen. Jars and crocks, pots and casseroles all were broken, either because they preferred their meat broiled or because they thought they'd eat only one meal with us. In the barn, the hired girl was handled so roughly that she was unable to walk away, I am ashamed to report. They stretched the hired man out flat on the ground, stuck a wooden wedge in his mouth to keep it open, and emptied a milk bucket full of stinking manure drippings down his throat; they called it a Swedish cocktail. He didn't relish it and made a very wry face. By this means they forced him to take a raiding party to some other place where they carried off men and cattle and brought them to our farm.¹³

The horrors inflicted on innocent men, women, and children compelled Grotius, in the midst of the Thirty Years' War, to develop principles that he hoped would control violence and avert bloodshed on the scale that was occurring in Germany and the Low Countries. One of Grotius's foundational principles was his contention that noncombatants were illegitimate targets for armies. Although he acknowledged that what he called "Force and Terror" were "the proper agents of war," and a state or monarch could legally "attack in every place where the enemy may be killed," he also argued that under no circumstances should women and children be killed. Revenge, Grotius told his readers, was not a reason for retaliation, nor should a state ever use minor acts of brutality committed by an enemy to justify laying waste to the enemy's countryside or civilians. Moderation in "despoiling" the enemy's homeland, Grotius wrote, was the most militarily as well as morally effective way to wage war. Since the purpose of war, as he explained, was to end hostilities as soon as possible on terms favorable to oneself, moderation and limitation of violence made sense. In forgoing the temptation to annihilate one's enemies through massacring their civilians, one did not make intractable enemies forced to wage war for national survival. If both sides

¹³ Johann Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen, *Simplicius Simplicissimus*, trans. George Shulz-Behrend (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965), 9-10.

knew that defeat in war did not necessarily mean complete annihilation, wars could end more quickly and thus spare all parties involved the financial and human costs of prolonged conflicts.¹⁴

After 1648 and the Treaty of Westphalia, when the Reformation and Counter Reformation no longer fueled the passions of war and the emergent nation-state system began to assert its dominance in the politico-military affairs of Western Europe, European war entered its limited phase. André Corvisier, for instance, has suggested that following the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) the direct effects of wars on Western Europe's civilian population were minimal. The first decade of the eighteenth century, he has written, signaled a new period in European war in which states assigned "frontier provinces" -- Bohemia and Alsace, for example -- a military role, but the "interior" of the new nation states withdrew from military activities except for increased taxes and the occasional levies of troops.¹⁵ Preservation of the international balance of power became the *raison d'être* of the nation states' armies. The officers who made up those armies understood themselves as gentlemen whose role was not to wage annihilationist wars against civilians, but to protect and defend the interests of the monarchs they served. As conservative entities, the Continental monarchs of the eighteenth century had no interest in radically affecting the

¹⁴ Hugo Grotius, *The Rights of War and Peace, Including the Law of Nature and of Nations*, trans. A.C. Cambell (Washington, DC: M. Walter Dunne, Publisher, 1901), 294, 324-30, 364-65.

¹⁵ André Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789*, trans. Abigail T. Siddal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 15.

status quo and thus would not unleash their armies against another monarch's civilian populace.¹⁶

The European officer corps understood that it needed to control its rank and file if it hoped to both maintain its military effectiveness as well as limit the impact of war on civilian populations. Much has been written about how eighteenth-century armies were little more than mobile prisons, manned by the poorest and most destitute members of European society. Officers and noncommissioned officers, to keep the "meaner sorts" in line both on campaign and in garrison, depended on blind discipline and brutal punishments.¹⁷ Discipline, wrote Raimundo Montecuccoli was the "soul of all armies; and unless it is established, and supported with unshaken resolution, they [soldiers] are no better than so many contemptible heaps of rabble, which are more dangerous to the very state that maintains them, than even its declared enemies."¹⁸

Marauding soldiers could meet peasants who did not take kindly to the devastation of their homes. Saxe complained that during the War of the Austrian Succession, for instance, the French Army failed to make one march

¹⁶ In 1742, for example, Great Britain gave Maria Theresa a gift of £500,000 for support of the House of Austria, the "Protestant interest" and the "maintenance of the balance of power." See Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of Treasury Books and Papers, 1729-1745*, comp. William A. Shaw, et. al., 5 vols. (1897; reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1974), 5 (1742): doc. #162.

¹⁷ Officers and noncommissioned officers watched individual soldiers closely in battle with the intention of encouraging "their men to make flight of the enemy, and to despise danger." The officers' and noncommissioned officers' swords, espetons, and halberds were the tools of "encouragement." The rank and file as well as the officers of the Prussian Army knew that "If it should happen that a soldier endeavors to run away, and goes one foot out of his rank for that purpose, the Officer or Non Commissioned Officer in the rear shall kill him on the spot, under the pain of being broke with infamy." See Thomas Simes, *The Military Guide for Young Officers Containing a System of the Art of War* (London: J. Millan, 1781), 95.

¹⁸ Montecuccoli quoted in Samuel Bever, *The Cadet, A Military Treatise* (London: W. Johnston, 1762), 1.

in Bohemia "without considerable Loss of Soldiers, either taken or slain by the Enemy or Peasants, when they straggled out for Pillage."¹⁹ There was within the Western European officer corps a sentiment that once their men pillaged, much like a house dog that gets the taste of blood, they were ruined.

Controlling pillaging, and thus desertion -- the greatest threat to all eighteenth-century armies -- became one of the main responsibilities for Western European officer and noncommissioned officer corps, and in turn shaped their attitudes to civil-military relations. For example, Frederick the Great's *Regulations*, the model handbook for Western European officers, forbade "all irregularities" against civilians.²⁰ "All acts of violence, on whomsoever they are committed by Soldiers," the *Regulations* read, "shall be punished with the gantlope [gauntlet]; as soon, therefore, as a complaint of this kind is made against any Soldier, he must be confined, examined, tried by a court-martial and sentenced to run the gantlope." The draconian system of military justice which Prussian soldiers lived under went further to convince soldiers that civilians were off limits. "Every Soldier is not only to avoid treating his landlord," the *Regulations* continued, "or any other person not belonging to the house, with abuse, but, on the contrary, to behave to him even with respect and civility."²¹ Violations of those directions resulted in running the gauntlet or another form of corporal punishment.

Of course, there is always a discount between theory and practice. Although legal theorists like Grotius, and soldiers like Montecuccoli, Saxe,

¹⁹ Saxe, quoted *ibid.*, 29.

²⁰ William Faucitt, trans. *Regulations for the Prussian Infantry. Translated from the German Original* (1756; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 350.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 363.

and Frederick the Great may have called for lessening of the violence directed against women and children, there was no mechanism in place other than beatings to assure that soldiers would abide by the rules. Yet, perhaps because of the writings and efforts of Grotius and eighteenth-century officers and noncommissioned officers, most eighteenth-century Western European soldiers acted with greater restraint toward noncombatants than their predecessors had in the Wars of Religion. In time, the relatively benign treatment of noncombatants became the norm for Western European armies, even for Western European practitioners of *petite guerre*, who functioned not as independent forces but auxiliaries under the control of regular generals. Captain Johann von Ewald, one of the foremost Western European irregulars of the eighteenth century, whose *Treatise on Partisan Warfare* became the German classic of irregular war, believed that "above all one can not deal harshly enough with those villains who mercilessly torment the peasants who are innocent of the war."²² We need to remember that Carl von Clausewitz, Europe's greatest theoretician of war, detested violence waged against noncombatants as an immoral and improper way to fight. Clausewitz did not develop his abhorrence for *petite guerre* in a vacuum. Rather, it was the product of his personal experience and disgust at seeing the behavior of the Cossacks after the Battle of Borodino in 1812, as well as at least a century and a half of development of the Western European culture of war making that looked upon the killing of noncombatants with opprobrium.

²² Johann von Ewald, *Treatise on Partisan Warfare*, trans. Robert A. Selig and David Curtis Skaggs (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 69.

Central and Eastern European soldiers, however, observed different traditions of war than those emerging in Western Europe. In the border regions of the Austrian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires *petite guerre* was the primary means of war. Magyar *huszars*, Serb *pandurs*, Turkish *dragons*, Cossacks from the steppes of Russia, and Polish partisans were masters at terrorist and hit-and-run war. The Central and Eastern European way of war in fact was not unlike the Anglo-American tradition of unlimited-irregular war directed against noncombatant populations.

The marchlands of Eastern and Central Europe that separated the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires had a tradition of irregular war dating back centuries. In the Hungarian-Turkish borderlands, for instance, Hungarian, Croat, and Serb nobles often resorted to terrorism and guerrilla war to maintain their independence from the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. In the process, as Lewis Gann has noted, Eastern Europe became "the classical region of guerrilla warfare, peasant risings were perhaps even more common, partly perhaps for topographical reasons, partly because clashes between social strata were intensified by overlaying religious and ethnic tension."²³

To the North, on the wide-open plains of Poland between the Austrian and Russian Empires, Polish soldiers developed a tradition of *petite guerre* that confounded Western soldiers. Even a commander as astute and skilled as Saxe found confronting the Polish irregulars perplexing. Saxe knew that the Poles "made war in such a vague and irregular manner, that, if an enemy makes a point of pursuing them, he will thereby be presently rendered

²³ Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1971), 9.

incapable of opposing their continual inroads."²⁴ Like Indians who had mastered skulking in the woodlands of North America, the Poles, Saxe continued, could march unseen, "thirty, and sometimes forty miles a day in large bodies," fall upon isolated outposts and devastate them, and then escape unharmed into the countryside like phantoms.²⁵

For the Central and Eastern European irregulars civilians, not opposing armies, were the objects of armies in times of war. Austrian Prince Johann Joseph Khevenhüller-Metsch, for instance, noted that the war in the Eastern half of the Austrian Empire was focused on criminal behavior more than soldiering. The *modus operandi* of the typical *huszar*, *dragon*, or *pandur*, Khevenhüller-Metsch wrote, was "setting fire to houses, pillaging churches, cutting off ears and eyes, murdering citizens and raping women."²⁶ Magyar *huszars* were experts at hit-and-run tactics. "Before they begin an attack," George Smith observed, "they lay themselves so flat on the necks of their horses, that it is hardly possible to discover their force; but being within pistol-shot of the enemy, they raise themselves with such surprising quickness, and fall on with such vivacity, that it is very difficult for troops to preserve their order. When a retreat is necessary, their horses have so much fire, and are so indefatigable, their equipage so light, and themselves such excellent horsemen, that no cavalry can pretend to follow them; they leap over ditches, and swim over rivers, with surprising facility."²⁷

²⁴ Maurice Count de Saxe, *Reveries, or, Memoirs Concerning the Art of War* (Edinburgh: Alexander Donalson, 1776), 134.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 137.

²⁶ Khevenhüller-Metsch quoted in Ewald, *Partisan Warfare*, 13.

²⁷ George Smith, *An Universal Military Dictionary: A Copious Explanation of the Technical Terms &c* (1779; reprint, Ottawa: Museum Restoration Service, 1969), 59.

Eighteenth-century Western Europeans, when they first encountered the variety of war that Khevenhüller-Metsch described, knew not how to respond to it. However, first the Austrians, and then the French, found ways to make Eastern-style *petite guerre* part of their regular military structures. In fact, the French led the way among the Continental powers in forging a protocol for *petite guerre* -- a protocol that put irregular war in their military establishment and made it a legitimate form of war.

In the first third of the eighteenth century the Austrian Hapsburgs found that they could not control the eastern reaches of their empire without the support of the *huszars*, *dragons*, and *pandurs* who dominated the military situation there. The Hapsburgs needed a way to harness the military energy of the eastern irregulars, and like the Anglo-American colonial assemblies, responded by privatizing war. The Hapsburgs encouraged their subject Slav and Magyar noblemen to raise personal armies of irregulars, whom the Austrians then organized as the *Grenz* [border troops]. The Hapsburgs in Vienna granted the Eastern nobles free rein in much of the day-to-day governance of their lands on the condition that they maintain military allegiance to the central government in Vienna, and, when called upon, march against the Hapsburgs' enemies. To encourage the rank and file *Grenz*, irregular commanders, with the tacit approval of their Hapsburg senior commanders, granted them the right to pillage and take booty normally prohibited to regulars. In time, war by the *Grenz* became a way for the Austrians to wage war cheaply, just as scalp hunting offered the New England provinces a relatively inexpensive way to strike at the Abenakis. As on the Anglo-American frontier in North America, *Grenz* service became a way of life on the eastern frontier of the Austrian Empire. By the Seven

Years' War Empress Maria Theresa had nearly 40,000 *Grenz* soldiers in her regular army of over 200,000 men.²⁸

The second third of the eighteenth century, especially in the wake of the French Army's difficulty in dealing with the Austrian *Grenz* in Bohemia during the War of the Austrian Succession, saw an explosion in French interest in *petite guerre*, which led directly to the development of a doctrine incorporating it in formal practice.²⁹ That doctrine developed in three stages. The first, initiated by Saxe, legitimated *petite guerre* and molded it to French conceptions of regular war. In the early 1750s, the second stage in the development of the French *petite guerre* began. First, Armand François de La Croix's *Traité de la Petite Guerre pour les Campagnes Franches* was the first widely read work in French primarily devoted to *petite guerre*.³⁰ Then, Grandmaison's *La Petite Guerre* postulated the need for a large-scale irregular corps in the French Army. Captain Louis de Jeney's *Le Partisan* started the third phase. His book was the first handbook that detailed how one actually conducted irregular operations.

Saxe's posthumously published memoirs, the *Reveries*, although designed primarily as a text for regular war, legitimated elements of *petite guerre* in French military circles. In the *Reveries*, Saxe presented the means by which a European regular army could adopt parts of Eastern-style irregular war to its military structure. Saxe's conceptualizations of the *guerre des*

²⁸ Childs, *Armies and Warfare in Europe*, 42.

²⁹ John Ellis, *A Short History of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 204-05. Ellis writes that the *Grenz* campaigns in Bohemia along with the American campaign against the British in South Carolina in 1780-1781 are the "notable guerrilla wars" of the eighteenth century.

³⁰ Armand François de La Croix, *Traité de la Petite Guerre pour les Campagnes Franches* (Paris: A. Boudet, 1752).

postes and the formation of a light-infantry arm, both tools of *petite guerre*, set the course of not only the French Army's irregular doctrine, but influenced British, Prussian, and Austrian understandings, as well.

Saxe contended that the most effective way to combat irregulars was to force them to fight regulars on regulars' terms. With that in mind Saxe developed his idea for the *guerre des postes*. The proper way to fight partisans, Saxe wrote, was "to avoid pursuing them, and to secure those posts which are properly situated, from whence one may be able, by parties of infantry, to subject the whole country about to contribution."³¹

The *guerre des postes* was suited well to anti-irregular operations in eighteenth-century Europe. Although they often spoke of partisans -- English, French, and German soldiers all used the term to describe irregulars -- the eighteenth century meaning of the word was bereft of political connotations.³² Eighteenth-century partisans generally did not fight for political and ideological reasons as today's partisans do; controlling an enemy's hinterlands or winning the hearts and minds of an eighteenth-century peasantry was not necessary to secure victory in the *ancien régime*. In an age when armies needed not to subdue enemy populations, but only enemy governments and monarchs, the *guerre des postes* offered a potential answer to the constant harassment of enemy partisans.³³

³¹ Saxe, *Reveries*, 137-38.

³² Robert Aspery, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, 2d ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), 48-49. Aspery notes that "In the West [Western Europe] the entire *direction* of war was changing . . . war remained very restricted and sharply limited in political purpose, while possessing little tactical subtlety."

³³ Loren B. Thompson argues that the most common form of war in the modern world is low-intensity conflict (terrorism and counter terrorism, insurgency and counter insurgency, and other special operations). A common characteristic of all modern low-intensity conflicts is their highly politicized nature "that tend to blur the traditional distinction between soldier and civilian and between front-lines and rear areas." See Thompson, ed.,

The second technique of *petite guerre* that Saxe appropriated centered on his creation of light infantry companies for service on the French regular establishment.³⁴ Saxe proposed to attach to each regiment in the French Army one company of seventy "light-armed foot." The light troops, Saxe noted, were to become expert marksmen and focus on training and conditioning for the rigors of *petite guerre*. Saxe suggested that the light-armed foot should consist of the youngest, most fit men in the army and the officers chosen from the regiments based not on seniority but on merit. "A body of infantry composed according to this plan," Saxe believed, "and thoroughly inured to labour, can march anywhere with the cavalry, and, I am confident, will be capable of doing very considerable service."³⁵

Saxe contended that lightly accoutered infantrymen armed with rifled weapons could patrol the country surrounding his *postes*, defend regular troops on the march against enemy partisan attacks, and serve as an effective tool to defeat other regular armies.³⁶ The mobile light infantry could cover the front, rear, and flanks of French columns, and with their rifled weapons that could hit targets 300 paces away, protect them from marauding

Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World (New York: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), ix.

³⁴ The building block of the eighteenth-century infantry was the company. Regiments were composed of from one to four battalions, and battalions ten or more companies. Within the French Army of the Seven Years' War, for example, the typical infantry regiment consisted of two battalions each comprised of sixteen line companies and one company of either light infantry or grenadiers. Each company had approximately thirty privates, eight noncommissioned officers, plus one Captain, one Lieutenant, and one drummer. In the provincial armies in North America most regiments were single-battalion regiments. For the organization of a typical mid-eighteenth-century European army see Lee Kennett, *The French Armies in the Seven Years' War: A Study in Military Organization and Administration* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1967).

³⁵ Saxe, *Reveries*, 41.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

bands of *huszars* and *dragons*.³⁷ Similarly, in battles between regular forces the light troops could use their skills as marksmen to kill the opposing side's officers. With the leadership of the other army thus devastated its rank and file would panic and open itself to defeat.³⁸

Every Western European army adopted a variation of light-armed foot to protect its convoys and detachment from enemy partisans. The British Army, for instance, in 1741 and 1742 attached light infantry companies to each of its regiments. Thirty years later it institutionalized a light company for each battalion of regulars.³⁹ In the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years' War, Frederick the Great formed the *Königlich Pruessisches Feld Jäger Corps* and the *Feld Jäger Corps zu Fuss* -- both corps of light infantrymen -- to act as irregulars. Frederick found that his much-vaunted regulars were more than a match for Maria Theresa's regulars, but could do little against her *Grenz*. Frederick's officers levied their *Jägers* from Central European hunters and

³⁷ Volleys were the only effective way that regulars with smooth-bore muskets could deliver lethal fire on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century battlefields. The effective range of most smooth-bore .68 to .76 caliber muskets was no greater than 100 meters. In addition, the fouling that accumulated in the barrel reduced the rate of fire below the three to four rounds per minute that manuals suggested was possible for well-trained infantry. Rifled weapons increased range significantly (up to 300 meters). However, rifles suffered from one serious disadvantage: the bullet had to be rammed in from the muzzle end to force the soft metal from which it was made into the rifling in the barrel. That required considerable effort, often including the use of a hammer. Thus the rate of fire was reduced considerably, and rifles more often than smooth bore musket suffered "hang fires" when the bullet did not leave the barrel of the gun. See B.P. Hughes, *Fire Power: Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 10-11.

³⁸ Saxe, *Reveries*, 50.

³⁹ For the European side to the development of British light infantry see Charles Messenger, *For Love of Regiment: A History of the British Infantry, Volume One, 1660-1914* (London: Leo Cooper, 1994), 57-86. Peter Paret notes that the Prussian General Staff reforms of the Napoleonic Era that resulted in the incorporation of light infantry and partisan troops originated not in colonial America, but in the eighteenth-century military experience in Central Europe. See Paret, "Colonial Experience and Military Reform at the End of the Eighteenth Century," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* 37 (1964): 49-59. For the New World origins of the British light infantry see introduction, note 16.

game wardens who were skilled in the use of rifles. In time the Prussian *Jägers* became more than light troops; they also served as military police. By the Era of the American Revolution, *jäger* corps were home to the elite infantry of Europe and the training ground for the top officers in the Prussian Army. Ewald, for instance, noted that the *jäger* corps was the ideal place for a young officer to learn the art of war. *Jäger* officers, he wrote, "Do on a small scale what a general does on a large scale."⁴⁰

By the end of the Seven Years' War, most of the minor German principalities had followed Frederick's example and created their own *jäger* companies. The most famous were of course the Hessian *jägers*, of whom two companies, one commanded by Johann von Ewald, fought for the British in North America in the Revolutionary War. In 1758 the Hapsburgs raised a *jägercorps* of ethnic Germans.⁴¹ Also by 1758, French *chasseurs à pied* were distributed throughout the French Army. In that year, for example, the French Army of the Lower Rhine included one company of *chasseurs à pied* within each sixteen-company line battalion.

The naming practices of the German and French irregulars point to the growing legitimacy of *petite guerre* within the Continental culture of war making. In Hungarian *huszar* means freebooter. *Dragon* in Turkish means pauper or scum, while Cossack, derived from *quzaq*, means adventurer or freebooter. But when the French and Prussians created their corps of irregulars in the early and mid-eighteenth century, they followed the example of the Serbs. In Old Serb, *pandur* means "constable" or "guardian of the public peace." *Chasseur* is the French word for hunter, and *jäger* is loosely

⁴⁰ Ewald, *Partisan Warfare*, 68.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 14-17.

translated as "game warden." The Continental powers chose not to call their irregulars either *voleur* or *Dieb* (thief). The British Army, on the other hand, referred, perhaps through ignorance, to their irregulars with derogatory terms. For example, while horse-mounted French irregulars took the name "free companies," British horse mounted irregulars -- the first squadron was formed in the 1690s -- were called dragoons, an Anglicization of the Turkish *dragon*, that ironically meant "scum."⁴²

The development of the French tradition of *petite guerre* entered a second phase in the 1750s. In 1752 Armand de La Croix published his memoirs recounting his service as a French irregular; this became the first widely read work on *petite guerre*.⁴³ As such, it was. Before the *Traité* the only work devoted to explicitly *petite guerre* was Jean Charles de Folard's *De la guerre des Partisans*. However, Folard never published his work; he only circulated it in manuscript form to friends and select officers.⁴⁴ (Folard has gone down in European military history not as the originator of a doctrine of irregular war, but instead as one of the first proponents for column-based tactical units.⁴⁵) La Croix's work, on the other hand, won an instant

⁴² For the lexical meanings of *huszar*, *dragon*, *Cossack*, and *pandur* see *ibid.*, note 11, 45.

⁴³ La Croix was the son of Joseph François de La Croix, *maréchal de camp* and Governor of Sète. The elder La Croix in 1727 formed the *Compagnie Franche*, a company of around 100 dragoons. The younger La Croix served in the *Compagnie Franche* in both Western and Central Europe. The details of La Croix's career are clouded in some confusion. Some sources claim that he was killed in 1735 while fighting as an irregular in Austria. Grandmaison, however, related raids of La Croix as late as 1743 when the Austrians captured him near Pfarrkirchen. See Ewald, *Partisan Warfare*, note 11, 138.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, note 12, 41. Neither La Croix, Grandmaison, nor Jeney listed Folard as inspiring their writings.

⁴⁵ Delbrück, *Dawn of Modern Warfare*, 399.

following. Indeed, only three years after its publication in French it was translated into German. It became the classic work on *petite guerre* in that language until Ewald's *Treatise of Partisan Warfare*.⁴⁶

The *Traité* prepared the ground for Grandmaison's seminal *La Petite Guerre*, published in 1756. *La Petite Guerre* was Grandmaison's attempt to bring irregular war to the fore of the mid-eighteenth-century French Army's collective consciousness by calling for the creation of a large and full-time irregular corps on the French regular establishment. Before Grandmaison, irregular units, like the *compagnies franches*, were formed on an *ad hoc* basis as the need for them arose. Grandmaison, however, argued that the War of the Austrian Succession had shown that a "new age" of European war had begun, an age in which irregulars would play a pivotal role.

Grandmaison had fought the *Grenz* in Bavaria and Bohemia and believed that the most important lesson that the French Army could learn from that conflict was the value of irregulars to a regular army. Grandmaison argued that the War of the Austrian Succession proved the utility of "*Troupes legeres & irrégulieres*" in modern war. The *Grenz*, he wrote, ceaselessly harassed French convoys, hospitals, baggage trains, foragers, detachments, and marauded across the countryside in "*grand nombre*." Grandmaison argued that although "neither seeing nor fighting" the main French army the *Grenz* managed to bring ruin to it.⁴⁷

Grandmaison believed that the French Army finally had taken appropriate steps to combat the problem of the *Grenz* during the war. In 1744, for example, it finally heeded the advice of officers like him and created

⁴⁶ Ewald, *Partisan Warfare*, note 11, 137-38.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

the regiments *de Grassin, de la Morliere*, and *des Volontaires-Bretons*, all units modeled on the *Grenz*. The next year it placed the *Compagnie Franche* on the regular establishment as the *Legion Royal*. "In Flanders, after the formation of the Regiments de Grassin & de la Morliere, " Grandmaison wrote, "we enjoyed in our camps the same tranquillity as the Austrians in Bohemia and Bavaria."⁴⁸

Grandmaison, after the war, wanted the French Army to devote more of its resources to *petite guerre*. He suggested that it create several full-time irregular battalions, and, if necessary, hire what he called "German" -- Central European -- mercenaries to man them.⁴⁹ With such parties of irregulars, Grandmaison wrote, the French Army could harass its enemies night and day, cover its own convoys and foragers, secure its marches, assure the security of its posts, guard its supplies, gather intelligence, and keep order in camp.⁵⁰ As Grandmaison envisioned it, for an irregular corps "there are often occasion where the General can employ them as the *avant-garde* and the rear guard, to attack the small *postes* that he finds on his march, to reconnoiter the movements of the enemy, to guard a forest or a defile during a battle."⁵¹ Indeed, he continued, irregular troops were the best troops possible to guard the rear and flanks of the army, to traverse woods, mountains, marshes, and canals that the enemy had to cross, and establish ambushes at strategic points.⁵²

⁴⁸ Ibid., 5-6.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 12.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 8-9.

⁵¹ Ibid., 397.

⁵² Ibid., 399.

The development of the French doctrine of *petite guerre* entered its third stage in 1759 with the publication of Jeney's *Le Partisan*. Whereas Grandmaison had presented an argument showing the need for irregulars, Jeney composed the first European manual on the mechanics of *petite guerre* operations. *Le Partisan* can be seen as a precursor to a "special forces" tradition of war -- a tradition of highly trained and elite troops that operated primarily behind enemy lines but in close coordination with a regular army.

Jeney stressed that partisans must be the best soldiers from the regular army; their officers had exemplary professional knowledge of war and leadership skills. The ideal partisan officer must possess "*coup d'oeil*" [an intuitive grasp of military matters including strategy, tactics, and leadership], an "intrepid heart against all appearances of danger," self-assurance, robust and indefatigable health, and the confidence of his men.⁵³ When brought together, the best soldiers and best officers could then accomplish the demanding tasks of *petite guerre*. For their bravery and skill, Jeney promised, they would attain the highest place of honor and glory in the army.⁵⁴

Jeney insisted that the most self-disciplined men comprise the partisan corps because irregulars had to operate behind enemy lines, away from the supervision of superiors. Grandmaison had insisted that irregulars act in unison with the regular army; he envisioned irregulars operating on the

⁵³ Louis Jeney, *Le Partisan; ou, l'art de faire la petiteguerre avec succès selon le génie de nos jours* (La Haye, France: H. Constapel, 1759), 6-7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

tactical offensive, but the strategic defensive.⁵⁵ The main objective of irregulars, wrote Grandmaison, was to protect the regular army by harassing the enemy's regulars. Jeney, on the other hand, argued that French irregulars should act on both the tactical and strategic offensives, securing avenues of march and reconnoitering the countryside, but also operating apart from the main army to infiltrate enemy lines, ambush outposts, disrupt convoys, raid garrisons, gather intelligence, and put into "use all the proper ruses to surprise them or disturb" the enemy supply and communication networks.⁵⁶ Self-discipline engendered through *esprit de corps*, meanwhile, could prevent the French *partisan* from engaging into *pandur*- or Cossack-like looting and atrocities.

Jeney therefore developed a detailed protocol for operating behind enemy lines. Since partisans would operate in hostile territory, they needed to blend into the countryside. Jeney, for instance, suggested that partisans be fluent in foreign languages to aid in gathering human intelligence.⁵⁷ He described how one conducted "Secret marches."⁵⁸ He discussed in detail the procedures for establishing ambushes behind enemy lines. He instructed partisan officers to divide their corps into two parties, one to hold the enemy in place and the other to attack it from behind. Jeney advised that an

⁵⁵ For a discussion of the tactical and strategic offensive and defensive, see Jones, *Art of War in the Western World*, 54-57.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁵⁷ Not until 1776 when Lewis Lochée, superintendent of the quasi-official military college at Woolwich, published his *An Essay on Military Education* (London: T. Cadell, 1776) did the British Army specifically suggest that officers speak more than English. See Lochée, *An Essay on Military Education*, 48-49.

⁵⁸ Jeney, *Le Partisan*, 35.

ambush must be executed from a position that would allow the partisans an avenue of retreat should they encounter a superior force.⁵⁹ Jeney even devoted a section of *Le Partisan* to the eighteenth-century version of emergency medicine. Since the partisans would operate behind enemy lines, and no troops were "more exposed to the intemperance of air, to the fatigues of a campaign & to the dangers of war," partisan officers would have to treat their soldiers' wounds and illnesses without the aid of a regimental surgeon. Thus Jeney suggested treatments for the typical eighteenth-century ailments, including indigestion, sore throats, eye and ear injuries, ulcers, "retention of urine," pleurisy, and fevers.⁶⁰

Jeney's *Le Partisan* was the last European-produced treatise on *petite guerre* for nearly twenty years. As such, it can be seen as the apogee in the mid-eighteenth century's development of a Continental way of irregular war. Indeed, by the middle of the eighteenth century Western European soldiers had created a tradition of *petite guerre* rooted in both experience and doctrine, from the *Grenz* through the *Grassin* to the *Jägers* and in the doctrine of Saxe, La Croix, Grandmaison, and Jeney. By the Seven Years' War *la petite guerre* had become an accepted and legitimate part of the Continental conceptualizations of war. Within the British Army, however, no similar development occurred.

British soldiers' main experience combating irregulars came not in Eastern or Central Europe but in Ireland and Scotland. In both those "foreign lands" English soldiers abandoned the rules of war and turned to terrorism,

⁵⁹ Ibid., 115.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 150.

the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants, and *petite guerre* to win and maintain control of hostile populations. The British Army's leaders, however, did not look at the campaigns against Irish rebels and Jacobites as wars, but rather as counter-rebellions. Since Irish and Jacobite rebels, unlike Austrian *Grenz* or French *Grassin*, operated without another state's sanction, British soldiers deemed acceptable acts of terrorism and murder as responses to attacks, or even refusals to submit to crown authority. The New Model Army used classic irregular methods to suppress the Irish Revolt of 1641-1642, and the British Army turned to the same techniques to quash the Jacobite Rebellions of 1715 and 1745.⁶¹ Yet most, but not all, British officers and military theoreticians refused to acknowledge that they won those conflicts with *petite* tactics. The British Army instead mistakenly saw in the '45 as "proof" that regular war was inherently superior to irregular war. Thus after 1745 no tradition or doctrine of *petite guerre* like that in the French or Anglo-American military culture had developed in the British way of war. When Major General Braddock arrived in America ten years later, his assumptions about the superiority of regular over irregular methods would be proved wrong on the Monongahela River. Yet in the post-battle investigation of Braddock's disastrous campaign, the British Army refused to acknowledge that *petite guerre* had defeated a British field army.

The English conquest of Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proceeded without the kinds of restraints that characterized military activities between states in the eighteenth century. The English quite consciously pursued annihilationist tactics in their efforts to subdue the "heathen" and "savage" Irish. At the center of the English military solution to

⁶¹ The English army dates only from the Restoration, and the British Army from 1707.

the "problem of Ireland" was a dependence on terrorism and the killing of noncombatants. English soldiers routinely killed Irish men, women, and children, and targeted Irish agricultural resources for destruction.⁶² In the second half of the seventeenth century, Englishmen in Ireland in fact embraced an annihilationist paradigm of war that was more in line with war in North America than with evolving European patterns of war.⁶³

Three factors shaped the English military experience in Ireland. First, Englishmen perceived Ireland as a place to be exploited: a place capable of enriching England only if the troublesome Irish could be turned into a tractable peasantry. Second, the military conflict in Ireland was connected and fortified by the divisions within Irish society between Protestants and Catholics that in turn led military conflict to take on the emotional fervor of the Wars of Religion.⁶⁴ Third, England faced no regular military establishment in Ireland. The Irish peasantry never had an army large or skilled enough to challenge the colonizers in a regular-style battle, and Irish soldiers, at any rate, preferred to fight as partisans.⁶⁵ Irishmen and Irishwomen used the tools of irregular war -- arson, murder, and terrorism -- to oppose British occupation of their homeland. Those factors combined to make Ireland, in

⁶² William Edward Hartpole Lecky, *A History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, 5 vols. (1892; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1969), 1: 3-6, wrote that Elizabethan Englishmen routinely killed Irish noncombatants and destroyed "all means of human subsistence."

⁶³ For the similarities between the English conception of the Irish and Indians see Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," *WMQ* 30 (1973): 575-98 and James Muldoon, "The Indian as Irishman," *Essex Institute Historical Collections* 111 (1975): 267-89.

⁶⁴ Hugh Kearney, *The British Isles: A History of Four Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 162.

⁶⁵ For the Irish way of war, see David Beers Quinn, *The Elizabethans and the Irish* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966), 41-43.

English circles, a place where conventional norms of military behavior did not apply.⁶⁶

The English response to the military situation in Ireland centered on three irregular approaches to war -- a *guerre des postes*, terror war, and forced transportation. The first response of the English in Ireland was to garrison strategic sea ports and provincial capitals and use its army to "hold down" the "natives" within the Pale of Settlement. Of course, that approach, like all uses of the *guerre des postes*, abdicated most of the control of the Irish countryside to potentially anti-English elements. In times of rebellion, the *guerre des postes* offered little protection to either isolated garrisons or Anglo-Irish settlers. At the start of the Rebellion of 1641-1642, for instance, Viscount Montgomery of the Ards wrote that without English troops in the country, he was powerless to stop Irish rebels from seizing several towns and garrisons and making "spoil of the rest of the country."⁶⁷

During times of rebellion, the English abandoned the *guerre des postes* and adopted terror war. For example, in 1641 the English garrisons in Ulster faced starvation at the hands of Irish rebels who had cut off all food supplies moving into the region.⁶⁸ English troops turned to *la chevauchée* [cavalcade], a remnant from medieval war. In a *chevauchée*, swiftly moving

⁶⁶ Nicholas Canny, in "The Marginal Kingdom: Ireland as a Problem in the First British Empire," in Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1991), 61, has made the similar argument that Ireland was a place where political norms generally did not apply.

⁶⁷ Viscount Montgomery of the Ards to the King, October 24, 1641, Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers Relating to Ireland: of the Reign of Charles I, 1625*, ed. Robert Pentland Mahaffy, 4 vols. (1900-1903, reprint, Nendeln, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1979), 341.

⁶⁸ Extract of the Lords Justices and Council to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, November 26, 1641, *ibid.*, 350-51.

columns of English troops would march through hostile territory destroying, pillaging, and killing as they went. Their objective was not to meet an enemy in battle, but rather to undermine an enemy's base of support and terrorize an enemy populace into submission.⁶⁹ In the winter of 1641 and 1642, for instance, the English garrison from Dublin conducted a *chevauchée* that pillaged and burned every Irish town within a dozen miles of Dublin. The *chevauchée* of 1641-1642 was no exception to the rule of wanton destruction aimed at reducing an entire population to submission -- or starvation -- and dependence on their conquerors. George Cook's account of his 1652 expedition against Irish rebels presents a further stark view of the English annihilationist war in Ireland. "In searching the woods and bogs," Cook reported, "we found great stores of corn, which we burnt, also all the houses and cabins we could find: in all which we found great plenty of corn. We continued burning and destroying for four days: in which time we wanted no provision for horse or man, finding housing enough to lie in; though we burnt our quarters every morning, and continued burning all day after."⁷⁰

The most successful and largest-scale irregular method of war that the English inflicted on the Irish was the expropriation of Irish lands and forced transportation of Irishmen and women to the West Indies and North America. One way to force the Irish to accept English domination of Ireland, the English thought, was to deny Catholic proprietors their landed property. When resistance rose, plans were set afoot for the distribution of this property

⁶⁹ For the English background to the *chevauchée* see Anthony Goodwin, *The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452-97* (New York: Dorset Press, 1981), 162.

⁷⁰ Stephen Saunders Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569-1681* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1979), 40-41.

among English soldiers and officials who had served in Ireland, or to English and Scottish favorites.⁷¹ In 1645, for instance, the English Parliament ordered that the estates of all "Papists and Delinquents discovered in Ireland" seized and used to pay for the establishment of more troops in the colony.⁷²

The Irish, with their land occupied by Englishmen, Scots, and pro-English Irish, were left few options. By the start of the eighteenth century, William E. H. Lecky wrote, "it would be difficult indeed to conceive of a national condition less favorable than that of Ireland to a man of energy and ambition."

Catholics, because of their creed, were stigmatized and excluded from every position of trust and influence, and prohibited from virtually every means of acquiring wealth. Irish Protestants meanwhile, were "almost compelled to emigrate, for industrial and commercial enterprise had been deliberately crushed." The result was a steady tide of both Catholic and Protestant emigration.⁷³

The English experience with irregular war in Ireland set the example for the British suppression of Jacobitism in Scotland. During both the '15 and the '45, the British Army used primarily irregular methods. As in Ireland, religious and ethnic hostilities led to conditions in which *petite guerre* seemed appropriate. In the '15, irregular methods quickly defused the rebellion. In the '45, a larger revolt, the failure of regular tactics dictated the British Army again adopt irregular means.

⁷¹ See Canny, "The Marginal Kingdom," 38.

⁷² Further Orders of the Committee of Both Houses for Irish Affairs, September 27, 1645, *Calendar of State Papers, Ireland, 1633-1647*, 416.

⁷³ Lecky, *History of Ireland*, 1: 244-48.

The English experience in Scotland mirrored its experience in Ireland. Like Ireland, the English viewed the Scottish Highlands as marchland, a place where Englishmen felt traditional rules of civilized behavior did not apply against "wild and barbarous" Highlanders. Instead, any action proved to be justified, as long as it brought Britain greater control of the Highlands.⁷⁴ Complicating British attempts to bring Scotland into the English orbit was the resistance of much of the Highland nobility to English rule, the opposition of Scottish Roman Catholics to Anglican dominance of their homeland, and the fact that neither the English nor Scots could agree who "owned" the border between England and Scotland.⁷⁵ To that mix was added Jacobite sentiment following the overthrow of James Stuart as King James II of England. Indeed, for most of the first half of the eighteenth century, Jacobitism was a major threat to the stability of the Hanoverian monarchs of England.⁷⁶

The first major outbreak of militant Jacobitism in the eighteenth century occurred in 1715 in the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession and the accession of King George I to the throne. Ironically, much of English debate on civil-military affairs from the English Civil War through the Glorious

⁷⁴ "The Highlands," Eric Richards notes, "represented the most resistant and challenging marchland in Britain, a province so backward that it was often compared with America as a proper zone for colonization." See Richards, "Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire," in Bailyn and Morgan, eds., *Strangers within the Realm*, 81.

⁷⁵ Between 1040 and 1745 every English monarch but three suffered a Scottish invasion or invaded Scotland. See David Hackett Fischer, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 623.

⁷⁶ For example, in 1717, one Highland Lord believed that Jacobitism remained rampant in the Highlands. See Lord Lovat to Stannope, January 28, 1717, Great Britain, Public Record Office, *State Papers, Domestic Series, George I* (S.P. 35), *Typescript Calendar*. 4 vols. (London: Swift Printers, 1977-1980), 35: 8. For the impact of Jacobite fears on Robert Walpole and his contemporaries, see J.H. Plumb, *The Origins of Political Stability, England, 1675-1725* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).

Revolution had centered on how rulers would use standing armies to destroy their subjects' liberties. Indeed, a major cause of the Glorious Revolution was the fear that the Catholic King James II would enlarge and use the standing army to deny Englishmen their rights and liberties. When his place on the throne was endangered, however, King George I cared little for the ideological sentiment that opposed the use of the British Army against British subjects. Upon hearing the news that the Pretender might land in Scotland, George I placed a bounty of £100,000 on his head.⁷⁷ Similarly, George instructed the Army to arrest all Jacobites, forcing many to flee to France for sanctuary.

During the '45, the British Army again turned to irregular war to maintain the monarchy's control of Scotland. Unlike the poorly organized rising of 1715, however, the '45 was a major threat to the stability and security of the Hanoverians. The British Army quickly lost control of the Highlands and much of Northern England as Jacobites took control of the countryside and even defeated a British army in open battle. Only James Oglethorpe's application of the art of irregular war that he learned in North America turned the tide of the rebellion in the Hanoverians' favor. And while the British Army eventually defeated the Jacobite army in battle at Culloden, it was Oglethorpe's Scottish irregulars who paved the redcoats' road to victory. After Culloden, the regulars themselves turned partisan and unleashed a three-month long campaign of terror and annihilation to cow the Highlanders and their lairds into submission.

In the summer of 1745, Prince Charles Edward Stuart (the Young Pretender), grandson of James Stuart, landed in Scotland at the head of a

⁷⁷ Proclamation for the Pretender, September 15, 1714, *ibid.*, 35: 1.

small French army. One of King George II's first responses was to place a £30,000 bounty on Bonnie Prince Charlie's head and dispatch a regular army under the command of Sir John Cope to meet him in battle.⁷⁸ As Cope dallied and spent time requisitioning supplies for an army much larger than the one he had, thousands of Highlanders flocked to the Young Pretender's banner. Robert Craigie, Lord Advocate of Scotland, complained that while the British Army sat by and did nothing, the Highlanders moved about the countryside "arming and increasing their numbers, and send their emissaries over all the Highlands to stir up a general insurrection by threats and promises."⁷⁹

By mid-August it was clear that the rebels had gained control of the land surrounding the two main garrisons of the British in the Highlands, Forts William and Augustus. By mid-August the Highlanders controlled the road between the forts and had cut all communication between them. The British commander in Fort William was left with little choice but to send out a party to reopen the road. On August 16 he ordered two companies of the Royal Scots to march from Fort William to Fort Augustus in a show of force. A short way into their march an unknown number of Highlanders ambushed and killed a dozen of them, and took the rest prisoner.⁸⁰

The defeat of the Royal Scots gave the Jacobite cause the upper hand and led more neutrals to join the rebellion. The day before the rebels ambushed the Royal Scots, the Earl of Findlater wrote to Craigie that if "a few

⁷⁸ Marquis of Tweeddale to the Lord Advocate [Robert Craigie], August 1, 1745, John Heneage Jesse, ed., *Memoirs of the Pretenders and their Adherents* (London: George Ball and Sons, 1890), 459.

⁷⁹ The Lord Justice's Clerk to the Marquis of Tweeddale, August 20, 1745, *ibid.*, 483.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*; Fortescue, *British Army*, 126.

regiments" of regulars were sent North from England into the Highlands, "it would be in their power to quell the insurrection before it can be brought to any great length."⁸¹ After the defeat of the Royal Scots, however, the marquis Tweeddale understood that regulars were of little use in the Highlands. The Highlanders, like the natives of North America, would "retire" in the face of a regular attack into "the country where there might be any difficulty to get at them with regular troops."⁸²

The military situation in Scotland quickly reached a crisis point for the Hanoverians. By September it appeared that Young Pretender's army would march directly on London. Even when "a march of regular troops, when the country was in its present situation, by themselves, was thought to be hazardous,"⁸³ Cope sent his army northward to meet the Jacobites in battle. The ensuing battle of Prestonpans was a disaster for the British Army and regular methods. Cope's raw and undisciplined regulars panicked at the first sight of the claymore-wielding, screaming Highlander irregulars. As Cope aligned his men to fight a traditional eighteenth-century set-piece battle, the Highlanders rushed "upon the enemy sword in hand, as soon as they saw them, without order and without discipline."⁸⁴ In the ensuing ten-minute melee the Highlanders killed 400 of Cope's Redcoats and took 1,000 prisoners. "Never," wrote Sir John Fortescue, "was a victory so complete."⁸⁵

⁸¹ Earl of Findlater to Lord Advocate, August 15, 1745, Jesse, *Memoirs of the Pretenders*, 474.

⁸² Marquis of Tweeddale to Lord Advocate, August 24, 1745, *ibid.*, 489.

⁸³ *Gentleman's Magazine* 15 (1745): 115.

⁸⁴ Chevalier de Johnston, *A Memoir of the 'Forty-Five*, ed. Brian Rawson (London: Folio Society, 1958), 33.

⁸⁵ Fortescue, *British Army*, 131.

Yet even after the defeat of the Royal Scots and Cope's army at Prestonpans most Englishmen were slow to grasp the nature of the kind of war they faced. Expressing the hostility of most British professional soldiers toward *petite guerre*, Lord John Ligonier wrote peevishly from Flanders that eight regiments of regulars could "Putt out this infernal flame [Jacobitism] at ones" and crush the "Beggary banditry."⁸⁶ Another Englishmen suggested that the Scots irregulars were not serious military opponents. One writer suggested that rather than "waste" the regular army on the Scots they should be hunted and exterminated like vermin. "Do not," he wrote, "let us lavish the expense of preparation necessary to be made against an *Alexander* in opposition to a ragged hungry rabble of Yahoos of *Scotch Highlanders*; let us not hunt a rat with the charge, pomp, and terror of apparatus with which he would meet a lion on the plain."⁸⁷ What that commentator failed to realize, of course, was that it was the "Yahoos" who were doing most of the "hunting" of the regular British Army in the Highlands.

One British regular soldier, however, understood what was needed to defeat the Jacobites. James Oglethorpe knew that until the British suppressed the rebellion at its origin, in the countryside, it would be useless to seek battles with the Pretender's army. Indeed, Oglethorpe understood that the '45 was a rare eighteenth-century conflict, insofar as the Scottish partisans sought to destroy the status quo rather than merely to force redress of local grievances. Thus, along with defeating the Jacobite army, Oglethorpe knew he had to crush Jacobite support in the countryside. He

⁸⁶ Ligonier quoted in Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British Army, 1702-1770* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 108.

⁸⁷ *Gentleman's Magazine* 15 (1745): 547.

had little intention of winning the Jacobites' hearts and minds. He intended to establish a pro-British presence in the Highlands.

Oglethorpe knew from experience that regulars were the wrong type of troops to fight an irregular enemy in rough and wild terrain. As soon as Oglethorpe arrived in Scotland in the winter of 1745-1746 he changed the way that the British Army confronted the Jacobite rebels. One of his first acts was to confine the regulars to their garrisons and distribute arms among the Scottish population still loyal to Britain. Upon the outbreak of the rebellion, Duncan Forbes of Culloden had raised twenty "independent companies" of pro-British Scots.⁸⁸ Oglethorpe instructed that those "irregulars [the independent companies] were to be detached in small patrols, supported by parties of the regulars, with orders to attack any patrols of the rebels they might fall in with."⁸⁹

Oglethorpe's use of loyal Scottish irregulars for *petite guerre* solved the major problem that had faced the British Army in the previous months, namely its inability to march through the Highlands. The Scottish irregulars "were more suitably attired and of greater utility than those of the line, who were unused to a mountainous and difficult country where even the language was not understood . . . They could traverse peat bog and mountain with ease, where the cumbersomely clad and accoutered soldiers of the line, whether horse or foot, would flounder helplessly or be unable to proceed or only with difficulty."⁹⁰

⁸⁸ I.H. Mackay Scobie, "The Highland Independent Companies of 1745-1747," *JSAHR* 20 (1941): 17. Forbes was Lord President of the Court of Session. See *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Forbes, Duncan."

⁸⁹ *Gentleman's Magazine* 15 (1745): 624.

⁹⁰ Scobie, "Highland Independent Companies," 31-32.

With his irregulars providing intelligence and forcing the Jacobites onto the defensive, British regulars could concentrate on consolidating their hold on the areas that they occupied and rooting out Jacobitism. The regulars' preferred method quickly became intimidating the family members of suspected Jacobites. In Edinburgh, for example, British officers warned the town's inhabitants that "they would be punished with military execution if they aided the rebels."⁹¹

When William Augustus, duke of Cumberland, finally arrived in Scotland in the spring of 1746, Oglethorpe's loyal Scots had gone far toward reestablishing control in the Scottish countryside. Then, ignoring the recommendation of his French military advisors, Bonnie Prince Charlie chose to accept battle with Cumberland at Culloden on April 16, 1746. The Young Pretender insisted on placing his Highlander irregulars in a linear formation, from which he expected them to stand and exchange volleys with Cumberland's regulars, many of whom were veterans of Fontenoy. The outcome of the battle was never in doubt. In a reversal of Prestonpans, the veterans of Fontenoy killed 1,000 of the Pretender's troops and took 500 captive.

With the Pretender's main army defeated, the British Army focused its attention on ending the rebellion and punishing those responsible for it. Taking a page from the North American book of war, Cumberland, soon to earn the sobriquet "Butcher of Culloden," ignored the basic tenet of eighteenth-century regular war and unleashed his regulars and loyal Scots partisans on Highlander rebels and noncombatants alike. For three months the "Butcher of Culloden" proscribed the leaders of the rebellion, executed or

⁹¹ *Gentleman's Magazine*, 15 (1745): 626, 709; *ibid.*, 16 (1746), 90, 173.

transported them to North America, and garrisoned the Scottish countryside with soldiers whose primary mission was to intimidate the local populace into submission. In the eighteenth-century version of show trials, many of the Highland leaders were summarily tried, convicted, and imprisoned, some executed.⁹² The Scottish irregulars were particularly valuable "both in guarding the passes and cooperating with the troops of the line in searching both mainland and isles for the fugitive Jacobites."⁹³ Fortescue, 150 years after the fact, defended the British terror campaign in the Highlands as the way "a victorious campaign against mountaineers must always end, in the hunting of fugitives, the burning of villages, and the destruction of crops," though no regiment of today's British Army claims Culloden as a campaign in which it or one of its predecessors participated.⁹⁴

⁹² Robert C. Jarvis, ed., *Collected Papers on the Jacobite Risings*, 2 vols. (New York: Manchester University Press, 1972), 2: 283. The events of the '45 were watched with great interest even in New France. French officials in Canada noted that "A number of persons, including several lords and other, accused of high treason, have been executed in England on account of the Scotch rebellion." See *Journal of Occurrences in Canada*, 1746, 1747, *NYCD*, 10: 103.

⁹³ Scobie, "Highland Independent Companies," 31. Part of the success of the anti-Jacobite campaign after 1746 was the incorporation of even greater parts of the Lowland Scots into British society and positions of power and influence within the British colonial system. Many of the Lowland Scots were opposed to Jacobitism. Ironically, Cumberland's army at Culloden had more Scots in it than Englishmen. It had three regiments of Lowland Scots, including that Clan Campbell, although its nominal head John Campbell, fourth earl of Loudoun "sat out" the battle after having been defeated at Prestonpans and again at Inverness. Culloden therefore can be seen as the last battle in the civil war between the Highlands and the Lowlands. Still, Parliament felt compelled in July 1746 to root out all potential sources of Jacobitism and ordered the "restraining the use of the Highland dress" and the disarming of the Highland clans. See House of Commons Proceedings, July 4, 1746, Leo Francis Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, Volume 5, 1739-1754* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1941), 239. Many Scots responded by becoming the lead military, economic, and diplomatic agents of British imperialism. See Richards, "Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic Empire," 87-98.

⁹⁴ Fortescue, *British Army*, 146. The British victory at Culloden occasioned great celebrations and numerous contemporary artistic depictions of the '45. However, in the contemporary visual images (paintings, engravings, and sketches) of the '45, nothing was printed of the terror campaign. See Peter Harrinton, "Images of Culloden," *JSAHR* 63 (1985): 208-19.

The suppression of the '45 was the high point of Cumberland's military career and the most successful "counter insurgency" of the eighteenth century. After Culloden and the terror campaign against the rebellious Scots, Jacobitism never again threatened the political stability of Great Britain. The British Army, using primarily irregular means, had resolved the most pressing internal problem facing the British state and the Hanoverian monarchy. Yet when the British Army looked back on its victory over Jacobitism, it saw it as a victory of regulars over irregulars, not the successful application of irregular tactics.

In January 1746, at a time when British forces had conceded the Scottish countryside to bands of "Yahoos," there appeared in *Gentleman's Magazine* a brief anonymous "Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces."⁹⁵ The "Essay" is significant in that, as a thoroughgoing diatribe against irregular soldiers and irregular methods, it exemplified the British attitude toward *petite guerre* at mid-century.

The author of the "Essay" believed that well-disciplined regulars always would prevail over irregulars. In the "Essay," he argued that the irregular methods of the Scots Highlanders, and their victory over Cope's regulars, were not the result of the superiority of the irregular way of war, but rather caused by the ineptitude of Cope and his soldiers. In fact, the author explained, every defeat of a regular army at the hands of an irregular force resulted from three basic reasons: disparity in numbers (even regulars could be overrun); misconduct of officers (manifested in "surprise, temerity, [or] cowardice") and poor training, which made regulars confronted by the

⁹⁵ "Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces," *Gentleman's Magazine* 16 (1746): 30-32.

"difference of weapons" between irregulars and themselves, and disoriented by the "confusion" of battle, prone to panic. Regulars who maintained proper order had nothing to fear from partisans. To suggest that they adopt irregular tactics, he argued, was to invite disaster. "It is particularly to be observed," he wrote, "that regular men can never fight well when reduced to the form of a mob, no more than a mob can fight like regular men."⁹⁶

The author of the "Essay" misunderstood the nature of eighteenth-century *petite guerre*, both in Europe and in North America. Indians and French *Troupes de la Marine* in North America, and *Grassins* and Highlanders in Europe, never intended to face British regulars in a battle in which the British would have a numerical advantage. Moreover, irregulars always used surprise to strike at their enemies. Amidst that confusion, regular officers would, irregulars hoped, make mistakes. Eighteenth-century irregulars used *petite guerre* and the skulking tactics to achieve surprise, to close quickly on the enemy, and to defeat it before it the enemy could react. However imperfect his grasp of irregular war, however, the author of the "Essay" could hardly have provided a more perfect summary of the conventional, professional officer's point of view on *petite guerre*.

With the regular victory at Culloden and the explanation in the "Essay" for the defeat at Prestonpans in hand, the British Army chose to ignore *petite guerre*. Not until 1896 and the publication of Colonel Charles E. Calwell's *Small Wars* did the British Army have a formalized doctrine of *petite guerre* written by one of its own.⁹⁷ In the meantime, any British officer who wished to read up on guerrilla tactics had no choice but to consult foreign works, in

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁹⁷ Charles E. Calwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: HMSO, 1896).

foreign languages. It was not until 1777 that Grandmaison's *La Petite Guerre* was translated and published in English. Even then, the title of the English translation led readers to believe the book was not about *petite guerre*, but cavalry operations.⁹⁸ Even if it had been exactly true to the Grandmaison original, most junior officers in the British Army would not have read it.

James Haynes, for instance, has written that since promotion in the eighteenth-century British Army was based primarily on patronage, "Once started in the service a young officer had few incentives to study or interest himself in the theory of war."⁹⁹ Senior officers, meanwhile, focused their professional study on regular war.¹⁰⁰ George Smith's 1779-recommended reading list of the "chief instruments of acquiring knowledge" of the military science is instructive. His list of books in English centered on drill, discipline, field fortifications, and the exploits of the Great Captains -- Maurice of

⁹⁸ Grandmaison, *A Treatise on the Military Service, of Light Horse, and Light Infantry, in the Field, and in Fortified Places* (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1777). The translator took significant liberties with Grandmaison's original title of *La petite guerre, ou traité du service des troupes legeres en campagne*, [Little War, or a Treatise on the Service of Light Troops in the Field].

⁹⁹ James W. Hayes, "The Social and Professional Background of the Officers of the British Army, 1714-1763," M.A. thesis, University of London, 1956. The purchase system was not abolished in the British Army until November 1, 1871. The tradition of giving a commission to the individual who raised a regiment lasted until 1858. In 1794, one British officer wrote that "There is not a young man in the army that cares one farthing whether his commanding officer, his Brigadier, or the Commander-in-Chief himself approves of his conduct or not. His promotion depends not on their smiles or frowns -- his friends can give him a thousand pounds with which he goes to the auction room in Charles Street and in a fortnight he becomes a captain." See H. Biddulph, "The Era of Army Purchase," *JSAHR* 12 (1933): 229.

¹⁰⁰ Ira Gruber has argued that most of the professional British soldiers who fought in North America during the Revolution were intellectual heirs to two lines of strategic thought -- the primary classical, based on works like Caesar's *Commentaries*, and the other more modern, based on the regular approach to war. See Gruber, "Classical Influences on British Strategy in the War for American Independence," in John W. Eadie, *Classical Traditions in Early America* (Ann Arbor: Center for Coordination of Ancient and Modern Studies, 1976), 175-90.

Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, and the Duke of Marlborough, for example. Smith's list of foreign works contained neither Saxe, La Croix, Grandmaison, nor Jeney. In their place he recommended francophone books on the fortification system of Vauban and the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough.¹⁰¹ Without a base of doctrine from which to grow, the British Army devoted almost no time to training its men or junior officers in *petite guerre*.¹⁰² Without the experience of fighting in North America, as James Oglethorpe had, it is likely that a British officer would have understood very little of the practice -- or dangers -- of *petite guerre*.¹⁰³

In North America British soldiers would pay dearly for their officers' ignorance of the basics of *petite guerre*. British officers, including the commander of the Fort Duquesne expedition, Major General Braddock, believed that their North American enemies were no different from the "bandit" *pandurs* or *huszars* of Eastern Europe. As he prepared to march into the North American wilderness, Braddock only half-heartedly tried to raise four companies of "Foot Rangers" and one squadron of "horse rangers" to "secure" his march against Fort Duquesne.¹⁰⁴ Braddock then "sighted & neglected" the handful of Anglo-American rangers that volunteered, and

¹⁰¹ Smith, *An Universal Military Dictionary*, 32-34.

¹⁰² J.A. Houlding, *Fit For Service: The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 95.

¹⁰³ In "Redcoats in the Wilderness," Russell, as noted above, argued that the British Army won some familiarity with *petite guerre* fighting on the Continent and in Scotland. The challenges of *petite guerre* in those locals, however, paled in scope and magnitude to those it faced in North America. The British Army certainly learned more about irregular war after 1739 fighting in North America with and along side Anglo-American and Indian irregulars than against *Grassin*.

¹⁰⁴ Edward Braddock to Thomas Robinson, May 29, 1755, PRO 5: 46.

treated his fewer Indian allies even worse. When Benjamin Franklin suggested to Braddock that he might need more irregulars than he had requested, Braddock, Franklin wrote years after the fact and perhaps to justify the superiority of all things American over British, "Smiled at my Ignorance, & replied 'These Savages may indeed be a formidable Enemy to your raw American Militia; but, upon the King's regular & disciplined Troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make any Impression.'"¹⁰⁵

The "savages," however, made a profound impression on the King's regulars when they met them in battle on the Monongahela River on July 9, 1755. As Braddock and his 1,450 men approached Fort Duquesne they collided with a joint French-Indian army of nearly 900 Indians, Canadian militia, and French *marines* that was moving eastward to engage the British. The two forces quickly engaged one another. The advance party of the British light infantry under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage charged the French and Indians. The enemy, however, melted away in front of Gage's attack and deftly moved to attack another segment of the British line. Gage regrouped his light troops, but could find in the woods no French line to attack. The advanced party then "gave way, and fell back upon the van, which very much disconcerted the Men, and that added to a manner of fighting that they were quite unacquainted with, struck such a Panic" in the regulars.¹⁰⁶ The British officers tried to rally their men by shouting orders fit for a battle like Fontenoy. But, as Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dunbar later noted, the English "fought an invisible Enemy is by All Accounts Certain[,] for

¹⁰⁵ Benjamin Franklin, *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Louis P. Masur (Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 135.

¹⁰⁶ Major Robert Orme to Robert Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, PRO 5: 46.

I have heard many say both Officers and Soldiers they did not see One of the Enemy the whole day."¹⁰⁷ Even the Britons' artillery pieces, which they had so laboriously lugged across the mountains, were no use against the enemy. "The Indians," recalled one British officer, "whether ordered or not I cannot say kept an incessant fire on the Guns & killed the Men very fast. These Indians from their irregular method of fighting by running from one place to another obliged us to wheel from right to left, to desert the Guns and then hastily return & cover them."¹⁰⁸ Then, as the British tried to retreat from the field, "The Enemy," the officer continued,

pursued us butchering as they came as far as the other side of the River; during our crossing, they Shot many in the Water both Men & Women, & died the stream with their blood, scalping & cutting them in a most barbarous manner. On the other side of the river most of us halted to resolve on what to do; but the Men being so terrified desired to go on, nay indeed they would; melancholy situation! expecting every moment to have our retreat cut off (which half a dozen men would easily have done) & a certainty of meeting no Provisions for 60 miles. I must observe that our retreat was so hasty that we were obliged to leave the whole Train; Ammunition, Provision, and baggage to the plundering of the Indians.¹⁰⁹

In the end, Braddock's *aide de camp*, Captain George Washington, noted the Britons became "struck with a deadly *Panic*" while the "poor Virginians

¹⁰⁷ Dunbar to Robert Napier, July 24, 1755, Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), 106.

¹⁰⁸ "The Journal of a British Officer," Charles Hamilton, ed., *Braddock's Defeat: The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman; The Journal of a British Officer; Halkett's Orderly Book* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 50.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

behaved like men, and died like Soldiers."¹¹⁰ All told 977 regulars were either killed or wounded, including 60 of 86 officers.¹¹¹

Segments of the British Army's post-battle investigation on the conduct its troops at the battle on the Monongahela read like they were taken directly from the "Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces." Gage and Dunbar, the two officers who conducted the investigation, explained away the defeat of the British regulars at the hands of the French and Indian irregulars by claiming that the enemy outnumbered Braddock's army and that the misconduct of the rank and file contributed to a military disaster.¹¹² However, on July 9 the British force was nearly half again as large as their enemy. Likewise, the British troops panicked because their officers proved incapable of effectively leading them in a chaotic battle where no enemy was to be seen. Ironically, during the battle the Anglo-American auxiliaries had dispersed and took cover behind trees and rocks where they returned the enemies' fire. Thus Gage and Dunbar's criticism that "Frequent Conversations of the Provincial Troops & Country people that if they engaged the Indians in their European Manner of fighting, they would be Beat"

¹¹⁰ George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie, July 18, 1755, PRO 5: 46.

¹¹¹ Steele, *Warpaths*, 189.

¹¹² Historians have debated for years the reasons why the British lost on the Monongahela. For a review of the various arguments, see Robert L. Yaple, "Braddock's Defeat: The Theories and a Reconsideration," *JSAHR* 46 (1968): 194-201. Yaple believed that American conditions and the nature of the irregular fight that Braddock found himself in had little to do with why the British were routed. Yaple has argued that two factors were primarily responsible for Braddock's defeat. First, Gage panicked and failed to do his duty properly as commander of the van, and Braddock also had "bad luck" in that the French and Indians ambushed him the place he was most susceptible to being trapped. Yaple wrote "there were woods in Europe, after all, and Braddock was no amateur" (p. 201). Given North American conditions, of course, and the fact that the French and Indians managed to ambush Braddock in the place "he," in Yaple's terms, "was most susceptible to being trapped" suggests that Braddock's methods were in fact amateurish and inappropriate.

adversely affected the morale of the regulars may hold some truth. The British troops did not panic immediately; they stood their ground for nearly three hours and retreated only after their officers failed to lead them, as the Anglo-Americans' officers had done, out of the trap that they found themselves.¹¹³

In an age when promotion was tied so closely to political connections, however, Gage and Dunbar refused to fix responsibility for the defeat on Braddock or British "doctrine." Yet Braddock's unwillingness to incorporate more Anglo-Americans and Indians into his army certainly deserved much of the blame for the defeat. Franklin perhaps summed up Braddock best when he described him as "a brave Man, and might probably have made a Figure as a good Officer in some European War. But he had too much self-confidence, too high an Opinion of the Validity of Regular Troops, and too mean a One of both Americans and Indians."¹¹⁴ Of course, the French understood exactly why the British lost the battle on July 9, 1755. There was a simple explanation: "none of their (the French) Officers were in the least Surprised at it [Braddock's defeat], as it was a Maxim with them never to Expose Regulars in the Woods without a sufficient Number of Indians and irregulars for any Attack that might be Expected."¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Inquiry into Behavior of Troops at Monongahela, November 21, 1755, PRO 5: 46.

¹¹⁴ Franklin, *Autobiography*, 135.

¹¹⁵ William Shirley to Thomas Robinson, November 5, 1755, PRO 5: 46. In 1756, for example, French Army outside Quebec had nearly 700 Indian and Canadian auxiliaries led by regular officers whom the French called "Officers attachés aux Sauvages." The Indians allies served as *l'Avant garde* of the French Army. See *Ordre de Bataille sur Trois Colonnes* M. le B. de Dieskau General, 1756, PRO 5: 46.

As he lay dying from his wounds he received in battle, Braddock told his aides "Another time we shall know better how to deal with them."¹¹⁶ As events proved, it took several more times for the British Army to realize that its conceptualization of regular war and disdain for irregular methods were inappropriate for war in North America.

Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela clearly indicates the relative unimportance of *petite guerre* in mid-eighteenth-century British military culture. Unlike Continental soldiers, whose rich tradition of *petite guerre* was rooted in both experience and doctrine, British soldiers tended to dismiss irregular tactics out of hand. The British Army had fought little wars in Ireland and Scotland, but carried away the wrong lessons from both, particularly the '45. Eighteenth-century British soldiers mistakenly believed that regulars would always defeat irregulars, and thus *petite guerre* remained fit not for soldiers, but "savages and robbers."¹¹⁷ Thus, whereas *petite guerre* entered the regular military culture of the Continental powers, it never attained a mark of legitimacy within British military circles. Indeed, the British Army possessed a collective temerity in its disdain for irregular war. But as the author of the "Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces" knew, and Edward Braddock learned, regulars' temerity was perhaps the irregulars' greatest weapon.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in Fortescue, *British Army*, 285.

¹¹⁷ Quoted in Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society 1550-1800* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1991), 60.

CHAPTER 4

"THE SERVICE CANNOT BE DONE WITHOUT THEM": RANGERS, UNLIMITED-IRREGULAR WARFARE, AND THE BRITISH ARMY, 1755- 1763

At Crown Point, on September 13, 1759, Major Robert Rogers received orders from Major General Jeffery Amherst to lead a force of hand-picked Anglo-American rangers, British volunteers, and Stockbridge Indian scouts against St. Francis (Odanak), an Abenaki village in the St. Lawrence Valley, 150 miles to the North. "Remember the barbarities that have been committed by the enemy's Indian scoundrels on every occasion where they had an opportunity of showing their infamous cruelties on the King's subjects, which they have done without mercy," the commander in chief reminded Rogers. "Take your revenge," he continued, "but don't forget that though those villains have dastardly and promiscuously murdered the women and children of all ages, it is my orders that no women or children are killed or hurt."¹

Rogers ignored Amherst's prohibition on the killing of noncombatants. After a grueling march of twenty-two days, Rogers and 142 raiders arrived outside St. Francis.² When he reconnoitered the village, Rogers discovered hundreds of scalp-festooned poles flying from Abenaki lodges and the Abenakis celebrating the successes of a recent scalp-hunting foray on the

¹ Amherst to Rogers, September 13, 1759, Robert Rogers, *Journals of Major Robert Rogers* (London: J. Millan, 1765), 145.

² For a description of the route Rogers and his men traveled to and from St. Francis, see Albert Gravel, "Les Origines du Mot Coaticook et L'Expédition Rogers en 1759," *Le Canada Français* (1925) 12: 531.

Anglo-American frontier.³ Rogers determined that vengeance would be the rangers'. He returned to his trail-weary troops, granted them a few hours to rest, and then deployed them for a pre-dawn attack on the village. "At half an hour before sun-rise," he recalled, "I surprised the town when they [the Abenakis] were all fast asleep." As the Anglo-Americans and their allies emerged out of the darkness,

the enemy had not time to recover themselves, or take arms for their own defense, till they were chiefly destroyed, except some few of them who took to the water. About forty of my people pursued them, who destroyed such as attempted to make their escape that way, and sunk both them and their boats. A little after sun-rise I set fire to all their houses, except three, in which there was corn, that I reserved for the use of the party.

The fire consumed many of the Indians who had concealed themselves in the cellars and lofts of their houses. About seven o'clock in the morning the affair was completely over, in which time we had killed at least two hundred Indians, and taken twenty of their women and children prisoners, fifteen of whom I let go their own way, and five I brought with me, viz. two Indian boys, and three Indian girls. I likewise retook five English captives, which I also took under my care.⁴

Rogers's St. Francis raid, and Amherst's order to him to execute it, suggests the place that the Anglo-American way of unlimited-irregular war

³ Rogers, *Journals*, 154.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 147. There is some debate about how many Abenakis Rogers's force actually killed at St. Francis. Rogers's claim of 200 is disputed in other sources; enumerations vary between 30 and 250. See Ian Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 228. As Francis Jennings notes in his *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988), note 42, 200, "perhaps it would be better to say that Rogers *tried* to massacre, though there seems no doubt he killed indiscriminately." Even if Rogers only killed a couple of dozen Abenakis, the raid was still an important victory for the Anglo-Americans and Britons. St. Francis was destroyed and the survivors were forced to flee to the Caughnawaga mission at St. Regis for protection and adoption. Colin G. Calloway notes [*The Western Abenaki of Vermont, 1600-1800: War, Migration, and Survival of an Indian People* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 179]: "Despite its limited success the raid on Saint Francis constituted a disaster for the western Abenaki." William Johnson reported in 1763 that since Rogers's raid, the Abenakis had "lived scattered." See Enumeration of Indians within the Northern Department, November 18, 1763, NYCD, 7: 582.

had come to occupy in both the Anglo-American and British military cultures by the late 1750s.⁵ The rangers' campaign against the noncombatants of St. Francis was the logical extension of the Anglo-American tradition of war making that had developed over the previous 150 years. Amherst's willingness to employ provincial rangers, British, and Indian allies in such a capacity, meanwhile, points to the British Army's acceptance of Anglo-American-style warfare as effective, necessary, and legitimate. Although Amherst forbade Rogers to kill or harm women and children, his instructions were at best *pro forma* and at worst disingenuous. He must have known that Rogers and his rangers would kill innocents; Rogers had said as much when he first proposed raiding Canada three years earlier.⁶ More important, Anglo-Americans' past record of fighting Indians -- one that Amherst knew well -- showed that they rarely offered vanquished enemies quarter, whether combatant or noncombatant. By sending Rogers at the head of a party of Anglo-American, British, and friendly Indian irregulars against St. Francis, Amherst in effect sanctioned the colonial Anglo-American way of war.

The British Army came to terms with the Anglo-American way of unlimited-irregular war in the Seven Years' War and the Indian Wars of the early 1760s (the Cherokee War of 1759-1761 and Pontiac's Rebellion of 1763), conflicts in which irregulars played an important, and in some instances, dominant role. Analyses of those struggles, however, generally have focused on the wars' grand sieges and battles, like those outside Fort William Henry in 1757, Fort Ticonderoga in 1758, Quebec in 1759 and 1760,

⁵ Steele has a similar take on Rogers's raid. It "carried ominous messages for Indians," he has written, in that it was for little more than revenge and "without strategic significance beyond promoting Amerindian insecurity." See Steele, *Warpaths*, 227-28.

⁶ Rogers to John Campbell, fourth earl of Loudoun, August 11, 1756, LO 1467.

and the siege of Detroit in 1763 and in effect have overshadowed the irregular aspects of the war.⁷ And while other historians have discussed the organization and battlefield exploits of the American irregulars of those wars, none have explained adequately what the irregulars' service, and the contributions they made and the defeats they endured, meant for the development of an Anglo-American art of irregular war making.⁸

⁷ Steele's *Warpaths*, chaps. 9-12 is the exception. He places those wars in the context of the arrival of European regular war to North America. Lawrence Henry Gipson's *The British Empire Before the American Revolution*, vol. 6, *The Great War for Empire: The Years of Defeat, 1754-1757*; vol. 7, *The Victorious Years, 1758-1760*; and vol. 8, *The Culmination, 1760-1763* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-1969) is the starting point for regular-focused analyses of the war. Gipson interpreted the war as part of the British Empire's worldwide struggle against France. His works are of great value as a synthesis.

⁸ Those studies that do focus on irregular war in the 1750s and 1760s concentrate primarily on the life and career of Robert Rogers. For brief biographies of Rogers and descriptions of the major events of his career, see *DCB*, s.v. "Rogers, Robert" and *Colonial Wars of North America, 1512-1763*, s.v. "Rogers, Robert." The 1950s and 1960s saw the publication of two major studies of the rangers. John Cuneo's *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (1952; reprint, New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1987) is the best book-length account of the rangers' activities, although it verges on American military hagiography. As such, a new biography, one that takes a more balanced account of Rogers's career, is needed. Burt Garfield Loescher offered his three-volume *The History of Rogers' Rangers* (San Francisco: Burt Garfield Loescher, 1946-1969). Loescher obviously was enamored with the pre-Vietnam War American fascination with low-intensity conflict, President John F. Kennedy's "Flexible Response", and the then newly formed Green Berets. Loescher even went as far as to describe Rogers and his men as "America's first Green Berets," although Anglo-Americans had a well established tradition of ranging before the mid 1750s. On the whole, *The History of Rogers' Rangers* is not particularly reliable in its accounting of the events of Rogers's career, although the third volume -- *Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers* (1969) -- does provide a useful listing of the leaders of the rangers. For each officer and noncommissioned officer, Loescher gave a short biography and well as listing of their service in the rangers.

Other students of Rogers's Rangers have used local or state historical publications to focus on individual events in Rogers's career or ranger operations. For example, for Rogers's greatest defeat, see Richard John Curry, "Rogers' Battle on Snowshoes," *New-England Galaxy* (1974): 26-33 and Mary Cochrane Rogers, *Rogers' Rock, Lake George, March 13, 1758: A Battle Fought on Snow Shoes* (Derry, NH: Mary Rogers, 1917). For the St. Francis Raid, see Gravel, "Les Origines." Victor H. Paltsits's "Journal of Robert Rogers, the Ranger, on His Expedition for Receiving the Capitulation of the Western French Posts," *New York Public Library Bulletin* 37 (1935): 261-76, focuses on Rogers's activities in accepting the surrender of the western French forces after the Seven Years' War, as does Milo M. Qaife's "Robert Rogers," *Burton Historical Collections Leaflet*, 7 (1928): 1-16. For Rogers's post-war service as British Governor of Fort Michilimackinac, see Josephine Mayer, "Major Robert Rogers, Trader," *New York History* 15 (1934): 388-97; and William L. Clements, "Rogers's Michilimackinac Journal," *American Antiquarian Society Proceedings, New Series*, 28 (1919):

The Seven Years' War and the Indian Wars of the early 1760s were significant points in the development of an Anglo-American way of war because they signaled the British Army's acceptance and legitimization of Anglo-American unlimited-irregular warfare. The process of acceptance and legitimization passed through four stages between 1755 and 1763. Britons first entered the struggle against France in North America in 1755 discounting the need and importance of augmenting the British Army with Anglo-American irregulars, only to learn that they in fact would have to depend on substantial assistance from Anglo-American rangers to win the war. By mid-1756, Britons began a second stage in which they turned to Anglo-American rangers to wage the irregular side of the conflict for them. Yet many Britons distrusted the rangers and held them in contempt as little more than expensive and undisciplined ruffians. The British Army in late 1757 and early 1758 entered a third stage where it experimented with replacing Anglo-American rangers with Britons trained in Anglo-American methods of irregular war. That experiment failed, and by 1759 British commanders had abandoned the notion that British regulars could replace Anglo-American irregulars. In the final campaigns of the Seven Years' War, Amherst and Major General James Wolfe turned to Anglo-Americans to strike terror in Indian and Canadian noncombatants. In the fourth and last stage, during the Cherokee War and Pontiac's Rebellion, British commanders depended almost exclusively on the Anglo-American way of unlimited-irregular war, then waged by both Anglo-American irregulars *and* British regulars, that focused on defeating their enemies by destroying noncombatant populations. By the end of 1763, Britons therefore not only had accepted Anglo-American-style

224-73. Rogers's career is partially the topic of Kenneth Roberts's novel *Northwest Passage* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1937).

warcraft as a morally acceptable way of making war, but they also gave it a central position in their own military culture.

STAGE I: BRITONS COME TO DEPEND ON ANGLO-AMERICAN IRREGULARS, 1755-1756

The British first came to depend on Anglo-American irregulars between late 1755 and early 1756. Britons approached the war in 1755 convinced that their regular troops would win a victory in only one season of campaigning.⁹ They soon learned, however, that the fighting in North America was different from campaigning in Europe. Problems with supplying a regular force in the North American backcountry, and facing an enemy adept at conducting irregular operations in that wilderness, compelled British commanders to look to Indian allies to neutralize the enemy's advantage in irregulars. Few Indians, however, took up arms for the British. British commanders thus were left with little choice but to turn to Anglo-American rangers.

Senior British Army commanders entered the war believing that its regulars would be more than a match for the Indian "savages" of North America and the troops of New France. They of course were wrong. Braddock's defeat was a disaster that resulted in the expulsion of British regulars from the Virginia and Pennsylvania backcountry for three years.¹⁰

⁹ The British master plan for 1755 centered around executing four simultaneous regular-style operations against Forts Duquesne, Niagara, St. Frédéric, and Beauséjour. Among those four operations, only the one directed against Fort Beauséjour met with success.

¹⁰ Steele argues that even after the disaster on the Monongahela, the British still could have pushed on to Fort Duquesne "with a good chance of success." See Steele, *Warpaths*,

Yet even after Braddock's defeat, many Anglo-Americans and Britons were slow to realize that victory in North America would depend on more than British regulars. Expressing an opinion reminiscent of that stated a decade earlier in the "Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces," an anonymous author wrote from Boston that "nothing will ever be done here without veteran [regular] troops."¹¹ "I can not help flattering myself, that, when once you have recruited your regular Force in that Part of the world," the duke of Cumberland encouraged John Campbell, the fourth earl of Loudoun and newly appointed commander in chief of the North American army, "you will be an over-match for our Enemy's."¹² Well into 1756 the British high command outside North America gave little thought to how campaigning in North America might be different from that in Europe.¹³

But irregular methods of war indeed were in order. Two separate but interrelated issues -- wilderness logistics and the enemy's mastery of irregular operations -- shocked British commanders into embracing irregular solutions. As the defeats for British arms piled up in the wilderness, Britons realized that fighting a war in North America required a different approach from the one needed in Western Europe. It was soon clear to even the most regular-minded officer that war in America more closely resembled conflicts in

190. British officers and their men in August 1755, however, were in no mental state to march back into the wilderness and try their hand at fighting the French and Indians.

¹¹ Extract of a Letter from Boston, December 6, 1755, LO 690.

¹² Cumberland to Loudoun, October 22 - December 23, 1756, LO 2065.

¹³ In April 1756, for instance, Cumberland sent with the reinforcements to North America his instructions for the "Exercises for the American Forces." Those exercises contained no mention of the need to prepare the British troops to wage an irregular-style war in the woods of North America and were instead modeled on the Prussian system of regular drill. See Exercises for the American Forces, April 18, 1756, LO 1060.

the "undeveloped" regions of Europe (Scotland and Eastern and Central Europe) where *petite guerre*, irregular tactics, and small unit operations played an important part.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle for British arms to overcome was that British regular troops simply could not operate effectively in the wilds of North America. "A vast inhospitable desert, unsafe and treacherous" faced British soldiers in North America, William Smith noted, and "surrounds them, where victories are not decisive, but defeats are ruinous."¹⁴ Until late 1758 that "desert" presented British commanders with what seemed an insurmountable obstacle.¹⁵ The trackless wilderness -- "It is impossible to convey to the reader," David Ramsay wrote, "without he has been in America, a just idea of the face of the country. . . . It perhaps never has been trodden by human feet, if we except the savage" -- sapped the strength of both men and supply trains and demanded Herculean efforts to supply and equip troops in the

¹⁴ William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCCLXIV* (Philadelphia: n.p., 1765), ix.

¹⁵ Daniel Beattie correctly has argued that the main enemy of the British Army in the first three years of the Seven Years' War was neither the French Army nor its Indian allies, but instead the North American wilderness. He has suggested that a key to Great Britain's victory in the Seven Years' War in North America was British commanders' creation of a logistical and transport system to cope with American conditions. Beattie has contended that the catalyst for British victory after 1758 was that the British army finally could project and support its regular forces in the wilderness. See Beattie, "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare, 1755-1763," in *Adapting to Conditions: War and Society in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. Maarten Ultee (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1986), 56-83. King Parker's doctoral thesis is similar to Beattie's argument. Parker has written that in spite of the failure of Loudoun to win a single significant military victory, he made an important contribution to the British conquest of Canada through his re-organization of the military transport and supply system in the colonies. Loudoun's other significant contribution, and one supported in this dissertation was his encouragement and backing for the formation of Anglo-American units trained in irregular war. See King L. Parker, "Anglo-American Wilderness Campaigning 1754-1764: Logistical and Tactical Developments" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970).

backcountry.¹⁶ Complicating matters for British commanders, their French and Indian enemies made great advantage of the remote and isolated location of British military objectives. One prophetic author noted in late 1754 the "Difficulty on the part of the English of bringing any proper Force" to attack the French positions. Because of their distance from British centers of power, the "French in and about the Forts already built, with their Indian Auxiliaries, may be able to defend them at least against four times their Number."¹⁷ Such a situation demanded that the British consider using irregulars to weaken the French positions.

But if distances to and the remoteness of the French positions were not enough to overcome, British commanders in 1756 realized they faced foes better prepared to fight an irregular war. The superiority of the French forces at wilderness campaigning resulted from the French Army's commitment to training its North American troops for irregular war. French leaders could select from three distinct military forces within the colony, each well schooled in the art of irregular war: Indians; the Canadian militia; and the colonial regulars, or the *Troupes de la Marine*.¹⁸ Indians were masters at

¹⁶ David Ramsay, *Military Memoirs of Great Britain, A History of the War, 1755-1763* (Edinburgh: n.p., 1779), 169. Only in 1758, with the success that accompanied Brigadier General John Forbes's and Colonel Henry Bouquet's capture of Fort Duquesne and Lieutenant Colonel John Bradstreet's conquest of Fort Frontenac, did British regulars prove they could fight offensively in a wilderness campaign.

¹⁷ Considerations Relating to Measures to Be Taken with Regard to Affairs in North America, November 1754, Stanley Pargellis, ed., *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1936), 37.

¹⁸ Ironically, France lost its North American empire only after the marquis de Montcalm abandoned irregular methods and chose to engage the British in a regular-style war. "He wished the war to be conducted on European lines, sieges and set battles" William J. Eccles wrote, "in which superior discipline, training, and his leadership would bring victory. The sort of warfare that the Canadians excelled at he regarded with contempt, as accomplishing no worthwhile purpose. As for the Indian allies, he had no use for them at all."

skulking. The Canadian militia was, Cumberland noted, "God knows, many Degrees above" the Anglo-American militia in military prowess. The *marines*, meanwhile, comprised the best-trained and most battle-hardened European force on the continent.¹⁹ Decades of fighting against and alongside Indians had made the *marines* masters of what their European cousins called *petite guerre*. Technically regulars, the *troupes de la marine* thought and fought first as partisans. They were organized to conduct small-unit tasks in independent companies rather than regiments, and *marine* officers -- primarily Canadians -- obtained their commissions not by purchase, but on merit or when a vacancy occurred in the officer corps through death or retirement. Moreover, years of service as cadets in which they learned first-hand the art of irregular war made *marine* officers effective guerrilla leaders.²⁰ Benjamin Doolittle observed how the *marines* would "not give Men Commission, until they have been out in the War and done some Spoil on their Enemies."²¹ "Against them the American provincial troops and militia were no match," William Eccles wrote; "Great mobility, deadly marksmanship, skillful use of surprise and forest cover, high morale and, like the Royal Navy, a tradition of victory, gave the colonial regulars their superiority."²² Both

See Eccles, *France in America*, 2d ed. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1990), 199-200. See also Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 351.

¹⁹ Cumberland to Loudoun, October 22 - December 23, 1756, LO 2065.

²⁰ Eccles wrote that like in mid-eighteenth century Prussia, the primary industry of New France was war. A military ethos therefore imbued Canadian society. See Eccles, "The Social, Economic, and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France," *Canadian Historical Review* 52 (1971): 1.

²¹ Benjamin Doolittle, "A Short Narrative of Mischief Done by the French and Indian Enemy on the Western Frontiers of the Province of Massachusetts-Bay," (1750; reprint, *Early American Imprints, 1639-1800*, New Canaan, CT: Readex, 1981-82), microfiche #6488, 21.

²² William J. Eccles, "The French Forces in North America during the Seven Years' War," *DCB*, xvii. Since *marine* officers were mostly Canadians, it is more likely that they

Anglo-Americans and Britons in fact viewed the *marines* as almost supermen. "The New England Men [militia], by all Accounts," noted Loudoun, "[were] frightened out of their Senses, at the name of a French Man."²³ It thus must have been with some foreboding that Loudoun estimated there were at least 4,000 *marines* waiting to ambush and possibly destroy his army when he marched it into Canada.²⁴

Britons hoped that Indians allied with them in the Covenant Chain would join the British cause and neutralize the French advantage in irregular war. Judged as the "Strongest Barrier and Defense of all the Northern Colonies against the Designs of the French," British "Indian Agents" were convinced that the Six Nations of the Iroquois League, if enlisted on the English side, would be a deciding factor in the war.²⁵ What they were unprepared to deal with, however, was that the Iroquois might turn their backs on the British alliance.

The Iroquois League, as a whole, was wary about joining the British and becoming too embroiled in the destruction that would accompany the whites' war. Before they joined the British side, the Iroquois demanded a

learned to make little war by experience than by reading the French European doctrine of *petite guerre*. More important, La Croix's *Traité de la Petite Guerre* was not published until 1752, Grandmaison's *La Petite Guerre* in 1756, and Jeney's *Le Partisan* in 1759. The *marines* had been wreaking havoc on the Anglo-American frontier in times of war since King William's War.

²³ Loudoun to Cumberland, August 29, 1756, LO 1626. Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 172, writes that the frontiersmen of Canada "were incomparably superior to the 'American' colonials in their adaptation to wilderness campaigning." "Incomparably superior" overstates the case. Anglo-American irregulars proved on many occasions that they too could effectively wage the little war in the American wilderness.

²⁴ Loudoun's memorandum books, July 23, 1757, Huntington Manuscript 1717, Henry E. Huntington Library Manuscript, San Marino, CA, 1717, hereafter cited as HM 1717.

²⁵ Indian Affairs, February 1756, LO 2476.

"sign" that Great Britain indeed would win the war. As George Montagu Dunk, duke of Halifax noted, not until British arms had "done something of consequence for ourselves and them" would the Six Nations "heartily" raise the hatchet for the British.²⁶

Britons, however, could point to few battlefield victories between 1755 and 1758 that would bolster the Iroquois' confidence in the English. Over the course of those three years, the French and their Indian allies defeated the British on the Monongahela River (1755), at Oswego (1756) at Fort William Henry (1757), and at Fort Carillon (1758). As a result of the British disaster on the Monongahela, for instance, Peter Wraxall, Britain's Assistant Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs noted, the French possessed at least a three to one advantage over the British in Indian allies.²⁷ In fact, the only Indians the British could depend on were the Stockbridge and other "domesticated" Indians. Loudoun's correspondence is rife with complaints about his paucity of Indian allies. He advised Cumberland in the summer of 1756 that "From the Indians, you see we have no support." "We have at present no Indians but a handful of Mohawks and a few straggling Indians from different tribes," he later complained in November 1756 to Henry Fox,

²⁶ Halifax to Loudoun, August 13, 1756, LO 1478. The surrender of the British garrison at Oswego to the French and Indians, the day after Halifax wrote to Loudoun and in light of his observations on British-Iroquois relations, was an important defeat for the English. Not only did the French secure their lines of communication to their western outposts, but Iroquois neutrality thereafter tilted to them. See Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 297. Meanwhile, the "mini-massacre" at Oswego, when French officers turned a blind eye as their Indian allies killed British prisoners and plundered the fort, at least showed Indians that the French were willing to "do something" for their allies. See Loudoun to Cumberland, August 29, 1756, LO 1626.

²⁷ Wraxall to Henry Fox, September 22, 1755, LO 656.

"and those at present not useful."²⁸ "Those that we call friends," Loudoun noted, "are no more than neutrals."²⁹

On the whole, British diplomacy with the Six Nations did not meet British expectations. Maintaining good relations with the Senecas, the most powerful of the Iroquois, proved difficult for the British and shed light on danger-fraught affairs of British-Iroquois-French diplomacy. Situated in western Iroquoia, the Senecas' villages would be the first to feel the brunt of French-sponsored raids originating from the *pays d'en haut*. In October 1755, Governor Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil of New France warned the Iroquois that "should any of the Five Nations be found next spring among the English, I will let loose all our Upper [*pays d'en haut*] and domiciled Nations on them; cause their villages to be laid waste and never pardon them."³⁰ Yet the Senecas initially were willing to risk war with the French to remain on the receiving end of British presents of arms, food, clothing, and scalp bounties. They agreed to join the British for the summer 1755 campaign in New York on the condition that they be given among the usual presents a hearty supply of rum. The rum, however, "kept them Continually drunk" and made them of no use to British commanders.³¹ Then, in 1757, after the French victory at Oswego had driven the bulk of English forces from western New York, British

²⁸ Loudoun to Cumberland, August 20, 1756, LO 1525; Loudoun to Fox, November 22, 1756, LO 2263.

²⁹ Loudoun to Fox, August 19, 1756, LO 1522.

³⁰ Dyaderswane to William Johnson, September 24, 1756, LO 1887; M. de Vaudreuil to M. de Machault, October 21, 1755, NYCD, 10: 378. The French alliance with the Indian bands of the *pays d'en haut* remained strong, even in the face of earlier Indian "rebellions." See Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xiv, chap. 6.

³¹ William Shirley to Fox, December 20, 1755, LO 704.

agents discovered English scalps displayed as war trophies at Seneca castles.³² Upon being called to account for that fact, the Senecas openly joined the French and threatened the other nations of the League with civil war if they did not follow suit.³³ The Cayugas and Onondagas, stuck between the Senecas and the British, belatedly joined the Senecas. At a hastily called meeting between Sir William Johnson, British Superintendent of Northern Indian Affairs, and the western Iroquois a Cayuga spokesman acknowledged that some of his people had "used the hatchet against our Brethren the English." In the end, the Cayugas "repented" and claimed that they remained "firmly resolved to hold fast the Covenant Chain," but only after Johnson promised more gifts. At that point, the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas professed their neutrality, not fidelity, toward the English.³⁴

"Fickleness" and "treachery" like that exhibited by the Senecas led British officers to view all their Indian allies with animosity, making it unlikely that Britons ever would be comfortable in depending on Indian irregulars. Amherst, writing to Thomas Gage late in the war, perhaps best expressed the continued frustration of the British with their Indian allies. Describing the Stockbridge Mahicans -- the one band that consistently served faithfully as irregulars and scouts for not only Amherst, but Loudoun and Major General

³² Information about the Seneca, March 6, 1757, LO 2976.

³³ Loudoun to Johnson, June 9, 1757, LO 3809.

³⁴ Journal of Sir William Johnson's Proceedings with the Indians, *NYCD*, 7: 254-60. Francis Jennings writes that the Covenant Chain "had become a shadow of its former self before the war broke out." See Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 190, chaps. 3-5. The Senecas again became alienated from the British in 1761 as they saw the British occupation of the western forts at Niagara, Pittsburgh, and Detroit as an attempt by the British to encircle their territory. See White, *Middle Ground*, 271-72.

James Abercromby as well³⁵ -- Amherst wrote "I know what a vile brew they are and I have as bad an opinion of those lazy rum drinking Scoundrels as any one can have." Yet he felt compelled to enlist them in Britain's service for fear that they might join the French. "I shall however take them into his Majesty's service for this next campaign," he told Gage, "to keep them from doing mischief elsewhere."³⁶ In the end, he hoped that the Stockbridge rangers "may do some good by doing mischief of which we have a great deal to do to be a par with the French." Still, Amherst wrote, "I hate them all."³⁷

Several factors thus coalesced to create the Britons' dependence on Anglo-American irregulars. The difficulties and initial failures of the British Army in conducting regular-style operations in the wilderness, the superiority of the French and their Indian allies over British regulars in waging irregular war, and the unwillingness of Indians to serve the British faithfully as irregulars all forced Britons to look to Anglo-American irregulars to fight the little war for them. Frontier Anglo-Americans had long known that survival on the frontier in time of war demanded expertise in irregular war and military

³⁵ The Stockbridges were descendants Housatonic and Mahican Indians who in the late 1730s had settled at Rev. John Sergeant's mission and school in western Massachusetts. At Sergeant's mission, the Stockbridges were protected from the inimical effects of unscrupulous white traders and Iroquois mourning war parties. In time, the Stockbridges adopted Christianity to become Anglo-Americans' most loyal Indian allies. Besides their service in the Seven Years' War, they fought on the Patriots' side against the British in the American Revolution. See T.J. Brasser, "Mahican," *HNAI, Volume 15, Northeast*, 206-08. William Shirley originally planned to raise one company of 30 Stockbridges. Eventually, 45 enlisted under Captain Jacob Cheeksaunkun, Lieutenant Jacob Naunauphtaunk, and Ensign Solomon Uhauamvaumut. See Shirley to Henry Fox, December 20, 1755, LO 704; Shirley to James Abercromby, June 27, 1756, LO 1257; Muster Rolls for Captain Jacob Cheeksaunkun's Company of Stockbridge Indians, November 14, 1756, LO 2211; and William Johnson to Loudoun, August 3, 1756, LO 1397.

³⁶ Amherst to Gage, February 20, 1759, Jeffery Amherst MSS, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

³⁷ Amherst to Gage, March 26, 1759, *ibid.*

self-sufficiency. In 1756 and 1757, Britons acknowledged the truth of those lessons.

STAGE II: BRITONS TURN TO ANGLO-AMERICAN IRREGULARS, 1756-1757

British commanders had few options other than to turn to Anglo-American rangers. Fortunately for them, Anglo-American frontiersmen were willing to serve the British Army as irregulars. In the summer of 1755, following Braddock's defeat, Anglo-American backwoodsmen from across the colonies began their own war against the French and Indians. Britons came to see the Anglo-Americans who fought that little war as a potential weapon with which to negate the French superiority in irregulars and obviate the need for the Iroquois warriors who clung to neutrality. Loudoun became convinced that Anglo-American rangers would have to play a key role in British plans and operations in North America. In 1757, he led a move to more than double the number of rangers on British Army's rolls. Yet Loudoun held reservations about the way the rangers fought, particularly their tendency to make war against noncombatants. It became clear, however, that if British commanders wanted the rangers on their side, they would have to accept both the positives (expertise in woodland war) and negatives (their propensity for killing noncombatants) that the rangers brought to the British Army. In the end, Loudoun's was the sole voice among senior British officers that expressed concern over the rangers' record of killing noncombatants and civilians.

In the wake of the British disaster on the Monongahela, Anglo-Americans from across the colonies formed themselves into companies of

rangers. In New Hampshire, for example, Robert Rogers recruited fellow backwoodsmen from Colonel Joseph Blanchard's militia regiment to raise Rogers's Rangers.³⁸ The Virginia Burgesses, meanwhile, enlisted three fifty-man companies of rangers. Following a tradition that dated back well over half a century, the Burgesses promised the rangers a bounty of £10 on the scalp of every Indian above the age of twelve.³⁹ The Virginia bounties drew Anglo-American frontiersmen to the army. Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, reported in January 1756 that over the course of the previous fall and early winter his rangers had sacked several Indian towns.⁴⁰

Frontier communities needed the rangers to defend them as the French and their allies wasted little time after Braddock's defeat in striking at the Anglo-American backcountry. In late 1755 and early 1756, war parties fell on isolated Anglo-American settlements from Georgia in the South to Pennsylvania in the North. By the Spring of 1756, for example, Delaware and Shawnee raiders from the upper Ohio valley had killed or made prisoner upwards of 700 British subjects along the southern Appalachian range. By the fall, the number had reached 3,000. "The last news from Fort Duquesne assure us of the destruction of Virginia, Carolina, and part of New Georgia," French officials in America advised the crown, "all these province are laid waste for forty leagues from the foot of the mountains, in the direction of the sea."⁴¹ The situation, from a British and Anglo-American perspective, quickly

³⁸ Muster Roll of the Troops Employed in His Majesty's Service on Merrymac River, Nathaniel Bouton, ed., *Documents and Records Relating to the Province of New Hampshire*, 23 vols. (Concord: George E. Jenks, State Printer, 1867-93), 6: 318.

³⁹ SAL, 6: 465, 551.

⁴⁰ Robert Dinwiddie to William Johnson, January 23, 1756, LO 767.

⁴¹ Abstract of Despatches from Canada, n.d., NYCD, 10:424; Abstract of Despatches from Canada, August 30, 1756, NYCD, 10: 484.

deteriorated. By October 1756, Anglo-American settlers had abandoned their homes and plantations within fifty miles of Fort Cumberland (at the junction of Wills Creek and the Potomac River, in Maryland) for fear of "Flying Parties of the Enemy."⁴²

Anglo-American irregulars responded to the enemy offensive in kind, with their own raids against Indian villages. In one of the most famous irregular raids of the war, in 1756, Pennsylvania provincials and backwoodsmen set out for the Delaware village of Kittanning. Anglo-Americans designed the Kittanning raid as much to avenge earlier Delaware attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier as to destroy the town as a forward operating base for French and Indian raiders.⁴³ In a type of operation that had become commonplace for Anglo-American raiders, Colonel John Armstrong's small army crossed undetected into Delaware territory. In their pre-dawn attack on Kittanning, the Anglo-Americans spared no means in destruction and annihilation of the Delawares. They put Kittanning to the torch, immolating men, women, and children in their homes. They pursued wounded and dying Delawares into the woods, determined not to let valuable scalps escape them. After an orgy of destruction that lasted several hours, the Anglo-Americans gathered their forces, completed the razing of Kittanning, and then retreated for the relative safety of Anglo-American lines.⁴⁴

⁴² Dinwiddie to Loudoun, October 6, 1756, LO 1977.

⁴³ Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 276.

⁴⁴ John Armstrong, "Col. John Armstrong's Account of the Expedition against Kittanning, 1756," *Pennsylvania Archives*, ser. 1, 2: 767-75. Of course, the American attack on Kittanning motivated the Delawares to strike with greater ferocity against the frontier. See Intelligence &c. Related by Ogaghradasisha, October 11-18, 1756, LO 2001.

Two Britons who long had served in North America and seen first hand in King George's War the effectiveness of Anglo-American irregulars -- William Johnson and William Shirley -- determined to make good use of the rangers. Johnson, for instance, insisted that Rogers's ranger company be detached from the New Hampshire militia and attached to his force. He made them scouting arm of his army in his Lake George campaign in the summer of 1755.⁴⁵ William Shirley gave the Anglo-American irregulars an even larger role in his operations. He had in mind for Rogers's Rangers the same kind of operations he had seen Gorham's Rangers conduct in King George's War. Shirley ordered Rogers to organize a company of sixty-six men "used to traveling and hunting" whose primary mission would be to "distress the French and their allies, by sacking, burning, and destroying their houses, barns, barracks, canoes, battoes, etc., and by killing their cattle of every kind; and at all times to endeavor to way-lay, attack, and destroy their convoys of provisions by land and water, in any part of the country."⁴⁶

Loudoun followed Johnson and Shirley's lead and was quick to realize that Anglo-American rangers were "more proper" than British regulars for the kind of irregular war that he found himself fighting in North America.⁴⁷ After surveying the state of military affairs in the colonies, he told Henry Fox that "Whoever is Superior in irregulars has an infinite advantage over the other side; and must greatly weaken, if not totally destroy them before they can get to the Point where they can make their Push."⁴⁸ "There is no carrying on the

⁴⁵ Rogers, *Journals*, 1-7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

⁴⁷ Loudoun to Daniel Webb, August 20, 1756, LO 1808.

⁴⁸ Loudoun to Fox, October 3, 1756, LO 1961.

Service here for without Rangers," he informed Fox in October 1756, "for it is by them, we can have Intelligence of what motion the Enemy are making, and by them, that we can secure our Camps and Marches from Surprise; from here it appears to me that till we can regain the Indians, which can only be done by beating the Enemy, no Army can Subsist in this Country without rangers."⁴⁹

Loudoun hoped to incorporate large numbers of rangers into the British military establishment in the colonies. In September 1757, he publicly called for 1,100 Anglo-American rangers, or one-fourth of the total enlistees he requested from the northern colonies, for the campaigns of 1758.⁵⁰ In his private journal, Loudoun wrote that he would have preferred that the colonies enlist 4,000 rangers, perhaps as a response to his fear that there were 4,000 *marines* awaiting him in Canada. All told, when pondering the future of his army and the security of the British colonies in North America, he became another in the increasing line of senior British officers, who had made the realization concerning the rangers that "the Service cannot be done without them."⁵¹

Loudoun's staff as well came to appreciate the value of the rangers. In December 1757, Loudoun called a conference of his field commanders to discuss among other issues how many rangers they would need for the next year's offensives. To that date, less than 400 Anglo-American irregulars, the company of Stockbridge scouts then under Rogers's command, and a

⁴⁹ Loudoun to Fox, November 22, 1756, LO 2263.

⁵⁰ The Number of Rangers Required from the Northern Provinces, September 1757, LO 3957.

⁵¹ Loudoun's memorandum book, December 19, 1757, HM 1717.

company of Mohawks were the only pro-British irregulars in service.⁵² With the Stockbridge Mahicans threatening to abandon the British and return to their homes as a result of the shoddy treatment they had received at the hands of white traders, and the spring campaign season only months away, the officers responsible for leading the British army in the field seconded Loudoun's proposal to increase the Anglo-American ranger establishment to near 1,000 men.⁵³

With his staff's support behind him, Loudoun thereafter turned to the backcountry settlers of the northern colonies to fill the ranks of the expanded ranger corps. By late 1757 senior British commanders in North America had come to believe that frontier settlers possessed a corporate knowledge of, and "natural bias" toward, ranging.⁵⁴ The frontiersmen of New Hampshire, Loudoun told that colony's Governor, Benning Wentworth, were "more used

⁵² By late 1757 Rogers, John Stark, Charles Bulkeley, and John Shepherd commanded four companies or rangers totaling 317 men. See A Return of His Majesty's Companies of Rangers, November 7, 1757, LO 6802. In April 1756, William Shirley had instructed Major General John Winslow to raise two 100-man companies of rangers under Captains Thomas Speakman and Humphrey Hobbs from the best troops "fit for the Wood Service and to be depended upon" under Winslow's command in Nova Scotia. See Shirley to Winslow, April 30, 1756, LO 1091. Hobbs died of smallpox, and was replaced in command by Bulkeley. Shepherd replaced Speakman after the latter tendered his resignation due to poor health. In August 1756, British commanders, at the recommendation of William Johnson, placed the Stockbridges under Rogers's command. See Rogers, *Journals*, 26.

⁵³ Stockbridge Indians to William Shirley, December 16, 1756, LO 5026; Loudoun to Newcastle, December 26, 1756, LO 2416. By the spring of 1758, the Britons and the Stockbridge Indians had patched up their quarrels and the Mahicans again were willing to fight for the British. See Jacob Cheeksaunkun and Jacob Neva Nautphtonk to Loudoun, February 14, 1758, LO 5592. The 1758 Stockbridge force contained three officers, one sergeant, and 50 privates. Each private was paid 2s.6d per day -- the same pay as a provincial private. See Engagement of the Stockbridge Indians, February 1758, LO 5799. For the terms under which the Stockbridge Indians enlisted, see WO 34: 75, 1758, and for their 1758 muster roll, see WO 34: 76, summer 1758. The Stockbridge Indians accompanied Rogers on his St. Francis raid, and were again recruited into British service by Amherst in 1760. See WO 34: 51, March 20, 1760. Loudoun's memorandum books, December 20, 1757, HM 1717.

⁵⁴ Americanus to Loudoun, December 8, 1757, LO 4971.

to Ranging" than any other settlers.⁵⁵ They were, in Loudoun's estimation, "Stout able Men, and for a brush [fight], much better than their Provincial Troops."⁵⁶ In an October 1757 memorial Rogers had promised he could raise 1,000 New Hampshire and New England frontiersmen. Loudoun took him at his word and ordered him to raise five companies of rangers and placed them all under Rogers's command.⁵⁷

Yet even with the need for the rangers clear, Loudoun still had reservations about the rangers and Rogers, particularly their habit of targeting and inflicting violence on noncombatants. Although he acknowledged that the rangers were the ideal troops to "strike a terror into the Enemy," he was reluctant to unleash them against Canadian villages and farms.⁵⁸ In August 1756, for example, Rogers had submitted to the Commander in Chief the first of several memorials in which he requested permission to "plunder Canada."⁵⁹ When Loudoun failed to respond to his initial request, Rogers rushed off another letter in which he reaffirmed that he was most eager to march.⁶⁰ Loudoun, however, hesitated to authorize a campaign that might

⁵⁵ Loudoun to Benning Wentworth, August 18, 1757, LO 4252.

⁵⁶ Loudoun to William Pitt, May 3, 1757, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, ed. Gertrude Selwyn Kimball, 2 vols. (1906; reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 1: 55.

⁵⁷ Robert Rogers, Memorial to the Earl of Loudoun, October 25, 1757, LO 4702; Loudoun, Beating Orders to Captain Robert Rogers, January 11, 1758, LO 5391.

⁵⁸ Loudoun to Cumberland, October 2, 1756, LO 1948. Many Frenchmen also shared Loudoun's concern about the methods their native auxiliaries used, but they too agreed the irregulars were a necessary evil. Louis Antoine de Bougainville, for example, wrote in his journal in October 1757 that "We can unleash nearly three thousand Indians on the English colonies. What a scourge! Humanity shudders at being obliged to make use of such monsters. But without them the match would be too much against us." See Bougainville, *Adventure in the Wilderness: The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville 1756-1760*, ed. and trans. Edward P. Hamilton (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 191.

⁵⁹ Rogers to Loudoun, August 11, 1756, LO 1467.

⁶⁰ Rogers to Loudoun, August 16, 1756, LO 1501.

well degenerate into a scalp-hunting party. A combination of both moral repugnance and military necessity informed Loudoun's attitude toward the rangers' practice of scalping. First, Loudoun thought scalping was a "Barbarous Custom" and fell outside the accepted norms of soldierly behavior.⁶¹ Moral scruples aside, Loudoun and the British Army also needed prisoners from whom to gather valuable intelligence. "One Prisoner," he wrote in the fall of 1756, is "at present is worth ten scalps."⁶² Finally, in November 1756, Loudoun had seen enough of the rangers' scalping and warned that he would no longer reward the killing of enemy captives with bounties.⁶³

Loudoun's conviction that the rangers' scalping fell outside the mores of proper military behavior failed to take into account the realities of war in North America. At the center of the rangers' conceptualization of war, one that experience reinforced, was their understanding that quarter and the humane treatment of prisoners were things rarely to be offered, and unlikely to be offered them. Rogers possessed no reservations about killing prisoners, although that is not to say he killed every captive he took. Even after Loudoun expressed his concerns about scalping and mistreatment of prisoners, Rogers issued orders to his men to kill captives if the situation dictated it. He described to Loudoun an occasion in early 1757, for instance, when around two hundred Frenchmen and Indians ambushed his fifty-man company. The rangers were trying to reach British lines with seven captives.

⁶¹ Loudoun to James Abercromby, November 11, 1756, LO 2196. Loudoun believed that Montcalm shared his repugnance toward scalping. Yet Montcalm offered a 60 livres bounty on each English scalp. See Rogers, *Journals*, 22.

⁶² Loudoun to Phineas Lyman, September 13, 1756, LO 1798.

⁶³ Loudoun to James Abercromby, November 11, 1756, LO 2196.

Rogers, correctly suspecting that the enemy would attempt to rescue their comrades, directed that "those who had charge of the prisoners Should kill them" if the company came under attack. Moments later, a French and Indian force opened fire on the rangers. Rogers, he related in his official report of the skirmish, ordered the fire "returned after killing our prisoners." The ensuing fight was a near disaster for Rogers's command. On a western European battlefield, the rangers would have been seen as *hors de combat* and entitled to surrender without fear of reprisal. In the war between irregulars in the American wilderness, however, no such category existed.⁶⁴ When a French officer called to Rogers by name and assured him quarter if he surrendered himself and his men, Rogers "absolutely refused to receive their professed Mercy" and yelled back that his rangers would "Cut them to Pieces & Scalp Them."⁶⁵ Rather than risk torture and death as captives at the hands of the *marines* and their "savage" allies, the rangers closed ranks and fought with greater ferocity until they managed to break out of the ambush and reach safety.

Most senior British commanders other than Loudoun understood that part of Anglo-American irregular warfare included "barbarous" acts like scalping and the killing of prisoners. On the whole, they turned a blind eye to such actions. Indeed, rather than prohibit Anglo-American irregulars from engaging in such practices, they instead encouraged the rangers to wage

⁶⁴ The French and Indians were known to kill their prisoners as well. In March 1758, for instance, French forces took several rangers captive at the "Battle on Snowshoes." They bound the Anglo-Americans to trees and tortured them to death. After killing the captives they mutilated the corpses.

⁶⁵ Robert Rogers, *Journal of a Scout*, January 25, 1757, LO 2704. Rogers made no mention of killing his prisoners in his published journals. Perhaps because he wrote them for a London literary audience, he felt it best to delete such atrocities from his narrative. See Rogers, *Journals*, 40-46, for his published account of the battle.

their variety of war to the fullest extent of its barbarity. Thus while Loudoun tried to stop scalping, other British and American leaders encouraged Anglo-Americans to scour the frontier looking for victims. George Washington, who later in his career deemed scalping unfit for a "proper" soldier, in 1757 judged it as necessary and morally acceptable.⁶⁶ Major Generals Abercromby and Amherst, Loudoun's successors as Commander in Chief, held no reservations about the scalping. Abercromby even took the time to report to his military and civilian superiors in London, including the Secretary of State the results of minor scalping missions he had sent against the French and Indians. Abercromby's policy on scalping was to send Anglo-American rangers out to do "as Much Mischief as they" could. One way he judged the extent of the mischief the rangers inflicted on the enemy was by the number of scalps with which the rangers returned to British lines.⁶⁷

By the end of 1757, the British Army's turn to Anglo-American irregulars and its acceptance and legitimization of Anglo-American irregular warfare was almost complete. Most Britons in North America had acknowledged the military usefulness of Anglo-American irregulars and were prepared to look the other way when it came to the "excesses" that accompanied Anglo-American raids against the French and Indians. Except for a few holdouts, Britons were on the verge of abandoning the belief that the British Army could win the war in North America without Anglo-American irregulars and their methods. Before that happened, however, a small group of Britons made a last and failed attempt, through the creation of a British

⁶⁶ Washington to John Stanwix, June 15, 1757, LO 3838.

⁶⁷ Abercromby to Pitt, May 22, 1758, James Abercromby MSS 280, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, hereafter cited as AB.

irregular corps, to forgo the British Army's acceptance of the Anglo-American way of war.

STAGE III: BRITISH ATTEMPTS AND FAILURE TO FORGO THE RANGERS, 1757-1758

The British command's efforts to create a corps of irregulars had more to do with British social biases against Anglo-American troops than with the military effectiveness of the rangers. Britons viewed their provincial allies with contempt and disdain as undisciplined troops and "bad soldiers." The rangers were infamous for unruly behavior. That reputation, combined with the high cost of maintaining them, led Loudoun in 1757 to order that the British Army train Britons to act as irregulars to supplement and then replace the rangers. As one who recognized the British Army's need for irregulars in the short term, Loudoun turned to Robert Rogers to teach British volunteers the art of ranging. From Rogers's training efforts emerged the first written doctrine of any kind of war composed in North America. But when Thomas Gage, in early 1758, raised the 80th Regiment of Foot, the British attempt at forging a British irregular corps, he ignored Rogers's students and doctrine. More a vehicle for Gage's personal advancement within the army than a serious attempt at creating a viable ranging corps, the 80th Regiment of Foot never became an effective irregular fighting force. As the history of the First Battalion of the 60th Regiment of Foot (Royal Americans) showed, it took almost five years for the British Army to create an effective irregular corps from its regulars. In the interim, flexible-thinking commanders like Amherst and Wolfe chose to leave the irregular part of the conflict within the purview of Anglo-American rangers. In their campaigns of 1758 and 1759, Amherst and

Wolfe embraced an Anglo-American led and conducted war of annihilation against Canadian and Indian noncombatants.

British officers often disparaged their provincial allies as useless.⁶⁸ Even those officers who in time through their actions acknowledged that the rangers were instrumental to British victory heaped scorn on the typical Anglo-American's military aptitude and soldierly bearing. Wolfe, for instance, unfairly but casually dismissed the effectiveness of half the Anglo-American provincials serving with the British Army. "The Americans," he wrote, "are in general the dirtiest, the most contemptible cowardly dogs you can conceive."⁶⁹ Amherst, rarely one to temper his contempt for those whom he perceived were his social or intellectual inferiors, bemoaned the apparent pathetic state of the provincial soldiers and their unwillingness to fight the French. "If left to themselves," Amherst noted, "[they] would eat fried Pork and lay in their tents all day long."⁷⁰

That contempt for the line provincials carried over to the rangers. Although by late 1757 Britons had acknowledged that rangers were indispensable, vocal criticism that they comprised a wild and poorly

⁶⁸ Fred Anderson explains how contractual principles and providentialism affected the provincials' attitudes toward the war, their service in it, and the British officer corps. Anderson argues that the provincials "subscribed to notions about military service and warfare that were wholly incompatible with the professional ideals and assumptions of their British regular army allies. . . . Examined in light of their own ideas about what it meant to serve in an army or to fight a war, however, the provincials' apparently unsoldierly conduct can be seen to have been highly consistent, and indeed highly principled." See Anderson's *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for IEAHC, 1984), viii-ix.

⁶⁹ Wolfe, quoted in Cuneo, *Robert Rogers*, 69; James Wolfe to His Father, May 20, 1758, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe*, ed. Beckles Willson (New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1909), 365.

⁷⁰ Amherst's journal, September 9, 1759, *The Journal of Jeffery Amherst in America from 1758 to 1763*, ed. John C. Webster (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931), 166-67.

disciplined lot abounded. "The Ranger officers have no Subordination amongst them," Captain James Abercromby wrote after having accompanied a ranger patrol on a scout of Fort Carillon in November 1757, "& not the least command of their men." "If your Lordship should increase the number of Rangers or even keep them up to the present numbers," he advised Loudoun, "it will be necessary to put some Regular officers amongst them to introduce a great deal of Subordination."⁷¹ Major General Abercromby expressed similar reservations. A week after the commander-in-chief's field leaders had stated that they wanted and needed more rangers, Abercromby told Loudoun that "I hope it was not proposed to increase them to 1,000 men; they seem already numerous enough to govern."⁷² As for Rogers, Abercromby saw him as "necessary and useful," but also a scheming provincial in search of preferential treatment. He mocked Rogers's "good share of Nonsense he has got into his head" that Loudoun would promote him to provincial Colonel and make him "Captain Commandant" of all the Rangers.⁷³

Discipline among the rangers in fact was less than ideal. Although desertion rates were much lower within the rangers than among the provincials or regulars, the rangers did not match the eighteenth-century-western-European model of the disciplined, automaton regular soldier. "The

⁷¹ Captain James Abercromby to Loudoun, November 29, 1757, LO 4915. Captain Abercromby was the *aide-de-camp* to his father-in-law, Major General Abercromby. Captain Abercromby originally had a positive opinion of Rogers and his rangers. In February 1757, he had written to Rogers to express "how all ranks of people here are pleased with your conduct, and your means of behavior." See Captain Abercromby to Rogers, February 6, 1757, Rogers, *Journals*, 47.

⁷² Abercromby to Loudoun, December 30, 1757, LO 5159.

⁷³ Abercromby to Loudoun, January 2, 1758, LO 5316.

Rangers," Francis Jennings has noted, "understood only too well how necessary they were, and they thumbed their noses at authority."⁷⁴ Ill will between the rangers and British officers reached a crisis point in December 1757 when rangers stationed at Fort Edward "mutinied" after Britons had flogged two privates in Rogers's company for stealing rum from the garrison's stores.⁷⁵ Disconcerted by the flogging, several rangers had gathered outside the guardhouse that held the thieves in a show of support for their peers. Suddenly, the rangers began to demolish the stockade, and one of the mutineers even went as far as to take an ax and chop down the whipping post at which the floggings had been executed. Only the arrival of the ranger officers John Shepherd and Charles Bulkeley defused the situation. Shepherd forcibly seized the weapon from one of the mutineers and ordered the "loyal" rangers to kill any man who as much as touched the guardhouse.⁷⁶

Although Shepherd's quick actions averted bloodshed in the "Whipping Post Mutiny," as the revolt of the rangers came to be called, those regular officers who disliked and distrusted the rangers used it as further proof of the rangers' unfitness for military duties.⁷⁷ Colonel William Haviland, British commander at Fort Edward and home to the rangers, demanded a court

⁷⁴ Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 208.

⁷⁵ As many as 1,500 lashes or a sentence of hanging could be awarded for theft. Mutiny resulted in execution. See Anderson, *A People's Army*, 138-39.

⁷⁶ Court of Inquiry, December 8-11, 1757, LO 4969.

⁷⁷ Mutinies on the part of provincials were relatively rare, especially considering the acrimonious relations that existed between them and the regular British officers. Fred Anderson has shown that virtually all of the "troop disorders" resulted from the provincials' conviction that the army had failed to fulfill its obligations to them. See Anderson, *A People's Army*, 187-88, 251-53. The origins of the Whipping Post Mutiny, however, resided in the rangers' anger at the severity of the punishment that the Britons had inflicted on the rangers for simple larceny, a crime of which the perpetrators indeed were guilty.

martial. Rogers agreed that one was necessary, though he warned if British officers inflicted too harsh a punishment on the mutineers, the entire force of rangers might desert. Pronouncements such as those convinced Haviland that Rogers was interested more in covering up the mutiny and protecting his men than punishing the perpetrators.⁷⁸ Moreover, in his estimation, it was better that the rangers leave the British camp than to have "such a Riotous sort of people" among the regulars eroding discipline by bad example.⁷⁹

Upon hearing of the mutiny, Major General Abercromby penned a note to Loudoun to remind him that he had long thought the rangers were "unfit for service."⁸⁰ In January 1758, Loudoun summoned Rogers to Albany and warned him of "the bad consequences of not keeping up discipline and complained to him that these things made me hesitate about augmenting the Rangers so much as I proposed."⁸¹

In late 1757, near the same time that the backlash from the Whipping Post Mutiny had started to erode his confidence in Rogers and the rangers, Loudoun faced the unenviable task of reducing the costs of maintaining the British Army in North America. In his effort to impose fiscal economy on British operations, one obvious point jumped out at Loudoun. The rangers were exorbitantly expensive to maintain. The yearly expense of maintaining a 100-man company of Anglo-American rangers, Loudoun's staff estimated,

⁷⁸ A court of inquiry led by Rogers was convened to assign responsibility for the mutiny. However, since the court could not place blame for the riot, the affair was dropped. See Court of Inquiry, December 8-11, 1757, LO 4969.

⁷⁹ William Haviland to Abercromby, December 16, 1757, LO 6859. After the Whipping Post Mutiny, Haviland and Rogers relationship remained strained, and the two rarely spoke to one another.

⁸⁰ Abercromby to Loudoun, December 11, 1757, LO 4998.

⁸¹ Loudoun's memorandum book, January 9, 1758, HM 1717.

was £3,251.10.10, or approximately £270 per month.⁸² Each ranger also received an annual enlistment bonus, varying between 6 Spanish dollars and £10.⁸³ A rough extrapolation thus shows that to maintain a two-battalion regiment-sized force of 1,000 rangers, bonuses included, would cost around £42,400. For £40,000, the army could pay for nearly 4,000 regulars.⁸⁴

The solution to the problems of discipline and costs that came with the rangers, it seemed to Loudoun, was to train Britons in the ranging service. Loudoun was confident that his superiors would approve such a plan. Soon after he had arrived in North America, Cumberland had weighed in on the relative merits of Anglo-American and British irregular troops. "I hope that you will, in time, teach your Troops to go out upon Scouting Parties," Cumberland wrote, "for, 'till *Regular* Officers with men that they can trust, learn to beat the woods, & to act as *Irregulars*, you never will gain any Intelligence of the Enemy, as I fear, by this time you are convinced that *Indian* Intelligence & that of *Rangers* is not at all to be depended upon."⁸⁵

⁸² Yearly Expense of a Company of Rangers, December 18, 1757, LO 5039. Monthly maintenance of the 50-man Stockbridge rangers cost approximately an additional £200. See WO 34: 76. At the same time that British officials experienced difficulty in paying for the rangers, so too did Anglo-American officials. Pennsylvania resorted to a lottery, the first of its kind in North America, to help pay the costs of maintaining a company of rangers on the colonial establishment. See Asa Earl Martin, "Lotteries in Pennsylvania Prior to 1833," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 48 (1924): 76.

⁸³ WO 34: 76, May 24, 1756; Abercromby to Loudoun, December 30, 1757, LO 5159. Shirley had agreed to pay each ranger private 3s. per day, New York currency (the same pay he gave the Stockbridge scouts), the three sergeants at 4s., an Ensign at 5s., a Lieutenant at 7s., and Rogers 10s. When Loudoun authorized Rogers to raise the additional companies of rangers in January 1758, he reduced the ranger privates' pay from 3s to 2s.6d per day. See Rogers, *Journals*, 14-15.

⁸⁴ House of Commons Proceedings, December 1, 1758, R.C. Simmons and P.D.G. Thomas, eds., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America 1754-1783, Volume 1, 1754-1764* (London: Kraus International Publications, 1982), 269.

⁸⁵ Cumberland to Loudoun, October 22 - December 23, 1756, LO 2065.

In the summer of 1757, even before the Whipping Post Mutiny, Loudoun had taken the first step in what he expected would be a long-drawn-out process in training Britons in the art of irregular war. He called for "Gentleman Volunteers" from the regular regiments who would be willing to learn "the ranging, or wood service" under Rogers' command and management. Loudoun deserves credit for going against tradition and placing British regulars under provincial officers. As Oglethorpe had earlier, Loudoun understood that if Britons had any hopes of waging irregular war in North America, they would have to learn it from those who knew how to fight it.

Rogers saw the formation of the Gentlemen Volunteers as an opportunity to win further favor from Loudoun and raise his standing in the Army. He took the fifty-five volunteers that presented themselves to him and began a rigorous program of instruction in what he called the "ranging discipline." He placed the regulars in an independent company and personally trained them "in our methods of marching, retreating, ambushing, fighting, etc., that they might be better qualified for any future service against the enemy we had to contend with."⁸⁶

As a training aid for the volunteers, and as further evidence that he was the Army's irregular leader *par excellence*, Rogers "reduced into writing" his "rules of ranging." Rogers, when he had suggested in October 1757 that Loudoun increase the ranger establishment to 1,000, had also submitted to him an essay on the "Methods Used in Discipline the Rangers with the Manner of and Practice in Scouting & Fighting in the Woods."⁸⁷ Rogers's

⁸⁶ Rogers, *Journal*, 56-59.

⁸⁷ Robert Rogers, "Methods Used in Disciplining . . .", October 25, 1757, LO 4701. Rogers presented a slightly different version in his *Journals*, 60-69.

essay impressed Loudoun, although in its original form of over twenty pages it was too long. Loudoun directed that Rogers therefore prepare a "sketch of his methods." Rogers distilled his doctrine first into twenty-eight maxims, and then later into his nineteen "Standing Orders," or bullet statements that described the essentials of ranging.⁸⁸ They read:

1. Don't forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute's warning.
3. When you're on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don't never lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don't never take a chance you don't have to.
6. When we're on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can't go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so it's hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.
10. If we take prisoners, we keep 'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between 'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.

⁸⁸ Rogers to Loudoun, October 27, 1757, LO 4707.

12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little one, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Indians attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch. Then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.⁸⁹

Rogers's Standing Orders were the first formal doctrine of war making composed in North America. Although written in a style and with language that most educated Britons would have deemed crude, the Standing Orders nonetheless elucidated the key points of ranging, so much so that they remain the foundation of American ranger doctrine to this day.⁹⁰ Rogers's

⁸⁹ US Army, *Field Manual 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1987), D-1. The rangers rarely carried bayonets, and they depended on weapons other than the standard eighteenth-century soldiers' issue. The rangers used weapons that were better for close-in fighting. They preferred tomahawks, carbines, and muskets with sawed-off barrels that loaded with shot rather than individual balls. For a contemporary's description of the rangers' equipment and accouterments, see John Knox, July 12-13, 1757, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America, For the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760* (1769; reprint, ed. Arthur G. Doughty, 3 vols., Toronto: Publications of the Champlain Society nos. 8, 9, 10, 1914), 1: 34. For British efforts to copy the rangers' equipment, see Beattie, "The Adaptation of the British Army to Wilderness Warfare."

⁹⁰ David H. Hackworth, in *About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1989), 492, notes that in 1965 MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) issued "little cards to carry around in the jungle and study like the Bible. One was . . . the 'Standing Orders, Rogers' Rangers,' . . . Even Maxwell D. Taylor had said

doctrine was pragmatic and stood in sharp contrast to the rigid formulations that British regular officers were to employ on the battlefield. "Such in general are the rules to be observed in the Ranging service" Rogers wrote;

there are, however, a thousand occurrences and circumstances which may happen, that will make it necessary, in some measure, to depart from them, and put other arts and stratagems in practice; in which cases every man's reason and judgment must be his guide, according to the practical situation and nature of things; and that he may do this to advantage, he should keep in mind a maxim never to be departed from by a commander, viz. to preserve a firmness and presence of mind on every occasion.⁹¹

Indeed, Rogers's writings, when compared with Cumberland's insistence that his troops march into battle with no more than eighteen inches separating each rank, show which military tradition was more in tune with the realities of war making in the wilderness of North America.⁹²

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gage, meanwhile, saw the formation of the Gentleman Volunteers, Rogers's doctrine, and the Whipping Post Mutiny as an opportunity for his personal advancement. Cognizant of the discussion within the high command about the necessity of placing a regular officer at the head of the rangers, Gage considered volunteering to accept such a

the VC [Viet Cong] was 'an enemy as shrewd, well-trained, and with the guile of the American Indian during his best days and Major Robert Rogers' two-hundred-year-old guidelines were as applicable in Vietnam as they'd been in the American colonies during the French, Indian, and revolutionary wars.'"

⁹¹ Rogers, *Journals*, 70. *Field Manual 7-85* still stresses the pragmatic approach to ranging that Rogers's first proposed over two centuries ago. It reads: "This publication does not contain everything the ranger needs to know to successfully execute a unit mission. Rather, it supplements unit training and the ranger unit commander's guidance; it does not supersede it." (p. iv). Rogers's call for a "firmness and presence of mind" resembles Jeney's instance that *partisan* officers possess *coup d'oeil*. See chapter 3, note 53.

⁹² "Exercises for the American Forces," April 18, 1756, LO 1060.

billet. Rather than command rambunctious Anglo-Americans, however, Gage wanted to lead disciplined and professional British regulars. He found a compromise. In December 1757, he submitted to Loudoun a formal proposal to raise at his own expense a 500-man regiment of "light-armed foot" of British irregulars, provided the crown promised to reimburse him and commission him a colonel.⁹³

With the apparent need for British irregulars clear, Gage's proposal met a generally favorable reception from Loudoun's staff. Abercromby, as one of the more vociferous critics of the rangers, thought it "extremely advantageous" since British irregulars would be able to discharge "all the functions of Rangers in a short time better than those at present."⁹⁴ Both Colonel Ralph Burton and George Augustus, viscount Howe agreed it was "the best plan" for bringing discipline to the rangers.⁹⁵ Only one officer, Colonel John Forbes, Loudoun's respected and capable Adjutant General, opposed it. As he saw it, the plan was too "lucrative" for Gage "who is a favourite." More important, Forbes correctly noted, there would be few cost savings to be had in raising yet another regiment.⁹⁶

Loudoun overrode Forbes's objections and gave Gage command of the British Army's irregular corps in North America. To Loudoun, Gage's proposal seemed like a panacea that solved all the problems associated with the Rangers. British irregulars, he wrote to William Pitt,

⁹³ Thomas Gage, Proposal to His Excellency the Earl of Loudoun for Raising a Regt. of Light Armed Foot, WO 34: 46A.

⁹⁴ Abercromby to Loudoun, December 18, 1757, LO 5038.

⁹⁵ Loudoun's memorandum book, December 11, 1757, HM 1717.

⁹⁶ Loudoun's memorandum books, December 15, 1757, *ibid.*

should both make so great a Saving to the Public, in reducing the pay of the Rangers . . . and at the same time have a Corps of Rangers that would be disciplined, which, except a very few, is not the case at present; And as by if this Plan, if it Succeed, I should be Independent of the Rangers, and from thence be able to reduce their expense, besides which, as I am obliged to increase the Rangers, it is necessary to have an Officer at their head, by whom I can communicate the orders to them, and to be answerable for them being executed.⁹⁷

With Loudoun's support in the form of a £2,600 advance, Gage, in early 1758, set about raising his regiment.⁹⁸ Loudoun of course expected that Gage would turn to the Gentleman Volunteers and students of Rogers's "ranger school" to fill the officer billets in the new regiment.⁹⁹ Gage, however, used the new regiment to build his personal patronage base within the army. He ignored most of the British officers with ranging experience. Of the nineteen officers whom Gage recommended to Loudoun and the War Office for commissions, only four had been Gentleman Volunteers. Just as important, he appointed them to the regiment's most junior billets. Gage instead offered the senior commissions in his regiment to the senior company grade officers in the regular line regiments.¹⁰⁰ In May 1758, the crown, either unconcerned about or unaware of the actual makeup of the regiment or its

⁹⁷ Loudoun to Pitt, February 14, 1758, LO 5598.

⁹⁸ Warrant on Abraham Mortier, January 3, 1758, LO 3664. See also John R. Cuneo, "Factors Behind the Raising of the 80th Foot in America," *Military Collector & Historian* 11 (1959): 97-103.

⁹⁹ Loudoun to Gage, January 2, 1758, LO 5319.

¹⁰⁰ Volunteers for Gage's regiment came from every unit stationed in North America, excluding the troops in the Maritimes and South Carolina. See "Muster Roll," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, 5 (1941): 15-16; *A List of the General and Field Officers as They Rank in the Army* (London: War Office, 1759), 134, hereafter cited as *Army List*; and W. Thomas, "Stations of Troops in North America," *JSAHR* 14 (1935): 235-36.

intended mission, approved Gage's petition, granted him a colonel's commission, and brought the 80th of Foot onto the British establishment.¹⁰¹

There was little chance that Gage's Own could replace the rangers. Part of the problem resided in the lack of experienced irregulars in its ranks and officer corps. A greater part, however, centered on Loudoun's selection of Gage as the regiment's commander. Loudoun gave Gage command of the new regiment because Gage was the most senior lieutenant colonel in the British Army then serving in North America. Gage proved to be a competent organizer who fretted over the details necessary to commanding a regiment in garrison. But as a combat leader, as John Shy has noted, he possessed "no talent for making war."¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ *Army List*, 134; N.B. Leslie, *The Succession of Colonels of the British Army from 1660 to the Present Day* (London: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1974), 92.

¹⁰² John Shy has described Gage as "pleasant, honest, sober; a little dull; cautious." See Shy, "The Empire Militant: Thomas Gage and the Coming of War," in *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, rev. ed., (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1990), 113. While that passage describes Gage at the outbreak of the American Revolution, it also describes his abilities in the Seven Years' War. "Honest," nonetheless, is a adjective that should not be attributed to Gage. Gage was extremely jealous of Rogers's successes and went to no small effort to ruin Rogers's career. While Rogers was a man who rubbed many people the wrong way and seemed at times overly self-assured, and may have been involved in some inappropriate financial dealings at Michilimackinac, Gage's treatment of Rogers after the war was nonetheless despicable. After the Seven Years' War, when he was Commander in Chief, Gage dallied and did not release Rogers from a Montreal military prison in spite of a court marshal acquittal of Rogers on charges of treason and misconduct, charges that Gage unjustifiably initiated. Gage also refused Rogers the pay he deserved for his service during the Seven Years' War. Rogers wrote to Gage that he had been in service as a regular major during Pontiac's Rebellion when he had advanced his rangers £1,700 from his own pocket. He hoped Gage would approve a reimbursement. See Rogers to Gage, March 3, 1764, Robert Rogers MSS, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Gage informed Rogers that the rangers were not on the regular rolls, although Rogers was, and that Rogers would have to receive his pay from provincial sources. See Gage to Rogers, March 19, 1764, Rogers MSS. He then brushed aside Rogers' request for a peace-time command of a frontier garrison by writing "I am very convinced of your abilities, and knowledge in that particular service, but do not know of any Rangers to be raised at present . . . Should the opportunity offer itself of employing you to your advantage, I should gladly embrace it." See *ibid.* Rogers spent the rest of his life trying to repay the debts he had incurred in service of the crown. In time, his debts landed him in debtor's prison and undoubtedly contributed to his estrangement and eventual divorce from his wife.

Gage deserves the blame for the 80th's failure to become an effective irregular force, especially since other British officers and units made the transition from regulars to quasi-irregulars. The 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiment of Foot, for example, under the command of Colonel Henry Bouquet, a Swiss mercenary who had seen first hand *petite guerre* waged in Central Europe, proved that regulars, if given time and proper training, could operate in limited irregular capacities.¹⁰³ Besides learning to drill and march as "proper" regulars, Bouquet ensured that his troops also mastered a mix of the skills of the eighteenth-century light infantryman as described by Marshal Saxe and those he saw the Anglo-American rangers and Indians employ in North America.¹⁰⁴ Bouquet's standing with the army's senior leaders rocketed upwards after he began his program to train his men as what he called "hunters" -- the equivalent of the German *jägers* and his native French *chasseurs*.¹⁰⁵ In 1758, when Bouquet was his second in command of the campaign against Fort Duquesne, John Forbes had nothing but praise for his

¹⁰³ Lewis Butler, *The Annals of the King's Rifle Corps, Volume 1, "The Royal Americans"* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1913), 25-26, 31. John Cuneo argued that the 80th of Foot was the New World progenitor of British Light Infantry units of the Napoleonic Wars. See Cuneo, "Factors Behind the Raising of the 80th Foot in America." Butler puts the origins of the British "Green Jackets" with the First Battalion of the 60th of Foot. Since the 80th hardly realized the level of success as the Royal Americans, and if the British Army used either of those units as the model for their rifle corps, Butler probably was correct.

¹⁰⁴ Perhaps the men of the Royal Americans were more "naturally" inclined to accept an irregular training regime. They were drawn primarily from western Virginia and Pennsylvania Anglo-American settlers, and Irish and Central European (mainly German) mercenaries. See SAL, 7: 61. Of course, the failure of the 80th to become an effective irregular corps should not be placed primarily on the fact that most of its men were from the British Isles. Consider a dictum from today's military: "There are no bad troops, just bad officers." Moreover, many of the company officers in the Royal Americans had under with Rogers in his Rangers.

¹⁰⁵ For Bouquet's "Preparations for an Expedition in the Woods against Savages" see Butler, *King's Rifle Corps*, 159-162, 330-34.

efforts to "comply and learn the Art of War, from Enemy Indians or anything else who have seen the Country and War carried on it."¹⁰⁶

Bouquet's efforts to train his men in North American-style *petite guerre* paid dividends for the British at the Battle of Bushy Run in August 1763. On August 5, 1763, a numerically superior force of Indians ambushed Bouquet's column of troops from the Royal Americans, Highlander regiments, and Anglo-American rangers as it marched for Fort Pitt. Unlike Braddock's troops eight years earlier, Bouquet's men did not panic. Employing a mix of both regular and irregular tactics, the Britons and Anglo-Americans withstood two days of battle with an Indian force in the wilderness.¹⁰⁷ And unlike Gage and Thomas Dunbar, who blamed their troops for their personal deficiencies in the defeat on the Monongahela, Bouquet wrote that he could not do "sufficient Justice to the Troops" who "suffered considerably" but defeated "the Savages [who] exerted themselves with uncommon Resolution."¹⁰⁸

In the summer of 1758, however, Bouquet's success in turning British regulars into quasi-irregulars was still five years off, and it was clear that 80th was incapable of replacing the rangers. Not only had events proved Forbes right and the creation of the regiment not presented the promised savings to the treasury, but the 80th Regiment's regular-minded officers made it clear they were in no position to march into the wilderness and challenge the

¹⁰⁶ Forbes to Bouquet, June 27, 1758, *The Writings of General John Forbes Relating to His Service in North America*, ed. Alfred Procter James (Menasha, WI: The Collegiate Press, 1938), 125.

¹⁰⁷ For the details of Bushy Run, see Don Daudelin, "Numbers and Tactics at Bushy Run," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 68 (1985): 153-79.

¹⁰⁸ Bouquet to Amherst, dated August 5, 1763, *The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet*, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941-43), series 21653, 209-10.

troupes de la marine and Indians in a *petite guerre*.¹⁰⁹ Richard Saunders Huck, for instance, noted that "although it has been pretty much in vogue lately to decry all Rangers[,] and Rogers has come in for his Share of Discredit, Parties therefore of regular troops commanded by such Officers as were judged the properest for that [ranging] Service have been sent out to procure Intelligence but returned without effecting any thing, for which they blamed" their troops. Many were "not a little sick of these Experiments."¹¹⁰ Even Major General Abercromby, the staunch critic of the rangers, recognized that 80th was no match for *les marines* and Indians. He therefore promoted Rogers to Major and ordered that when parties of the 80th took the field they were to be commanded by Rogers or other ranger officers.¹¹¹

After Amherst replaced Abercromby, Gage tried with little avail to convince the new Commander in Chief that the 80th made up the elite irregular unit of the army. Speaking of engaging Indians in the woods, Gage told Amherst:

I despair of this being done by Rangers only, Judging from the many Pursuits of these People after Indians during my Service in this Country in which they have never once come up with them. The light Infantry of the Regiment headed by a brisk Officer, with some of the boldest Rangers mixed with Them, to prevent their being lost in the Woods, will be the most likely people to Effect this Service.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ The initial outlays for raising the 80th cost £4,738.18.12. The estimated monthly cost for keeping the regiment operational was £843.16.8 (about £10,100 per year), or half the costs of supporting a similar sized unit of rangers. Warrant on Abraham Mortier, July 23, 1758, AB 940. Since the 80th was unable to perform the mission for which it was raised, the money spent on it would have been better spent on rangers.

¹¹⁰ Richard Saunders Hook to Loudoun, June 29, 1758, LO 5866.

¹¹¹ Abercromby to Pitt, August 19, 1758, *Correspondence of Pitt*, 1: 319. Rogers did not receive his official regular commission as a Major until 1760 and the Cherokee War.

¹¹² Gage to Amherst, February 18, 1759, Gage Letter Book, Thomas Gage MSS, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

Amherst ignored Gage's unfounded criticism of the rangers and instead made the 80th adjuncts to Rogers's command. Anglo-American irregulars and British regulars acting in concert, Amherst believed, could strike crushing blows against the enemy. But it was important, he also knew, that Anglo-American irregulars, more adept at ranging and irregular operations, lead those operations. As such, he put aside what reservations that he may have had about placing Britons under the command of Anglo-Americans and instead used combined Anglo-British patrols to fight the Canadian and Indian partisans.¹¹³ Amherst also tolerated the use of Anglo-Americans, with Britons in supporting roles, against enemy noncombatants. British regulars, as noted above, accompanied Rogers and the Rangers in the annihilation of St. Francis. They performed well. In the process, even before Bouquet's successes at Bushy Run, they proved that the real employment of irregular doctrine and methods -- not the cosmetic efforts Gage and the leadership of the 80th -- were the key to the British goal of having regulars act like irregulars.¹¹⁴

James Wolfe, even more than Amherst, made Anglo-American irregulars the sword with which he struck his Canadian and Indian foes.

¹¹³ Amherst's journal, May-September, 1759, *Journal of Jeffery Amherst*, 108-179.

¹¹⁴ Army administrators in London attempted more cosmetic changes in 1761. In December of that year the Army authorized the American-born Joseph Hopkins, formerly a Lieutenant in the 48th Regiment of Foot, to raise a 100-man company of Anglo-American rangers, the Queen's Royal American Rangers, that would serve on the regular British establishment. Hopkins recruited his men in Maryland and Pennsylvania and mustered them into service in the summer of 1762. William Alfred Foote argued in his chapter on Hopkins's company ["The American Independent Companies of the British Army 1664-1774," Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1966, chap. 16] that with Hopkins's company, "Joseph Gorham and Robert Rogers had a potential rival!" (p. 365). That potential was never realized. Hopkins's company was ordered to the West before he had time to train his men in the proper techniques of ranging. He lost over half his command as casualties during Pontiac's Rebellion and never effectively deployed his company as irregulars. In September 1763 Amherst ordered the Queen's Royal American Rangers disbanded and the few remaining men fit for duty drafted into the regular regiments garrisoning Detroit and Niagara.

Wolfe had served as Cumberland's *aide-de-camp* while on "police duty" in Scotland after the '45, where he saw the effectiveness of irregulars in crushing enemy opposition. As William J. Eccles noted, Wolfe determined that "Canadian settlements were to receive the same treatment as had the Scottish Highlands after Culloden."¹¹⁵ As in Scotland thirteen years earlier, Wolfe, in 1758, had at his disposal native irregulars who were more than willing to kill and intimidate noncombatants.¹¹⁶ By thus encouraging what Wolfe saw as the "barbarity which seems so natural" among native Americans, whether Indian or Anglo-American, Wolfe hoped to save his British regulars from the distasteful tasks of annihilationist war.¹¹⁷

Ironically, Wolfe proved himself to possess the same barbarity for which he criticized the natives of North America. While Amherst laid siege to Louisbourg in 1758, Wolfe ordered his Anglo-American ranger companies commanded by Captains Joseph Gorham and Benoni Danks, experienced partisan officers who led war-hardened New England and Nova Scotia troops, to devastate the Gaspé region.¹¹⁸ Captain John Knox, a British witness to many of the rangers' raids, described how they received encouragement from Wolfe to "scour this province, [and] burn their [the

¹¹⁵ Eccles, *France in America*, 212.

¹¹⁶ Anglo-Americans were, in Wolfe's estimations, "better for ranging and scouting than either work or vigilance." See Wolfe to Amherst, June 19, 1758, *Life of Wolfe*, 376.

¹¹⁷ Wolfe quoted in Knox, *Historical Journal*, 1: note 1, 409 and Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, note 54, 421.

¹¹⁸ For a glimpse into the war of annihilation that Gorham waged in the Nova Scotia in 1757, see Joseph Gorham, A Report of Proceeding in Schooner Monckton, August 7, 1757, LO 4135. For other irregular operations in the Maritimes, see Journal of a Partisan Officer, 1758, AB 410; DCB, s.v. "Danks, Benoni"; *ibid.*, s.v. "Goreham (Gorham), Joseph;" and Ellen D. Larned, "Orderly Book of Sergeant Joshua Perry," *NEHGR* 54 (1900): 70-76.

enemy's] settlements."¹¹⁹ In command of the British Army outside Quebec in 1759, Wolfe increased the scale and scope of his Anglo-American-style unlimited-irregular war. Although he declared that he and the British Army would not target Canadian civilians, his actions spoke louder than his words.¹²⁰ A little over a month after promising the Canadians that they could avoid his wrath, he became "indignant at the little regard paid by" them in refusing to surrender. He ordered Gorham's Rangers to "burn and lay waste the country" and authorized them to scalp those Canadians "dressed like Indians."¹²¹ Gorham's Rangers took Wolfe's order as a license to kill, plunder, and destroy. They conveniently found that most "Canadians dressed like Indians" and used that "fact" as an excuse to take "a few scalps."¹²²

Wolfe's ranger-led war outside Quebec, added to Amherst's destruction of Saint Francis, signaled the acceptance within British military circles of Anglo-American irregulars and the kind of war they waged. Britons' wartime experiences had shown that Anglo-American irregulars indeed were important to British success in North America. Just as important, Britons could not expect their regulars to replace the rangers. In the Indian wars that

¹¹⁹ John Knox, May 12, 1758, *Historical Journal*, 1: 170-71.

¹²⁰ General Wolfe's Proclamations to the Canadians, June 27, 1759, *NYCD*, 10: 1046-47.

¹²¹ General Wolfe's Proclamations to the Canadians, July 29, 1759, *ibid.*, 10: 1047-48; Knox, July 24, 1759, *Historical Journal*, 1: 437.

¹²² For the rangers' campaign of destruction outside Quebec, see *Journal de L'Expédition sur le Fleuve Saint-Laurent . . . Extrait du New York Mercury*, No. 385, daté de New York, 21 décembre 1759 (n.p.: n.d.), 8-9. For Gorham's Rangers' scalping parties, see Knox, August 11, 1759, *Historical Journal*, 2: 26; August 30, 1759, *ibid.*, 2: 54. Ironically, the rangers were so efficient in destroying Canadian farms and villages that in the winter of 1759-1760 the British troops then garrisoning Quebec were forced to subsist primarily on old stores of salt pork. Over 1,000 of them succumbed to scurvy over the course of the winter. See Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 424.

ran concurrently with and followed the Seven Years' War, British commanders thus made the Anglo-American way of irregular war an even greater part of their designs for victory.

STAGE IV: BRITONS' COMPLETE ADOPTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WAY OF WAR, 1759-1763

British strategy in the Indian wars of the early 1760s grew out of the adoption of Anglo-American unlimited-irregular warfare. By then, Britons had learned the effectiveness of waging Anglo-American-style war against enemy civilians and in effect had removed the stigma that fell upon those who chose to target noncombatants. During the Cherokee War, British commanders focused nearly all of their military efforts in campaigns against Cherokee noncombatants. Over the course of two years, Anglo-American irregulars and British regulars fighting like Anglo-Americans subjected the Cherokee to a horrific war of devastation. During Pontiac's Rebellion, British commanders again built their plans for defeating Pontiac's "rebels" around Anglo-American warfare, then manifested in what today would be called "germ warfare," land privateering, and the use of British regulars trained and capable of operating as irregulars.

The Cherokee War placed a significant strain on British regular military resources in North America, compelling Major General Amherst to turn to Anglo-American irregular methods to confront the Cherokees.¹²³ When word of the outbreak of hostilities between whites and Indians on the southern

¹²³ For accounts of the Cherokee War, see Steele, *Warpaths*, 228-34; Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 10; David H. Corkran, *The Cherokee Frontier: Conflict and Survival, 1740-1762* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1962), 142-272; and Corkran, *The Carolina Indian Frontier* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), 52 ff.

frontier reached Amherst in the spring of 1760, the Commander in Chief stripped his regular regiments of their best men and rushed them to Charleston under the command of Colonel Archibald Montgomery. Amherst's orders to Montgomery were clear: punish the Cherokees and then return north for the impending campaign against Montreal.¹²⁴ When Montgomery arrived in Charleston with his regulars, he found in place an Anglo-American plan that would allow him to do just that.

From the opening days of the conflict, Anglo-Americans and Britons planned to focus their efforts against Cherokee noncombatants. In October 1759, for instance, Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina described in a letter to William Pitt how he proposed to crush the Cherokees. "In Case a War must be proclaimed," Dobbs wrote, "the three Southern Provinces of Virginia and the Carolinas should exert their whole force, enter into and destroy all the Towns of those at War with us, and make as many of them as we should take their Wives and Children Slaves, by sending them to the Islands [West Indies] if above 10 years old . . . and to allow £10 for every prisoner taken and delivered in each Province."¹²⁵

Montgomery's army arrived in South Carolina and in May 1760 incorporated Dobbs's plan in the first campaign in which British regulars waged war *directly* against Indian noncombatants. Before the Cherokee War, British commanders had parceled out to Anglo-Americans, Indians, or those British regulars capable of acting like irregulars (the Highland Rangers of King George's War and the Gentleman Volunteers of the Seven Years'

¹²⁴ John Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 103-05.

¹²⁵ Arthur Dobbs to William Pitt, October 14, 1759, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2: 185.

War, for example) the tasks of irregular war. In Montgomery's case, the entire British regular force in the Carolinas acted directly against Cherokee noncombatants. Montgomery knew, however, that his force could not defeat the Cherokees in their own country without Anglo-American and Indian support and the services that they provided as scouts and guides. Before setting out for the Cherokee towns, he therefore attached to his regulars 300 Anglo-American rangers, 40 hand-picked troops from the provincial forces, and 50 Catawba warriors.¹²⁶ Meanwhile, the Cherokees remained diplomatically isolated -- the Creeks and Chickasaws refused to join them, realizing that war against the British and the Anglo-Americans would result in their being on the receiving end of an Anglo-American campaign of devastation. With his allies in hand, and the enemy left to their own devices, Montgomery then set to out "to show those savages that it was possible to punish their insolence."¹²⁷

Montgomery marched against the Cherokees' Lower Towns, meeting little opposition, and spreading destruction in his army's wake.¹²⁸ His army first marched on Estatoe, a town of over 200 houses and "all the necessities of life." They put it to the torch, and in a familiar pattern, watched as fires killed those Cherokees who tried to hide from the attackers in their homes.

¹²⁶ Steele, *Warpaths*, 230. For South Carolina's efforts to enlist the Catawbans, see James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: The Catawbans and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), 197-98.

¹²⁷ Lieutenant-Governor Henry Ellis to Pitt, March 5, 1760, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2: 259; James Grant, Part of a Letter to His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, from Major Grant, *Gentleman's Magazine* 30 (1760): 306.

¹²⁸ The Cherokees' towns were divided among the Lower, Valley, Middle and Upper (Overhill) Towns. The Lower Towns were those closest to Charleston. See Verner W. Crane's map in *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), 326.

The Britons and their allies, Major James Grant reported, then "proceeded on our march, took all their towns in our way, and every house and town in the Lower Nation shared the same fate with *Estatoe*." One "could not help pitying them a little," Grant wrote. Nonetheless, "after killing all we could find, and burning every house," Grant recalled, the raiders marched westward toward the Middle and Overhill Towns where Cherokee resistance stiffened. After a short but bloody battle with Cherokee warriors, the whites struck Etchoe.¹²⁹ Ironically, Montgomery wanted to spare Etchoe, but upon finding the body of a white settler that the Cherokees had tortured to death earlier that morning, it became, "no longer possible to think of mercy." He ordered the destruction of part of the town as retaliation. Having determined what Grant called the "correction" of the Cherokees had been "pretty severe," Montgomery then withdrew to Charleston and set sail for New York.¹³⁰

In the summer of 1761, it was Grant's turn to lead the armies of destruction against the Cherokees. With the northern campaign settled, Amherst was able to focus his energies at striking the final blow against the Cherokees. In early 1761, he ordered Grant to lead an army into the Cherokee towns and that time spare no effort in annihilating the "miscreants."¹³¹

Grant's campaign of 1761 was even more destructive for the Cherokees than Montgomery's. Without facing the time restraints that

¹²⁹ A Particular Account of Col. Montgomery's Expedition against the Cherokees, *Gentleman's Magazine* 30 (1760): 442. Montgomery's corps suffered nearly twenty killed and ninety wounded in the ambush. See Hatley, *Dividing Paths*, 131.

¹³⁰ James Grant, Part of a Letter to His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, from Major Grant, *Gentleman's Magazine* 30 (1760): 306.

¹³¹ Shy, *Toward Lexington*, 104; Amherst to Pitt, December 8, 1760, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2: 360.

Montgomery had, Grant could remain in the Cherokee homelands until either they were destroyed, the Cherokees accepted peace on British terms, or he was defeated. There was little chance, however, that the Cherokees could drive the Britons and Anglo-Americans from their homelands. All that was left was either for the Cherokees to suffer complete annihilation or sue for peace on British terms.

It took just over a month for Grant's Anglo-American-British-Indian army to convince the Cherokees that peace was their best option. Grant marched back to Etchoe and destroyed what was left of the town. He then attacked and destroyed the Cherokee towns of Tasee, Nequassee, Joree, and Watoga and moved deeper into the Cherokee homelands.¹³² To increase the scale of destruction, he ordered his troops' rations cut so they would be forced to live off the land and consume more Cherokee crops and livestock. During his thirty-three-day campaign, Grant, Amherst reported, "burnt fifteen of their Towns, destroyed above fourteen hundred Acres of Corn, and sent near five thousand People into the Woods to perish, to be brought to reason and sue for Peace."¹³³ After Grant's juggernaut had ravaged the Lower and Middle Towns, and having exhausted their supplies of powder and shot in the effort to resist Montgomery's invasion, the Cherokees indeed had little choice but to accept the British terms for peace "in the most submissive Manner."¹³⁴ Indeed, in the case of the Cherokees, Anglo-American and British annihilationist war had worked.

¹³² Grant's Journal, WO 34: 40.

¹³³ Amherst to Pitt, August 13, 1761, *ibid.*, 2: 464-65; *Gentleman's Magazine* 31 (1761): 428.

¹³⁴ Amherst to Pitt, October 5, 1761, *Correspondence of William Pitt*, 2: 475.

Pontiac's Rebellion proved another occasion for another British attempt at the annihilation of an Indian enemy through irregular means.¹³⁵ As in the Cherokee War, British commanders spared no annihilationist effort "to bring them [Pontiac's rebels] to a proper Subjection."¹³⁶ Amherst intended British operations to realize his wish that "there was not an Indian Settlement within a thousand Miles of our Country."¹³⁷

Amherst formulated a multifaceted plan built on irregular operations for the annihilation of Pontiac's rebels. He ordered Anglo-American irregulars to take the field and engage in "Destroying any of the Indian Settlements in that Neighborhood [western Pennsylvania] . . . Distressing & Punishing the Guilty."¹³⁸ After the death of one of Amherst's favorite junior officers, Captain James Dalyell, at the Battle of Bloody Run outside Detroit, Amherst, as "Inducement for a Daring Fellow to attempt the Death of that Villain," placed a £200 reward on Pontiac's scalp.¹³⁹

But the most frightening irregular tactic that Amherst chose to use against Pontiac's rebels was to spread epidemic disease in their communities. In May 1763, he wrote that the British would "Do well to try to

¹³⁵ For general accounts of Pontiac's Rebellion, see Steele, *Warpaths*, 237-42; White, *Middle Ground*, chap. 7; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, chap. 20; and Howard H. Peckham, *Pontiac and the Indian Uprising* (1947; reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

¹³⁶ Amherst to Bouquet, June 19, 1763, *Bouquet Papers*, series 21634, 192.

¹³⁷ Amherst to Bouquet, August 7, 1763, *ibid.*, series 21634, 232.

¹³⁸ Amherst to Henry Gladwin, August 28, 1763, Amherst MSS.

¹³⁹ Amherst to Gladwin, September 9, 1763, *ibid.* In July Captain James Dalyell sortied out of Detroit with 400 men to burn the Ottawa towns located about five miles from the fort. The Ottawas, tipped off of the impending attack by Indian spies inside the fort, prepared an ambush for Dalyell's force. In a six hour engagement at Bloody Run, the British suffered 150 casualties. See Bouquet to Major Allan Campbell, September 7, 1763, *Bouquet Papers*, series 21653, 219.

Inoculate the *Indians*, by means of Blankets, as well as to Try Every other Method, that can Serve to Extirpate this Execrable Race." He asked Bouquet "Could it not be contrived to Send the *Small Pox* among those Disaffected Tribes of Indians? We must, on this occasion, Use Every Stratagem in our power to Reduce them."¹⁴⁰ Two months later Bouquet responded by noting "I will try to inoculate the bastards with Some Blankets that may fall in their Hands, and take Care not to get the disease myself" so to "effectually extirpate or remove that Vermin."¹⁴¹

With attempt of British commanders in 1763 to "extirpate" the Indian "vermin" of Pontiac's Rebellion, the British Army's acceptance of Anglo-American irregular warcraft and annihilationist war was complete. The Seven Years' War had forced British officers to acknowledge that war in North America demanded a willingness on their part to accept irregular methods of war making. In the process, the British Army made the Anglo-American art of irregular war a central part of both their military operations and culture. As officers indoctrinated in the eighteenth-century western European model of regular war, they looked askance at the "barbarism," "ill discipline," and "irregularities" involved in waging the mixture of annihilationist war, ranging, and land privateering in North America. But necessity dictated that they put aside their notions about what was "proper" and "improper" in war. Great Britain's greatest military heroes to emerge from the North American wars of

¹⁴⁰ Memorandum by Sir Jeffery Amherst, May 4, 1763, *Bouquet Papers*, series 21634, 161.

¹⁴¹ Bouquet to Amherst, July 13, 1763, *ibid.*, series 21634, 215. It is impossible to know the complete effect of Amherst's germ warfare campaign against Pontiac's rebels. Moreover, the rebellion petered out in the fall of 1763 after Pontiac's allies returned to their homes in the face of their failure to capture Fort Detroit and the announcement of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. One suspects that if the "rebellion" had continued, the British would have continued employing irregular methods.

the late 1750s and early 1760s -- Jeffery Amherst and James Wolfe -- were in fact the British leaders who most fully embraced the Anglo-American way of war. They showed that Britons would and could wage unlimited-irregular war against Canadian and Indian noncombatants. In the next war, the War of the American Revolution, other regular-minded British and Anglo-American leaders would embrace that way of war as well. Instead of focusing it against only Canadians and Indians, however, they would direct it against their own countrymen.

CHAPTER 5

"THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS KIND OF WAR": THE ANGLO-AMERICAN WAY OF WAR IN THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Late 1780 saw noncombatants across the Carolinas suffer great hardships and privations. The previous summer, in anticipation of a British offensive into the southern backcountry, a savage partisan war had erupted between Loyalists and Patriot militia that quickly spiraled out of control until no one -- Patriot, Loyalist, or neutral -- was safe.¹ By early winter the signs of the death and destruction inflicted by marauding bands of raiders in their fratricidal war were everywhere.² "The whole country," Major General Nathanael Greene soberly reported, "is in danger of being laid waste by the

¹ For book-length studies of the partisan war in the South, see John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1985) and Russell F. Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press for the South Carolina Tricentennial Commission, 1976). See also Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds., *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry during the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the United States Capital Historical Society, 1985). For a work that contextualizes the partisan war in the Carolinas as a guerrilla war, see Anthony James Joes, *Guerrilla Conflict before the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), chap. 1. For a primary account of the war, although one that touched only superficially on the war against noncombatants, see Banastre Tarleton, *A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North America* (1787; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1968). Tarleton, one of the most ferocious of the partisan leaders on either side, hid his culpability for murdering and pillaging in his recollection of the war.

² Regular commanders on both sides tried in vain to limit the plundering and marauding. In 1781, for instance, Brigadier General Francis Marion, one of the Patriots' most effective partisan leaders, authorized his troops to summarily try, convict, and execute anyone, whether Patriot or Loyalist, known to have been a marauder. See Francis Marion Orderly Book, March 1, 1781, Huntington Manuscript 625, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, vol. 3, hereafter cited as Marion O.B.

Whigs and Torrys, who pursue each other with as much relentless fury as beasts of prey."³

Why did Anglo-Americans resort to such brutality in their partisan war? The traditional answer is that civil wars are the most terrible kinds of wars, engendering vehement hatreds, indiscriminate killings, massacres, and atrocities. Many contemporaries of the conflict believed as much. After struggling with Loyalist partisans for months Patriot Colonel Isaac Shelby, for instance, observed that "It is impossible for those who have not lived in its midst to conceive of the exasperation which prevails in a civil war."⁴ Lord Francis Rawdon had predicted as early as the first months of the Revolution that "both sides hold each other in such detestation that which ever party is victorious it will not, I fear, use its power with moderation."⁵ Edmund Pendleton perhaps summarized best the attitude that condoned unfettered violence directed against women and children. Indeed, he judged Major General Charles Lee's proscription of the Loyalist families of Tidewater Virginia a necessary evil of civil war. It was, Pendleton wrote, "one of the inevitable consequences of this kind of war, that legal modes of inquiry must yield to necessity, and what the public safety seems to require, should be

³ Nathanael Greene to Samuel Huntington, December 28, 1780, Nathanael Greene MSS, vol. 13, #33, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

⁴ Colonel Isaac Shelby, n.d., William L. Saunders and Walter Clark, comps. and eds., *State Records of North Carolina*, 30 vols. (1886-1914; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1968-1978), 15: 110.

⁵ Francis, Lord Rawdon to Francis, tenth earl of Huntingdon, December 13, 1775, Francis Bickley, ed., *Report on the Manuscripts of the Late Reginald Rawdon Hastings, Esq., of the Manor House, Ashby De La Zouch* 4 vols. (London: HMSO for the British Historical Manuscripts Commission, 1934), 3: 161, hereafter cited as *Hastings Manuscripts*. Rawdon, in spite of expressed fear of the participants' lack of moderation, was not a peace maker. He instead was one of the foremost of the British Army's "hardliners."

immediately done, even though some injury may arise to innocent individuals."⁶

Yet the destruction that accompanied the partisan war resulted from more than an "inevitable consequence" of civil war alone. It was in fact the end product of more than a century of Anglo-American warcraft, one that Britons had sanctioned in the last war; one that accepted, legitimated, and even encouraged unlimited-irregular attacks on noncombatants.

This chapter examines the place of the partisan war, and with it the several other irregular wars that Anglo-Americans waged under during the American War for Independence, and their place in the evolution an Anglo-American way of unlimited-irregular war. We need remember that besides the partisan war in the Carolinas Anglo-Americans fought several unlimited-irregular wars. These included Patriot-Indian wars on the southern and western (the upper Ohio Valley and Illinois country) frontiers, horrific *petite guerre* among Whigs, Loyalists, Britons, and Indians in New York and present-day Kentucky, and partisan war in the North and the Carolinas.⁷ Each of those wars -- conflicts in which Anglo-Americans focused their efforts on destroying enemy noncombatants -- in their own way contributed to the development of an Anglo-American way of war.

Anglo-Americans' irregular conflicts of the Revolutionary War occupy two main points on the evolutionary path of a colonial Anglo-American way of war. The Patriots' unlimited and irregular wars against Indians point to a

⁶ Pendleton to Lee, May 5, 1776, *Lee Papers*, New York Historical Society Collections, 1871, 470.

⁷ Colonel Guy Johnson in his correspondence referred to the war on the New York frontier as a *petite guerre*. See Johnson to Lord George Germain, October 11, 1781, NYCD, 8: 813.

continuation of the way of war that had been evolving since the early seventeenth century. The details of the *petite guerre* and the partisan war, meanwhile, indicate a watershed in the evolution of Anglo-Americans' military culture. In the *petite guerre* Anglo-Americans, with the encouragement of Britons, for the first time, waged unlimited-irregular war against other Anglo-Americans. By the outbreak of the partisan war in 1780, as a result, the infliction of partisan violence on noncombatants had not only been reinforced, but legitimated -- against *Anglo-American* noncombatants. In the end, the partisan war stands as the logical and natural extension of colonial warcraft. Anglo-Americans had created a military tradition that erased distinctions between combatants and noncombatants; now they applied it, for the first time, to an enemy that consisted of their fellow countrymen, women, and children.

I: THE PATRIOT-INDIAN WARS

From 1775 through 1783 the frontier in the South and West was scene to a string of small wars in which unlimited-irregular approaches predominated. Facing destruction and havoc on the frontier wrought by Indian enemies, Patriot leaders and armies responded with campaigns directed almost exclusively at Indian noncombatants and villages.

The Patriots' two wars against the Cherokees during the Revolution point to the centrality of unlimited-irregular patterns in the Anglo-American culture of war making. The elements of annihilationism, ranging, and land privateering that had shaped Anglo-Americans' earlier wars against Indians remained at the core of the Anglo-American strategy and tactics for the struggles of 1776 and 1779-1781. By allying themselves with the British and

abandoning neutrality in 1776, the Lower and Middle Town Cherokees exposed their homelands to Anglo-American retaliation. The result was a brief but intensely violent campaign against Cherokee towns, women, and children. In 1779 the Overhill and Chickamauga Cherokees, at the urging of the British began raiding white settlements in the Carolina backcountry, precipitating a three-year war with the Patriots. Like the Lower and Middle Town Cherokees they too saw their villages, fields, and families fall victim to Patriot armies. By the end of the War for Independence in the South, Anglo-American troops using unlimited and irregular tactics had destroyed the Cherokees as a military threat.

The British and the rebels alike knew that an alliance with the Cherokees could mean the difference between victory and defeat on the southern frontier. British officials, with their forces in the South limited to the small garrisons of regulars at Mobile and St. Augustine, looked to the Cherokees to douse the flames of the rebellion. Alexander Cameron, Britain's Deputy Commissioner for Indian Affairs for the Southern Colonies, opened his purse and lavished arms, ammunition, and materiel on the Cherokees.⁸ Thomas Brown, the leader of the Loyalist Florida Rangers, wanted to enlist both the Cherokees and Creeks against the Patriots. The Patriots, meanwhile, sent agents to the Cherokees and suggested that they

⁸ Deputy Superintendent Mr. Henry Stuart's Account of his Proceedings with the Cherokee Indians about Going against the Whites, August 25, 1776, *Records of North Carolina*, 10: 763, 782. Great Britain's effort to enlist the Cherokees in a war was one of many blunders it made in dealing with the inhabitants of the South. By encouraging the Cherokees to strike at Patriots, British officials galvanized backcountry support for the rebel cause. For the effects of the British-Cherokee alliance on winning support for the Patriot cause in South Carolina, see Rachel N. Klein, *Unification of a Slave State: The Rise of the Planter Class in the South Carolina Backcountry, 1760-1808* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), chap. 3.

stand aloof from the impending conflict. The Lower and Middle Towns Cherokees, after weighing the comparative benefits of an alliance with either the British or the rebels, decided that the war between the whites offered an opportunity to settle old scores with the land-hungry Anglo-Americans. In August 1776, the Cherokees therefore declared for the British and sent upwards of 600 warriors to destroy Patriot settlements in South and North Carolina. As events proved, it was a fatal miscalculation.⁹

By late 1776 an Anglo-American design for the destruction of the Cherokees had coalesced in a particularly clear statement of annihilationism. "The gross infernal breach of faith which they have been guilty of shuts them out from every pretension to mercy," the North Carolina delegation to the Continental Congress advised, "and it is surely the policy of the Southern Colonies to carry fire and Sword into the very bowels of their country and sink them so low that they may never be able again to rise and disturb the peace of their Neighbors."¹⁰

The Patriot-Cherokee war of 1776 stands as an example of the effectiveness of Anglo-American warcraft.¹¹ In the late summer and fall of 1776 nearly 5,500 Anglo-Americans -- to that date the largest military operation ever conducted in the Southeast -- converged in three separate

⁹ Letter from Charles Roberson and James Smith about the Cherokees, July 13, 1776, *Records of North Carolina*, 10: 665; [North Carolina Assembly] to Gov. Rutledge, of So. Carolina, August 3, 1776, *ibid.*, 11: 337.

¹⁰ North Carolina Delegates in the Continental Congress to the North Carolina Provincial Council, *ibid.*, 10: 710.

¹¹ For the Patriot-Cherokee war of 1776, as well as the Patriot-Chickamauga war, see Coin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), chap. 7 and Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chaps. 15-17.

columns on the Indian towns west of the Patriot frontier. Colonel Andrew Williamson's 1,150 South Carolinians approached from the southeast; Colonel William Christian led 1,500 Virginians from the northeast; and Brigadier General Griffith Rutherford took 2,800 troops west-southwest from North Carolina. The results of the campaign never were in doubt. In the face of the advancing Anglo-American host the Cherokees fled westward and left their homes and fields to the mercy of the whites.¹² The Patriot armies spared nothing among the Lower and Middle towns. On their march toward the area surrounding present-day Cherokee National Forest the whites, one participant noted, "burned and cut down their corn moving from one town as we destroyed it and marched to another."¹³ Along their axes of advance the Patriots also managed to catch straggling Indian women and children, many of whom they preferred to kill and scalp rather than make prisoners.¹⁴ Rutherford's North Carolinians alone devastated the "greater part" of the Lower Towns, seized runaway African and African-American slaves, and presented North Carolina's Patriot leadership with plunder valued at over £2,500 to finance the war effort.¹⁵

The Whig leaders hoped that the expedition against the Cherokees would teach all the Indian nations that opposition to Patriots meant certain destruction. With their towns and fields in ruins and winter approaching, the Lower and Middle Cherokees had little choice but to accept tributary status

¹² Ibid., 10: xv.

¹³ James Martin, Petition for Pension, *ibid.*, 22: 146.

¹⁴ Colonel Andrew Williamson to General Griffith Rutherford, August 14, 1776, *ibid.*, 10: 746-47.

¹⁵ North Carolina Council of Safety to Governor Patrick Henry, of Virginia, about the Cherokee Expedition, October 25, 1776, *ibid.*, 10: 861.

from the Anglo-Americans. George Washington, meanwhile, spread the word of the rebels' might. "The Cherokees and Southern Tribes were foolish enough to listen to them [the British]," Washington told the chiefs of the Passamaquoddy nation at Christmas, 1776; "and take the Hatchet Against us; Upon this our Warriors went into their Country, burnt their Houses, destroyed their Corn, and obliged them to sue for peace and give Hostages for their future Good Behavior. Now Brothers never let the King's Wicked Counselors turn your Hearts Against Me and my Brethren of the Country."¹⁶

The message of the rebels' military prowess seems to have gotten through. For three years no Indian nation took up arms against the United States. Then, in early 1779 Dragging Canoe -- an Overhill war chief who had led his followers and handfuls of survivors from the Lower and Middle towns westward and established new villages near Chickamauga Creek -- proved that the desire for revenge had continued to smolder; his warriors began raiding the Patriot settlements that had inched into the Tennessee River Valley.¹⁷ The Patriot response, as promised, was swift and severe.

The Patriots' war against the Chickamaugas was a repeat of those of the war of 1776. Upon the outbreak of hostilities North Carolina rushed 500 mounted rangers to burn the Chickamaugas' towns and "chastise that nation and reduce them to obedience."¹⁸ In 1780 Virginia and North Carolina pooled their military resources to create an overwhelming force to send against the

¹⁶ George Washington to the Chief of the Passamaquoddy Indians, December 24, 1776, *The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series*, ed. Philander D. Chase, 8 vols. to date (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985-), 7: 433-34.

¹⁷ For the Chickamaugas' raids on Patriot settlements, see William Flemming to Thomas Jefferson, January 19, 1781, *CVSP*, 1: 446.

¹⁸ Governor Martin to Brig. Gen. McDowell, *Records of North Carolina*, n.d., 16: 697.

Indian villages. The idea behind the Patriots' plan was to "transfer the War without delay" to the Chickamauga towns and destroy "their habitation and provisions."¹⁹ Arthur Campbell's army therefore spent late 1780 cutting a wide swath of destruction through the Overhill towns. In 1781 Lieutenant Colonel John Sevier led 700 Virginians and North Carolinians into present-day middle Tennessee and northern Alabama where they burned Indian towns and massacred entire Indian families. The blows inflicted by Campbell's and Sevier's raiders were too much for the Chickamaugas. Some fled further westward; most agreed to another peace dictated by victorious white armies.²⁰

The western frontier during the War for Independence was another arena in which Anglo-Americans waged unlimited war against Indian noncombatants.²¹ The Patriots' conflicts with their Indian enemies in the West can be divided into five overlapping phases: 1775-1777, the two years in which peace endured in the upper Ohio Valley following the Anglo-American victory in Lord Dunmore's War; 1777-1779, the years of the Patriot-Shawnee war in Ohio; 1778-1779, the period that saw George Rogers Clark's campaigns in the Illinois country; 1779, the year of the Patriot Sullivan-Clinton

¹⁹ Arthur Campbell to Thomas Jefferson, January 15, 1781, CVSP, 1: 434-37.

²⁰ William Christian to Thomas Jefferson, April 10, 1781, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian P. Boyd, 29 vols. to date (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-), 5: 395. Following Sevier's campaign the Chickamaugas that fled westward found themselves engaged in a war with the white settlers of middle Tennessee. Bands of Chickamaugas and their western allies, the Chickasaws, would battle white settlers for control of north western Georgia, northern Alabama, and middle Tennessee for another decade.

²¹ For the Revolutionary War in the Ohio Country, see Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 5-6; and Calloway, *American Revolution in Indian Country*, chap. 6.

Campaign against the Senecas of western New York; and 1780-1783, the three years of the Patriots' war with the Shawnees and Delawares. In each of those phases, unlimited-irregular war, more than any other factor, determined the course of action that Patriots leaders and armies took.

During the first phase of the Revolutionary War in the Ohio Country, the Indians' fear that the events of Lord Dunmore's War would be repeated was enough to guarantee peace. Anglo-Americans had been important in the military affairs of the West since the end of the Seven Years' War, but Lord Dunmore's War drove home to the western Indians the notion that war with the Anglo-Americans would mean annihilation.

Anglo-Americans came to dominate the West in the decade leading up to the Revolution by sheer weight of numbers -- and an unrestrained appetite for land. Following Pontiac's Rebellion the British Army withdrew from the West and left only small garrisons at Fort Gage (where the Kaskaskia River empties into the Mississippi River) and Detroit.²² It was expensive to garrison the frontier with regulars. Moreover, Whitehall assumed that their Anglo-American subjects would abide by the Proclamation of 1763 that had prohibited white settlement west of the crest of the Allegheny Mountains. The Line of 1763 was designed as the first step in an orderly and limited expansion of the West, one intended to lay to rest Indians' fears that land-hungry Anglo-Americans would soon overrun their homelands.²³ By the early 1770s, however, few in the colonies paid any attention to the Proclamation of

²² John Shy, *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 402.

²³ Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 162-66.

1763. As John Murray, fourth earl of Dunmore, royal governor of Virginia, himself a land speculator with a voracious appetite for western lands, noted, no policy conceived in Great Britain could "restrain the Americans; and that they do and will remove as their avidity and restlessness incite them."²⁴ With the British Army absent from the West, and dozens of Anglo-American frontier settlements springing up in present-day West Virginia and Kentucky, one would expect that the next war would be fought with primarily Anglo-American methods, especially a focus on unlimited-irregular attacks on noncombatants.

Lord Dunmore's War stood as the first major test of Anglo-American military capabilities since the Seven Years' War. In early 1774 the Shawnees responded to white encroachments on their hunting grounds in Kentucky with raids across the upper Ohio Valley on white settlements and land surveyors. Anglo-Americans proved themselves more than up for the task. At first word of the Indian attacks Dunmore ordered 150 Virginian rangers to fall upon the Shawnee towns. Meanwhile, he mobilized the Virginia militia for a large-scale invasion of the Ohio country.²⁵ His orders to his subordinate commanders focused directly on Anglo-Americans' intentions for the Shawnee nation. "Proceed directly to their Towns," he instructed Colonel Andrew Lewis, "and if possible destroy their Towns & magazines and distress them in every other way that is possible."²⁶

²⁴ Lord [William] Dunmore to Lord [William Legge, second earl of] Dartmouth, December 24, 1774, Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., *Documentary History of Dunmore's War* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905), 371, hereafter cited as *Dunmore's War*.

²⁵ Colonel William Preston to Colonel William Christian, June 27, 1774, *ibid.*, 52; Dunmore to Colonel William Preston, July 3, 1774, *ibid.*, 62.

²⁶ Dunmore to Colonel Andrew Lewis, July 12, 1774, *ibid.*, 86.

For the Shawnees it soon became apparent that the "Big Knives" -- the western Indians' name for the Virginians -- threatened the existence of their entire nation. After the Delawares refused to join them the Shawnees knew that short of besting the whites in a pitched battle there was little they could do to defend their homes. Thus, in an ironic reversal of military roles, the Shawnees hoped to draw the Anglo-Americans into single engagement and inflict so many casualties on them that the whites would not cross the Ohio River. In October, the out-manned and out-gunned Shawnees therefore offered Lewis battle at the confluence of the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers. At the battle of Point Pleasant they subjected the Anglo-Americans to what in the Indians' minds should have been a crushing defeat: at the end of the day, nearly forty percent of Lewis's troops were casualties.²⁷ Yet the Big Knives seemed not to notice their losses. Lewis regrouped his forces and prepared to cross the Ohio.

The failure to halt the Anglo-American army's advance at Point Pleasant opened the Shawnees' homelands to almost certain destruction, compelling them to accept a humiliating peace on the whites' terms.²⁸ In 1764 the Shawnees had made a similar decision for peace when Henry Bouquet had marched westward from Fort Pitt and threatened their settlements; now, however, they found it much harder to make peace overtures. The whites would demand more than a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. In a crushing blow to their autonomy, Dunmore demanded that

²⁷ Dunmore to Dartmouth, Official Report, December 24, 1774, *ibid.*, 385. Dunmore reported that Lewis suffered 49 killed and 80 wounded. The Shawnees, Dunmore claimed, had 30 dead and "some wounded."

²⁸ Henry Bouquet to Thomas Gage, November 15, 1764, *The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet*, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941-43), series 21653, 256.

the Shawnees agree to give up hostages for their nation's future good behavior and abandon all claims to their hunting lands in Kentucky.²⁹ Overall, the Battle of Point Pleasant proved an important victory for Anglo-American arms. As Dunmore explained, "The Event of this Action, proving very different from what the Indians had promised themselves, they at once resolved to make no further efforts against a Power they saw so far Superior to theirs."³⁰

Dunmore's victory secured peace for whites in the West for the first two years of the Revolutionary War. Given the choice between seeing their villages burned and their women and children killed, or waiting until a more advantageous moment to strike, the Shawnees chose the latter.³¹ "The Virginians are hauty Violent and bloody," British Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton noted from Detroit in late 1775, and "the savages have a high opinion of them as Warriors."³² Indeed, rather than face the onslaught of armies of the "violent and bloody" Long Knives, all the major tribes of the West agreed to peace with the Patriots in September 1775.³³

²⁹ Dunmore to Dartmouth, Official Report, December 24, 1774, *Dunmore's War*, 386.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 385.

³¹ Richard White has argued that relations in the *pays d'en haut* for the three quarters of a century preceding the Revolutionary War had been defined by weakness and negotiation. Mediation, the dominant form of cross cultural exchange in the *pays d'en haut*, had shaped a "Middle Ground" in that no one group (Indians, Frenchmen, Britons, or Anglo-Americans) could impose their will on other groups through conquest. The Revolutionary War signaled the beginning of the end for the "Middle Ground." After the Revolution, Anglo-Americans could impose their will through conquest of the Indian peoples of the *pays d'en haut*. See White, *Middle Ground*, chaps. 9-11. The Anglo-American way of war thus became the hammer by which Anglo-Americans shattered the "Middle Ground."

³² Lieutenant-Governor Henry Hamilton to [Major] General Guy Carleton, November 30, 1775, Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., *The Revolution on the Upper Ohio* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1908), 129.

³³ The Continental Congress meanwhile also did its best to prevent a war on the Ohio. It even tolerated sporadic Indian attacks on white outsettlements. When the renegade

The peace forged at the end of Dunmore's War, however, disintegrated in early 1777, when Shawnee resentment at the outcome of Dunmore's War finally erupted in raids on western settlements. The Continental Congress responded by turning to the standard strategy of unlimited-irregular war. In 1778 it ordered two operations against the Shawnees that it hoped would crush opposition. Both campaigns failed not because of the unsoundness of Patriot strategy, but because of their commanders' ineptitude and unwillingness to pursue aggressively an offensive war. By the end of 1778 all that Patriot arms could claim for a half year of campaigning was a handful of murdered Indian neutrals and two untenable forts on the frontier.

Revanche motivated the Shawnees in 1777. The peace between them and the Anglo-Americans, Henry Hamilton observed two years earlier, was "liable to frequent interruption from more causes than one." "In the inroads of the Virginians upon the savages," Hamilton reported, "the former have plundered, burnt, and murdered without mercy. 'Tis to be supposed from the character of the savages, that opportunity only is wanting to retaliate."³⁴

The Shawnees chose 1777 to retaliate because that moment seemed to offer immediate advantages. Bands of Shawnees, expecting a British

Shawnees of Pluggy's Town, for instance, raised their hatchets against the Virginians, the assembly responded by authorizing a force of 300 militia to annihilate the Indians. Cooler heads, however, prevailed. Congress understood that in striking Pluggy's Town the Virginians might shatter the fragile peace between the Patriots and all the Indians of the upper Ohio. Congress therefore ordered the Virginians' expedition postponed with the intention of settling the score at a later date. See Orders of the Virginia Council, March 12, 1777, *ibid.*, 237; Governor Patrick Henry to Colonel David Shepherd, April 12, 1777, *ibid.*, 247. Patriot military resources were better spent in the East fighting the British regular army.

³⁴ Hamilton to Carleton, November 30, 1775, *ibid.*, 129-30.

victory in the East to result from the Major General John Burgoyne's invasion of New York, welcomed Hamilton's invitation to take up arms against the Patriots.³⁵ In the summer and fall Shawnee war parties struck throughout the upper Ohio Valley, driving settlers back to Wheeling, where they besieged Fort Henry.³⁶ Yet just when it seemed that the Shawnees were on the verge of victory the tide of the war turned against them. Patriot forces repulsed the British invasion of New York, freeing up Anglo-American riflemen to rush the Ohio country while Virginia and Pennsylvania volunteers raised the siege of Fort Henry. Able to focus resources and attention on the Ohio, the Continental Congress then ordered that Patriot armies in the West go on the offensive and destroy the Shawnee nation.

The Patriots' war against the Shawnees in 1778 became a slaughter of innocents. In February 1778 Congress ordered Colonel Edward Hand to lead 500 militiamen and regulars to destroy British-held Sandusky and the Indians wintering there. Bad weather and high waters, however, prevented the rebels from reaching Lake Erie. The "Sandusky Campaign" thereafter turned into the "Squaw Campaign." With no Shawnee villages between them and Fort Pitt, Hand's men instead fell upon the parties of neutral Delawares they found in the countryside. Forty-five miles from Fort Pitt, for instance, they killed and scalped four Delawares (one man, two women, and a child) and carried

³⁵ Hamilton advised the Shawnees that Burgoyne was preparing a war-ending invasion of New York. Burgoyne would march down the Montreal-Albany Corridor and rendezvous at Albany with a force of Iroquois and Loyalists, led by Lieutenant Colonel Barry St. Leger, that would advance through the Mohawk River Valley. From Albany Burgoyne could isolate New England and take New York out of the war. With Patriot arms thus occupied, so it must have seemed to the Shawnees, there was little chance that the Anglo-Americans could protect the frontier.

³⁶ Calendar of Letters, October 13-16, 1777, Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., *Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 134, hereafter cited as *Frontier Defense*.

two Indian women into captivity; later they learned that they had killed the brother of the Delaware chief Captain Pipe, "a noted friend to the United States."³⁷ On another occasion, Hand's troops killed a Delaware boy who was out bird hunting. Hand had to put down a near riot as his troops argued and fought with one another for the right to claim the "honor" of having killed the boy.³⁸ Later in the "campaign," the Patriots fell upon four more Delaware women and a boy making salt; they killed three of the women while the boy escaped. "You be will Surprised in performing the Above great exploits," Hand reported, perhaps intending irony, that he "had but one man Wounded, & one Drowned."³⁹ Yet for all Hand's exploits, all he could point to was a body count of less than a dozen neutral Indians.

Following the Squaw Campaign fiasco Congress made another attempt to destroy the Shawnees. In July it replaced the ineffectual Colonel Hand with the equally ineffectual Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh. To strengthen McIntosh's hand, Congress gave him 1,000 more men than his predecessor and explicit orders to "proceed, without delay, to destroy such towns of hostile tribes of *Indians* as he in his discretion shall think will most effectually to chastise and terrify the savages, and check their ravages on the

³⁷ Colonel George Morgan to Board of War, July 17, 1778, *ibid.*, 113. For the string of killings of friendly Indians by Anglo-Americans see White, *Middle Ground*, 384-86. White attributes the murders to Anglo-American "Indian haters," men who had abandoned the "familiar" view of Indians that dominated the "Middle Ground" for the perception of Indians as "others." In that context, the murder of Cornstalk, Captain Pipe's brother, and White Eyes also resulted from an Anglo-American tradition of war making that held no reservations about killing noncombatants.

³⁸ Recollections of Samuel Murphy, *Frontier Defense*, 219.

³⁹ Hand to Jasper Ewing, March 7, 1778, *ibid.*, 216.

frontiers."⁴⁰ The Shawnees, however, withdrew closer to Sandusky where their women and children would be safe. McIntosh found, meanwhile, that he had no stomach for chasing the Indians around the Ohio country, and instead chose to build two new forts on the frontier -- one of which he named in honor of himself -- where he could spend the winter waiting for the war to come to him.⁴¹ Of course, one can only wonder what his troops would have done when their enlistments expired on January 1, 1779, if they had found themselves deep in the midst of Shawnee territory, far from Patriot settlements or forts; it is possible that they would have continued, even in the march for home, to inflict punishment on the Shawnees. But instead of forcing his troops to act McIntosh committed the classic blunder of frontier warfare. He garrisoned the newly constructed forts with troops who were safe from all but a want of provisions.⁴² Outside the walls of the forts, however, Shawnee war parties had a free hand to scour the Anglo-American frontier.

Fortunately for the Patriot cause in the West Congress had at its disposal for the third of the Patriot-Indian wars an officer willing to risk his

⁴⁰ Resolution of the Continental Congress, July 25, 1778, Louise Phelps Kellog, ed., *Frontier Advance on the Upper Ohio, 1778-1779* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1916), 121.

⁴¹ Shawnee war parties attacked Fort Laurens, located on the Tuscarawas River, in January and again in February 1779 to little effect. After short sieges they retreated. In the summer of 1779 Congress ordered Fort Laurens abandoned.

⁴² Lachlan McIntosh to Colonel Richard Campbell, November 3, 1778, *ibid.*, 164. As the winter progressed the garrisons at Forts McIntosh and Laurens increasingly came to depend on friendly Delawares for food. See *Recollections of John Cuppy*, *ibid.*, 160. In September the Delawares had signed a treaty with McIntosh at Fort Pitt in which they agreed to become proxies for the Patriots as long as the Anglo-Americans promised them protection and trade. See *ibid.*, 21. Ironically, whites murdered Chief George White Eyes, the man most responsible for convincing the Delawares to join the Patriot side. Patriot leaders told the Delawares that White Eyes had died of smallpox.

command in offensive operations. In early 1778 Virginia had commissioned George Rogers Clark a colonel and had given him command of 200 Virginia volunteers for a Patriot invasion of the Illinois Country.⁴³

Opinions on the significance of Clark's campaigns in Illinois vary. Some historians have seen them as the centerpiece of a "heroic" tale of how American frontiersmen overcame both the wilderness and Indians to bring white civilization to the West.⁴⁴ Others have argued that since the British posts in the Illinois did not threaten Patriot positions in the East, Clark's invasion of the West signified little more than a land grab.⁴⁵ Within the context of the development of an Anglo-American way of war, however, Clark's campaigns mean much more, for in them we see an almost perfect example of how Anglo-Americans used unlimited-irregular warfare as a means of intimidating populations of uncertain allegiance.

The key to Patriot success in the Illinois country was Clark's threat to wage Anglo-American style war against the French and Indians. Clark was an experienced partisan leader, having learned his trade in 1774 after Dunmore's War on a campaign against the Mingos.⁴⁶ As he surveyed the

⁴³ Secret Instructions to Clark, January 2, 1778, *George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781*, ed. James Alton James, *Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Volume 8, Virginia Series, Volume 3* (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 34, hereafter cited as *Clark Papers*.

⁴⁴ For works that put Clark in a heroic light, see Lowell H. Harrison, *George Rogers Clark and the War in the West* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1976); Dale Van Every, *A Company of Heroes: The American Frontier 1775-1783* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962); and John Bakeless, *Background to Glory: The Life of George Rogers Clark* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1957).

⁴⁵ Jack M. Sosin, *The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763-1783* (New York: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), 117.

⁴⁶ In 1774, after the peace that followed the battle of Point Pleasant, the Mingos remained on the warpath. Dunmore dispatched Major William Crawford and 250 men, one of whom was Clark, to lay waste to the Mingos' Salt Lick Town, near present-day Columbus, Ohio. See William Christian to William Preston, November 8, 1774, *Dunmore's War*, 301-02.

military situation facing him in Illinois, Clark knew that his small army was no match for either the Indians or the British in a regular campaign.⁴⁷ He also knew that the Big Knives' reputation as warriors who without hesitation killed Indian women and children preceded them and gave him a powerful weapon with which to intimidate the Indians of the West.⁴⁸

Clark capitalized on the psychological advantage of the Patriots' reputation. After capturing Kaskaskia, for instance, he dispatched a message to the British-allied Indians wintering outside Detroit. Abandon the British, he told them. "This is the last Speech you may ever expect from the Big Knives," Clark warned, "the next thing will be the Tomahawk. And You may expect in four Moons to see Your Women and Children given to the Dogs to eat, while those Nations that have kept their words with me will Flourish and grow like the Willow Tree on the River Banks under the care and nourishment of their father the Big Knives."⁴⁹

Nowhere did the Anglo-Americans' reputation for ferocity and its accompanying deterrent value have a greater impact than outside Vincennes in February 1779. Henry Hamilton, in a ploy to keep them tied to crown interests, had told the French-speaking residents of Illinois that they "could expect nothing but Savage treatment from the Americans."⁵⁰ Clark decided

⁴⁷ Clark to George Mason, November 19, 1779, *Clark Papers*, 119.

⁴⁸ George M. Waller has noted that the Vincennes campaign suggested to the Indians that the Patriots were capable of striking the Indians in their western homelands. "It left the Indians of the West," Waller has written, "and the French inhabitants of Detroit openly eager to receive the Americans" (p. 57). See Waller, "Target Detroit: Overview of the American Revolution West of the Appalachians," in *The French, the Indians, and George Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country: Proceedings of An Indiana American Revolution Bicentennial Symposium* (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1977): 47-66.

⁴⁹ Clark's message to the Indians, December 1778, *Clark Papers*, 146.

⁵⁰ Clark to Mason, November 19, 1779, *ibid.*, 120. Besides the stick of savagery, Clark, with the United States and France officially allies, could offer the French speakers of

to turn Hamilton's propaganda against him by using it to cow the French into submission. He first made a public spectacle of the scalping of one François Maisonville, a *coureur de bois* who supposedly had joined Indian war parties. Clark directed Maisonville bound in a chair and scalped in plain sight of the town's inhabitants. After raising "two pieces of the Skin of the size of a sixpence," Clark pardoned Maisonville.⁵¹ Then, after Hamilton refused to accept Clark's demand for the unconditional surrender of Fort Sackville, Clark gave all who could see another example Anglo-American warcraft. Shortly after surrounding Fort Sackville Clark's men had captured four Indians and another *coureur de bois*. Upon failing to receive his demand for surrender, Clark ordered the prisoners taken into the street opposite the fort's main gate where Hamilton and his garrison could watch the ensuing events unfold.⁵² After sparing the Frenchman's life in a gesture of magnanimity toward the French inhabitants, Clark ordered the four Indians executed. Hamilton described the scene:

One of the others was tomahawked either by Clark or one of his Officers, the other three foreseeing their fate, began to sing their Death song, and were butchered in succession. A young chief of the Ottawa nation called *Macutté Mong* one of these last, having received the fatal stroke of a Tomahawk in the head, took it out and gave it again into the hands of his executioner who repeated the Stroke a second and a third time, after which the miserable being, not entirely deprived of life, was dragged to

Illinois a carrot of peace. For the ambiguous ground the French inhabitants of Illinois occupied between the Patriots and British, see Donald Chaput, "Treason or Loyalty? Frontier French in the American Revolution," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 71 (1978): 242-51.

⁵¹ John D. Barnhart, *Henry Hamilton and George Rogers Clark in the American Revolution, with the Unpublished Journal of Lieut. Gov. Henry Hamilton* (Crawfordsville, Indiana: R.E. Batta, 1951), 182, hereafter cited as *Hamilton's Journal*.

⁵² *Clark Papers*, 167.

the river and thrown in with the rope about his neck where he ended his life and tortures.⁵³

Clark's execution of his Indian prisoners convinced Hamilton that he should accept whatever terms the Patriots offered. While eighteenth-century besiegers often threatened their enemies with death if they did not surrender, such threats by Clark must have seemed very real to Hamilton. When the respective commanders met outside the fort's walls to discuss terms, Clark announced that he would consider only unconditional surrender. As Hamilton tried to argue for more lenient terms, Clark began to wash his hands and face "still reeking" in Macutté Mong's blood, then reiterated his threat to put the entire garrison to death if it did not surrender immediately.⁵⁴ A shaken Hamilton returned to his quarters, conferred with his officers, and opened the fort's gate the next morning. Upon entering the fort, Clark ordered the "Famous Hair Buyer General" arrested, shackled, and transported to Williamsburg. There the Patriots detained him not as a gentleman prisoner of war but a war criminal.⁵⁵

At the same time that the Patriot leadership celebrated Clark's successes in Illinois it prepared to begin the fourth phase of the Patriot-Indian wars in the West. In 1778 the Senecas and Loyalist rangers had devastated the Patriot frontier in western New York. In early 1779, therefore, the Continental Congress determined that the proper response was to raise an army of overwhelming strength and in one campaign turn its full fury on the Senecas. In the end Seneca women and children paid in spades the price for their warriors' and the Loyalists' destruction of the New York frontier.

⁵³ *Hamilton's Journal*, 182-83.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁵⁵ Clark to Patrick Henry, February 3, 1779, *Clark Papers*, 97.

The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign of 1779 is a classic example of unlimited-irregular war making. In one of the most complex Patriot operations of the Revolutionary War, Congress directed that three separate armies -- under Major General John Sullivan, Brigadier General James Clinton, and Colonel Daniel Brodhead -- sweep across New York and converge near Tioga.⁵⁶ From Tioga the combined army, Sullivan noted, would "totally extirpate the unfriendly nations of the Indians, to subdue their country, destroy their crops, and drive them to seek habitations where they would be less troublesome to us and our allies."⁵⁷ The state governments of New York and Pennsylvania, meanwhile, backed Congress's plan and volunteered militiamen to augment the regulars. Pennsylvania went as far as to place a bounty of fifty Spanish dollars on the scalps of female Senecas as an enlistment bonus for its troops.⁵⁸

Patriot armies used the late summer of 1779 to devastate huge tracts of western Iroquoia. Although Brodhead's force could not make the rendezvous point at Tioga, Sullivan's and Clinton's columns, totaling 4,500 troops, managed to link up near the border of New York and Pennsylvania. In August Sullivan's troops brushed aside the last obstacle to their plan when they bested a party of Senecas and Loyalist rangers at the battle of Newton outside present-day Elmira, New York.⁵⁹ A typical Anglo-America campaign

⁵⁶ Alexander Flick, "The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign in 1779," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society* 15 (1930): 66-67.

⁵⁷ John Sullivan's Address to the Oneidas, Albert Hazen Wright, ed., *The Sullivan Expedition of 1779: Contemporary Newspaper Comment and Letters*, 4 vols. (Ithaca: A.H. Wright, 1943), 1: 6, hereafter cited as *Sullivan Expedition*.

⁵⁸ Rufus B. Stone, "Sinnontouan, or Seneca Land, in the Revolution," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 48 (1924): 211.

⁵⁹ Extract of letter from Camp, August 30, 1779, *Sullivan Expedition*, 3: 1.

of annihilation followed. The Patriots poured into the Seneca homelands, killed any Indians they could catch, and destroyed hundreds of houses and thousands of acres of crops in the field. By the end of the campaign, the *Hartford Post* reported, the Seneca villages were in "great heaps of ruin."⁶⁰ Guy Johnson reported to his superiors in London that Patriots had destroyed "almost all the Villages and cornfields of the Six Nations" and forced the survivors forced to flee to British-held Niagara.⁶¹ Everyone in Congress could agree that the campaign had been a resounding success.

The final phase of the Patriot-Indian wars in the West -- the Patriot war with the Shawnees and Delawares -- repeated on a smaller scale the Patriot methods and success of the Sullivan-Clinton Campaign. Between 1780 and 1783 Patriot armies subjected Shawnee and Delaware villages and noncombatants to an unrelenting war of annihilation.

From the beginning of the conflict of 1780-1783 Anglo-American leaders clearly wanted to extirpate the Shawnees and Delawares of the Ohio Valley. Pennsylvania, for instance, promised to continue paying generous bounties on the scalps of Indian women and children.⁶² When the then neutral Delawares, their towns situated between the Patriots and the Shawnee homelands, protested to Patriot leaders that their *entrepreneurs de*

⁶⁰ *Hartford Post*, September 25, 1779, *ibid.*, 3: 11.

⁶¹ Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, October 11, 1781, *NYCD*, 8: 813.

⁶² Summary of a Letter of Pres. Joseph Reed to Col. Daniel Brodhead, April 29, 1780, *Frontier Retreat*, 176. Near the same that the Patriots were encouraging their soldiers to take scalps, British commanders at Detroit were trying to get the Shawnee and Wyandot allies to cease in the practice. Like Loudoun a generation earlier had, Colonel Arent De Peyster advised his auxiliaries that "*Scalps* serve to show me you have seen the enemy, but they are of no use to me, I cannot speak with them." See Col. Arent S. De Peyster to Delawares, April 12, 1781, *ibid.*, 376. By 1781, it seems, Britons had passed on expressing moral outrage at scalping, although they still questioned its military usefulness.

guerre might waylay and kill innocent Delawares, the white officers refused to do anything to allay their fears. The best that they would offer was the Delawares must avoid "the warrior paths" and keep clear of whites.⁶³

Late summer 1780 saw the Patriots begin in earnest their war of annihilation directed against the Shawnees. Congress gave Clark, the most aggressive of the Anglo-America commanders in the West, 800 troops to destroy the Shawnee towns of southern Ohio.⁶⁴ After the Patriot army crossed the Ohio River from Kentucky, the historian Lowell Harrison has written, "small raiding parties spread out over the countryside to inflict maximum damage."⁶⁵ For over a month Clark's raiders devastated and plundered Indian villages and fields. Upon his return to Louisville Clark claimed to have crisscrossed Shawnee territory for 480 miles, scalped forty warriors and women and children, and put to the torch over 800 acres of fields.⁶⁶

In the spring of 1781 the Patriots turned their destructive energies on the Delawares. In March 1781 several Delaware bands had declared for the British and raided Patriot settlements. In retaliation, Colonel Daniel Brodhead, commander of the Patriot forces in the upper Ohio Valley, ordered white settlers to their blockhouses and flooded the frontier with rangers and scalp hunters.⁶⁷ In April he crossed the Ohio River with 300 Continental Army

⁶³ Colonel Daniel Brodhead to the Delawares, May 27, 1780, *ibid.*, 184.

⁶⁴ Rev. John Heckewelder to Col. Daniel Brodhead, August 14, 1780, *ibid.*, 245; Summary of Letter of Col. Brodhead, September 5, 1780, *ibid.*, 271.

⁶⁵ Harrison, *Clark and the War in the West*, 91.

⁶⁶ Clark to Thomas Jefferson, August 22, 1780, *Clark Papers*, 451.

⁶⁷ Col. Daniel Brodhead to Col. David Shepherd, March 8, 1781, *Frontier Retreat*, 242-43.

regulars and set out for Delaware towns near the forks of the Muskingum and Tuscarawas Rivers. "The savages" recalled C. W. Butterfield, one of Brodhead's raiders, "had received no warning of the approach of an enemy." In a driving rain storm the Patriots attacked the Delaware town of Coshocton and laid it waste. Brodhead then led his men against Lichtenau, a Moravian mission town; there they killed fifteen warriors and took twenty old men, women, and children as hostages, but spared the town itself, because it had been a mission. After retreating back across the Ohio to Fort Pitt, Brodhead convened a council of war to determine the fate of his prisoners. "Brodhead, himself a humane and chivalric officer," Butterfield later recalled, "only acted upon the idea of a complete justification according to the usages of war. The warriors were bound, taken a little distance below the town, and dispatched with tomahawks and spears, and then scalped."⁶⁸

The Patriots increased the scale and scope of unlimited war against the Delawares in 1782.⁶⁹ Indeed, 1782 became occasion to one of the most atrocious acts in American military history. Colonel David Williamson's militia company had embarked on a search-and-destroy mission against those Delawares who had not yet surrendered to the Patriots. Upon failing to find any such Delawares, Williamson's men instead turned against the Christian and friendly Delawares at the Moravian mission at Gnadenhutten.⁷⁰ At

⁶⁸ C.W. Butterfield's Narrative of Brodhead's Cosohton Expedition, *ibid.*, 376-79.

⁶⁹ News of Charles Cornwallis's capitulation to the Patriot-French army at Yorktown in October 1781 did not reach Detroit until April 1782. De Pester did his best to minimize the significance of the loss among his Indian allies, and to show that Great Britain intended to carry on the war, sent his allies against the Patriot frontier. See Harrison, *Clark and the War in the West*, 86.

⁷⁰ The year earlier Brodhead had suggested to the Moravian Delaware leaders that they move their settlements close to Fort Pitt where he could offer them protection. See C.W. Butterfield's Narrative of Brodhead's Cosohton Expedition, *Frontier Retreat*, 377. Many of the

Gnadenhutten Williamson's troops gathered nearly 100 Indians, tried them in a kangaroo court, and sentenced them to death. In the ensuing slaughter, many of the Gnadenhutten victims passed their last moments on earth holding hands and singing Christian hymns while their Anglo-American executioners methodically tomahawked them to death. Ninety Indians had their brains beaten out of their heads. With the Indians killed, the Patriots put the mission to the torch.⁷¹

After the Gnadenhutten massacre the cycle of violence rapidly spiraled out of control. Both sides made it clear that no enemies would be spared. In August, near present-day Blue Lick Springs, Kentucky, a Shawnee-Delaware war party ambushed a Patriot militia detachment and then massacred the seventy-seven Patriots who surrendered themselves upon the promise of quarter. The Patriot response, of course, was to seek out more Indians for destruction. In the fall, nearly a year after Yorktown, Clark led over 1,000 Patriots in the war's last major offensive operation. Clark's army razed six Indian villages in Southern Ohio and killed dozens of Indian women and children.⁷² The Patriots' final campaign of the war had no strategic value beyond the desire to avenge Indian attacks on the frontier by killing Indian noncombatants.

Thus ended the Anglo-Americans' wars against the Indians of the West in the era of the American Revolution. Starting in the Patriot-Cherokee war in 1776 and ending in the assaults on the Shawnees and Delawares in

Delawares at Gnadenhutten were there seeking Anglo-American protection from the ravages of war.

⁷¹ White, *Middle Ground*, 390.

⁷² Waller, "Target Detroit," 69-60.

1783, Anglo-Americans made Indian noncombatants the primary focus of their military endeavors. Building upon a tradition that had developed over the previous 175 years, they had put unlimited-irregular approaches at the center of their war making -- and their conception of Indian relations on the frontier.

II: *PETITE GUERRE*

While the Patriot-Indian wars raged on the frontier, a second kind of war, a multilateral *petite guerre* among Patriots, Britons, Loyalists, and Indians, also consumed lives and property on the frontier. In this particular *petite guerre*, Anglo-Americans, especially Loyalists, targeted (as usual) their enemies' noncombatants for destruction; this time, however, they departed from the heretofore-prevalent pattern of directing their attacks at Indians, or cultural "others," and focused their attacks on fellow Anglo-Americans.⁷³ This innovation changed the entire dynamic of Anglo-American warfare by erasing the line that had separated Anglo-American from Indian noncombatants. It would prove to be a transformation of enormous consequence for the American way of war.

⁷³ Robert F. Berkhofer has written that "The 'Indian' is the Native -- or original -- American conceived and imagined as an 'other.' It is the paradigm of human understanding of other human beings according to race or ethnicity, it is the rule for members of the self-designated in-group to divide themselves from those they categorize as an outgroup." In this paradigm, the "other" are understood without or deficient in the values, traits, and virtues ascribed to the in-group by its members. The others' government, religion, economy, arts, behavior, and worldview are always in contrast to the in-groups'. Berkhofer contends that "such a conceptual paradigm lay at the base of the whole conception and understanding of the 'Indian' from the time of Columbus to the present." See Berkhofer, "White Conceptions of Indians," *HNAI*, vol. 4, *History of Indian-White Relations*, 522. Philip Deloria has recently argued for a subtler conception of the other -- one that incorporates aspects of Indian "otherness" in white self-definition. See Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

The *petite guerre* that opposed Anglo-American to Anglo-American did not begin immediately, but ultimately gathered an uncontrollable momentum. From early in the conflict Britons could have used their Indian allies and Loyalist rangers to spread destruction over the Patriot communities and villages of western New York and the upper Ohio Valley, but refrained until 1778 from allowing Indian raiders and Loyalist rangers to attack along the frontier. From then until the end of the war Loyalist and Indian raiders subjected Patriot settlements across New York and in the upper Ohio Valley to devastating raids, inflicting suffering on enemy noncombatants in a style reminiscent of the Thirty Years' War in Central Europe.

From the first months of the conflict the British had a large irregular corps at their disposal. Britons, Loyalists, and Patriots alike knew that the Iroquois League would play an important role in any war fought on the New York frontier. George Washington, for instance, noted that the failure of the Patriots to secure at least neutrality from the Senecas and Mohawks "would be a most fatal stroke" to Patriot interests.⁷⁴ Both the British and Patriots, as a result, rushed emissaries to the Iroquois council houses in hopes of winning the League's support.⁷⁵ Even then, however, the Mohawk leader Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea), common-law brother-in-law of the late Sir William Johnson, was in London being fêted at the highest levels of the British cabinet, and the Patriots stood little chance of securing either Mohawk

⁷⁴ Washington to Philip Schuyler, April 19, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 4: 90.

⁷⁵ For the Patriots' efforts to bring the Iroquois to the American camp, see Proceedings of the Commissioners of the Twelve United Colonies with the Six Nations, August 15, 1775, *NYCD*, 8: 606. For the British side of Iroquois-British diplomacy, see Journal of Colonel Guy Johnson from May to November, 1775, *NYCD*, 8: 658.

amiability or neutrality. Upon receiving Lord George Germain's pledge to investigate Brant's claims that Anglo-American settlers had encroached upon Mohawk lands, Brant promised to help the British resolve the "troubles in America."⁷⁶ The Senecas, meanwhile, followed the Mohawks' lead and joined the British. Only the smaller nations -- the Oneidas, Cayugas, Tuscaroras, and Onondagas -- showed any disposition to support the rebels, probably reflecting historical Iroquois tendencies to seek a neutral position from which to play off white enemies against one another.

The British, nevertheless, chose not to play the Iroquois card for the first two years of the war. Although Major General John Burgoyne threatened the white settlers on the New York frontier that he would "give stretch to the Indian forces" under his direction and promised "devastation, and famine and every concomitant horror" if they aided the rebels, British commanders saw little need to destroy the Patriot frontier with Iroquois warriors in either 1776 or 1777.⁷⁷ Since Britons assumed that a regular-style victory alone could be won on the frontier, they used the Senecas and Mohawks primarily as scouts. Indeed, as late as October 1777 Burgoyne took time to chastise the Patriots for allowing their Oneida, Cayuga, and Stockbridge allies to mistreat British captives. Gentleman officers, Burgoyne contended, simply did not allow their troops -- or even their allies -- to abuse their prisoners.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Answer of Captain Brant to Lord George Germain, May 7, 1776, *ibid.*, 8: 678.

⁷⁷ Burgoyne quoted in Harry M. Ward, *The American Revolution: Nationhood Achieved, 1763-1788* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 112. The Patriots made great use of the Burgoyne's pronouncements to turn public opinion against the British, especially after Burgoyne's Mohawk allies scalped Jane McCrea. The killing of McCrea became a *cause célèbre* to rally Patriot support against the British "invaders" of New York.

⁷⁸ George Washington to John Hancock, October 5, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 6: 475. Washington took no exception of his Indian allies' harsh treatment of their British captives. Washington knew that if the Patriots looked the other way as their Indian allies mistreated their captives, the Indians would be more likely to join the Patriots on future

But the British disaster at Saratoga and the French alliance that ensued changed the entire course of the war on the New York frontier. British commanders in Canada, with the loss of 7,000 British and German regulars found that they had too few regulars on hand to use in other than defensive roles, and no prospect of acquiring a replacement for Burgoyne's force; they therefore turned to irregulars for all offensive operations on the New York frontier. As British planners diverted troops slated for North American to the defense of the West Indies, there seemed no alternative to using Iroquois and Loyalist rangers to wage war against the Patriot enemy.⁷⁹

The summer of 1778 therefore saw the beginning of the Iroquois-Loyalist onslaught against the Patriot frontier. In July Colonel John Butler commanded a combined force of over 1,000 Loyalist rangers, Senecas warriors under The Old King (Kaien?kwaahtoñ) and Cornplanter (Kaiutwah?ku), which, together with one company of British regulars, fell on the Patriots in the Wyoming Valley along the north branch of the Susquehanna River. Butler later would claim that after his troops had overwhelmed the militia protecting the settlements he tried to restrain Cornplanter's Senecas from plundering and scalping. Nevertheless, over 70 Patriots, including women and children, were killed and scalped.⁸⁰ "Man,

campaigns. "Perhaps in point of policy," he suggested to Hancock, "it may not be improper to overlook these infractions on their [the Indians'] part."

⁷⁹ For the changes in British grand strategy following their defeat at Saratoga see Piers Mackesy, *The War for America, 1775-1783* (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1964), chap. 7. Mackesy has written that after Saratoga there was a growing belief within the highest levels of British policy making circles that Northern colonies "were not worth the effort of recovering" (p. 158). By using the Indians and Loyalist irregulars against the Patriot frontier, Britons could therefore expend the fewest resources to gain maximum advantage of keeping the rebels off balance and perhaps punish them, as well.

⁸⁰ *Sullivan Expedition*, 1: 19.

woman, and child were either cut down or carried off with us," one of Butler's ranger officers later recounted, "the dwellings plundered, devastated, and burned." The Loyalists rangers were no less culpable than the Senecas. When Captain Johann Ewald of the Hessian *jägers* inquired if he too had killed and scalped, the ranger replied "Oh Yes! In the same affair I had worked with my tomahawk and scalping knife that my arms were bloody above the elbows." His excuse: "I was born and brought up among these people, and am trained in their customs. He who lives with the Indians and to enjoy their friendship must conform to them in all respects, but then one can depend upon these good people."⁸¹

The "Wyoming Massacre" -- as John Butler's raid became known -- was only the first of a series of devastating attacks that racked the New York frontier in 1778. In September Brant's Mohawks joined with Captain William Caldwell's company of Loyalist rangers to destroy the Patriot settlement at German Flats.⁸² For most of October the raiders roamed Ulster County, New York, burning farms and killing anyone they could catch. Then, in November, Brant's Mohawks left Caldwell to link up 200 rangers under Captain Walter Butler, and a band of Senecas under Little Beard (Sequidonquee) for an attack on Cherry Valley.⁸³ After capturing all the settlers except for those who managed to retreat to a blockhouse, Little Beard's Senecas killed and

⁸¹ Ewald's diary entry, June 6, 1779, *Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal*, ed. and trans. Joseph P. Tustin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 166, hereafter cited as *Ewald's Diary*.

⁸² Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, September 10, 1778, NYCD, 8:752.

⁸³ Butler had assumed command of the rangers after his father fell ill.

scalped their prisoners -- about thirty in all.⁸⁴ By the end of 1778 and after the "Cherry Valley Massacre" Butler's Rangers had become from the Patriots' perspective an "infamous corps of murderers."⁸⁵

The Mohawk-Loyalist raids against the Patriot frontier continued for the first half of 1779. Brant's Mohawks ranged as far east as Minisink on the Delaware River where they destroyed a Patriot militia detachment sent to ambush them, put the settlement to the torch, and killed some of their militia captives.⁸⁶ But with Sullivan's and Clinton's columns converging on the Seneca homelands, John Butler, Brant, and Cornplanter had to pull back from the Patriot frontier to defend western Iroquoia. Their resulting defeat at Newton and the destruction of the Senecas' homeland gave the Patriots in western New York a reprieve from Indian and Loyalist attacks.

In the upper Ohio Valley, meanwhile, British commanders came to the same conclusion that their compatriots in New York had reached. Although Clark had condemned Hamilton as "the Hair Buyer," the Lieutenant Governor in fact had limited Indian participation in the war to only small scalping parties.⁸⁷ His superiors in Canada, particularly Guy Carleton, feared that a general Indian conflagration in Ohio would drive white settlers to the Patriot

⁸⁴ DCB, s.v., "Thayendanegea," "Butler, John," "Butler, Walter." Like his father after the "Wyoming Massacre," Walter Butler claimed innocence in ordering the one at Cherry Valley. Of course, one has to ask if Loyalist or British officers justifiably could have expected that their Iroquois allies would not massacre their captives. As the ranger officer told Ewald, when the Indians were "far from their homeland" they rarely offered quarter to their vanquished foes. See *Ewald's Diary*, June 6, 1779, 166.

⁸⁵ Multiple contemporary newspaper accounts, *Sullivan Expedition*, 2: 37-38.

⁸⁶ DCB, s.v. "Thayendanegea."

⁸⁷ For Hamilton's Indian policy, see Waller, "Target Detroit," 50 and Jack M. Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-Assessment of Responsibility," *Canadian Historical Review* 46 (1965): 101-21.

cause. But with the British reduced to holding only trading posts at St. Joseph, Michilimackinac, Detroit, and Sandusky, and their Indian allies leaving them in droves as a result of the Patriots' successes, the new British commander in Canada, Major General Frederick Haldimand, gave Colonel Arent De Peyster, Hamilton's successor, permission to use the crown's western Indian allies as he saw fit.⁸⁸

De Peyster put Indians and Loyalists at the center of his operations for the summer of 1780. In the spring of that year he sent Colonel Henry Bird with 150 regulars and Loyalist rangers and 700 Indians to attack Fort Nelson, the Patriot outpost at present-day Louisville, Kentucky.⁸⁹ On the march southward from Detroit, however, Bird's Shawnee, Wyandot, and Ottawa auxiliaries learned that Clark knew of Bird's target and had prepared an ambush for them. The Indians then suggested that Bird instead attack the thinly defended Patriot settlements along the Licking River in Kentucky. Bird diverted his column and in June reached the Kentucky settlements. The slaughter the Indians and rangers perpetrated was unprecedented; as the Bird's column advanced down the Licking Valley it destroyed whatever could not escape: at Ruddle's Station, for instance, they massacred 200 men, women, and children. In a particularly brutal act, even by frontier standards, Bird's allies won the vehement hatred of the Patriots when the few survivors who managed to escape the carnage reported that the Indians had made sport of throwing John Ruddle's infant and wife, while still alive, into a bonfire.

⁸⁸ Waller, "Target Detroit," 48. Richard White has written that at the same time that the British seemed to be losing influence in the *pays d'en haut*, so did the Patriots. The "Indian hating" of the Anglo-Americans, manifested in the murders of innocent Indians, offered the British an opportunity to regain Indian allies in the struggle against the Patriots. See White, *Middle Ground*, 396.

⁸⁹ Captain Killbuck to Colonel Daniel Brodhead, June 7, 1780, *Frontier Retreat*, 191.

Bird, nonetheless, deserves some credit for at least trying to limit the scale of the slaughter. With over 340 captives in hand, and worried that he would not be able to protect them indefinitely, he ordered a hasty retreat to Detroit, and thereby spared vulnerable Lexington.⁹⁰

As Great Britain's first major victory in the West, the Licking River raids devastated Patriot morale. Many Kentuckians, with "doubts and fears" in their minds, quit the frontier. "From what I have seen of the situation of the Enemy's Country," the Patriot Colonel John Floyd reported, "they can at any time they please carry on a campaign against this part of the country with equal success to" Bird's.⁹¹

While the Patriots in Kentucky reeled under the onslaught of Bird's raiders, Sir John Johnson struck on the New York frontier. The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign, besides devastating huge tracts of western Iroquoia, also fueled the Senecas' commitment to the British. In the spring of 1780 Johnson welcomed a large Seneca army at Niagara, and after augmenting it with Butler's Rangers and troops of his own King's Royal Regiment of New York, advanced toward the Patriot settlements in the Mohawk River Valley.⁹² While Brant's Mohawks moved against the villages of the Oneidas and Tuscaroras, thereby denying the Patriots much of their intelligence network, Johnson's

⁹⁰ Captain Killbuck and the Delaware Council to Col. Daniel Brodhead, July 19, 1780, *Frontier Retreat*, 220.

⁹¹ Colonel John Floyd to Colonel William Preston, August 25, 1780, *ibid.*, 266.

⁹² Governor [James] Robertson to Lord George Germain, July 1, 1780, *NYCD*, 9: 793. In 1776 Patriot militia had sized Johnson's wife, Mary Watts Johnson, as hostage in the hopes that if they held her, Johnson would not attack the frontier. See Mary Watts Johnson to George Washington, June 16, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 5: 5. Mary's captivity seems not to have discouraged Sir John from waging war against the Patriots. The Patriots also held kin of the Butlers. That too seems not to have prevented them from waging war vigorously on the New York frontier. For the hardship endured by the Senecas at Niagara, see Calloway, *American Revolution in Indian Country*, chap. 5.

raiders swept across western New York. By June alone he could report that his Indians and rangers had killed or made prisoner 156 Patriot settlers. Throughout the summer Indians and Loyalists remained in the field. In the fall they swept down on Canajoharie and Schoharie and laid waste to those settlements and the stores of grain without which the Patriots would suffer famine in the winter.⁹³ Upon assessing the impact of Johnson's campaign, Guy Johnson judged it one of the major accomplishments of British and Loyalist arms on the New York frontier.⁹⁴

By 1781, after suffering under three seasons of raids, the western New York frontier had become a no-man's land. Few Patriots remained on the frontier as most had fled eastward toward the relatively more secure confines of Schenectady.⁹⁵ There remained standing no Patriot targets worthy of a major effort. After sending the Mohawks against the Oneida villages for good measure, Guy Johnson dispatched Brant and his warriors the Ohio country. It was there in August that Brant and his Mohawks ambushed a detachment from Clark's army and killed or captured all of them. Meanwhile, with few targets of opportunity remaining in western New York, Guy Johnson continued to probe for advantage with his irregular corps. In October he instructed Major John Ross of the 35th Regiment of Foot and Captain Walter Butler to take 1,200 Indians, rangers, and regulars and sack Schenectady, the largest surviving Patriot outpost on the New York frontier. At the battle of

⁹³ Mr. Heron's Information on a Conversation at New York, September 4, 1780, NYCD, 8:806.

⁹⁴ Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, July 26, 1780, *ibid.* 8: 797.

⁹⁵ For a fictional account of the fear that the Senecas, Mohawks, and Loyalist rangers inspired along the New York frontier among Patriots see Walter D. Edmonds's classic of American historical fiction, *Drums Along the Mohawk* (1936; reprint, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

Johnstown, however, Patriot militia managed to situate itself between the Ross and his target. Since his mission was not to fight the Patriots in the open but rather destroy Patriot settlements, Ross began an orderly retreat back to Niagara. For most of the march westward Patriot rangers, militia, and Oneida scouts nipped at Ross's flanks. On October 30 an Oneida war party captured Walter Butler and executed him. "The rebels of the Mohawk Valley," it has been said, "rejoiced more over the news of his death than they did at the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown."⁹⁶

The death of Walter Butler brought to an end the *petite guerre* of the New York frontier. In four years of fighting, in both New York and the upper Ohio Valley, British commanders had used their Indian allies and Loyalist irregulars with devastating success in a war of annihilation against Patriot civilians. Beyond destroying the Patriot frontier, that war pointed to a new development in the evolution of Anglo-American warfare. By using Indians and Loyalists in a war on civilians, Britons and Anglo-Americans had started the Anglo-American way of war down a path toward the ultimate acceptance of unlimited-irregular attacks on Anglo-Americans by Anglo-Americans.

III: THE PARTISAN WAR

While it might be tempting to attribute to the Indians the ubiquity of massacres and atrocities committed on the western frontier after 1778, one must remember that in the theaters where Indians played no significant role, Loyalist and Patriot Anglo-Americans turned their tradition of unlimited-irregular war on one another. In the savage partisan war fought in the

⁹⁶ DCB, s.v. "Butler, John."

shadows of the Continental and British Armies' regular conflict in the North and the Carolinas, irregulars on both sides made Anglo-American unlimited-irregular warcraft the primary focus of their military endeavors.

Since the events of the partisan wars are well known there is no need to relate in detail the raids, counter raids, and killings, burnings, and lootings that comprised those conflicts.⁹⁷ It is, however, necessary to examine the process by which, and the reasons why, unlimited-irregular warcraft came to dominate the partisan wars in the North and Carolinas. Once we understand why, as much as how, Anglo-Americans fought one another in the partisan war, we can assess its impact on the broader development of the Anglo-American way of war.

Between 1775 and 1781 both the North and the Carolinas saw an inexorable march toward the wholesale application of unlimited-irregular war by Anglo-Americans against Anglo-Americans. Commanders on both sides entered the war by making clear that they intended to fight a regular war and demanded a strict separation between combatants and noncombatants. Below the highest echelon of commanders, however, there were hardliners, junior officers who felt little compunction about unleashing the dogs of war against the other side's noncombatants. Gradually both the British and the rebels manifested the hardliners' attitudes. As the level of violence directed against noncombatants increased, so to did the number of Anglo-Americans who sought vengeance against their enemies by serving in irregular corps.

⁹⁷ Besides the works noted above in note 1 that discuss the partisan war in the South, see Mark V. Kwasny's *Washington's Partisan War, 1775-1783* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1996) for the irregular conflict in the New York-Connecticut-New Jersey theater of operations.

Within less than two years of the outbreak of open hostilities, irregular units managed to attract many of the most capable and aggressive officers of both sides. All the elements of unlimited partisan war were in place; all that remained needful was for either the Patriot or the British high command to create an environment in which irregulars could play a decisive role.

Thomas Gage and the rest of the British high command hoped to avoid becoming mired in a bloody partisan war. Although Gage made public proclamations to the effect that he would string the rebels from the nearest trees for their treasonous behavior, he refused to implement a program of proscription against rebel sympathizers like that used in the Highlands in the wake of the '45.⁹⁸ Gage, in fact, could not fathom that he faced the first stages of a revolutionary struggle.⁹⁹ Although he considered the rebels "Spirited up by a rage and Enthusiasm, as great as ever People were possessed of," Gage maintained that he could quash the rebellion alone with a large reinforcement of regular troops with which to engage Washington's army in battle.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Henry Clinton, *The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782, with an Appendix of Original Documents*, ed. William B. Willcox (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), 16.

⁹⁹ John Shy, "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War," in *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence*, rev. ed., (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1990), 244. Shy has written that Britons' perception of the war went through three phases. They initially saw the war as a kind of police action requiring the re-establishment of British law. After the outbreak of actual fighting, the police action turned into a eighteenth-century limited war. In the third and last stage, the British began to take into account the need to protect Loyalist citizens and considered the military potential they offered to the British Army, thus in turn leading to the military pacification of the South.

¹⁰⁰ Gage to Barrington, June 26, 1776, *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage, with the Secretaries of State and with the War Office and the Treasury*, comp. and ed. Clarence Edwin Carter, 2 vols. (1933; reprint, New York: Archon Books, 1969), 2: 686.

Since they thought it would be a limited one on the eighteenth-century model of regular war, commanders initially issued orders not to harm enemy noncombatants and civilians. "To the Glory of Civilized nations, humanity and War have become compatible," Gage wrote to Washington in the summer of 1775, "and compassion to the subdued, is become almost a general system."¹⁰¹ Major General William Howe, Gage's successor and empowered by King George III to make peace as well as to prosecute the war, ordered that his troops "upon no Account to Molest or Commit any Depredations upon the Inhabitants of" New York.¹⁰² Major General Henry Clinton, who followed Howe as Commander in Chief, likewise wanted his troops, particularly his Loyalists, to "restrain themselves from offering violence to innocent and inoffensive people, and by all means in you power protect the aged, the infirm, the woman and children from insult and outrage."¹⁰³

A split between rhetoric and reality nonetheless soon emerged. Within the British officer corps there were what Stephen Conway has termed the "conciliators" and "hardliners." While the conciliators recommended and practiced restraint toward the colonists, the hardliners proposed to bludgeon on the colonists into submission. "The conciliators," Conway writes, "were convinced that mild treatment of civilians was essential if the British were to gain worthwhile victory" while "hatred, fear, anger, and frustration all help to

¹⁰¹ Gage to Washington, August 13, 1775, *Papers of Washington*, 1: 301.

¹⁰² William Howe Orderly Book, August 22, 1776, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

¹⁰³ Clinton quoted in Shy, "The Military Conflict," 231.

account for a predilection for severity" among the hardliners.¹⁰⁴ At the core of the conciliators' attitude was what Lord Rawdon denigrated as a flawed perception "that the hostile declaration of the Bostonians, were only the clamour of a small wrong-headed party, whose rage would quickly subside if left to itself, whereas an exertion of military force might only make the affair become serious."¹⁰⁵ As the war went on, and the hardliners came to predominate, "many localities were subjected to small-scale versions of the general policy of harshness that they advocated -- probably many more than experienced the benevolent attentions of conciliatory officers."¹⁰⁶

As early as the fall of 1775 hardliner attitudes shaped British operational planning. A large show of force, the hardliners contended, might be enough to douse the flames of rebellion.¹⁰⁷ As such, British sailors and marines sailed out from Boston and burned Falmouth (Portland) Maine to the ground. Britons publicly claimed that they had destroyed Falmouth as retaliation for that community's support of rebel privateers.¹⁰⁸ George Washington saw the raid in a different light, as an attempt to intimidate the local rebellious populace into submission as well a gain for Patriot propaganda. "A few more of such flaming Arguments as were exhibited at

¹⁰⁴ Stephen Conway, "To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the Conduct of the Revolutionary War," *WMQ* 43 (1986): 382.

¹⁰⁵ Francis, Lord Rawdon to Francis, tenth earl of Huntingdon, August 3, 1775, *Hastings Manuscripts* 3: 157.

¹⁰⁶ Conway, "To Subdue America," 405.

¹⁰⁷ Francis, Lord Rawdon to Francis, tenth earl of Huntingdon, December 13, 1775, *Hastings Manuscripts*, 3: 161.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Oliver, *Peter Oliver's Origin & Progress of the American Rebellion*, ed. Douglass Adair and John A. Schutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 140-41.

Falmouth," Washington wrote, "will not leave numbers at a loss to decide upon the Propriety of Separation."¹⁰⁹

There were, of course, hardliners among the Patriots as well. As events on the battlefield unfolded against Patriots even the most conciliatory-minded rebel leaders could become hardliners. After suffering combat losses the Patriot civil and military leadership escalated the war to begin the state-sanctioned harassment of Loyalist civilians. Connecticut's Governor Jonathan Trumbull, for instance, moved in late 1775 to confiscate all Loyalist property in the area rebel troops controlled.¹¹⁰ Washington, as he fled headlong across New York and into New Jersey, forgetting that the Falmouth raids had driven neutrals into the Patriot camp, ordered Loyalist families deported from New York and New Jersey.¹¹¹

The hardliners' policies regularly backfired. The British, for instance, blundered badly in New York by failing to restrain overzealous and abusive leaders. Because they failed to reinstate civil government in New York, partly out of ignorance of the need to do so and partly out of antipathy to the colonists, they managed to turn one of the most staunchly loyal areas in late 1775 into a den of rebellion by the end of the war.¹¹² Rawdon's disregard for

¹⁰⁹ Washington to Joseph Reed, January 31, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 3: 226. Both Gage and his naval counterpart, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves, worried that burning a town "in that early stage of the quarrel might possibly excite in England as well as in the colonies" hostility to the British cause. See *Clinton's Narrative*, 16. Yet they still ordered the destruction of Falmouth.

¹¹⁰ Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., to Washington, January 1, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 3: 7.

¹¹¹ George Washington to Secret Committee of the New York Convention, July 13, 1776, *ibid.*, 5: 298; Washington to Samuel Tucker, August 7, 1776, *ibid.*, 5: 616-17.

¹¹² For British civil-military policy in New York, see Joseph S. Tiedemann, "Patriots by Default: Queen's County, New York, and the British Army, 1776-1783," *WMQ* 43 (1986): 35-63 and Milton M. Klein, "Why Did the British Fail to Win the Hearts and Minds of New Yorkers?," *New York History* (1983): 357-75.

the concerns of Loyalists who charged British soldiers for sexually assaulting their wives and daughters sheds light on the attitude of many Britons who treated the New Yorkers not as liberated friends but potentially rebellious foes. "The fair nymphs of the isle," Rawdon mockingly wrote, "are in wonderful tribulation, as the fresh meat our men have got here has made them as riotous as satyrs. A girl cannot step into the bushes to pluck a rose without running the most imminent risk of being ravished, and they are so little accustomed to these vigorous methods that they don't bear them with the proper resignation, and of consequence we have most entertaining courts-martial every day."¹¹³

The Patriots' policies to win the hearts and minds of neutral Anglo-Americans often were no better. The case of Thomas Brown, who became of the most brutal and vindictive Loyalist partisan leaders of the war, is instructive. Concerned about the number of backcountry inhabitants who were passively if not actively hostile to the Patriot cause, the Georgia Sons of Liberty and Patriot militia set out in August 1775 to make an example of Brown, a wealthy planter with influence in the backcountry. The Patriots captured Brown at his home in Augusta and then set about "convincing" him of the errors of his ways. They applied burning splinters to his feet, shaved his head, shackled him in a cart, and paraded him through the town's streets. Brown, to save himself, publicly swore allegiance to the Patriot provisional government. The morning following his public humiliation, however, Brown began to look for a way to strike back at his tormentors. Upon the first

¹¹³ Francis, Lord Rawdon to Francis, tenth earl of Huntingdon, August 5, 1776, *Hastings Manuscripts*, 3:179. Rawdon's reference to rape is the only primary source account of sexual assault in North American that I found explicitly mentioned in my research for this dissertation.

opportunity that presented itself and after recovering from his wounds, Brown fled to British East Florida where he raised the Florida Rangers that raided Georgia throughout the war and lobbied for arms and matériel to equip the Cherokees and Creeks for raids against Patriot settlements.¹¹⁴

The "disaffected" on both sides, as a result, flocked to join the British and Patriot armies. Besides the Loyalist militia that mustered and skirmished with their Patriot counterparts for control of the local populations, thousands of Loyalists rushed to join the British provincial irregular corps.¹¹⁵ During the war over 50,000 Loyalists in over 40 provincial battalions (many of them irregular corps) served with the British army in North America.¹¹⁶ From the British perspective the most sought-after Anglo-Americans were those that had suffered at the hands of Patriot mobs, paramilitary groups, and militia. New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey, where Patriot mobs ran rampant terrorizing Loyalist families, therefore offered British partisan officers a deep pool of such recruits upon which to draw. Indeed, because of the insults and privation of having their property confiscated and their persons assaulted, the New Jersey Loyalists, John Graves Simcoe of the irregular Queen's Rangers told Rawdon, were the best and most willing irregular troops.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ For Brown's treatment at the hands of the Patriots, see Marvin L. Cann, "Prelude to War: The First Battle of Ninety Six," *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 76 (1973): 201. See also, Johnson, *Militiamen, Rangers, and Redcoats*, 120. For Brown's career as a guerrilla leaders, see Edward J. Cashin, *The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown and the American Revolution on the Southern Frontier* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989), 26.

¹¹⁵ For the creation of Loyalist militia units, see Philip Katcher, "Loyalist Militia in the War of American Independence," *JSAHR* 54 (1976): 136-40.

¹¹⁶ Among the most feared of the irregular corps from the Patriots' perspective were Brown's Florida Rangers, the Queen's Rangers, Tarleton's British Legion, and Benedict Arnold's American Legion.

¹¹⁷ Simcoe to Lord Rawdon, January 24, 1780, Huntington Manuscript 22539, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.

The irregular corps became the place where junior officers could make a name for themselves. On the Patriot side Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter -- who historian Robert Bass judged "a genius at arousing, organizing, and leading irregular troops"¹¹⁸ -- became partisans because they were offered the command of irregular units.¹¹⁹ Unfortunately for the Patriots, the two best irregulars of the Seven Years' War remained loyal and created their own irregular corps. Joseph Gorham raised the Royal Fencible Americans in June 1775 for service in Nova Scotia.¹²⁰ Robert Rogers joined the King's forces the next year. Although it now seems clear that Rogers hoped to sell his services to the highest bidder, George Washington, having no desire to face a partisan as skilled as Rogers, ordered him arrested. "The Major's reputation," Washington wrote, "has increased my jealousies about him."¹²¹ That settled matters from Rogers's point of view. He fled to British lines and in August 1776 raised from mostly New York and western Connecticut Loyalists the Queen's Rangers. By the end of the war, the Queen's Rangers, under the command of Rogers, and later Simcoe, had become one of the most efficient and effective units in the British Army.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Robert D. Bass, *Gamecock: The Life and Campaigns of General Thomas Sumter* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 3.

¹¹⁹ Marion O.B., November 11-12, 1775, vol. 1, part 1; December 7, 1775, vol. 1, part 1; October 22, 1776, vol. 1, part 1. For Marion's background and motivation in becoming a partisan leader, see Daniel E. Fitz-Simons, "Francis Marion the 'Swamp Fox': Anatomy of a Low-Intensity Conflict," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 6 (1995): 1-16.

¹²⁰ *Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units, 1775-1783*, s.v. "Royal Fencible Americans."

¹²¹ Washington to John Hancock, June 27, 1776, *Papers of Washington*, 5: 122-23.

¹²² *Encyclopedia of British, Provincial, and German Army Units, 1775-1783*, s.v. "Queen's Rangers." Rogers, by then an alcoholic and only a shadow of the leader that he had been in the Seven Years' War, commanded the Queen's rangers until October 1776 when a Patriot militia detachment defeated him at Mamaroneck near Long Island Sound. Command of the Queen's Rangers then fell to a Lieutenant Colonel French and then Major

When the opportunity presented itself to command the Queen's Rangers, Simcoe jumped at it. "My wish has been gratified, and my ambition satisfied," he wrote to Major General Howe, "in being interested by your Excellency with the Command I wished for, a Command of Light Troops for Active Service."

¹²³ By 1779 Simcoe was a bane to Patriot regulars and irregulars alike.

Once the irregulars were in place all that was required for an unlimited-irregular war to become part of the War for Independence was for either Patriot or British commanders to make it one. While on the frontier it had been British commanders who first turned to *petite guerre* against Anglo-Americans by Anglo-Americans, in the North it was George Washington. Following the disaster of the 1776 campaigning season and his minor recovery at Trenton and Princeton, Washington made eighteenth-century western European *petite guerre* a focus of his operations. Throughout the winter of 1776-1777 he sent out irregular units from his winter quarters at Morristown to harass British outposts, convoys, and foraging parties. It was a war, Ewald wrote, of "daily skirmishing of our patrols and the continual alarms of the outposts of both sides."¹²⁴ However, the intended eighteenth-century *petite guerre* quickly degenerated into an eighteenth-century Anglo-American unlimited-irregular war. Within only a short matter of time Washington's partisans became involved in an ongoing fight with Loyalist

James Wemyss. In October 1777 command of the Rangers was given to the Major John Graves Simcoe. For histories of the Queen's Rangers, see Simcoe, *Simcoe's Military Journal* (1784; reprint, Toronto: Baxter Publishing Company); George Herbert Locke, *The Queen's Rangers* (Toronto: Public Library of Toronto, n.d.); and James Hannay, "History of the Queen's Rangers," *Proceedings of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 2 (1908): 123-86.

¹²³ Simcoe to William Howe, May 18, 1778, Hunting Manuscript 22548, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA

¹²⁴ Ewald's *Diary*, 55.

irregulars and militia. The result was the now familiar war of burning, killing, and plundering of combatant and noncombatant alike.

After 1778 and the failure of the British Army to win a regular victory in the North, commanders on both sides had new reason to increase their emphasis on partisan operations. Many of the same considerations that had led British commanders to turn to a *petite guerre* on the frontier led them to turn to a partisan war in the Carolinas. At the core of the British planning for the conquest of the South was the belief that Loyalists would flock to the British banner and make the regular army's job in the South that much easier.¹²⁵ But soon after turning loose the Loyalist irregulars, Lord Charles Cornwallis lost his ability to control their activities. Instead of waging a western-European kind of *petite guerre* or pacification programs to support his *grande guerre*, the Loyalist turned on Patriot noncombatants and civilians.¹²⁶ The Patriots, of course, responded in kind. The result, as Nathanael Greene observed, was that the Carolinas were laid waste by bands of marauding rebels and Loyalists who behaved more like beasts of prey than "proper" eighteenth century soldiers.

In the final analysis, that Anglo-Americans chose to butcher one another in the Carolina's partisan war should not seem shocking. They had entered the war with a longstanding tradition of defeating their enemies by making targets of their women and children. Indeed, Patriot Anglo-Americans

¹²⁵ For the British policy changes that led to the use of Loyalists in the South, and with it the resultant partisan war, see John Shy, "British Strategy for Pacifying the Southern Colonies, 1778-1781," in *A People Numerous and Armed*, 193-212.

¹²⁶ For the many problems that Cornwallis had in controlling his Loyalist partisans and his inability to get them to fight as he wished, see Louis D.F. Frasc  , "Problems of Command: Partisans and Militia, 1780," *Military Review* 57 (1977): 60-74.

embraced that very tradition as the centerpiece of their wars against Indians on the frontier. Britons and Loyalist Anglo-Americans, meanwhile, decided in 1778 that military necessity dictated that they too focus their destructive energies on the enemies' noncombatants, even if it meant that those noncombatants were the Anglo-American women and children of the western New York frontier and the upper Ohio Valley. By the time the partisan war in the Carolinas erupted, the wars on the frontier had prepared Patriots, Britons, and Loyalists to wage an irregular war. Of course, in the formula of Anglo-American warcraft, irregular war's old partner was devastating and horrific unlimited war. That remained the case in the partisan war as well. All that was different was that in the partisan war Anglo-Americans found reasons and ways to use those tactics against one another.

EPILOGUE

The regular side of our military heritage overshadows the ubiquity and permanence of unlimited and irregular war in Americans' culture of war making. American military history, the conventional wisdom seems to show, progressed through the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries in a series of regular wars. Indeed, historians have focused on Americans' conflicts between the War of 1812 and the Second World War as little more than regular conflicts. In those instances when Americans embraced unlimited means -- whether William T. Sherman's march through the South in 1864 and 1865, or in the dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 -- Americans, the historians point out, attacked civilian populations only as a means to the end of increasing the effectiveness of regular warcraft. "To fight the enemy armies was immensely expensive, above all in lives," Russell Weigley has written to explain why Sherman unleashed his armies on the women and children of the Confederacy. Weigley has pointed out that

Sherman came to believe that if terror and destruction of war could be carried straight to the enemy people, then they would lose their zest for war, and lacking the people's support, the enemy armies would collapse of their own weight. So he made of his marches campaigns of terror and destruction, with his armies ordered to forage liberally on the country, with all war industries and transport his target, and with greater depredations by his men treated leniently.¹

¹ Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1973), 149.

Yet underlying each of the regular conflicts were unlimited and irregular wars and campaigns. Indeed, from the first campaigns of the United States Army, unlimited-irregular war waged against enemy noncombatants in its own right has been a leitmotiv within the way that Americans have fought. In 1789, for instance, Secretary of War Henry Knox ordered the newly formed United States Army to "extirpate utterly, if possible" the hostile Indians of the West.² The practice of conducting unlimited-irregular war against Indian civilians on the frontier in fact defined Americans' strategy and tactics throughout the nineteenth century, from the campaign to destroy the Shawnee Prophet's (Tenskwatawa's) Town that led to the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, through the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864, and culminating at Wounded Knee in 1890.³ Americans, of course, also waged their annihilationist campaigns against their white enemies' noncombatants. In the War of 1812, American troops burned and pillaged York, Canada after it had surrendered. During the Civil War, besides Sherman's March to the Sea, Americans, the most famous being William Quantrill and his band of Confederate raiders, fought a bloody guerrilla war in Missouri and Kentucky reminiscent of the partisan war waged in the Carolinas during the Revolution.

² Knox quoted in Francis Paul Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier 1783-1846* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 20.

³ Tippecanoe was the U.S. Army's most well known victory against the Indians of the West between the Battle of Fallen Timbers and the end of the Indian wars in 1890. Yet unlimited-irregular operations precipitated the battle. In November 1811 William Henry Harrison led an American army against the Prophet's Town to destroy it. Tenskwatawa was the brother of Tecumseh, the Shawnee leader the Americans held most responsible for encouraging Indians throughout the West to resist the United States' demands for Indian lands. On November 7, 1811 Tenskwatawa's warriors launched a preemptive strike against Harrison's army as it camped outside their town. After suffering nearly 200 casualties the American troops drove the Indians from the battlefield. The Americans then seized the food supplies they needed and completed their assigned mission and burned the town.

For the most part, however, we Americans like to think that our military culture neither condones nor encourages the killing of noncombatants.⁴ Today we recoil at the news reports of the killings of innocent men, women, and children in the Balkans or Central Africa. We judge those events of genocide as acts that fall far and wide outside the norm of American behavior. And when we look into our military past and see something like the My Lai Massacre, we can rationalize it as an anomaly or the result of an overzealous and deranged junior officer like Lieutenant William Calley, not as a grim waypoint in the evolution of an American way of war against civilians.

Coming to terms with what happened at My Lai, or for that matter any other American "atrocities," forces us to the crux of the question this study has attempted to answer: where does war waged against noncombatants fit in the American culture of war making? American soldiers killing noncombatants is not, as Stephen Ambrose has suggested, the "logical development" from the Second World War, what he calls "a break with the past" when "the civilian became a legitimate target" through strategic bombing and the use of atomic weapons.⁵ Nor is it, as Weigley has suggested, the legacy of the Civil War and the adoption of a Clausewitzian-Delbrückian unlimited-annihilationist synthesis. Rather, war against noncombatants has been a central part of American warcraft from the beginning. Starting with the first settlers' wars against the Indians, first Englishmen, then Anglo-Americans, and finally

⁴ For the American attitude -- one fraught with hostility and exasperation -- toward waging what today is termed low-intensity conflict, see Carnes Lord, "American Strategic Culture in Small Wars," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 3 (1992): 205-16. For the place of violence and terror directed against noncombatants in modern-day low-intensity conflicts, and the American perception of those methods, see Roger Beaumont, "Thinking the Unspeakable: On Cruelty in Small Wars," *ibid.*, 1 (1990): 54-73.

⁵ Stephen Ambrose, "My Lai: Atrocities in Historical Perspective," in *Americans at War* (New York: Berkley Books, 1997), 200, and Ambrose, "The Atomic Bomb and Its Consequences," in *ibid.*, 127.

Americans have built a tradition of unlimited war waged against their enemies' noncombatants. Over the course of the colonial period, Anglo-Americans found that waging irregular war was the most effective means to succeed in those unlimited wars. In time, Anglo-Americans, particularly in the wars of the middle of the eighteenth century, not only refined their tradition of unlimited-irregular war, but saw it gain acceptance and legitimization within British military culture as well. By the era of the American Revolution, unlimited-irregular war had become the Anglo-American way of war, a way of war that they then turned on one another. The 176 years between the first Indian war in Virginia and the end of the Revolutionary War created the seedbed from which Sherman's March to the Sea, as well as the My Lai Massacre, grew. Indeed, when we consider the future of American warcraft, we would be wise to recognize the unlimited and irregular ways in which Americans always have, and perhaps always will, let slip the dogs of war.

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